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Summary
This thesis commences with a review, evaluation and critique of 
selected theories of power from the literature of sociology and 
political science. The partial nature of most of these theories and 
the various confusions and contradictions that surround them are 
described and the central themes extracted. These themes would have 
to be incorporated, explained and resolved by any alternative model 
of power. The major theories of power in the organisational theory 
and industrial relations are then reviewed. Attention is drawn to the 
lacuna surrounding power within the industrial relations tradition.
The various theories are then located in terms of their epistemological 
and methodological assumptions and their functionalist origins revealed. 
It is argued that any new model of power should focus upon alternative 
paradigms in order to relate the concepts of action and structure.
Power is seen as a concept which is inherently related to the processes 
of social life. The theories of social action and social structure are 
then reconciled by the concept of 'levels of social life' and by the 
'theory of structuration'. An alternative theoretical model is then 
developed in order to explain the operation of power in the workplace.
Data gathered from a research study in an engineering company is then 
presented. The research methodology which included tape-recording and 
direct observation is then described and evaluated. The data is 
structured in an attempt to describe, illustrate, illuminate and analyse 
the operation and processes of power within the workplace studied. An 
attempt is then made to integrate the understandings of power derived 
from field research and theoretical study respectively.
Contents Page No
Prologue 1 - 8
Chapter 1 The general social and political theories 
of power
1.1 A review of the literature on power 10
1.2 Weber’s concept of power 10
1.3 The community power debate 20
1.4 Dahl on power 30
1.5 Exchange theories of power 38
1.6 The two dimensional view 48
1.7 The three dimensional view 55
1.8 A typology of power 66
1.9 An alternative typology 74
1.10 A structural view of power 78
1.11 An evaluation of the literature 87
Chapter 2 Power in the organisational and industrial 
relations literature
2.0 Power in the organisational and industrial
relations literature 98
2.1 The early organisational literature 99
2.2 The strategic contingencies theory 104
2.3 Power in current american organisational
theory 111
2.4 Organisations as bargaining and influence
systems 124
2.5 The development of industrial relations
theory 127
Chapter 2 Continued Page No,
2.6 Systems models of industrial relations 131
2.7 The action theory model 143
2.8 The unitarist and pluralist frames of
reference 149
2.9 The Marxist or radical theory 154
2.10 Power in industrial relations research 162
2.11 An evaluation of the use of power in the
organisational and industrial relations 
literature 177
Chapter 3 The epistemology and ideology of power
3.1 The philosophical arena 186
3.2 Locating the theories of power 196
3.3 Where do we go from here? 208
Chapter 4 A model of power
4.1 Action and structure in social theory 212
4.2 Levels in social analysis 217
4.3 Reconceptualising power 225
4.4 Hegemony and ideological domination 234
4.5 Hegemony and domination in organisational life 245
4.6 A new approach to the concept of power 258
Chapter 5 Bestobell Mobrey Limited; Background and 
Methodology
5.1 Bestobell Mobrey Limited 273
5.2 Research methodology 285
Appendices Continued Page No
Appendix C Works Committee: Rules and procedures 418
Appendix D The shiftworker representative issue:
Agenda meeting 9.3.1979 423
Appendix E The 1979 Wage Review 432
Appendix F Extended leave of absence policy 446
Bibliography 447
Figures Page No,
1.1 Method, model and discipline in the community
power debate 28
1.2 Blau’s theory of ’power-dependence* relations 43
1.3 The typology of Lukes 58
1.4 A comparison of the one, two and three
dimensional views of power 59
1.5 A typology of social power - Hamilton (1977) 73
1.6 A typology of power - Wrong (1979) 75
1.7 A comparison of the typologies of Hamilton 77
and Wrong
1.8 A model of power relations - Martin (1977) 83
2.1 Types of compliance relationships 102
2.2 The strategic contingencies model 108
2.3 Overview of four organisational decision
making models 115
2.4 A model of the conditions producing the use 
of power and politics in organisational
decision making 120
2.5 A framework for analysing industrial systems
- Craig (1973) 135
2.6 The contract zone under bilateral monopsony 144
2.7 Hick theory of wages 146
2.8 The unitary and pluralist views of interests,
conflict and power. 152
2.9 The radical and marxist views of interests,
conflict and power 161
2.10 A comparison of the models of Marchington
and Poole 171
Figures Continued Page No,
3.1 A scheme for analysing assumptions about the
nature of social science: The subjective - 
objective dimension 188
3.2 Four paradigms for the analysis of social
theory 195
3.3 The general theories of power 201
3.4 Organisational theories of power 205
3.5 Industrial relations theories 207
4.1 Giddens’ model of the 'duality of structure' 218
4.2 The structure of power in organisations 223
4.3 Giddens' view of power 228
4.4 The four elements of social life 230
4.5 Clegg's view of power 234
4.6 The realms of hegemony and domination 239
4.7 An alternative model of power ^G1
5.1 Bestobell Limited 1978 276
5.2 Bestobell Mobrey organisation chart 1978 278
5.3 Production Department organisation plan 281
5.4 Manual worker grade structure and payments
(21.9.1979) 283
7.1 An alternative model of power 382
A.l Disruption factor 398
A.2 Replaceability factor 399
Prologue
.. nothing more can be attempted than to establish the beginning and 
direction of an infinitely long road. The pretension of any systematic 
and definitive completeness would be, at least, a self-illusion. 
Perfection can here be obtained by the individual student only in the 
subjective sense that he communicates everything he has been able to 
see". (Georg Simmel)
The research project can never be neatly divorced from its context.
It, on the one hand, forms part of, or takes issue with, a tradition 
of intellectual theorising. On the other hand, it represents the 
position reached by the author at a particular point and as such is 
the product of the authors background and experiences. In this thesis 
a fairly explicit debate takes place with the various traditions of 
power theorising. Therefore this prologue will focus upon the 
intellectual history of the author and the development of the ideas 
contained in the thesis.
Others have used the notion of a 'journey' as a metaphor for the 
research process. Journeys do not just begin; they have a gestation 
period. A journey is initiated by a need, a want or a desire for 
knowledge. So it was with my research journey. The journey begins 
with the transition from school to work. For many young people this 
first step represents a radical change and requires a period of re­
adjustment. It is perhaps fair to say that I was profoundly affected 
by this first step. Coming from a lower middle class background and a 
sheltered Grammar school environment I proceeded to a 'management 
traineeship' at a carton printing firm which involved extensive shop 
floor experience. Here was a completely new world which I found 
rather strange. Partly as a result
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of this 'culture shock' and partly because of intellectual curiosity 
I began to question members of the organisation. My questions were 
not concerned with the technicalities of managerial science but, 
instead, were related to the concepts, which I only 'labelled' much 
later, of alienation, conflict, hierarchy, control and power. In my 
naive manner I was questioning some of the 'taken for granted' assump­
tions of industrial organisations and the answers given largely failed 
to satisfy my curiosity. I was beginning to form, in a vague manner, 
a variant of the Hobbesian question of how social order is possible.
Thus I was concerned with how industrial order was possible. A series 
of broad questions began to develop. Why did the system work? Why 
did people accept their position within the system? What was the 
'glue' that holds the system together? How was control exercised in 
organisations?
For a variety of reasons, not the least of which was the desire to 
find answers to my questions, I turned to academic study. First a 
degree in business studies specialising in manpower management and 
then, after a further period in the printing industry, a Masters degree 
in industrial relations. Upon completion of the latter I obtained a 
post as a research officer and began to contemplate doctoral research.
At this stage I began to realise that, despite my education, I had not 
yet fully explained the questions which had earlier troubled me. I was 
also worried at the tendency in much of the industrial relations 
literature to focus upon large plants, conflict, strike activity and 
militancy which I considered, in many instances, to be atypical. With 
these thoughts in mind I originally submitted a draft proposal to do 
research on workgroup activity. I had become particularly interested in 
workgroups that appeared to possess a high degree of power (perhaps due 
to their position in the work process) and yet failed to exercise that
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power in situations where it would be to their advantage. However early 
reading in the subject led me increasingly to concepts such as power 
and domination. Thus gradually the topic of my research became power 
and its operation in workplace industrial relations.
After my registration I began to research and review the literature on 
power and associated concepts. It soon became clear to me that power 
constituted a major lacuna in the industrial relations literature 
despite its centrality to the notion of an industrial relations system 
and its usage in bargaining theory. I therefore embarked upon a 
review of the literature in the field of organisational theory as well 
as the more general areas of sociology and political science. I was 
at this stage searching for a conceptual framework which would help 
me to understand the utilisation and operation of power at the level 
of the workplace. Instead of a single framework I was confronted by a 
plethora of different views of power which were both incomplete and, 
at times contradictory. The benefit of the exercise was that I was 
able to identify some crucial themes and problems which an alternative 
and integrated model of power should be able to encompass and resolve.
By this stage of the research project, time and my supervisor were 
both pressing me to commence fieldwork. My initial reticence to enter 
the 'field' without a framework disappeared when I started to realise 
that any alternative model of power could only emerge from insights 
generated during field research. Therefore I entered a research site, 
of which more details will be given later, and began to examine the 
processes of power as they occurred within one particular forum in the 
workplace setting.
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Gradually I developed an outline model of power derived from 
observation and discussion in the field and from further reading in 
the literature. I initially conceived of power as having two distinct 
and separate components. The first referred to the possession, 
exercise and sources of power while the second referred to the reactions 
of those over whom power was exercised. I loosely termed these 
concepts 'power* and 'consciousness' respectively. They appeared to 
parallel Etzioni's (1961) notion of 'compliance' which refers both to 
the power employed by superiors and to the subsequent orientation of 
the subordinates to that power. I also realised that power could be 
considered both as a concept of 'action' and as a concept of 
'structure'. Similarly the duality of social structure and social 
action could be applied to my notion of 'consciousness' or 'worker 
orientation'. However I soon saw that, given the constraints of a 
part-time doctoral research programme, it would be impossible to 
consider both power and aspects of consciousness. I therefore decided 
to focus upon the concept of power.
The production of a theoretical idea can be a complex and tortuous 
process. The model that I advance later in this thesis is the result 
of an often confusing interaction between data and theory. Thus on 
many occasions,incidents, actions or interviews in the field led to 
the development of vague notions or concepts which were noted, but 
often lay dormant until, at a later date, further reading refined them 
or put them into perspective. Similarly theoretical concepts derived 
from the literature were often abandoned or shelved only to be revived 
in the light of new data from the case study. Thus, for example, 
throughout the research I had adopted a notion of power operating on 
different levels but it was not until towards the end of the field 
research that a reading of Giddens (1978, 1979) enabled me to develop
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the idea into a coherent model. Again the key concepts of rhetoric, 
legitimising arguments and ideology were not finally formulated in a 
systematic manner until after the fieldwork had been completed.
The theoretical model developed in this thesis must, therefore, be 
seen as the product of a complex process of interconnections between 
the insights suggested by data and the concepts derived from the 
literature. The theoretical model was developed neither before nor 
after the field research process but emerged during and as an integral 
part of it. It is a matter for some regret that the sequential nature 
of the thesis mitigates against capturing the essential interaction 
between literature and data. For reasons of clarity I have decided 
to discuss the theoretical side first and the data at a later stage.
The purpose of the theoretical model advanced in this work is twofold. 
Firstly it is necessary in order to help remedy the existing lacuna 
concerning power in the industrial relations literature. It also 
serves to integrate some of the partial and diverse theories of 
power derived in other disciplines. In these senses the model is an 
end in itself. However the second purpose of the model is to enable 
the researcher to make sense of the operation of power within the work­
place. It provides the conceptual tools to facilitate an understanding 
of the complex processes of power. In this sense the model is a means 
to an end.
I would like to return to the journey metaphor at this stage. During 
the course of a journey one is presented with a variety of routes, some 
of which turn out to be 'dead-ends' which take up precious time but 
lead nowhere. One is also confronted with a series of 'by-ways', which 
appear to be interesting but only serve to deviate the traveller from 
his original route. Both of these phenomena also occur in the research
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process. Whilst taking the reader along these roads would serve the 
purpose of accurately depicting the research process, it would unduly 
distract from the argument that I hope to develop. Therefore this is 
an abbreviated version of the 'journey' which enjoys the benefit of 
the clarity that accompanies hindsight.
It is very difficult to reach an ending in the research journey, as 
the quote from Simmel at the beginning of this prologue suggests.
The end of the research project is, in a sense, an artificial device 
forced upon the author by the constraints of time limits, resources 
and deadlines. The end is simply a statement of how far the author 
has travelled along a particular path. I hope, both in terms of the 
theoretical framework and the analysis of the operation of power, that 
this thesis had made advances upon the existing state of accepted 
knowledge in the industrial relations arena. Nevertheless there remains 
much more work to be done into the concept of power. Thus every
ending is in fact another beginning.
The argument presented within this thesis proceeds as follows.
Chapter One contains a review, evaluation and critique of selected 
theories of power from the literature of sociology and political science. 
It seeks to demonstrate the partial nature of most of these theories 
and the various confusions and contradictions that surround them. An
attempt is made to extract the central themes and dichotomies from the
literature. These themes and dichotomies would have to be incorporated 
explained and resolved by an alternative model of power.
Chapter Two consists of a review of the major theories of power and 
their utilisation in the organisational and industrial relations
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literature. It seeks to identify the links between the more general 
socio-political literature and the theories of power contained in 
the organisational and industrial relations literature. An attempt 
is made to draw attention to the lacuna surrounding power within the 
industrial relations tradition. Finally Chapters One and Two 
together serve to identify theories of power which have interesting 
components but are incomplete.
Chapter Three attempts to locate the theories described in terms of 
their epistemological and methodological assumptions and in doing this 
seeks to trace and demonstrate their functionalist origins. It is 
suggested that any new model of power should focus upon alternative 
paradigms in order to link the notions of action and structure.
Chapter Four seeks to argue that power is a concept which is inherently 
related to the processes of social life. An attempt is made to show 
how the theories of social action and social structure can be reconciled 
by the concept of 'levels of social life' and by the 'theory of 
structuration'. Finally the Chapter develops an alternative theoretical 
model in order to explain the operation of power in the workplace.
Chapter Five introduces the research site and describes the organisation 
in some detail. There is also a discussion of the research methodology 
used in the course of the study. Chapter Six contains the empirical 
data gathered during the research study. The material is structured 
in an attempt to describe, illustrate, illuminate and analyse the
— 7 -
the operation and processes of power within one particular workplace
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Chapter 1
The general social and political 
theories of power
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1.1 A review of the literature on power
The literature on power is extremely diverse and is located within 
many academic disciplines. Obviously it forms a central core of the 
literature in both political science and sociology. Thus the purpose 
of this Chapter is to present a critical review of the power literature 
contained within these two disciplines. In the next chapter a similar 
review will be presented of the power literature within the disciplines 
of economics, organisational theory and industrial relations. Given 
the voluminous academic literature and the multiplicity of common 
senses uses, it is impossible to present a complete review. Thus I 
have attempted to select those views of power which are central or 
seminal to a tradition of power theorising or offer a unique 
insight. Therefore an attempt has been made to commence with one of 
the most influential definitions of power and from that platform to 
trace the subsequent debates and developments in power theorising. 
Finally this chapter seeks to answer the following question. If one 
knew nothing at all about power (perhaps having arrived from another 
planet!), what impression and understanding of the concept would be 
gained from a reading of the academic literature? Thus this chapter 
hopes to extract the central themes from the various traditions of 
power theorising.
1.2 Weber * s concept of power
It is always difficult to judge where to commence when attempting to 
chart the historical development of a concept or idea. However most 
modern writers on power, explicitly or implicitly, appear to take as a 
starting point the work of the German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920). 
Thus Weber is tacitly acknowledged as the originator of a tradition of 
power theorising.
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This choice is interesting but perhaps slightly incongruous due to 
the confusion which surrounds his work in this area.
Firstly, Weber only briefly mentions the concept of power in his 
work, although he devotes a great deal of attention to closely 
related concepts and ideas such as the nature, bases and forms of 
authority. In his major theoretical work in sociology 'Wirtschaft 
und Gesellschaft' (1952)*, Weber only mentions power twice. In Part 1 
he gives definitions of power and other associated concepts in a 
section on the basic concepts in sociology, while in Part 2 he makes 
a subsidiary reference to power. Secondly, Weber’s definitions have 
been rendered differently by the various translators of his work. As 
MacRae (1974) points out, this is probably partially due to the 
obscure stylistic nature of Weber's prose as well as to deficiencies 
in his translators. However, whatever the cause, the result is that 
much of the early theoretical work on power is flawed by the con­
ceptual confusion surrounding the term.
In Part 1, Section 16 of 'Wirtschaft Und Gesellschaft', Weber intro­
duces three related terms. These are 'Macht', 'Herrschaft', and 
'Legitime Herrschaft'. While the term 'Macht' has almost invariably 
been translated by commentators as 'power', the translations of the 
definition of 'Macht' have differed widely.
* First totally translated into English as "Economy and Society: An 
outline of interpretive sociology" - edited by G. Roth and C. 
Wittich N.Y. Bedminster Press (1968).
— 11 —
In the original English translation Parsons and Henderson translate 
'power' as:
"The probability that one actor within a social relationship will be 
in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, 
regardless of the basis on which this probability rests".
(Weber 1947: 139)
Referring to Weber's alternative reference in Part 2 of 'Wirtschaft 
Und Gesellschaft', Gerth and Mills offer the following translation:
"In general, we understand by power the chance of a man or of a 
number of men to realise their own will in a communal action even 
against the resistance of others who are participating in the action" 
(Weber 1958: 180)
These then, are the original translations of both Weber's references 
to power.
From these original definitions a whole series of commentators have 
produced definitions purporting to be derived from Weber. Some 
originate in the Parsons and Henderson definition (1947), others 
follow the Gerth and Mills definition (1948), while others appear to 
be a synthesis of both. The following are some typical examples:
T. Parsons (1968: 656): "The probability within a social 
relationship of being able to secure one's own ends even against 
opposition".
- H.P. Secher (1962: 117): "By power is meant that opportunity 
existing within a social relationship which permits one to 
carry out one's own will even against resistance and regardless 
of the basis on which this opportunity rests".
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R. Bendix (1962: 290): "The possibility of imposing one's own 
will upon the behaviour of other persons".
P. Blau (1963): "The ability of a person to impose his will upon
others despite resistance".
R. Aron (1964: 101): "The chance of obtaining the obedience of 
others to a particular command".
J. Freund (1969: 221): "The probability that one actor within a 
social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own 
will despite resistance".
G. Roth and C. Wittich (Weber 1968: 926): "In general we under­
stand by "power", the chance of a man or a number of men to 
realise their own will in a social action even against the 
resistance of others who are participating in the action".
It can be seen from these definitions that some crucial differences 
in translation and interpretation exist. Some definitions presume 
the existence of conflict by use of the phrase "despite resistance" 
(Weber 1947, Blau 1963, Freud 1969) while others introduce the phrase 
"even against resistance (opposition)" which suggests that conflict is 
not a necessary condition (Weber 1948), Parsons 1968, Secher 1962,
Weber 1968). Parsons and Henderson in their translation (Weber 1968) 
use the term "probability" whereas the Gerth and Mills translation 
(Weber 1968) uses "chance". Other commentators have rendered different 
translations of this term. Secher (1962) employs "opportunity",
Bendix (1962) prefers "possibility" while Blau (1963) offers "ability".
A number of definitions drastically change the meaning of Weber's 
original by omitting his final clause: "regardless of the basis on which 
this probabiliy rests". (Weber 1947).
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Finally most definitions employ the phrase "social relationship" to 
indicate the social nature of the concept and its reciprocity but 
in the Gerth and Mills (1948) translation the term "communal action" 
is used, which has a completely different meaning.
Thus it may be argued that these are two basic problems with Weber's 
writing on power. Firstly he used two distinct, essentially different 
and partially contradictory views of power. These views were 
assimilated into the sociological literature in a piecemeal, confused 
and unrelated way. This has led to a plethora of definitions purpor­
ting to be derived from Weber. The second problem concerns the 
differences in the translation of Weber definitions. As Banton (1972) 
has remarked:
"A sociologist's approach to such questions has to begin with Max
Weber’s analysis  It must start from what Weber wrote and not
from Talcott Parsons's solution to the difficult problems of 
rendering the texts into English". (1972: 86)
In an attempt to resolve the translation problem, Walliman, Tatsis 
and Zito (1977) have attempted a definitive contextual (as well as 
literal) re-translation of Weber's major definition of power. They 
offer the following:
"Within a social relationship POWER means chance, (no matter whereon 
this chance is based) to carry through one's (individual or 
collective) own will (EVEN against resistance). (1977: 234)
The authors are forced to admit that this formulation is stylistically 
inelegant, but argue that it comes closest to Weber's original German 
meaning. It could, however, be suggested that such a re-translation 
presents as many problems as it solves and that the real objective
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is to gain the 'essence* of Weber's concept and not a totally 
accurate translation.
Despite the conceptual problems outlined above, it is still possible 
to extract the major strands of Weber's notion of power. Firstly, 
power is the property of an actor. However, Weber also presumes that 
for power to be utilised a social relationship must exist between two 
actors or groups of actors. Thus defined, power is open to many 
different interpretations. If power is seen as the property of an 
individual actor, then it follows that power can be equated with 
potential to affect the behaviour of another. Thus power can be 
regarded as 'capacity'. However, the concept of power as embodied 
in a social relationship negates the notion of power as capacity. 
According to this view, power only exists when it is 'exercised' or 
'realised' in a social relationship between two or more actors. Thus, 
if actor A is said to possess power over actor B, it must be possible 
to establish a relationship between them. This is largely unproblem- 
actic at the micro or individual level but raises problems of inter­
pretation at the macro or collective level. Can an elite group be 
said to possess power if there are only tenuous links with those over 
whom they are said to exercise power? This problem, which surfaces in 
the work of Weber, pervades much of the later debate surrounding the 
nature of power.
Secondly, for Weber, power is related to the achievement of an actor's 
objectives or goals. This is a facet that most power theorists agree 
upon, although there is debate concerning whether the objectives are 
achieved by purposive action on the one hand or by 'non-action' or non­
decision on the other hand.
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Some theorists maintain that the former alone should count as an 
instance of power.
Thirdly, Weber argues that while conflict may exist between the 
actors in the social relationship, the existence of such conflict 
is not a necessary condition for power. Subsequent writers have 
often misread Weber and argued that conflict is an essential 
ingredient of power. Finally, Weber does not specify whether 
power stems from either the resources controlled by an actor or from 
the reactions and motives for compliance exhibited by the other actor. 
He thus draws no distinction between power bases and motive bases.
Thus his original definition specifies "regardless of the basis on 
which this probability rests" (1947: 139). Many subsequent theories 
have unfortunately focused upon either power bases (French and Raven 
1959) or motive bases (Hamilton 1976) in isolation.
However, despite being able to delineate the main strands of Weber's 
notion of power it is important to remember that power (Macht) is only 
one of the terms used by Weber to describe certain properties of social 
relationships and social action. Thus, to understand Weber's concep­
tion of power in its widest sense, one has to examine his use of the 
terms 'Herrschaft' and 'Legitime Herrschaft'.
In the original Parsons and Henderson version 'Herrschaft' is 
translated as:
"the probability that a command with a given specific content will be 
obeyed by a given group of persons". (Weber 1947: 139)
Most commentators have used this definition. However, Secher utilises 
the following definition of the concept:
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"By (Herrschaft) is meant that the opportunity to have a command of 
a given specific content obeyed by a given group of persons".
(1962: 117)
While the definition of 'Herrschaft' is reasonably clear, there exists 
a great deal of confusion over the actual translation of the term 
itself and the associated concept of 'Legitime Herrschaft'. In the 
original translation Parsons and Henderson (Weber 1947) translate 
'Herrschaft' as 'Imperative Control' and 'Legitime Herrschaft' as 
'Authority'. Thus they translate the trilogy of Weber's terms as 
power, imperative control and authority. However, other commentators 
and translators have produced alternatives. In the Roth and Wittich 
version (Weber 1968) the three concepts are translated as 'power', 
'domination' and 'authority' respectively. Another commentator 
d'Entrenes (1967) prefers the trilogy 'might', 'power' and 'authority'.
The central point to note is that Weber's three central concepts are 
logically related. 'Herrschaft' is a sub-set of 'Macht', while 
'Legitime Herrschaft' is a sub-set of 'Herrschaft'. All three terms 
are related to forms and modes of 'compliance'. With 'Macht' there can 
be voluntary compliance or no voluntary compliance. This is inferred 
from Weber's use of the phrase "even despite resistance" which suggests 
that 'Macht' can exist whether conflict is present or not. However, 
in the case of 'Herrschaft', a minimum of voluntary compliance is 
assumed. Weber then proceeds to delineate a more specific form of 
'Herrschaft' based on the assumption of legitimacy. Later in his work 
he outlines the bases upon which such legitimacy rests.
- 17 -
In order to fully understand Weber’s concept of power and its 
associated concepts, one has to consider the context in which he 
developed his ideas. As Clegg (1975) notes:
"His definitions of Macht and Herrschaft are introduced among ’the 
fundamental concepts of sociology*. As such they are constituted 
within a particular mode of sociology, that of an 'interpretive 
sociology'. They occur after a discussion of social relationships, 
which is prefaced by a discussion of social action. Both these 
concepts are implicit in the definition he gives to Macht and 
Herrschaft". (1975: 57)
What, then, are the specific features of Weber's interpretive 
sociology? Weber defined it as a "science concerning itself with 
the interpretive understanding of social action in order to arrive at a 
causal explanation of its course and consequences". (1968: 4). By 
causal explanation Weber meant that it should be possible to determine 
the probability that a given observable event will be followed or 
accompanied by another event. Thus, this notion of 'probability' was 
applied to the definition of a social relationship. As Weber argued:
"Every social relationship thus consists entirely and exclusively in 
the existence of a probability that these will be a meaningful course 
of action - irrespective for the time being of the basis of this 
probability" (1968: 27). Thus, Macht and Herrschaft are defined in a 
similar way.
As Clegg has argued, if one wishes to fully understand Weber's notion 
of power, one has to take note of two further points. Firstly, Clegg 
argues that much of the confusion that surrounds Weber's use of 
Herrschaft disappears if it is translated as 'rule' rather than 'authority'
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Secondly, Weber also argues that action in a social relationship is 
'oriented towards an 'order'. This order is contained in a 
'structure of dominancy'. Thus for Weber power in organisations is 
embedded in a 'structure of dominancy'.
"Without exception every sphere of social action is profoundly 
influenced by structures of dominancy. In a great number of cases 
the emergence of a rational association from amorphous social action 
has been due to domination and the way in which it has been exercised. 
Even where this is not the case, the structure of dominancy and its 
unfolding is decisive in determining the form of social action and its 
orientation towards a 'goal'". (1968: 941)
Therefore, it can be suggested that Weber's notion of power is two- 
dimensional. The concept of Herrschaft as rule or authority views 
power as embodied in observable decision-making. The notion of a 
structure of dominancy opens the possibility for a 'hidden face' of 
power. Here power is located, not in the making of decisions,but in 
the processes whereby issues are presented from occurring by a variety 
of largely ideological means.
Perhaps the most important point about Weber is not the confusion which 
surrounds his work on power, but the fact that this confusion in some 
way typifies the problems of theorising about power and has pervaded 
the work of subsequent theorists as we shall see in the rest of this 
Chapter. Indeed as Clegg has remarked:
"That confusion exists as to the meaning in translation of 'power' 
in Weber's work is not to be taken as a need for definitive remedial 
work on Weber's texts. What makes Weber's work interesting as a 
topic is its continuing indexicality, and the various forms of
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commitment it generates through the provocation that this offers 
to readers and authors to display their theorising on it. This 
theorising in turn serves to magnify and regenerate the contra­
dictions inherent in Weber". (1975: 57)
1.3 The community power debate
The next major theoretical discussion of power emerged as a result 
of the so-called 'Community Power Debate' which arose in the 1950's. 
The debate centered upon the distribution of power in the local 
community, and, by association, in the society at large. Was power 
held by a single identifiable 'elite', or was it held plurally by 
different groups on different community issues? Although on the 
surface this appears to be an empirical debate, it in fact reflected 
a much more general debate on the nature of power. Thus, the parties 
to the community power debate can be seen to be reflecting an on-going 
debate between the two major schools in social theory; the Consensus 
theorists and the Conflict theorists. The Consensus view of power, 
also known as the 'pluralist view', is perhaps best typified by the 
work of Parsons (1957, 1963). Hiw view of power emerges during a 
critique of the notion of power held by Conflict theorists in general 
and C. Wright Mills in particular.
Conflict theorists, generally working from a quasi-marxist or radical 
perspective, argued that power in the local community or society at 
large was attributable to a small 'elite' group who sought to retain 
their power and use it to their own advantage. The most popular and 
famous example of this tradition was C. Wright Mills' "The Power Elite" 
(1956). Mills begins the book by stating that:
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"As the means of information and of power are centralised, some men 
come to occupy positions in American society from which they can 
look down upon, so to speak, and by their decisions mightily affect 
the everyday worlds of ordinary men and women". (1956: 3).
He then proceeds to describe and analyse the ruling elite. Miliband 
summarised the central theme of the book as follows:
"...in America some men have enormous power denied to everyone else; 
that these men are, increasingly, a self-perpetuating elite; that 
their power is, increasingly, unchecked and irresponsible; and that 
their decision-making, based on an increasingly 'military definition 
of reality' and a 'crackpot realism' is oriented to nafarious ends". 
(1962: 16)
At this point there are several comments that need to be made about 
Mill's analysis. Firstly, nowhere in 'The Power Elite' does he 
explicitly define what he means by power, although it is possible to 
infer his view of power from his analysis. Mills appears to consider 
that the ability to control the decision-making arena as a form of 
power. In this respect Mills is a founder of a tradition of power as 
non-decision to be later developed by Bachrach and Baratz (1962). 
Secondly, it is important to note that Mills explicitly denied that he 
was a Marxist, although he was obviously centrally within the conflict 
tradition.
Parsons argues that Mills has misconceived the notion of power because 
he treats it as a 'Zero-sum' concept. This means that power is viewed 
as a finite resource, so that to the extent that one part has power, 
all others are prevented from possessing it.
- 21 -
Thus, Parsons argues, this perspective naturally views the exercise 
of power as serving sectional interests. Parsons suggests that power 
is more accurately conceived by analogy with a non-zero sum concept; 
in other words, a situation where both (or all) parties may gain.
This stems form his concept of power as being 'generated' by the 
social system in a similar way as wealth is generated in productive 
organisation in the economy. By this analogy with money. Parsons 
wishes to make two important points. Firstly, power can be 'shared' 
among several parties; each party or actor possessing a different 
amount of power. Secondly, power is not a finite thing; the amount 
of power generated can change in relation to the structure and 
organisation of the society.
In one of his later works. Parsons defines power as:
"Generalised capacity to serve the performance of binding obligations 
by units in a system of collective organisation where the obligations 
are legitimised with references to their bearing on collective goals", 
(1963: 237)
This is a typical piece of convoluted Parsonian prose. Giddens 
explains Parsons' position much more clearly as follows:
"Just as money has 'value' because of common 'agreement' to use it 
as a standardised mode of exchange, so power becomes a facility for 
the achievement of collective goals through the 'agreement' of the 
members of a society to legitimise leadership positions and to give 
those in such positions a mandate to develop policies and implement 
decisions in the furtherance of the goals of the system. Parsons 
emphasises that this conception of power is at variance with the more
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usual 'Zero-sum' notion which has dominated thinking in this field". 
(1968: 259)
Thus for Parsons, power is centrally related to authority, in that 
authority becomes the institutionalised legitimation that underlies 
power.
In fact, the concepts of authority and legitimation are so central 
for Parsons that he cannot accept the notion of 'illegitimate' power.
As Parsons puts it:
"..the threat of coercive measures, or of compulsion, without 
legitimation or justification, should not properly be called the 
use of power at all, but is the limiting case where power, losing 
its symbolic character, merges into an intrinsic instrumentality of 
securing compliance with wishes, rather than obligations". (1963: 250)
As we shall see later, this is rather a narrow and limited notion of 
power.
Parsons' critique of the 'Zero-sum' view of power contains a number of 
useful insights into the nature of power. Firstly, he is undoubtedly 
correct to argue that power is not synonymous with its utilisation.
Thus a group may be powerful and yet rarely have to use their force.
Or to put it the other way around, the continued need to exercise power 
may point to the existence of a weak basis for power. It is important 
to note that on this issue Parsons differs from the other major 
theorist in the consensus/pluralist camp; Dahl (1957/1961) working in 
a behaviourist model argues that power can only exist if it can be 
observed and measured. Secondly, Parsons demonstrates that a group can 
wield power while having few coercive sanctions available to rein-
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force their rule. This is possible if the group holding power has 
their position legitimised by those subject to their power. As 
Giddens describes it:
"In such circumstances, the party in power depends, not on the 
possession of coercive sanctions with this it can override non- 
compliance , but sheerly upon the recognition by the subordinate 
party or parties of its legitimate right to take authoritative 
decisions. The latter in some sense acquiesce in their subor­
dination". (1968: 262)
However Parsons does not seem to consider that this legitimation or 
consensus may be 'created' by the ruling group and not freely given 
by the subjects.
Despite his valuable insights, it must be stated that Parsons' view 
of power is fatally flawed. As Giddens has brilliantly argued:
"...What slips away from sight almost completely in the Parsonian 
analysis is the very fact that power, even as Parsons defines it, 
is always exercised over someone. By treating power as necessarily 
(by definition) legitimate, and thus starting from the assumption of 
consensus of some kind between power-holders and those subordinate 
to them. Parsons virtually ignores, quite consciously and deliberately, 
the necessarily hierarchical character of power, and the division of 
interest which are frequently consequent upon it". (1968: 264)
Thus the Parsonian definition of power is incapable of dealing with 
conflict. Parsons ignores clashes of interest and the fact that 
power can be exercised 'over' someone. He escapes dealing with these 
issues, which are difficult for him, by defining power as being related
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to authority and legitimation. Yet his analysis ignores the fact that 
authoritative decisions can serve sectional interests and that most 
conflicts in society are in fact struggles for power.
As has already been noted, the two competing schools of social theory, 
the Consensus and the Conflict, meet not only at a macro, theoretical 
level but also at the more micro level of the ’Community Power Debate’. 
Here the consensus school is represented largely by political 
scientists who adopted a ’pluralist' view of power. Thus for them, 
power is widely distributed in the local community between a plurality 
of interest groups. The conflict school is largely represented by 
sociologists who adopted an 'elitist' view of power. Thus for them 
power is held by an 'elite' group in the local community.
Perhaps the best way in which to illustrate the debate is to briefly 
consider two of the seminal works in their respective fields. The 
major empirical work on the 'Elitist' side was the study of Regional 
City by Floyd Hunter (1953). Hunter's methodology consisted of 
selecting a list of leaders from various sources including documents 
and interviews. This list was then narrowed down after discussions 
with prominent city leaders until a list of 'key' leaders emerged.
These leaders were then interviewed and questioned concerning the 
influence and power of the other people on the list. This form of 
analysis became known as the 'Reputational' approach and came to 
characterise the approach of sociologists to the study of community 
power. From his data Hunter was able to identify a 'ruling elite' in 
Regional City.
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Dahl (1961) chose the town of New Haven, Connetlcut for his classic 
'pluralist' study. He used a different method to ascertain the 
distribution of power in the local community. The central thrust 
of Dahl's method was:
"To examine a set of 'decisions' in different 'issue-areas' in order 
to determine what kinds of persons were the most influential 
according to one operational measure of relative influence, and to 
determine patterns of influence". (1961: 331)
Subsidiary to this was the need to:
"...survey random samples of participants in different issue areas in 
order to determine their characteristics". (1961: 331)
Thus Dahl uses what is known as the 'Decision-Making' methodology and 
focuses upon observable behaviour on different key issues in order to 
assess power. This methodology characterises the approach of political 
scientists to the study of power in the local community. Dahl's 
results are totally different from those of Hunter. Dahl finds in 
New Haven the existence of a political
"system dominated by many different sets of leaders, each having 
access to a different combination of political resources. It was, 
in short, a pluralist system". (1961: 86)
Thus, these two studies, by authors from different disciplines, using 
different methodologies and different background notions of power, 
arrived at different conclusions as to the distribution of power in 
the local community. However, these are not the only studies on each 
side of the debate. Other studies which support the 'conflict' or 
'elitist' model include the Middletown studies (Lynd and Lynd 1929,
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1937); the Yankee City Studies (Warner and Lunt 1941/1942, Warner 
and Srole 1945, Warner and Low 1947, Warner 1959); Baltzell's 
'Philadelphia Gentleman' (Baltzell 1958); and the study of Pacific 
City (Miller 1958). Other studies which support the 'pluralist' 
thesis include Polsby (1963) and Wolfinger (1974).
The community power debate can be subjected to two major criticisms. 
Firstly, it may be argued that the results of the researchers are 
dependent upon their theoretical model of power. Thus Polsby (1963) 
suggests that what
"...social scientists presume to be the case will in great measure 
influence the design and even the outcome of their research".
(1963: 6)
In particular, he argues that the theoretical model of power assumed 
by the conflict/elitist researchers leads them to 'discover* ruling 
elites, despite the evidence. Thus, he suggests that their research 
is a self-fulfilling prophecy. However, unfortunately for Polsby, 
exactly the same critique can be applied to pluraliste, their 
theoretical assumption of power diffusion leading to the 'discovery' 
of a plurality of interests at the local level.
Secondly, it may be argued that the use of different methodologies by 
both sides has led to confusion and the obtaining of different results. 
Walton (1966) after examining 33 different studies into community power, 
has demonstrated that the use of the 'reputational' method tends to be 
associated with the identification of a power 'elite', while the use of 
the 'decision-making' method tends to lead to the discovery of a plura­
list distribution of power in an amorphous or factional manner.
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Walton has also shown that the 'reputational* method is largely 
used by sociologists, while the 'decision-making' method is 
favoured by political scientists. Thus, it may be suggested that 
the Community Power Debate is 'method-bound'.
However, in order to characterise the debate, it is possible to go 
further. It may be argued that the discovery of a particular 
methodology is not solely related to academic discipline, but is 
also related to theoretical perspective or adherence to one of the 
major social theories. Thus, it may be argued that in the Community 
Power Debate, discipline affects theoretical perspective which 
determines choice of method, which tends to determine results. This 
can be illustrated by Figure 1.
SOCIOLOGISTS-^ CONFLICT/ELITIST-^REPUTATIONAL— *■ POWER ELITE
MODEL METHOD
POLITICAL SCIENTISTS— » CONSENSUS/PLURAL I ST— > DECISION-MAKING— > PLURAL
MODEL MODEL DISTRIBUTION
OF POWER
Figure 1.1 Method, model and discipline in the community power debate
Thus, ranged on one side of the debate are researchers, mostly 
sociologists by discipline, who adopt a conflict model of society and 
who in their empirical work utilise the reputational method. These 
parameters lead them to a particular conception of power which sees it 
as the property of a small elite group in any society. Their notion 
of power is thus a 'Zero-Sum' concept, in that, to the extent that an 
elite group possess power, then this is not available to other groups 
in the society.
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Therefore, there exists a power imbalance in our society. There is a 
tendency for these researchers to see power as synonymous with 
coercion.
On the other side of the debate are the political scientists who 
adopt a consensus model of society and who in their empirical work 
utilise the decision-making methodology. These assumptions lead them 
to a pluralist view of power. Power is diffused throughout society 
and is distributed between various interest groups. Following Parsons, 
power is seen as a 'non-Zero-sum* concept in that it can be 'generated* 
within the social system.
Thus, it can be argued that one's notion of power is determined in 
part by one's ideological and methodological premises. However, one 
can further argue that what divides the two sides is a different 
epistemology. As Clegg has said:
"We might want to argue that any such controversy may be seen instead 
to arise from the lack of agreement between political scientists and 
sociologists as to what counts as "correct procedure" for producing 
what counts as "factual knowledge" as divorced from knowledge which 
is hearsay, heresy, gossip, ideology or repute, rather than "reality"
... What we would appear to have here is ... a lack of agreement 
among power study practitioners of what power is, and how it ought 
to be studied, and how such studies ought to be interpreted".
(1976: 69)
Thus, both sides are working from different epistemological positions 
and, therefore, the inability to reconcile their views of power is not 
simply attributable to poor research, use of different methodologies
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and possession of certain ideologies, but is, at base, only explicable 
if one takes cognizance of these epistemological differences.
A few final comments on the importance of the community power debate 
are in order. Firstly, it focused attention on the need for more 
theoretical work on power and brought Dahl's view of power to the fore. 
This will be discussed in the next section. Secondly, Dahl's 1961 
study was assumed to have shown the elitist view to be incorrect, 
once and for all. In fact, it merely led to a more sophisticated 
version of the elitist theory being produced. We can now move on to 
discuss Dahl's theoretical view of power.
1.4 Dahl on power
Dahl's concept of power originates in his 1957 paper entitled "The 
Concept of Power". Dahl, although acknowledging the work of Weber, 
prefers to try a new definition based upon a common sense and 
intuitive notion of the nature of power:
"My intuitive idea of power, then, is something like this: A has 
power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that 
B would not otherwise do". (1957: 202-203)
Dahl explicitly states that he will try to avoid the equation of 
power with cause. However, he appears to deviate from this 
intention. By 1968 he is arguing that:
"The closest equivalent to the power relation is the causal relation. 
For the assertion 'C has power over R', one can substitute the 
assertion, 'C's behaviour causes R's behaviour". (1968: 410)
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Dahl proceeds to suggest that power is a social relationship between 
actors. To merely specify the actors in a power situation is, however, 
not very useful. Thus, he suggests that an attempt needs to be made 
to consider the following dimensions of power; the bases of power, the 
means of power, the amount or extent of power and the range or scope 
of power. Dahl then proceeds to specify some properties of the power 
relationship. Firstly, he argues that for power to exist there must 
be a time 'lag', however small, between the actions of the actor who is 
exercising power and the response of the actor subjected to it. 
Secondly, he suggests that there:
"... is no 'action at a distance'. Unless there is some 'connection' 
between A and a, then no power relation can be said to exist".
(1957: 204)
Finally, Dahl slightly alters his original notion of power by sugges­
ting that power seems:
"...to involve a successful attempt by A to get a to do something 
he would not otherwise do". (1957: 204)
Here Dahl seems to equate power with its application, whereas in his 
original definition power seems to refer to capacity or potential.
Dahl then proceeds to examine the central problem of power compara­
bility. How is one to measure the relative power of two different 
individuals or groups? Dahl puts forward five factors which could 
be considered when making such a comparison:
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"... (1) differences in the basis of their power, (2) differences 
in means of employing the basis, (3) differences in the scope of 
their power, i.e. in type of response evoked, (4) differences in 
the number of comparable respondants, and (5) differences in the 
change in probabilities..." (1957: 205-206)
In a paper the following year, Dahl engaged in a critique of the 
ruling elite model of power favoured by C. Wright Mills and Floyd 
Hunter. In the course of this critique, Dahl further develops his own 
theoretical notion of power. He points out that power is related to 
scope. Thus, merely because an individual or a group exerts power 
over one decision, it does not follow that they will exhibit power in 
respect of other decisions. Thus Dahl argues that:
"Neither logically or empirically does it follow that a group with 
a high degree of influence over one scope will necessarily have a 
high degree of influence over another scope within the same system.
This is a matter to be determined empirically. Any investigation 
that does not take into account the possibility that different elite 
groups have different scopes is suspect". (1958: 465)
Thus Dahl's empirical work focuses on a number of different observable 
issues and attempts to determine which actors are able to exert power 
over these issues. Secondly, partially rejecting his original 
definition of power as capacity, Dahl argues that potential power must 
not be equated with actual power. Potential power, he argues, can only 
be realised if the group concerned has a corresponding potential for 
unity. This is confusing, as Dahl has not really discounted potential 
power, but has only specified a necessary condition for its existence. 
Finally Dahl appears to reject the idea that any one group or elite 
could establish total dominance and hence some form of false consciousness,
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To summarise Dahl's theoretical view of power, one can make several 
points. Dahl appears confused as to whether power is to be equated 
with potential capacity or merely its actual employment in a specific 
situation in relation to a particular issue. Yet, in his empirical 
work, Dahl solely focuses upon the way in which power is exercised.
His method in 'Who Governs' was to:
"...determine for each decision which participants had initiated 
alternatives that were finally adopted, had vetoed alternatives 
initiated by others, or had proposed alternatives that were turned 
down. These actions were then tabulated as individual 'successes' 
or 'defeats'. The participants with the greatest proportion of 
successes out of the total number of successes were then considered 
to be the most influential". (1961: 336)
Thus, for Dahl, the stress is upon the study of concrete, observable 
behaviour. Dahl also appears to assume that for power to be exercised, 
there must be a conflict of interests between the parties. Thus it is:
"a necessary though possibly not a sufficient condition that the 
(key) issue should involve actual disagreement in preferences 
among two or more groups". (1958: 467)
Lukes (1947) has termed Dahl's approach the one-dimensional view of 
power and describes it as involving:
"... a focus on behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over 
which there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests, 
seen as express policy preferences, revealed by political partici­
pation". (1974: 15)
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Having described Dahl's notion of power, we can now move on to a 
critique of his theoretical view. Perhaps the major source of most 
critiques of Dahl is focused upon his behaviourist conception of 
power and in particular his stress on causality. Originally Dahl 
attempted to keep power and causation apart. In his 1957 paper he 
states that he will;
"...therefore quite deliberately steer clear of the possible 
identity of 'power' with 'cause', and the host of problems this 
identity might give rise to". (1957: 203)
Dahl is quite correct to identify causation as an abyss, but he seems 
unable to pull away from the edge. In 1965 Dahl suggests that power 
as one of the key concepts in political science is "strictly causal" 
(1965: 88).To put it another way, he argues in the same paper that:
"... a relationship of power, influence, control or authority is a 
causal relation among two or more human actors". (1965: 89)
Thus for Dahl, power and cause seem inextricably intertwined.
Dahl's equation of power with causation is not novel. Ball (1975, 
1976) has traced this notion of power back through Hume and Lock to 
Hobbes. Hobbes states that:
"Power and Cause are the same thing. Correspondant to cause and 
effect, are POWER and ACT; nay those and these are the same things". 
(1839: X, p.127).
Ball suggests that the model which underlies the Hobbesian view of 
causation and power is:
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"... that of matter in motion, of forces in collision, of bodies 
pushing (agents) and being pushed (‘potients’)". (1975: 215)
In other words, Hobbes' notions are based upon metaphors drawn from 
classical Galilean mechanics. Dahl in one work specifically confronts 
the historical origins of his concept of power. He admits that his:
"...way of thinking about power or influence is analogous to the 
concept of force in mechanics. In mechanics object A exerts a 
force on object B if A produces a change in the velocity of B. 
Galileo's famous law of inertia states that a body left to itself 
will move with a uniform velocity in one and the same direction.
Any change in the velocity of a body, then, indicates the presence 
of a force. And the size of the force is proportional to the size
of the change in velocity". (1963: 41 )
Thus power is viewed in the mechanical imagery of push and shove, 
contact and collision.
The adoption of this metaphor for the analysis of social power has 
several unfortunate consequences. The first, which has already been 
discussed, is that power is seen as being equated to causation. Ball 
has suggested that
"the characterisation of power as a species or subset of causal 
relations is systematically distorted and misleading in its theor­
etical exclusivity". (1976: 192)
Similar arguments against the notion of power as causation have been
voiced by Gibson (1971), Lukes (1974) and Clegg (1975, 1979).
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The second problem of the mechanistic metaphor is the assumption that 
for power to exist C's power attempt must precede, by a time-lag 
however small, the responses of R. As Dahl asserts:
"A necessary condition for the power relationship is that there exists 
a time lag, however small, from the actions of the actor who is
said to exert power to the responses of the respondent ... C can
hardly be said to have power over R unless C's power attempts 
precede R's responses". (1957: 204)
However, the fallacy in this argument is the assumption that only events
can be causes. As we shall demonstrate later, it is perfectly possible 
for non-events to be examples of power. Ball is surely correct when 
he states that:
"In stipulating that causes must be events, Dahl ... and ... others 
have narrowed unduly, and done violence to, our multifarious 
conception of causation; and if power is, as they maintain, a causal 
notion, then we might expect their conception of power to be an 
unduly narrow one". (1976: 196)
One result of Dahl's insistence that only events can be causes, is 
that the case of total power or domination where the rule is never 
challenged and therefore no power 'attempts' have to be made, cannot 
be considered as an example of power.
The third implication of the mechanistic metaphor is that it logically 
leads to a 'behavioural' view of power where the observable 'actions' 
or 'behaviour' of the powerful are related to the 're-actions' of the 
subordinated actors. As Clegg has noted, Dahl has:
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"... tried to develop a behavioural political science. His model 
of man is derived from epistemological considerations which seek 
to limit our knowledge of other men to what we can perceive and 
measure". (1975: 20)
Thus, for Dahl the notions of 'latent* or 'reserve' power do not 
exist. Something must be 'exercised' in a specific situation if it 
is to count as a case of power.
The final implication of the mechanistic metaphor utilised by Dahl 
concerns the problem of 'action at a distance'. According to Dahl's 
view of causation, the prior movement of one thing can be said to 
'cause' the change in the movement of position of another only if it 
first exhibits some 'contact' or 'connection'. As Ball puts it:
"The problem is this: If power relations are causal relations, and
if causation is understood primarily in mechanistic terms, then 
what, in political-scientific discourse, corresponds to the 
mechanists principle of 'no action at a distance'?". (1975: 219)
The answer appears to be 'communication'. Thus if there is no 
communication between the actors, then power cannot be said to exist. 
This, however, again prevents total power or domination (where there 
may be no regular communication between dominators and dominated) from 
inclusion as a form of power. This view of power also gives rise to 
other problems and leads Ball to argue that:
"... this understanding of communication as a 'causal' mechanism is 
egregously confused. For among other things, all human communi­
cations are, in this view, either successful or unsuccessful 'power 
attempts'". (1975: 220)
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It may be argued that Dahl and his fellow theorists misconceive 
power because they are trapped in a particular metaphor or model of
the world. This model has certain implications for the understanding
of causation and thus power. Yet it is unlikely that 'cause* and 
'power' are concepts with single meanings. If Dahl could look beyond 
the vistas of classical mechanics, there may be other metaphors and 
models which could further illuminate the concept of power. In the 
debate over causation in science Hanson (1969) suggests that we:
"Speculate what our ideas of cause and effect might have been had 
melting butter been our model instead of billiard balls. As it is, 
the world may seem to us to be a succession of clicks, pushes,
ticks and tocks. Had the melting of butter or wax seized our
imagination instead, the world would have appeared to us as a 
series of simmerings, drippings, meltings, and splashes..."
(1969: 282-283)
Thus different analogies could yield fresh insights into the nature 
of power.
1.5 Exchange theories of power
Immediately subsequent to the Community Power Debate and its con­
flicting views of power, there arose a third theoretical strand. This 
was the exchange view of power as developed by Emerson (1962) and 
Blau (1964). Indeed it has been argued, (Jessop 1969) that the 
assertion that there are only two major perspectives in social theory 
- the consensus and conflict models - is incorrect. He suggests that 
exchange theory can act as a point of convergence between the two 
models and enable a genuine synthesis in social theory.
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While it will be argued in this work that Jessop is mistaken in his 
belief, it is undeniably true that exchange theory has a distinctive 
character and as will be shown later, has deeply permeated the 
literature of industrial relations.
Emerson (1962) begins his work on power with an acknowledgement to 
Weber. However he sees Weber as providing a typology and not an 
organised theory of power. Emerson also takes issue with what he 
sees to be the central flow of most work on social power; that most 
theories treat power as an 'individualistic* notion. Thus power is 
attributed to individuals or groups. This leads to actors being 
'ranked' according to the amount of power that they 'hold' and the 
development of a power structure. However, Emerson wishes to argue 
that power cannot simply be possessed by an individual or group. It 
must always be power 'over' someone. Thus:
"Power is a property of the social relation; it is not an attribute 
of the actor". (1962: 32)
Dahl, while recognising that this was the case, did not take the 
analysis to its logical conclusion. According to Emerson:
"Social relations commonly entail ties of mutual dependence between 
the parties. A depends upon B if he aspires to goals or gratification 
whose achievement is facilitated by appropriate actions on B's part". 
(1962: 32)
Thus, in this situation, it is essential for each actor to be able to 
control or affect the other's behaviour. At the same time, to take the 
other side of the coin, each actor is in a position to facilitate or 
deny the other's goals and gratification. Thus:
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"... It would appear that the power to control or influence the other 
resides in control over the things he values ... In short, power 
resides implicitly in the other's dependency". (1962: 32)
Therefore, suggests Emerson, there are two main variables which need 
to be defined: dependency and power. Emerson defines these as follows
"Dependence (Dab). The dependence of actor A upon actor B is (1) 
directly proportional to A's motivational investment in goals 
mediated by B, and (2) inversely proportional to the availability of 
those goals to A outside the A-B relation ... Power (Pab). The 
power of actor A over actor B is the amount of resistance on the part 
of B which can be potentially overcome by A". (1962: 32)
At this stage, two important points can be made. Firstly, unlike 
Dahl's analysis this definition of power does not necessarily equate 
power with observable behaviour. It can also be a potential or 
capacity for power which is employed occasionally. However, Emerson 
suggests that power will only be 'empirically manifest' if A makes a 
demand of B. Thus he appears to be arguing that there are two forms 
of power, but only one is empirically testable. He also suggests that 
power is not empirically manifest unless A's demand runs counter to 
B's desires. Thus, like Dahl, Emerson appears to assume that for 
power to exist there must be a conflict of interests between the 
actors. Secondly, Emerson explicitly states that his conception of 
power is wider than that of Parsons, in that it does not restrict 
itself to 'legitimate power' but views this as one form of power 
amongst many.





These can be balanced so that the power of A over B is equal to the 
power of B over A due to their equal dependence, or unbalanced as in 
the following example:
_̂________Pab=Dba_______^
is greater than is greater than
<_________Pba=Dab_______^
In this example, equilibrium can be restored by increasing the 
dependence of A on B (Dab) or reducing the dependence of B on A (Dba). 
As the relationship is reciprocal there are four possible courses of 
action open. Firstly, B could reduce his desires or needs for the 
goals or services controlled by A. Secondly, B could obtain 
alternative sources of these goals or services. Thirdly, B could 
attempt to increase A's dependence on him by making available new 
goals or services to A. Finally, the situation would be restored to 
equilibrium if A were to be denied alternative sources of his desired 
goals or services.
The concept of exchange is developed and utilised much more widely by 
Blau (1964). He suggests that social exchange is a central factor in 
social theory. Thus he argues:
"The concept of social exchanges directs attention to the emergent 
properties in interpersonal relations and social interaction... 
Exchange is here conceived as a social process of central significance 
in social life, which is derived from simpler processes and from 
which more complex processes are in turn derived". (1964: 4)
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For social exchange to occur two conditions need to be met. Firstly, 
actors must desire goals/ends which are only attainable via inter­
action. Secondly, actors must seek to adapt means to further the 
achievement of those ends.
Blau then proceeds to apply the concept of exchange to the study of 
power. Proceeding from Weber's definition Blau argues that, broadly 
defined:
"...power refers to all kinds of influence between persons or 
groups". (1964: 115)
However, he wishes to suggest that coercive power, which depends upon 
the threat of sanctions, is analytically different from influence 
which is based upon the use of rewards. Thus he proposes the 
following definition of power:
"... It is the ability of persons or groups to impose their will on 
others, despite resistance, through deterrence either in the forms 
of withholding regularly supplied rewards or in the form of punish­
ment, inasmuch as the former as well as the latter constitute, in 
effect, a negative sanction". (1964: 117)
It can be seen that this definition draws heavily both on Weber's 
work (ability ... to impose ... will on others, despite resistance) 
and on the work of Emerson. However, Blau's definition is wider than 
Emerson's as it includes punishment as well as the situation where an 
actor controls goals or services desired by the other. Several other 
points should be noted in reference to Blau's definition. Firstly, 
following Parsons (1963) he argues that power refers to the ability of 
an individual or a group to 'recurrently' impose his/their will on
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others, not to a single such instance, however important. Secondly, 
he emphasises the voluntary nature of power. Although punishment is 
threatened, compliance may not be secured because the actor may 
decide to accept the punishment rather than comply. Thus, power in 
this definition is differentiated from 'pure* physical coercion. 
Finally, Blau suggests that power is a 'net' concept; thus actors 
powers and dependencies can be aggregated to produce a 'net' figure 
which is a measure of their power.
Blau then proceeds to develop a schema for 'power-dependence' relations 
based upon a reformulation of the work of Emerson. This is presented 
below in diagrammatic form.















































Blau starts by considering actor A who has need of a service that 
actor B has to offer. B makes certain demands of A if he is to 
furnish him with the service. If A wishes to avoid compliance 
with B's demands, then he has four possible courses of action.
Firstly, A can supply B with a service that B wants so badly that 
he will offer his service in return, abandoning his demands. Secondly, 
A could attempt to find another supplier of the service other than B. 
Thirdly, A could force B to furnish the service, provided that he 
was capable of doing so. Finally, A could perhaps do without the 
service of B or find a substitute for it. Blau then argues that this 
schema can be used to indicate the conditions of social independence, 
the requirements of power and the structural implications of these 
alternatives.
Thus, if A is to utilise one of the four possibilities to compliance 
with B's demands, then certain conditions must be fulfilled if that 
independence is to be achieved. Thus, if A hopes to supply B with an 
inducement, then he must have the available resources to do so. To put 
it more generally, the greater the amount of strategic resources an 
actor possesses, the less dependent, and therefore, the more powerful 
they are. Secondly, if A is attempting to avoid compliance by seeking 
the service elsewhere, then this assumes that there are alternative 
sources of supply to hand and that B is not a monopoly position. Blau 
points out that this condition is not as stringent as it appears. An 
employee may remain in his job because of the lack of suitable or 
equally rewarding jobs elsewhere. Thirdly, if A is to force B to 
provide the service, then this depends upon A's ability to use 
coercive force. A's ability to use force may be increased by forming 
coalitions capable of enforcing demands.
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Finally, if A is to do without B's service, it may be the case that 
an ideology or ideal is helpful to A to enable him to rationalise his 
loss.
Blau then considers the other side of the relationship. If B is to 
retain power over A, he must prevent him from choosing one of the four 
alternatives to compliance. Thus in the first case B will retain 
power if he is indifferent to what A has to offer. In the second case 
B must possess a near monopoly over the thing or service A needs. 
Thirdly B must be able to resist coercive force or take appropriate 
action (such as an employer discouraging unionisation) to prevent 
coalitions which would result in increased force. Finally, if B can 
promote values which support or enhance demand for his service, then 
A will find it harder to do without. Thus, in capitalist economies, 
great stress is placed on materialistic values to ensure continuing 
consumption growth and prevent a potentially disastrous fall in 
consumption which could destroy the system.
Finally, Blau suggests that each of the alternatives leads to the 
analysis of some basic problems in social structure:
"First, the fact that benefits can be obtained by reciprocating for 
them with others directs attention to the study of exchange processes 
and the distribution of resources. Secondly, the exploration of 
alternative opportunities points to the investigation of the emerging 
exchange structure, the competitive processes in them, the going 
rates of exchange, and the normative standards that tend to develop. 
Third, the study of coercive power raises questions concerning the 
establishment of coalitions and organisations to mobilise power.
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the differentiation of power in social structures, and the processes 
that govern the struggle over political power in a society. Fourth, 
the ability to get along without something originally needed calls 
attention to the modifications of social values that occur under 
various conditions, the formation of new ideologies, and conflicts 
between ideologies". (1964: 123-124)
It is at this point possible to evaluate the exchange theories of 
power and place them in context. It is undoubtedly true that in many 
ways these theories are an improvement over earlier ones and provide 
us with useful insights into the notion of power. For example, they 
suggest that power does not necessarily equate with observable 
behaviour; nor is power solely concerned with the arena of 'legitimate 
power'. Thus exchange theories are an improvement upon the theories 
of Dahl and Parsons respectively. The exchange theories are also 
important in that they led to the development of yet more theories.
The stress on dependency originating here, can be seen developed in the 
'Strategic Contingencies' theory to be described later. Perhaps the 
most important point in relation to this work is that forms and 
derivations of exchange theory have been much utilised in the field of 
industrial relations. They have usually taken the form of bargaining 
models between management and unions. These will be examined in 
Chapter 2.
What then do the various exchange theories contribute to our under­
standing of power? The underlying assumption is that each party to a 
potential exchange has something which the other wants and values. Each 
party wishes the other to make the greatest contribution, but neither 
wants the exchange to be discontinued.
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Thus, as we will see later, this seems to be firmly located in a 
pluralist tradition of power.
One important aspect of the exchange theories is that they see power 
as the property of a recurrent social relationship and as a 'net' 
concept where dependencies on both sides can be totalled to determine 
the relative power balance of the participants. They also assume that 
each party desires something controlled by the other and that thus a 
conflict of interests is present. It requires no great stretch of the 
imagination to see that these assumptions are present in the field of 
industrial relations and thus many of the implicit notions of power 
used in that discipline are derived from this tradition of power and 
developed as 'bargaining models' of power.
Finally, the exchange theories see power as the property of a social 
relationship between two parties. These parties can be individuals or 
collectivities. Yet it may be argued that most of the research in this 
tradition has focused either on individuals or small groups within 
organisations. Thus, most research is micro in dimension. However, if 
one re-examines Blau's schema, it will be seen that an alternative 
reading is possible using the Marxist tradition. In so far as the 
Marxist position is predicated upon the notion of an antagonistic, 
unequal exchange relationship between two classes, then this 'macro' 
view of power and dependence can be viewed in the exchange manner. Thus, 
if one assumes that a Ruling Class A controls and directs, directly or 
indirectly, a Subordinate Class B, then Class B can either comply with 
the control of Class A or attempt to avoid compliance by use of one of 
the four methods listed by Blau. In doing so, they have to be aware 
that the Ruling Class A have certain resources which they control.
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which preserves their power, and that there are certain criteria 
of independence, which the Subordinated Class B need to achieve, if 
they are to avoid compliance with the control of Class A.
There are certain criticisms of the exchange approach to power. As 
Clegg and Dunkerley have argued:
"Although exchange theories provide us with a way of seeing exchanges 
occurring, they have nothing to say about the rules governing 
exchange processes, nor how these operate, nor how they have 
developed". (1980: 450)
While the exchange theories enable us to understand the power balance 
in a situation between two parties and perhaps even help to predict 
the outcome, they do not demonstrate how the particular social (power) 
relationship arose. This power is seen as related to resources 
controlled and dependencies but no explanation is given for the current 
distribution of those resources and associated dependencies.
1.6 The two dimensional view
In 1962 Bachrach and Baratz produced their seminal paper entitled "The 
Two Faces of Power" in which they develop their argument that there 
exist two distinct faces of power. They see their work as a critique 
of both positions in the Community Power Debate : elitist and pluralist. 
They suggest that the ’elitist' sociologists in the debate see neither 
face of power, while the 'pluralist' political scientists see only one 
face. Thus, they formulate their theory of power upon a critique of 
both the elitist and pluralist positions.
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Dahl proposed that power be restricted to observable behaviour 
concerned with the making of concrete decisions, but Bachrach and 
Baratz argue that power cannot be restricted to such situations.
Power is, of course, exercised when one actor participates in the 
making of decisions that affect another. But for Bachrach and 
Baratz power:
"...is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or 
reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices 
that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration 
of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A. To the 
extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, for all 
practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues that might 
in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A's set of 
preferences". (1962: 948)
Thus Bachrach and Barataz argue that power refers also to the ability 
of a person or group, whether consciously or unconsciously, to prevent 
another from raising issues. Bachrach and Baratz approvingly quote 
Schattschneider:
"All forms of political organisation have a bias in favour of the 
exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others 
because organisation is the mobilisation of bias. Some issues are 
organised into politics while others are organised out". (1960: 71)
This introduces the important concept of 'mobilisation of bias' into 
the study of power. Bachrach and Baratz describe this concept as:
"A set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals, and institutional 
procedures ('rules of the game') that operate systematically and 
consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the
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expense of others. Those who benefit are placed in a preferred 
position to defend and promote their vested interests". (1970: 43-4)
Discussion of the 'mobilisation of bias' leads on to the concept of 
'non-decision-making'. Certain individuals or groups may participate 
more in the process of 'non-decision-making* than they do in making 
actual decisions. Surely these individuals or groups are exhibiting 
power?
Bachrach and Baratz critcise Dahl for his inability adequately to 
differentiate between a 'key' and a 'routine' political decision. It 
can be argued that one of the major failings of the empirical pluralist 
studies of community power is their arbitrary selection of issues for 
consideration. Most pluralists (e.g. Polsby 1963) recognise that there 
are both 'key' and 'routine' or 'unimportant' political decisions.
However, they are less clear on how the researcher is to recognise 
which decisions are 'key' decisions. Dahl suggests that it is:
"...A necessary, although possibly not a sufficient condition, that 
the (key) issue should involve actual disagreement in preferences 
among two or more groups". (1958: 467)
However, the simple existence of conflict fails to distinguish between 
'important' and unimportant issues. Bachrach and Baratz offer a 
solution to this problem. They suggest that:
"The distinction between important and unimportant issues, we believe, 
cannot be made intelligently in the absence of an analysis of the 
'mobilisation of bias' in the community ; of the dominant values and 
the political myths, rituals, and institutions which tend to favour 
the vested interests of one or more groups, relative to others".(1962:950)
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Thus they identify an 'important' issue as one which challenges the 
dominant values and the existing 'rules of the game', while recognising 
that this results in an increase in subjectivity of the analysis. They 
also generally criticise the pluralists for having:
"... Begun by studying the issues rather than the values and biases 
that are built into the political system and that, for the student 
of power, give real meaning to those issues which do enter the 
political arena". (1962: 950)
To summarise; Bachrach and Baratz draw attention to two central con­
cepts previously ignored by theories of power. These are the 
'mobilisation of bias' and 'non-decision-making'. Thus, they argue 
that power has two separate faces: one concerned with observable 
decision-making, and the other with the subtle processes of non­
decision-making. These are the overt and the 'covert' faces of power 
respectively.
In a later paper Bachrach and Baratz further refine their concept of 
power. They offer another definition which states:
"A power relationship exists when (a) there is a conflict over values 
or course of action between A and B; (b) B complies with A's wishes; 
and (c) he does so because he is fearful that A will deprive him of 
a value or values which he, B, regards more highly than those which 
would have been achieved by non-compliance". (1963: 635)
From this definition we can suggest that Bachrach and Baratz believe 
that for power to exist there must be conflict between the parties, 
although such conflict does not have to be overt.
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Bachrach and Baratz also construct a typology of power. Their typology 
consists of the following concepts: power, influence, authority, force 
and manipulation. However, Lukes (1974) has pointed to an inconsis­
tency in their analysis concerning their use of the term power. On one 
level in their analysis, power appears to refer to all forms of 
successful control by A over B. Yet, as part of their typology they 
use power to refer to the gaining of compliance by the threat of 
sanctions. Lukes suggests that this second use of the term could equally 
well be rendered use of the term 'coercion'. Thus, their typology of 
power would now read; coercion, influence, authority, force and 
manipulation. How do Bachrach and Baratz define these terms? Coercion 
exists where A secures B's compliance by threat of deprivation or 
sanction. Influence occurs when A causes B to change his course of 
action, without recourse to either an overt or covert threat of depri­
vation or sanction. If A has authority over B, then B complies because 
he recognises that A's command is reasonable either because its content 
is legitimate, or because it has been arrived at through a legitimate 
and correct procedure. Force occurs when A achieves his objectives by 
depriving B of the 'choice' between compliance and non-compliance. 
Finally, manipulation is seen as a sub-set of force, since in this case:
"Compliance is forthcoming in the absence of recognition on the 
complier's point either of the source or the exact nature of the 
demand upon him". (1970: 28)
Finally, Bachrach and Baratz provide definitions of the central 
concepts of decision-making and non-decision-making. The former is:
"... A choice among alternative modes of action". (1970: 39)
A non-decision is:
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"... A decision that results in suppression or thwarting of a latent 
or manifest challenge to the values or interests of the decision­
maker" . (1970: 44)
Thus non-decision making is:
"... A means by which demands for change in the existing allocation 
of benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated before 
they are even voiced; or kept covert; or killed before they gain 
access to the relevant decision-making area; or, failing all these 
things, maimed or destroyed in the decision-implementing stage of the 
policy process". (1970: 44)
Previous reviewers of the work of Bachrach and Baratz have not always 
been in total agreement as to their interpretation of the main tenets 
of their position. One can contract the ways in which Lukes (1974) 
and Ball (1976) have interpreted their work on power. Ball, quoting 
an example from Bachrach and Baratz (1962), suggests that they imply 
that power does not have to be accompanied by conflict. However, Lukes 
takes the opposite interpretation and quotes (1974: 19) a passage from 
Bachrach and Baratz which suggests that if:
"... There is no conflict, overt or covert, the presumption must be 
that there is consensus on the prevailing allocation of values, in 
which case non-decision-making is impossible". (1970: 49)
These differing views on the relationship of power and conflict in the 
work of Bachrach and Baratz can be explained if one examines the way 
in which Ball and Lukes 'read' Bachrach and Baratz in relation to 
causation. Ball argues that while:
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"Pluralists hold that only events can be causes’ non-decision 
theorists, by contrast, are willing to admit non-’events’ to causal 
status". (1976: 198)
Thus, he proceeds to suggest that certain 'non'-events such as 
'reasons' or 'beliefs' about others' actions can be causes. If this 
is correct, and Clegg (1979) insists that it is not, then power can 
exist without the presence of conflict. Lukes, on the other hand, 
seems to imply that only 'events' can be causes but that the process 
of non-decision-making is to count as an event.
These differing interpretations have led to differing attempts to 
locate Bachrach and Baratz in the tradition of power theorising.
Ball sees their work as the re-emergence of the 'stratificationist' 
or 'elitist' view and classifies their notion of power as a 'sophisti­
cated elitism'. Lukes argues that in terms of their epistemological 
and methodological position they are actually closer to the pluralists. 
Thus he suggests that:
"The central thrust of Bachrach and Baratz's critique of the plural' 
ists' one-dimensional view of power is, up to a point, anti-behaviour­
al ; ... On the other hand, they do insist ... that their so-called
non-decisions which confine the scope of decision-making are themselves 
(observable) decisions). (1974: 18)
Thus Lukes continues to see what he terms the 'two-dimensional' approach 
of Bachrach and Baratz as essentially behavioural.
Despite the above differences, both are convinced that the work of 
Bachrach and Baratz represents an improvement upon the uni-dimensional 
concept of power used by Dahl. Both Ball and Lukes also agree that
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the correct 'level* of the Community Power Debate and its continu­
ation in the dialogue between Dahl and Bachrach and Baratz, is at the 
level of 'concepts' and epistemology, rather than empirical disputes 
and research methodology.
1.7 The three dimensional view
Steven Lukes (1974) developed his concept of power in the course of a 
critique of the pluralist view of Dahl and the subsequent criticism 
of that approach by Bachrach and Baratz. We can begin our examination 
of Luke's notion of power with his critique of Bachrach and Baratz.
While the two-dimensional view of power developed by Bachrach and 
Baratz is undoubtedly an improvement on the one-dimensional view of 
the earlier pluralists, Lukes suggests that it is still inadequate for 
three specific reasons. Firstly, he argues that it is still basically 
a behaviourist theory, focusing upon the study of actual 'overt' 
behaviour. This behaviour is exhibited in the process of decision­
making over issues which are contested by the parties. Thus Lukes
argues that:
"In trying to assimilate all cases of exclusion of potential issues 
from the political agenda to the paradigm of a decision, it gives a 
misleading picture of the ways in which individuals and, above all, 
groups and institutions succeed in excluding potential issues from 
the political process". (1974: 21)
This occurs because Bachrach and Baratz follow the 'pluraliste' and 
Weber in adopting too methodologically individualist a view of power.
Lukes on the contrary argues that :
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"The power to control the agenda of politics and exclude potential 
issues cannot be adequately analysed unless it is seen as a function 
of collective forces and social arrangements". (1974: 22)
Secondly, Lukes argues that the two dimensional model is inadequate 
because it equates power with actual observable conflict. Thus Bachrach 
and Baratz have failed to shake off the criticisms of pluralists such 
as Dahl. Both follow Weber and his stress upon the realisation of 
one's will, 'despite the resistance of others'. However, Lukes 
demonstrates that this insistance on the existence of conflict will 
not do for two reasons. Firstly, even according to Bachrach and 
Baratz's own typology, two of the forms of power, namely manipulation 
and authority, may not involve such conflict. Secondly, as Lukes 
remarks :
"To put the matter sharply, A may exercise power over B by getting 
him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power 
over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants".
(1974: 23)
Thus Lukes suggests that, contrary to Bachrach and Baratz and the 
pluralists, the most insidious use of power is to prevent conflict 
from arising at all.
The third reason that the two dimensional view is inadequate is 
related to the previous one. Bachrach and Baratz argue that non­
decision making power only exists where there are grievances which 
are denied entry into the political process in the form of issues.
Thus if there are no grievances which the observer can find, then a 
'genuine' consensus on values must be presumed to exist.
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However this is inadequate because as Lukes suggests:
"To assume that the absence of grievance equals genuine consensus 
is simply to rule out the possibility of false or manipulated 
consensus by definitional fiat". (1974: 24)
Thus Lukes is pointing out, surely correctly, that the supreme form 
of power is the ability to shape and mould people's values in such a 
manner that they accept the status quo because they see it as benefi­
cial, unchangeable or the 'natural order'.
Lukes summarises his three-dimensional approach as follows:
"... The three-dimensional view of power involves a thoroughgoing 
critique of the behavioural focus of the first two views as too 
individualistic and allows for consideration of the many ways in 
which potential issues are kept out of politics, whether through 
the operation of social forces and institutional practices or through 
individuals decisions. This, moreover, can occur in the absence of 
actual, observable conflict, which may have been successfully averted 
though there remains here an implicit reference to potential conflict. 
This potential, however, is never in fact actualised. What one may 
have here is a latent conflict, which consists in a contradiction 
between the interests of those exercising power and the real 
interests of those they exclude". (1974: 24-5)
It is important to examine this three-dimensional notion of power in 
some detail. In attempting to the articulate the basic concepts that 
underlie the notion of power, Lukes makes several interesting and 
controversial points. Firstly he suggests that power "is one of those 
concepts which is ineradicably value-dependent". (1974: 26)
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Thus the concept of "power is, in consequence, what has been called 
an 'essentially contested concept'". (1974; 26). Secondly, he 
argues that the concept of power basically involves a notion of some 
foim of primitive causal 'affecting' of another actor and must also 
involve some notion of significance. Thus, for Lukes, power can be 
reconceptualised as a form of 'significant affecting'. We will return 
to these premises and some of the controversy surrounding them in a 
short while, but we firstly need to examine the typology of power 
that Lukes produces after his initial 'ground-clearing' exercise.
The typology is shown in Figure 1.3.
Power









persuasion etc.i I Manipulation
Figure 1.3 The typology of Lukes
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In this typology Lukes attempts to locate all forms of ’significant 
affecting’ on a couple of major dimensions. Thus, power may or may 
not be a form of influence, depending upon whether sanctions are 
involved or not. Authority and influence both may or may not be 
forms of power depending upon whether a conflict of interests is 
involved or not. Consensually, legitimated authority in the Parsonian 
sense is not therefore to be classed as power. We will compare this 
typology with others later in this chapter.
Lukes defines his concept of power "by saying that A exercises power 
over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests".
(1974: 34). He then argues that the notion of Interests is an 
irreducibly evaluative notion and that conceptions of interests vary 
with different moral and political positions. The ways in which 
interests are related to different moral and political positions and 
different notions of power is presented in the figure below.
Figure 1.4 A comparison of the one, two and three dimensional views 
of power
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diverted or suppressed in 
the decision making process
Wants/preferences may be 
created/shaped by the 
system in a way that is 
contrary to the actors 
'real' interests. Thus, 
interests equal what people 
would want/prefer, if they 
were able to make a free 
choice
The main advantage claimed by Lukes for the three-dimensional view of 
power is that it enables an exploration of how demands are suppressed 
or even prevented from arising in the decision-making process. As 
Lukes puts it, the three-dimensional view:
"Offers, in other words, the prospect of a serious sociological and 
not merely personalised exploration of how political systems prevent 
demands from becoming political issues or even from being made".
(1974: 38)
Lukes also identifies one area of possible difficulty with his 
approach. In order to do so, he introduces the notions of the 
'effective' and 'operative' exercise of power. The former occurs when 
A by doing something actually gets B to do what B would not otherwise 
have done. Thus the intervention of A (which could, of course, in­
volve non-decisions) can be said to have made a difference to the result 
The operative exercise of power refers to a situation where A's action 
is by itself sufficient to have produced a different result in terms 
of B's behaviour, but in this situation has not necessarily caused the 
actual result.
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This covers the case of 'over-determination', where two actors A and 
C both simultaneously act in order to produce certain behaviour from 
B. It is impossible to say which one actually caused the change in 
result but they both 'exercised' power in the 'operative' manner.
Both forms of the exercise of power involve what Lukes has termed "a 
relevant counterfactual". (1974: 41). This refers to the fact that
but for A, or but for A together with any other sufficient conditions, 
B would otherwise have done something else. Where there is conflict 
between A and B, then 'the relevant counterfactual' is ready-made. 
Consider the case when B desires to do Y but A would prefer that B 
did X. If A has power over B, he may be able to prevail over B and 
make B do X. In this case, if it had not been for A's power, then B 
would obviously have done something else (i.e. Y).
However, if there is no observable conflict between the parties, then 
the task of identifying the relevant counterfactual becomes more 
difficult. As Lukes argues:
"Where there is no observable conflict between A and B, then we must 
provide other grounds for asserting the relevant counterfactual.
That is, we must provide other, indirect, grounds for asserting that 
if A had not acted (or failed to act) in a certain way - and, in the 
case of operative power, if other sufficient conditions had not been 
operative - then B would have thought and acted differently from the 
way he does actually think and act". (1974: 41)
Thus the two major difficulties of the three-dimensional approach are, 
firstly, to justify the relevant counterfactual and, secondly, to 
identify the mechanism of transmission related to the alleged
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exercise of power.
Having fully described Lukes' three-dimensional view of power, it is 
now possible to examine some of the critiques that have been made of 
it. This is of central importance because of certain similarities 
between Lukes' conception of power and my own, and secondly because 
the criticisms raise topics and problems which will be considered 
later in this work. It is proposed to use the critique of Lukes to 
illustrate areas of confusion and difficulty but to avoid the com­
plicated retelling of academic debates and detailed criticism.
Central to the three-dimensional view of power is the notion of 'real 
interests' and Lukes has argued that "the indentification of those 
interests ultimately rests on empirically supportable and refutable 
hypotheses". (1974:25). Later in his book, he takes a slightly 
different line and suggests that:
"The identification of these is not up to A, but to B, exercising 
choice under conditions of relative autonomy and, in particular, 
independently of A's power - e.g. through democratic participation". 
(1974: 33)
Bradshaw (1976) has taken issue on this point, suggesting that while 
such a procedure "will lead to the crystallization of different 
preferences, but not necessarily to the revelation of 'real interests'". 
(1976: 121) The first problem with Lukes' notion is what constitutes 
'relative autonomy'. Bradshaw doubts both whether the removal of the 
power subject will equate with the removal of all sources of power over 
the power object and whether a situation of total autonomy and freedom 
from structural constraints is possible.
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Thus, Bradshaw does not believe that Lukes’ notion of real interests 
is operational on his own definition. He argues that Lukes avoids 
this problem by accepting an observer's assessment of real interests. 
Bradshaw further suggests that Lukes' problem stems from his use of 
an essentially Marxist notion (which can be justified within that 
theoretical and ideological framework) in a non-Marxist manner. In 
essence, then, this problem seems to be one of epistemology. The two 
authors are not debating the 'existence' of 'real interests', but only 
the grounds upon which they can be identified and operationalised.
The second main area of criticism concerns Lukes' individualist con­
ception of power and his inability to embrace a truly structural view 
of power. This problem surfaces in various ways. Bradshaw criticises 
Lukes for his use of the restricted illustrative methodology of A and 
B mind experiments derived from Dahl, Bachrach and Baratz and others. 
The result of this is that:
"There can be no proper examination of group workings, either in 
terms of the individual executive's power or in terms of the growth 
of organisational effects and biases. Lukes has to leap straight 
from diadic illustrations to assertions about collective exercises 
of power mediated through the various forms of group decision-making, 
institutional effects, or 'mobilization of bias'". (1976: 123)
Lukes very clearly rejects the individualist behaviour analyses of 
Dahl and of Bachrach and Baratz, arguing that power is a property of 
social forces and collectivities. Indeed Lukes states that:
"Bachrach and Baratz follow the pluralists in adopting too methodo­
logically individualist a view of power.
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In this both parties follow in the steps of Max Weber, for who 
power was the probability of individuals realising their wills 
despite the resistance of others, whereas the power to control 
the agenda of politics and exclude potential issues cannot be 
adequately analysed unless it is seen as a function of collective 
forces and social arrangements". (1974: 22)
Yet in the final chapter of his book, where he reviews the debate 
between Poulantzas (1969, 1973) and Miliband (1969, 1970, 1973), Lukes 
appears to retract and retreat from his earlier position. Bradshaw 
states that:
"In the final pages of his essay Lukes denies the validity of a 
structural or social forces definition of power, returning instead 
to the individualist conception that he earlier rejected in the 
writings of the pluralist and non-decision theorists". (1976: 125)
Clegg (1979) identifies the same retreat from a structural notion of 
power in Lukes' description of Crenson's (1971) work on the power of 
U.S. Steel in Gary, Indiana. Lukes appears to reduce U.S. Steel's 
power to individual citizens and civil leaders and to widespread 
beliefs (See Clegg 1979: 57-58). Rather than adopt this individualis­
tic reputational methodology, Clegg suggests that:
"Lukes might instead have been concerned to argue how the possibility 
of any such beliefs, or actions, could be structurally feasible. This 
would imply analysis of hegemony and a mode of production, rather than 
agents beliefs". (1979: 58)
Thus, despite his arguments, Lukes appears to have lapsed into viewing 
power in an individualist relational manner and thus fails to locate
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the concept in the context of a wider theoretical framework which 
deals with the operation of society as a whole.
The third area of criticism concerns the notion of power as 'value 
dependent* and Lukes' characterisation of the three-dimensional view 
of power as 'radical'. Hindess (1976) argues that it is possible to 
construct any concept (such as boredom) and then to identify one, two 
and three-dimensional views of it, without its being necessary to 
consider the three-dimensional view as 'radical' in any sense. However, 
Hindess may be said to be missing the point. While the identification 
of a three-dimensional notion of power is not 'radical' by itself, 
what is 'radical', given a Marxist theoretical framework, is the 
implications of such an understanding of power, if this were to be 
transmitted to the subordinated class. Lukes is therefore justified 
in using the term 'radical' as he has argued that views of power are 
value-dependent. This however, despite his claim to the contrary, 
leaves him in a position where he is really unable to argue that his 
view of power is superior to all others. If he adopts a relativist 
epistemology, then this is not a great problem. Thus, it appears to 
be Hindess's rejection of the relativistic thesis which leads him to 
reject the notion of a 'radical' three-dimensional view of power.
In summary, we can say that the main contribution of Lukes' work lies 
in the identification of a system of domination as a form of power 
in which a false consensus is created by the manipulation of values 
and attitudes, resulting in a 'false' consciousness. However, the 
major deficiency of his approach is that it does not satisfactorily 
delineate the different forms of power or, more importantly, locate 
them in a coherent framework which would explain the exercise of
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power on all levels within a given system (for example, the workplace). 
Thus Lukes does not explain how the consensus is created or what 
methods are used in order to maintain it. These are some of the 
questions that any alternative model of power would usefully set out to 
answer.
1.8 A typology of power
Some writers, rather than attempt a comprehensive theory of power, have 
instead decided to produce typologies of all the forms and manifest­
ations of power and other associated concepts. We can examine the 
work of Hamilton (1976, 1977) as an example of this form of analysis.
Hamilton's work consists of an analysis of social power, a definition 
and a typology. He initially considers the ways in which the term 
power has been used by means of a critique of the major schools and 
critical issues. From this critique emerges his own definition of 
power and an extremely comprehensive typology.
Following other writers, Hamilton identifies two differing views of 
power. The first view equates power with the use of force or 
negative sanctions. The second is a wider view which sees power as any 
type of interaction in which one party causes some action or change in 
the behaviour of another party. As we shall see Hamilton prefers a 
qualified version of the latter view of power. He criticises the 
former as being too restrictive and cites the exchange theory of 
power (Blau) which equates power with negative sanctions as an example.
Hamilton also steers a middle course in regard to another debate 
concerning power and conflict. He rejects the view that for power to 
exist there must be a conflict of interests but is concerned to avoid
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the opposite Parsonian view that power relationships are character­
ised by consensus and legitimation.
Hamilton takes issue with Lukes (1974) over his three-dimensional 
view of power. He presents Lukes' argument as being that power can 
exist when one party refuses to co-operate with another party and 
so prevents that party from achieving its objectives. However, it 
can be argued that this is not an accurate or fair resume of Lukes' 
position. Hamilton proceeds to argue that the three-dimensional view 
should not count as an instance of power at all. He argues that:
"It has to be excluded because if one person exercises power over 
another merely by not co-operating with the other, then it has to 
be admitted that we all exercise power over one another most of the 
time ... The list of things an individual or organisation is 
reluctant to do is endless because it includes everything that it 
would conceivably do minus only what it is actually willing to do.
And it is not the case that such refusals don't prevent others 
doing what they would have otherwise done. It is certain that people 
will encroach upon time, skills and resources almost without limit. 
That they don't actually attempt to do so is because they know the 
attempt will in most cases be futile". (1976: 301)
However, this does not appear to be a satisfactory critique of the 
three-dimensional view. If the three-dimensional view simply referred 
to non co-operation then Hamilton would probably be correct. However, 
it is much wider than that. It refers to a situation where B has 
objectives which are blocked by A who would prefer B's objectives not 
to be realised.
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In order to do this A uses all his resources to ensure that B's 
objective is not on the agenda for decision making. Secondly,
Hamilton appears to assume that all issues are equal in importance
whereas, in fact, some issues are unimportant while others are 
crucial to the parties concerned.
Hamilton proceeds to address some of the crucial questions regarding 
power that confront anyone who tries to define the concept or construct 
a typology. Firstly, on the question of non-behavioural effects he 
sides with Dahl. Thus he argues that power can only be said to exist 
if A, by whatever means, gets B to do something that he was not doing
or would not have done. Thus, if A fails to get B to change his
behaviour in some way, then the attempt to exercise power has failed. 
Therefore, Hamilton adopts a behaviouralist conception or power. 
Secondly, Hamilton suggests that the term power should be restricted 
to situations of 'intention'. That is where A 'intends' to alter the 
behaviour of B. Hamilton accepts that there are situations concerned 
with unintended effects but suggests that these can be covered by the 
term 'influence'. Finally, Hamilton addresses the vexed question of 
'potentiality' and identifies two views. Firstly, the notion of 
'potential power' which derives from a concept of power as an 
individualistic capacity. Secondly, the notion of 'actual power' which 
arises from the conception of power as a relationship. Hamilton 
proposes to restrict the use of the term power to those situations 
where A regularly alters B's behaviour. Thus, he does not recognise 
'potential' power and argues that,
"... power does not exist independently of its use or exercise".
(1976: 306)
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However, he does recognise that the other situations, while not 
instances of pure power, can still exist. Thus he suggests that:
"When cases are referred to in which A could exercise or have power 
over B if he chose to do so, the term 'possible power' will be used. 
When cases are referred to in which A's actions would have caused 
B's compliance, had he intended not to comply, the term 'latent 
power' will be used. When cases are referred to in which A can 
exercise or have power over B when circumstances arise in which he 
desires or requires the compliance of B, and this includes cases 
where A might demand this compliance in virtue of some office he 
holds, the term 'potential power' will be used. (1976: 306)
Hamilton then produces his first definition of power which will form 
the basis of this typology. His definition argues that:
"A is said to have or to exercise power over B or in relation to B 
whenever he gets B to comply with his intentions, when B would not 
otherwise have done so, either because of some action of A prior to 
B's response, or in anticipation of A's response, and for whatever 
reason". (1976: 306)
Unlike some other theorists (e.g. Dahl 1960) who use 'power bases' as 
the foundation of a typology, Hamilton instead uses 'motive bases'. 
Thus, his classification is not founded upon the type of power resource 
available to the exercise of power, but is instead founded upon the 
motives that actors have for compliance. Hamilton's typology of social 
power is illustrated in Figure 1.5. The concept of social power is 
taken and sub-divided until eleven forms of power emerge.
- 69 —
Social power can, suggests Hamilton, be split into environmental and 
interactive components. Environmental power occurs when A manipulates 
the environment of B or alters B's perception of this environment. In 
such situations it is not necessary for B to be aware of A's intentions, 
Interactive power involves cases where there exists direct communi­
cation or interaction between the parties. In cases of interactive 
power B complies because of his perception (accurate or not) or the 
intentions of A.
Interactive power has two possible forms; exchange power and direct 
power. In exchange power the action of B is conditional on some 
course of action being followed by A. Thus exchange power is to a 
certain extent indirect in that the compliance of the other is 
contingent upon some action on the part of the exerciser of power. 
Direct power, on the other hand, occurs in situations where the com­
pliance of B does not depend in any way upon the action on the part 
of A. Thus in direct power, A exercises power over B simply by making 
his wishes known directly.
Direct power can be subdivided again into its 'directive' and 
'regulative' components. Directive power refers to cases where B 
evaluates A's directive as being a good reason for acting in the 
desired way or as being congruent with his own goals. Regulative 
power covers situations where B complies without such considerations. 
Regulative power can be further sub-divided into 'normative' and 
'personal' forms. Normative power is vested in individuals because 
they hold certain positions, or because they traditionally have held 
such power. Personal power is held by individuals by virtue of their 
personal characteristics or personalities.
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It Is now possible to consider the eleven final forms of power.
1. Physical Constraint/Enablement
This involves manipulating the environment in such a way, that the 
behaviour of the other party is physically prevented if that behaviour 
is not desired. Conversely, the behaviour may be made physically 
possible or less difficult where the behaviour is desired.
2. Situational Power
This occurs where the environment, or someone's perception of it, is 
altered in such a way, that they behave differently, purely as a result 
of their own decision.
3. Instrumental Power
This means that one party simply demands directly the compliance of 
the other and this is forthcoming because the directive is assessed as 
being in the other party's own interests. Thus, instrumental power 
occurs where the compliance of the other group is due to the belief, 
rightly or wrongly held, that what is required of them is in their own 
interests. This category also covers the case of 'expert power' where 
compliance occurs because it is thought that the party exercising 
power has additional knowledge or skills and is therefore 'correct'.
4. Prescriptive/Proscriptive Power
Where one group changes the behaviour of another group by convincing 
them that it is in accordance with certain values or norms that they 
already hold, or convincing them of the worth of other values which 
they ought to hold, then this can be called Prescriptive/Proscriptive 
power. Thus this is a form of moral power.
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5. Authority
Unlike other theorists (e.g. Weber), Hamilton includes authority as 
a form of power and not as a separate but related concept. He uses 
it, however in the classic Weberian formulation.
6. Habitual Power
This refers to the case where power is derived from the habitual 
compliance of one actor to another actor who in the past has always 
been able to exercise power of one type or another. This is similar 
to Weber’s concept of traditional authority.
7. Exemplary Power
This refers to the ability to set an example for others to follow by 
taking a certain course of action.
8. Référant Power
Where one actor's compliance is due to personal regard or admiration 
for another actor, then this can be seen as an example of référant 
power. This is similar to Weber's notion of charismatic authority.
9. Conformative Power
This refers to all cases where one actor complies with the wishes of 
another actor in order not to draw his disapproval or in order to 
elicit his approval. As this is a one way spontaneous interaction it 
cannot be a form of exchange power. The most important form of this 
power:
"... is that held jointly by a group. Most individuals find the strong 
disapproval of their group as a whole a most uncomfortable penalty and, 
on the other hand, their approval one of the most satisfying of rewards 
Conformative power in the hands of a group is thus a very effective 
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This form of power is based upon the interaction of two parties and 
is indirect. This means that compliance is contingent upon some 
action on behalf of the party possessing the power. Inducive power 
occurs where A acts in a way desirable to B in return for a recipro­
cal action, or gives something to B in exchange for a desired action 
or object.
11. Coercive Power
This occurs where one party 'threatens' to act in a certain way in an 
attempt to 'coerce' the other party into compliance.
1.9 An alternative typology
In his recent book on power, Wrong (1979) develops a typology which 
he uses to inform his discussion of the concept. This typology is 
shown in diagrammatic form in Figure 1.6.
Wrong begins with the concept of influence. Like Hamilton, he sees 
this as a weaker form of power. Where influence is intended then it 
is a form of power. However, situations where influence is unintended 
cannot be counted as cases of power. Wrong then identifies four major 
forms of power.
Firstly, there is the situation where A 'forces' B to do something he 
would not otherwise have done. A can use either violent or non­
violent physical techniques or psychic pressures in order to ensure 
compliance with his wishes. Secondly, there is the case where A 



























As Easton puts it,
"When B is not aware of A*s intention to influence him but A does in 
fact manage to get B to follow his wishes, we can say that we have 
an instance of manipulation". (1958: 179)
Thirdly where,
"A presents arguments, appeals or exhortations to B, and B, after 
independently evaluating their content in light of his own values 
and goals, accepts A*s communication as the basis of his own 
behaviour, A has successfully persuaded B". (1979: 32)
Thus, the third form of power analysed by Wrong is persuasion. Finally 
Wrong, like Hamilton argues that authority is a special case of power, 
although Wrong's conception of authority is wider than Hamilton's.
Wrong splits the concept of authority into five component parts. Coer­
cive authority occurs where A has convinced B of his capability and 
willingness to carry out his threat of force as a penalty for non- 
compliance. A may convince B by making explicit and displaying the 
means of force that he possesses or controls. Induced authority refers 
to the offering of position sanctions (i.e. rewards), rather than the 
use of negative sanctions, to ensure compliance with a directive. 
Legitimate authority refers to the classic Weberian concept of rational- 
legal authority. Hence,
"the source rather than the content of any particular command endows it 
with legitimacy and induces willing compliance on the part of the 
person to whom it is addressed". (1979: 49)
Competent authority occurs when B obeys A's directives because of a
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belief in A ‘s superior competence or expertise and ability to decide 
which actions will be in B's best interests. Finally, personal authority 
covers situations where B obeys because of a desire to please A or 
because of A's personal qualities. Thus for Wrong charismatic 
authority is a sub-set of personal authority.
It is possible to compare the typologies of Hamilton and Wrong. Such a 
comparison is shown in Figure 1.7.
Figure 1.7 A comparison of the typologies of Hamilton and Wrong
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Force or coercive authority
It can be seen from the Table that the two typologies have many points 
of similarity. The only major difference is that Wrong does not appear 
to have a category to match Hamilton's notion of habitual power. However, 
following Weber, this could be rendered by the use of traditional 
authority which would fit easily into his scheme.
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The utility of such typologies as those by Hamilton and Wrong is that 
they focus attention upon the fact that power can occur in many 
different forms. The major criticism of such typologies, whether 
they are based upon the possession of 'power resources' or based upon 
the 'reasons for compliance', is the same. They enable us to examine 
a specific occurrence of power and suggest that A had power over B 
either because of some 'power resources' possessed by A or because B 
chose to comply with A's wishes/demands for certain reasons. Such 
typologies, however, do not enable us to develop a general theory of 
power. The typologies which use 'power resources' appear to assume 
that the specific 'resources' which had a utility in one situation 
will have that utility in all situations. This assumption is, of 
course, not warranted. These typologies of power are content to explain 
the 'exercise' of power in terms of a differential distribution of 
'power resources', yet they do not attempt to show how this situation 
orginated. As Clegg and Dunkerley have argued,
"The assumption of 'resource'-based explanations of 'power' ought 
also to entail an exposition of how come people come to have access 
to these 'resources' while some others do not". (1980: 436)
1.10 A structural view of power
As with previous authors, Martin, (1977) attempts to locate his 
definition of power within the tradition of power theorising as a 
preface to the construction of a typology. Martin thus locates and 
criticises the Weberian and Parsonian schools of power. The Weberian 
view is subjected to three criticisms. Firstly, Martin suggests that 
it assumes a conflict of interests between the parties. Secondly, it
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"transposes a property of interactions, of interrelations, into a 
property of actors". (1977: 37)
This leads to the third problem which is that the Weberian view tends 
to see power as a generalised capacity, rather than the observable 
attributes of a specific relationship. However, Martin is also 
critical of the view of power expressed by Parsons. As he argues 
(following Giddens 1968)
"... the new Parsonian definition creates more problems than it 
resolved, for Parsons places consensus where Weber placed conflict. 
Parsons defines out of existence the problems which have usually pre­
occupied sociologists of power". (1977: 38)
What, then, is the solution to this theoretical dilemma? Martin, 
rejecting Dahl's 'intuitive conception', draws upon the systems 
notion of communication flow and constructs a new (and rather in­
elegant) definition. He suggests that,
"In these modified cybernetic terms, therefore, power may be defined 
strictly, at the most general level, as that type of information flow 
which symbolises non-self-regarding action for the recipient".
(1977: 39)
In this definition he is attempting to stress two major points. Firstly, 
that power is a specific type of information flow and thus the property 
of a relationship. Secondly, by the term "non-self-regarding action", 
Martin appears to be referring to action by an individual in which his 
costs exceed his benefits.
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To the extent that he is prepared to act in this way, despite the 
disadvantageous cost/benefit balance, then we can assume that he is 
subject to the power of another individual or group. If, on the other 
hand, the individual's benefits exceeded his costs, then there would 
not be any power relationship.
Martin argues that his definition has considerable advantages over the 
standard definitions of power. As has already been shown, it demon­
strates that power is the property of a relationship and is a specific 
mode of communication. Secondly, the power 'signals' only have 
meaning in terms of the perceptions of the actors in the situation, and 
especially in terms of the perception or frame of reference, of the 
subordinate actor in the relationship.
Despite its advantages, Martin acknowledges that there is at least 
one possible major criticism of his definition. This concerns 
situations where subordinates fail to realise that their actions are 
non-self-regarding, although judged to be so by external observers.
In terms of his definition this is not a case of power. Yet others 
such as Lukes (1974) have argued that this situation is a very 
important form of power. In his three dimensional view of power Lukes 
specifically argues that power can exist in situations where sub­
ordinates are unaware of the fact that power is being exercised over 
them. Thus subordinates may be socialised into accepting a false 
consciousness of their own interests and may therefore adopt a 
position or action contrary to their own true interests. This has 
been succinctly expressed by Lukes as follows.
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"I have defined the concept of power by saying that A exercises 
power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests". 
(1974: 34)
Here Lukes defines interests as what men would want (between alterna­
tives) if they were given the choice, and not what they actually do 
want. This view is supported, either directly or indirectly, by a 
number of theorists including Westergaard (1974), and Fox (1973).
Martin responds to this possible critique by making several points. 
Firstly, the reasons for the compliance of a subordinate lie in his 
own motive bases and consciousness, and not in that of any observer. 
Secondly, there exists no objective criterion for deciding whose 
definition of 'real' interests is correct and finally there exists no 
"adequate theory specifying the processes whereby the actor acquires 
false consciousness" (1977: 40). This discussion will be further 
amplified in a later chapter.
Before constructing his model of power Martin finds it necessary to 
define some related concepts; these are compliances, coercion, authority 
and influence. Rejecting the standard definition from Etzioni (1975) 
which refers to the act of compliance and to the orientation of the 
subordinate actor, Martin argues that,
"Compliance refers to the attitudes and behaviour caused, by power, or,
more formally, to the 'non-self-regarding' actions performed at the
behest (direct or indirect) of others". (1977: 41)
With regard to coercion Martin decides to adopt Etzioni's definition. 
Thus coercion is defined as.
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"the application, or the threat of application of physical sanctions 
such as the infliction of pain, deformity, or death; generation of 
frustration through restriction of movement; or controlling through 
force the satisfaction of such needs as those for food, sex, comfort 
and the like". (1975; 5)
In relation to the concept of authority Martin seeks to stress the 
notion of legitimacy and quotes the classic Weberian discussion of the 
concept. Finally, he defines influence, which he sees as the situation 
where compliance results,
"... from a fear of the consequences of non-compliance, even where 
the deprivations likely to follow are not physical, or where the 
relationship is not legitimised". (1977: 42)
Martin, in his model of power relations, focuses both upon actor's 
goals and the distribution of resources, unlike both Hamilton and Wrong, 
who concentrate upon the subordinates reasons for compliance. His 
model of power relations can be seen in Figure 1.8. This model starts 
with compliance and works backward through the factors which are 
involved in determining the amount of compliance (and thus power) in any 
given relationship. It is useful in explaining this model to quote 
at length from Martin,
"Assymetric patterns of dependence, and thus the need for compliance, 
results from differential control over access to the resources 
required to achieve these goals. This differential control is 
based partly upon the degree of 'criticalness' of specific attributes 
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’’Criticalness is a function of centrality and scarcity, and differs 
according to the prevailing forces of production and availability of 
natural resources. In summary terms : technology and natural resources 
determine criticalness; criticalness and inheritance lead to differen­
tial control over resources; differential control over resources leads 
to dependence where resources are desired; imbalanced dependence and 
limited possibilities for escape lead to compliance” . (1977: 50)
It can be clearly seen that Martin’s model is completely different 
from the simple typologies of Hamilton and Wrong. It is a macro-level 
discussion of the variables that determine the compliance of groups in 
different systems of labour exploitation and poltical economy.
The variables in the model can now be specified in more detail. 
Technology refers to:
’’the physical actions involved in treating and manipulating raw 
materials, the organisation of the labour force thus employed, and 
the knowledge used in combining the two” . (1977: 51)
Thus the term does not simply refer to the physical objects or tools 
of production. Although rejecting pure technological determinism, 
Martin seeks to argue that groups who benefit from the distribution of 
resources, resulting from a given system of technology, will try to 
preserve that technology. Thus, a particularly technical process 
’dictates’ a specific pattern of work relations and thus social 
relations including power relations. Martin identifies five types of 
technology based upon the predominant instrument of production; hunting 
and gathering, simple horticultural (based upon the digging stick), 
advanced horticultural (metal hoe), agrarian (plough, harness and more
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advanced metallargy) and industrial. He then argues that,
"These five technologies will produce different characteristic 
distributions of control over desired resources, and thus 
different typical patterns of asymmetric dependence relations". 
(1977: 52)
'Criticalness' is composed of two elements which need to be present; 
these are centrality and scarcity. The centrality of a resource 
depends upon its nature and its utility to large sections of the 
population. The scarcity of a resource is a function of the distri­
bution of that resource and the existence of any technology to exploit 
it. The amount of dependence in a society is largely influenced by 
both criticalness and inheritance. Inheritance has two main effects. 
Firstly, where a society permits intergenerational transmission of 
control of resources, then there is likely to be a greater concen­
tration of control of resources, in comparison to those societies 
which do not permit such inter-generational transmission. Secondly 
control over resources is affected by the "partibility of inheritance" 
(1977: 53)
The distribution of the control of resources, taken together with the 
goals and desires of individuals, leads to a situation of dependence. 
But dependence does not lead directly to compliance. This only occurs 
where no escape routes are available. Following Blau (1964), Martin 
suggests that there are four escape strategies available to subordin­
ates. Firstly, they can supply the superior with inducements in terms 
of resources he desires and which are relatively costless to the 
subordinate. Secondly, he may attempt to find elsewhere the resources 
which create his dependence.
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Thirdly, he may seek to combine with other subordinates with similar 
dependencies, in an attempt to modify the exchange rate between 
dependence and compliance. Finally, the subordinate may decide that 
the costs of his * non-self-regarding* actions are higher than the cost 
of foregoing the resources which created his dependency. Thus, he will 
do with the resources. Therefore dependence only leads to compliance 
when escape routes are unavailable or where their use would result in 
costs greater than those involved in the original power relationship.
Martin proceeds to specify that,
"The amount of power in any relationship is directly determined by the 
relevant distribution of dependence and the availability of escape 
routes: ceteris paribus, the greater the imbalance and the more 
difficult the escape, the greater the amount of non-self-regarding 
action required in order to obtain the resources, and therefore the 
greater the amount of power involved". (1977: 55)
Finally Martin argues that the amount of power influences, but does 
not directly determine, the basis of power. Thus, in general terms, 
the greater the amount of power, the greater the probability that it 
will rest upon authority. This relationship is, however, influenced 
by other factors, such as the type of compliance action required by 
the superior and the basis of the dependence.
It should be noted that Martin's model of power relations is of a 
completely different nature from the typologies of Hamilton and Wrong. 
They focus on motive bases for compliance and seek to list all the 
possible reasons for compliance. Martin uses compliance as a starting 
point but considers both motive and resource bases for power.
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He is also more concerned with explaining how power relations differ 
under different social systems of labour exploitation, based upon 
different technologies. Thus, as Martin acknowledges, his model 
attempts to get away from the interpersonal level of power research 
and study the "social processes and structures at the macro-level". 
(1977: 58)
1.11 An evaluation of the literature
What then can we learn from the literature about this elusive concept 
of power? Searching for a model of concept of power which would assist 
the understanding of Industrial Relations phenomena, one is confronted, 
not by a single tradition and internally coherent view of power, but 
instead by a plethora of differing views and divergent traditions which 
only serve to confuse and obfuscate.
In order to 'map' the terrain of power theorising, a number of 'key' 
issues and debates have been extracted from the literature. Arguably, 
from a discussion and examination of these issues and debates,it is now 
possible to generate an improved understanding of the concept of power. 
Any theory of power,if it is to be considered successful,must of 
necessity confront and resolve each of these issues and debates. The 
following major 'issues' have been identified:
a) Intercursive or integral power?
Is power plurally distributed in society, or is it held by an elite 
group? This is a central issue in the power literature and one which 
has implications in terms of industrial relations.
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This debate also subsumes some other debates, namely the conflict/ 
consensus theories debate and the Zero Sum/Non Zero sum debate. Thus, 
on the one hand there are those theorists who believe that power is 
distributed throughout society; who argue that power is a non-zero sum 
concept and who believe in a basic consensus within society. On the 
other side are ranged those theorists who believe that power is 
concentrated into a few hands; who argue that power is a zero-sum 
concept and who believe that society is characterised by a state of 
conflict rather than consensus. These issues are, of course, central 
to the Community Power Debate but they can be extended much more 
widely than that. Thus on the ’Pluralist' side we can include Dahl, 
Polsby and other pluraliste in the Community Power Debate. It may be 
suggested that the work of exchange theorists such as Emerson and Blau 
has strong affinities with the pluralist position, although at least 
one writer (Jessop 19@9 ) has argued that the Exchange tradition can 
act as a synthesis of both conflict and consensus positions. On the 
'Elitist' side are C. Wright Mills, Hunter and others in the Community 
Power Debate as well as Lukes and radical structuralists such as 
Althusser and Poulantzas. Some writers appear to steer a middle 
course in relation to this debate. An interesting example is the 
work of Bachrach and Baratz (1962) which is seen as representing the 
'pluralist' tradition by Lukes (.1974) but as being a 'sophisticated 
elitist' view by Ball (1975). This debate does not, of course, have 
to be seen in polarised terms. Thus it may be conceded that power is 
not necessarily zero-sum and that it is partially distributed through­
out society. A basic societal consensus, broadly similar to what 
Paskin (1971) has termed the 'dominant value system', may also be 
said to exist. However, the distribution of power is uneven and un­
equal and the value consensus fragile and challenged by the
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'subordinate’ and 'radical' systems. Indeed, one may go further and 
suggest that on certain occasions and in certain areas, the value 
consensus may be artificially created or manipulated. This is of 
course in line with Lukes' three dimensional view of power. On this 
issue, therefore, I would tend towards the conflict/elitist side of 
the debate.
b) Power as potential or as exercise?
There is a great deal of disagreement as to whether power can be 
'possessed' and 'stored' and thus treated as capacity or potential 
to exert power at some point in the future or whether power only exists 
at the time when it is actually exercised. Both Weber and Parsons 
appear to adopt the former view while Martin, while not totally equating 
power with its exercise, does criticise the 'generalised capacity' 
notion of Weber and thus seems to restrict power to instances of its 
use.
This issue is particularly interesting, as it shows that sometimes the 
theoretical positions taken by writers differ from their own methodo­
logical practices. Thus Dahl in his earlier theoretical work (Dahl 
1957) appears to view power as capacity or potential but in his later 
empirical work (Dahl 1961) power is related to observable decision 
making and the ability of actors to achieve their goals. Thus power 
is seen as 'exercise'. Some other authors recognise that both forms 
of power could exist but seek to restrict what counts as an instance 
of power to one of views. Thus Emerson and Hamilton both acknowledge 
that potential power exists but argue that it is only the exercise of 
power that can be empirically verified and thus only such instances 
should count as forms of power.
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While power is more easily observed when it is exercised, any 
definition which restricted power to instances of this sort, would 
be unable to handle the more subtle aspects of the power process.
Thus any new model of power would have to encompass both power as 
exercise and as potential.
c) Observable power or non-observable power?
For a situation to count as an instance of power, does an actor 
within a social relationship have to 'do* anything or be seen to 'do' 
something? This question is obviously related to the previous issue 
and the protagonists are very similar. Dahl suggests that power only 
exists in situations where an actor 'exercises' his power in an 
observable way. Thus, power can be monitored and studied via the 
process of decision-making. Bachrach and Baratz, despite their 
identification of the process of 'non-decision-making' still insist 
that this process is itself a process of observable decision-making 
and thus power is still equated with observable behaviour by one of the 
actors in a social relationship. Ranged against these views are those 
theorists who argue power can occur and be present even if in simple 
terms, 'nothing happens'. Thus Lukes suggests that the third dimension 
of power covers the situation where the 'real' interests of B are 
thwarted by A and his ability to shape and determine the 'wants' of B. 
While this case of domination may not be directly observable it is 
certainly to count as a form of power. In a similar vein Ball has 
suggested that the pluralist insistance that only events can be causes 
is unduly restrictive. Thus any new theory of power would have to be 
able to handle power in both its observable and non-observable forms.
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d) Behavioural versus structural conceptions of power 
One division running throughout the voluminous power literature 
concerns the question of whether power is the property of social 
actors or the property of social communities and structures. This, 
in turn, may be seen to reflect a division in wider social theory 
between theories of action and theories of structure.
In the power field there is one group of theorists, which includes 
Weber, Dahl, Bachrach and Baratz and Hamilton who define power in terms 
of the capacity or probability of an actor to achieve desired goals 
or outcomes. On the other hand there is another group which includes 
such diverse talents as Parsons, Poulantzas, Martin and Clegg who 
suggest that power is specifically a property of social structures. 
Giddens has succinctly stated the two positions as follows;
"There are effectively two versions of how power structures are 
constituted, and two versions of domination. The first tends to 
treat domination as a network of decision-making, operating against 
an unexamined institutional backdrop; the second regards domination 
as itself an institutional phenomenon, either disregarding power as 
relating to the active accomplishments of actors, or treating it as 
in some way determined by institutions". (1979: 89)
The work of Lukes, despite his criticism of the behavioural focus of 
both Dahl and Bachrach and Baratz, seems to sit uneasily between the 
two competing schools.
It may be suggested that this is one of the most important question 
areas concerning power. I shall argue, later in this thesis, that what 
is required for a comprehensive theory of power is a synthesis of the 
action and structural approaches.
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Thus, only a unified model can encompass both the action and 
structural manifestations of power.
e) Power or social control?
This question raises the relevance of intentionality to the concept
of power. Is power to be restricted to those cases where an actor 
intentionally acts in such a way as to exercise power over someone?
Or, alternatively, could power be regarded as much wider than this, 
embracing all forms of social control, purposive and non-purposive? 
Wrong (1979) has argued that power must be confined to cases of 
intended influence while Hamilton, on similar grounds, differentiates 
between power (Intended) and influence (unintended). Other theorists 
such as Lukes have developed notions of power which do not necessarily 
include intentionality. Those theorists who adopt a structuralist 
notion of power are less likely to insist on the criterion of intention 
while those who adopt an individualist conception of power are perhaps
more likely to adopt such a criterion. As, later in this thesis, a
synthesis of the action (individualist) and structuralist approaches 
will be suggested, then it may be argued that both forms of power are 
possible.
f) Illegitimate power or legitimate power
This question serves to focus attention upon the simplistic notion 
found in some analyses that power equates to coercion or force.
However, most theorists appear to assume that power embraces both 
illegitimate and legitimate forms. Hamilton has identified the work of 
Blau as being one of the closest to the position of equating power with 
coercion. Blau argues that power is related to the withholding of 
regularly supplied rewards or the application of punishment in as much 
as both constitute forms of negative sanction.
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The closest a writer comes to the opposite position of an exclusive 
focus on legitimate power is the work of Parsons who almost defines 
illegitimate power out of existence.
g) Power as conflict of interests?
Is the use of the term * power' to be restricted to situations in 
which a conflict of interests exists between the actors involved in a 
social relationship? Those that answer in the affirmative can be 
split into two groups. Firstly there are those who simply state that 
power can exist in situations where there is a conflict of interests 
between the parties. Secondly there are those, including Dahl and 
Emerson, for whom the conflict must also be overt and empirically 
manifested.
On the other hand there are those who argue that power can exist in 
the absence of a conflict of interests. Thus Weber (1948) speaks of 
the power of an individual "even against the resistance of others ..." 
(1958:180). Lukes has argued that the most insidious form of power is 
that which prevents conflicts of interest from arising. Hamilton and 
Martin have also argued that the assumption of a conflict of interests 
is erroneous and unnecessary.
The problem with this question is that both sets of protagonists mean 
different things by the term 'conflict of interests'. Those who assert 
that a conflict of interests must be present for power to exist, are 
normally referring to an immediate and short-term conflict between the 
parties over a particular issue. Those who argue the reversé also 
implicitly utilise a concept of interest, but this time a long-time 
conflict caused by the structuring of society. Thus Lukes argues 
that power occurs even where there is no conflict of interests apparent 
but also notes that this could be because one party has developed a
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'false consciousness' and thus is incapable of understanding the 
nature of its own 'real' interests.
h) Power as causation?
Another central issue concerns whether power is to be regarded as a 
causal concept. Dahl, despite his early protestations, appears to 
introduce this notion into the literature arguing that,
"the closest equivalent to the power relation is the causal relation". 
(1968: 410)
While not fully supporting Dahl's view, Lukes has argued that the 
underlying notion of power involves some form of 'causal affecting' 
together with some criterion of significance. However it has been 
persuasively argued (Ball 1975/1976) that the adoption of a causal 
metaphor and its associated classical mechanics imagery has had some un­
intended and unfortunate consequences and distorted and limited our 
understanding of power.
i) Resource bases or motive bases?
Weber in his original definition of power suggested that it was,
"the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be 
in a position to carry out his own will despite resistence, regardless 
of the basis on which this probability rests". (1947: 139)
Thus Weber seems willing to consider both resource bases and motive 
bases of power. Others simply concentrate upon one facet or the other. 
Thus there are those who concentrate upon the 'power resources' possessed 
by various actors in any given situation. This can be termed the 
'Resource Bases' approach. An example of this approach is provided in 
the next chapter in the work of French and Raven (1959) who list the
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resource bases available to actors. Another group of theorists tend 
to focus instead upon the reasons for compliance by the subordinate 
actor. This can be termed the 'Motive Bases' approach. Thus Hamilton 
and Wrong both concentrate upon a typology of such motive bases.
The difference between the resource base and motive base approaches 
can be seen as reflecting, in Etzioni's terms, the difference between 
the power employed and the orientation of the subordinated actor.
It has already been suggested in the Prologue that this thesis will 
concentrate upon the former rather than the latter.
j) One, two or three dimensional power?
Lukes (1974) divides the literature on power into groups by 
identifying three different faces of power each related to a distinct 
moral and political position and a different conception of interests.
The 'One-Dimensional' theorists who adopt a behavioural stance include 
Dahl and other 'pluralist' writers. The 'Two-Dimensional' category, 
which recognises a 'hidden' face of power as either 'unobservable' or 
'non-decision', includes Bachrach and Baratz and, if we consider his 
wider writings and not merely his definitions, the view of Weber. Lukes 
then advances a 'Three-Dimensional' view which, he argues, transcends 
the more limited horizons of the other two approaches. One of the central 
arguments of this thesis will be that any theory of power must be able 
to represent all three 'faces' or 'dimensions' of power.
We have shown above that, while there are a great number of 'issues' 
which emerge from the power literature, all of the theories so far 
discussed are 'partial' in the sense that they address themselves to 
some but not most of the major issues concerning the concept of power.
Any integrated and more comprehensive theory of power would have to 
take account of all these issues and develop a position in regatd to 
each one.
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This review has also demonstrated the way in which conceptions of 
power are related to various positions taken by theorists. Thus we 
have seen how in the Community Power Debate the notion of power 
appeared to be related to the academic subject discipline, the type 
of methodology used and the general political position adopted. The 
debate between Lukes and the One and Two-Dimensional theorists can be 
seen to focus upon epistemological and political positions. Lukes 
sees Dahl and Bachrach and Baratz as being too closely tied to a 
behaviourist epistemology and a pluralist political position. Finally, 
at the macro level, we have seen that the adoption of a metaphor for 
power such as the causal one, predicted upon the ideas of classical 
mechanics as utilized by Dahl, can systematically distort our view of 
power.
One final criticism is that the theories studied so far each focus 
upon a different level of power. Thus some theories operate on the 
micro or individual level seeking to explain the power of one social 
actor viz a viz another, while others focus upon the structural macro 
determinants of power or the power of groups and collectivities.
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Chapter 2
Power in the organisational and 
industrial relations literature.
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2.0 Power in the organisational and industrial relations literature
Having reviewed and analysed some of the main concepts and theories of 
power developed in the social and political arenas, it is now possible 
to narrow the focus and turn our attention to the development of the 
concept in the literature of organisational theory and industrial 
relations. It is hoped to demonstrate how notions of power percolated 
down from the more general literature into organisation theory and 
then, on at least one occasion, into industrial relations. These 
notions of power will then be evaluated and criticised.
In order to simplify the analysis the literature has been divided into 
a number of discrete areas. The review commences with the earlier 
organisational theories of power which have subsequently formed the 
basis for the development of more sophisticated notions. The strategic 
contingencies approach which appears as the dominant paradigm of 
power theorising within the field of organisational theory is then 
examined. This is followed by a discussion and evaluation of two 
recent theories of power; one American and one British. Attention is 
then turned to the field of industrial relations which forms the 
central focus of this work.
An attempt is made to examine the various ways in which power has 
been conceptualised in industrial relations theory and to evaluate to 
what extent these approaches have furthered our understanding of the 
true 'nature' of power within the subject. In order to achieve this, 
the theoretical development of the subject will be charted, the 
various theoretical strands will be delineated and the use of power 
in industrial relations research discussed.
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2.1 The early organisational literature
Much of the early literature in the field of organisational theory 
or administrative science that addresses the concept of power is 
American in origin. It is characterised by its use of social science 
concepts and by its partial and tentative nature. It is useful, 
however, to consider some of the more influential theories which have 
later been incorporated into more complex theories of power.
One such seminal work was the attempt by French and Raven (1959) to 
develop a typology of power. Viewing power as a social relationship 
between two actors, they suggest that it can be considered in two ways 
by posing two questions. Firstly, "What determines the behaviour of 
the agent who exerts power?" and secondly, "What determines the 
reactions of the recipient of this behaviour?" (1959: 259). These 
questions reflect, of course, the dichatomy between resource bases and 
motive bases of power. French and Raven appear to favour the latter 
arguing that they formulate their theory
"... in terms of the life space of P, the person upon whom power 
is exerted". (1959: 259)
By 'bases' of power they mean the relationship between A and B which 
is the source of that power. Thus, what is it in the relationship 
between A and B that makes B comply with A's wishes? Acknowledging 
that any one relationship may involve several different 'bases' of 
power they proceed to identify five common 'bases'. These are as 
follows,
(a) Reward power This is based upon B's perception that
A has the ability to confer or withhold
rewards 
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(b) Coercive power This is based upon B's perception that
A has the ability to use physical 
sanctions and punishment against him.
(c) Legitimate power This is based upon the perception by B
that A has a 'right' to issue orders 
or demands and be obeyed.
(d) Referent power Based upon B's identification with A as
an individual personality.
(e) Expert power This is based upon the perception that
A possesses certain knowledge or skills 
which B requires.
French and Raven take great care to ensure that each of their five 
forms of power is defined in terms of B's perception of A's power; in 
other words in terms of a motive bases approach. However, when they 
discuss each of the types in detail they drop this perspective and 
simply refer to the ability of A to exert power based upon factors he 
controls or positions he holds. In short, they seem to move towards 
a resource bases approach. For example they define reward power as 
"power whose basis is the ability to reward" (1959:263). Similar types 
of definitions are offered for the other four types of power.
A later theory which discusses both the resource and motive dichotomy 
is that of Etzioni (1961). He attempts to replace common sense 
organisational categories by developing a typology based upon organisa­
tional control. Thus his classification scheme focuses upon the inter- 
organisational aspects of power and control. The central variable that 
Etzioni uses for the development of his typology is that of 'compliance' 
This is defined as
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"a relationship consisting of the power employed by superiors to 
to control subordinates and the orientation of the subordinates to 
this power". (1961: xv)
and elsewhere as,
"the relation in which an actor behaves in accordance with a directive 
supported by another actor’s power and to the orientation of the 
subordinated actor to the power applied". (1961: 4)
Thus compliance refers to the situation of obedience and to the reasons 
for that obedience. This enables Etzioni to encompass both resource 
bases of power and motive bases of power.
Etzioni suggests that compliance is the result of two separate factors; 
the orientation of the actor twards the power applied by the organi­
sation (their involvement) and the resources which enable the exercise 
of power. Etzioni then proceeds to identify three forms of 'power'. 
Coercive power which consists of the use of physical sanctions and 
constraints; remunerative power which is based upon the control of 
material resources and rewards; and normative power which "rests on 
the allocation and manipulation of symbolic rewards and deprivations". 
(1961: 5). The way in which organisational actors respond to the 
exercise of power is then considered and three main types of 'involve­
ment' are located. Aliénâtive involvement which implies an intense 
negative orientation to the power situation; calculative involvement 
which consists of either a positive or negative orientation of low 
intensity; and moral involvement which designates a positive orientation 
of high intensity.
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Figure 2.1 Types of compliance relationship




Alienative Calculative Moral 
1 2 3 
4 5 6 
7 8 9
With three forms of power and three types of involvement, it is clear 
that there are nine possible compliance relationships (See Figure 2.1) 
Etzioni argues that three of the relationships (1, 5 and 9)
"are found more frequently than the other six types. This seems to 
be true because these three types constitute congruent relationships 
whereas the other six do not". (1961: 12)
Etzioni then uses his typology to analyse the varying compliance re­
lationships. He also seeks to argue that
"organisations tend to shift their compliance structure from incon- 
gruent to congruent types and organisations which have congruent 
structures tend to resist factors pushing them toward compliance 
structures". (1961: 14)
If the typologies of power of Etzioni and French and Raven are compared 
it will be noted that there are many similarities. Both use coercive 
power; Etzioni's remunerative power parallels French and Raven's use 
of reward power while Etzioni's final form of power seems broad enough 
to embrace French and Raven's concepts of legitimate power and referent 
power.
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The concept of expert power however does not appear to fit neatly 
into Etzioni's classification. As we have already seen in Chapter 
1 these typologies have been developed by others such as Hamilton 
(1976, 1977) and Wrong (1979) into more sophisticated and extended 
typologies.
Deriving the concept of 'lower participants' partly from Etzioni, 
Mechanic (1962) seeks to analyse the power possessed by such actors 
as distinct from the formal power and authority structure of the 
organisation. He attempts to identify the sources of the power 
possessed by lower participants but his theoretical discussion of 
power is rather confused. On the one hand, following Dahl and in a 
causal and behavioural tradition, he defines power as a force. Thus 
power is, "any force that results in behaviour that would not have 
occurred if the force had not been present". (1962: 351) Yet despite 
this view of power as force, and an explicit rejection of the view of 
power as a relationship. Mechanic also argues that power is closely 
related to dependence and acknowledges the work of Emerson (1962). 
Dependence in organisations, he suggests, is achieved by controlling 
access to information, people and instrumentalities. Instrumentalities 
are defined as "any aspect of the physical plant of the organisation 
or its resources (Equipment, machines, money, and so on)". (1962: 352)
Mechanic then considers the sources of power of lower participants in 
organisation and identifies several factors which enable lower partici­
pants to obtain or exercise their power. The possession of desired 
expertise, the existence of high levels of discretion in task perfor­
mance and a position of centrality in the work organisation are all 
factors which are positively related to power.
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Thus the more expertise, the more discretion and the greater 
centrality possessed by a lower participant, the greater is their 
power. Mechanic also identifies the concept of replaceability or 
substitutability of an individual or group which is a factor which 
is negatively related to power. Thus the harder it is to replace an 
individual or group of individuals, the greater will be their power.
One final stand of organisational theory concerns the linking of 
power to uncertainty. Crozier (1964) in his study of the bureau­
cratic phenomenon in the 'Industrial Monopoly', argues that groups, 
such as the maintenance men in his study, who can control the level of 
uncertainty for other groups in the organisation then possess power 
as a result. Thus control of uncertainties generates power. Thompson 
(1967) takes this notion of uncertainty and locates it within a 
coherent and advanced theoretical framework. He utilizes systems 
theory and views organisations,
"as open systems, hence undeterminate and faced with uncertainty, but 
at the same time as subject to criteria of rationality and hence 
needing determinateness and certainty". (1967: 10)
Thus again the ability to control and resolve uncertainty confers 
power upon the individual or group concerned.
2.2 The strategic contingencies theory
The strategic contingencies theory of Hickson and his colleagues 
(Hickson, Hinings, Lee, Schneck and Pennings 1971), draws together 
many of the elements mentioned in previous works. They take from 
Emerson (1962) the notion of power as dependency in a social relation­
ship. This is then allied to the concept of power as control of
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uncertainty, first elaborated by Crozier (1964) but developed by 
Thompson (1967). From Thompson they also adopt the use of an open 
systems model of organisations. Finally from Mechanic (1962) they 
utilise the notions of replaceability and centrality as factors 
contributing to power. However, unlike many of the previous 
theorists Hickson et al focus upon sub-units of organisations rather 
than individuals. Thus,
"... organisations are conceived of an interdepartmental systems in 
which a major task is divided and allotted to the sub-systems, the 
division of labour creating an interdependence among them. Imbalance 
of this reciprocal interdependence among the parts gives rise to 
power relations". (1971: 217)
Hickson et al identify three main variables which lead to intra­
organ is at ion al dependency. These are coping with uncertainty, sub­
stitutability and centrality. The relationships between these variables 
and power is expressed in a series of hypotheses.
"Hypothesis 1. The more a sub-unit copes with uncertainty, the 
greater its power within the organisation". (1971: 220)
"Hypothesis 2. The lower the substitutability of the activities of 
a sub-unit, the greater its power within the organisation". (1971: 221)
"Hypothesis 3a. The higher the pervasiveness of the workflows of a 
sub-unit, the greater its power within the organisation". (1971: 222)
"Hypothesis 3b. The higher the immediacy of the workflows of a sub­
unit, the greater its power within the organisation". (1971: 222)
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The first hypothesis merely restates the position of Crozier (1964) 
and Thompson (1967), whilst the second develops the view of Mechanic 
(1962). It suggests that the more indispensable a sub-unit becomes 
and the harder it is to replace, then the more powerful it becomes. 
In Hypothesis 3a the term pervasiveness refers to the idea that,
"the activities of a sub-unit are central if they are connected with 
many other activities in the organisation". (1971: 221)
while in hypothesis 3b, immediacy means that the activities of a sub­
unit are central if,
"they are essential in the sense that their cessation would quickly 
and substantially impede the primary workflow of the organisation". 
(1971: 221)
While presenting these variables as discrete, Hickson et al are aware 
that, in fact, they are inter-related. In order to allow for this 
they introduce the notion of "control of contingencies" (1971: 222) 
as a representation of organisational interdependence. Thus sub-units 
control contingencies for each others activities and gain power from 
the dependencies created. As Hickson et al argue,
"The more contingencies are controlled by a sub-unit, the greater its 
power within the organisation". (1971: 222)
A contingency refers to a situation where an essential activity of one 
sub-unit is mediated by the activities of another sub-unit. As the 
independent variables are necessary but not sufficient conditions for 
organisational dependency then contingencies controlled by a sub-unit 
as a result of a single variable are not strategic unless the sub-unit
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also controls other contingencies by virtue of the other variables. 
Hickson et al illustrate their strategic contingencies theory of 
power by the diagram in Figure 2.2. The diagram shows how each of 
the three major variables; coping with uncertainty, centrality and 
substitutability affect the control of strategic contingencies and 
thus the power of a sub-unit. This power is measured in terms of 
weight, domain and scope. Weight refers to the degree to which one 
sub-unit affects the probability of another sub-unit acting in a 
certain way. Domain is the number of sub-units affected by a 
particular sub-unit, while scope is the range of decision issues 
affected by a sub-unit. The diagram also shows the effects of 
routinisation. Hickson et al argue that there are two distinct forms 
of routinisation. Firstly, routinsation of coping by prevention, 
which is negatively related to uncertainty of inputs. Thus the more 
a sub-unit can cope by prevention the less uncertain the environment 
becomes. Secondly, there is routinisation of coping by information 
or absorption. This is positively related to substitutability. Thus 
as a sub-unit has its tasks routinised by information or absorption it
increases its subtitutability and thus reduces its power. Hickson and
his colleagues have subsequently applied their model to a series of 
organisational settings with results which they find satisfactory. 
(Hinings, Hickson, Pennings and Schneck 1974)
The Strategic Contingencies approach has been criticised on many
counts. Firstly it may be argued that it is built upon shakey found­
ations in terms of the traditions which form the basis of the theory.
In attempting to summarise these, Clegg and Dunkerley have suggested 
that Hickson et al (1971) "write in the tradition of an exchange theory 
allied to a behavioural concept of power, in a functionalist systems 
framework". (1980: 44 9)
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To this could be added that they also are located within the recent 
contingency tradition. The defects and problems of both the exchange 
tradition and the behavioural concept of power have been discussed 
elsewhere. The main criticism of the contingency approach is that it 
consists of a form of 'environmental determinism'. Thus contingency 
theory sees the organisation as having to cope with contingencies 
which derive from environmental factors. In the Strategic Contingen­
cies approach to power, the unit of analysis changes from the organi­
sation to the 'sub-unit' and the environmental inputs may come from 
outside or within the organisation.
The second major criticism concerns the definitions of some of the key 
terms used in the theory. The approach focuses upon the sub-unit as 
the appropriate level of analysis. Yet this concept is far from 
unproblematic. The strategic contingencies theory has to avoid the 
pitfall of consensual reification in its definition of sub-units. For 
as Legge (1978) has argued,
"if it is accepted that some individuals within a functioning sub­
unit can choose and make decisions for it, another circularity in 
defining the basis of power emerges. To speak of a sub-unit, which 
presumably is a collective of various and, possibly, at times, 
conflicting interests, as one 'thing', is to recognise that some of 
its members have the power to speak for it. Where does their power 
come from?" (1978: 29)
Clegg has also pointed to the difficulties encountered by the Strategic 
Contingencies theory in its treatment of sub-units. He argues that the 
theory in fact assumes that which it seeks to explain. In order to 
resolve the difficulties of sub-unit definition the theory assumes that
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power of managers. As Clegg demonstrates,
"This assumption enables the theory to talk of 'the environment' and 
the 'sub-unit' as if they were unitary phenomena. Thus a collective 
of potentially conflicting interests and world-views is regarded as 
one thing (a 'sub-unit'), which serves only to demonstrate the power 
of some members of that collective.They are able to 'speak' for it, 
representing it as one such thing. Any such assumption of identity 
in the face of differences would have to spell out how that difference 
was overcome in a way which the 'strategic contingency' theory does 
not". (1975: 47)
We have therefore a circular argument where, "Power comes to be 
located in the portals of power". (Clegg and Dunkerley 1980: 442).
The strategic contingencies theory also appears to have problems with 
its concept of uncertainty. Initially Hickson et al (1971) define 
uncertainty as "a lack of information about future events, so that 
alternatives and their outcomes are unpredictable". (1971: 219)
Thus uncertainty is a property of organisational members and their 
perceptions and not a facet of the environment. Yet later in the 
paper it is stated that; "Uncertainty might be indicated by the 
variability of those inputs to the organisation which are taken by the 
sub-unit". (1971: 220). Here then, uncertainty is located not in the 
minds of members but in the environmental inputs. Hence in both the 
case of the concept of 'sub-unit' and of 'uncertainty' it may be argued 
that power is determined by the structural properties of the organi­
sation.
Thus the main criticism of the strategic contingencies approach is that
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it relates power to structural relationships but ignores the 
origins of these relationships and the processes which created them.
As Clegg has eloquently argued,
"Power in the organisation begins to look rather like an ongoing 
game of chess in which the pieces gain their power through their 
current position, rather than gaining their current position through 
their power to make moves according to the rules of the game. In 
short, the power which a piece has is defined totally in terms of 
its relationships. This definition entirely neglects the progress 
of the game in terms of its history and rules". (1975: 49)
Because of their structural determinism Hickson et al (1971) manage 
to ignore prior questions of the history and rules of game.
2.3 Power in current american organisational theory
It is at this point useful to attempt an overview of the conceptual­
isation of power in the American organisational theory literature. 
During the last decade two of the most prolific writers on power in 
organisations have been Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald Salancik (Pfeffer 
and Salancik 1974, 1978; Salancik and Pfeffer 1974, 1977; Pfeffer 
1977, 1978, 1981). Pfeffer has recently produced a review of power 
entitled 'Power in Organisations' (1981) which we can usefully consider 
as representing the 'state of the art' as far as the concept of power 
in organisational theory is concerned. By an analysis of Pfeffers 
work we can gain a clear appreciation of the ways in which power is 
considered in the organisational theory literature.
Pfeffer's concept of power refers to "the capability of one social 
actor to overcome resistance in achieving a desired objective or
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result". (1981: 2). This his view of power seems close to that of,
Dahl (1957, 1968). Power is seen as a force sufficient to overcome 
conflict between social actors in a specific relationship or context. 
Power is not generalised capacity or potential but is restricted to 
specific examples of its ’exercise’ over specific 'issues’. Pfeffer 
argues that while power may be difficult to define it is not difficult 
to recognise. It refers to "the ability of those who possess power 
to bring about the outcome they desire". (Salanicik and Pfeffer 1977b 
:3) .
Like Hickson et al (1971), Pfeffer argues that the vertical, hierar­
chical dimension of power is not the only dimension and identifies 
'sub-units' as a focus of horizontal power within organisations. Thus, 
"power is, first of all, a structural phenomenon, created by the 
division of labour and departmentation that chracterise the specific 
organisation or set of organisations being investigated". (1981: 4) 
However Pfeffer does discuss the role of authority and, following 
Mechanic, the power of lower participants in the organisation.
Power, for Pfeffer, is a static phenomena given by structural factors 
at a particular point in time. In order to cover the dynamic aspects 
he discusses the associated concept of 'politics'. Thus "Power is the 
property of the system at rest; politics is the study of power in 
action" (1981: 7). Pfeffer defines his concept of organisational 
politics as involving,
"those activities taken within organisations to acquire, develop and 
use power and other resources to obtain one's preferred outcomes in 
a situation in which there is uncertainty or dissensus about choices", 
(1981: 7)
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Pfeffer then considers the question of why the concept of power has 
been so neglected in organisational theory in spite of the common- 
sense understanding of both power and political behaviour. Two 
reasons are suggested to explain this neglect. Firstly the diffi­
culties of definition and operationalisation of the concepts. Secondly, 
and more importantly, he argues that one needs to examine the role 
of management and organisational theory.
"A more likely explanation for the neglect of power in the management 
and organisational behaviour literature is found by considering the 
role of management writing in the management process, and the 
position of a topic such as power as implied by the various functions 
served by management writing. The argument to be developed is 
relatively straightforward: management writing serves a variety of 
functions; in virtually all these functions there is a strong 
component of ideology and values; topics such as power and politics 
are basically incompatible with the values and ideology being devel­
oped; therefore, it is useful, to ignore topics which detract from 
the functions being served by the writing, and this includes tending 
to ignore or to downplay the topics of power and politics". (1981: 10)
Pfeffer acknowledges that much of management writing is itself 
political and that it makes unwarranted assumptions. He also notes 
that this can be clearly seen when one compares American theories with 
the European organisational literature and its more context-specific, 
historical and wide political view and where it is assumed
"that conceptions of organisations themselves are products of a social 
construction of reality which also constitutes an ingredient of 
politics played out on a macro-social level". (1981: 15)
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Yet despite identifying these notions, Pfeffer fails to fully develop 
them in his account of power.
Pfeffer suggests that while power and politics are important and 
neglected factors in organisations they constitute a political model 
which is just one of several competing models of organisation. These 
models include the Rational Choice model; the Bureaucratic model and 
the Decision Process or Organised Anarchy models. Figure 2.3 briefly 
describes the four competing models on eight relevant dimensions.
Pfeffer appears to suggest that the political power model increasingly 
characterises many organisations. Having located his political power 
model we can now move on to a more detailed examination.
Pfeffer begins by examining how we can assess power in organisations.
He suggests that this requires two separate operations. Firstly the 
actors in the power relationship need to be identified and secondly 
the relative amounts of their power need to be evaluated. Before 
considering how this can be done Pfeffer raises two associated 
problems. One concerns what Dahl (1957) called the problem of the 
chameleon. This refers to individuals who follow the lead of, and always 
side with, a powerful actor within the organisation. Thus they 
are usually on the winning side of any dispute but may have little 
or no power. The second difficulty concerns what Friedrich (1937) 
termed the 'rule by anticipated reactions'. Dahl (1957) suggested 
that there must exist a 'time-lag' between the actions of A and the 
responses of B or power cannot be said to exist. This conception is 
dictated by his causal metaphor. But this need not be the case.
As Pfeffer argues.
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"The less powerful social actor may and, in fact, probably will take 
into account the likely response of the more powerful in framing 
action in the first place. Thus, an attempt to assess power must 
try to account for the extent to which initial expressions of 
preference already reflect the power of others in the organisation". 
(1981: 46)
Interestingly enough, despite this statement, Pfeffer again fails to 
fully develop the implications of this idea in his work.
How is the relative power of political actors in the organisation to 
be identified? Pfeffer discusses five separate methods. Firstly there 
is the process of assessing power by its determinants. This is 
attributed to Gamson (1968) amongst others. It involves understanding 
what causes power in a particular situation and then measuring the 
relative power of social actors by demonstrating how much of the cause 
of power they possess. Thus "instead of trying to measure power 
directly, power is assessed by considering how much of each of the 
determinents of power the various individuals, sub-units, or groups 
possess". (1981: 48). Pfeffer acknowledges that this approach 
creates problems of operationalisation.
The second method of assessing power consists of examining the 
consequences or results of power. This is, in essence, the so-called 
'issue' approach used by the pluraliste including Dahl (1957) in the 
Community Power Debate. This approach argues that power is used in 
organisations to affect the decision-making process and therefore the 
distribution of power can be elucidated by an examination of which 
social actors benefit most from the decisions taken. As Pfeffer 
suggests, there, "are many examples of the consequences of power:
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budget distributions among sub-units, the allocation of positions, 
the making of strategy and policy choices which are favoured by and 
are favourable to various actors, and so forth” . (1981: 49). As we 
discussed in the first Chapter there are several problems with this 
approach. The researcher needs to be able to distinguish 'key' 
decisions over which conflicts will occur and thus which will reflect 
the power distribution and also it must be possible to identify which 
social actors have won and lost in relation to these issues. Both of 
these can, at times, be problematic, especially in the field of 
industrial relations where winning and losing is not clear cut and 
where both parties often 'cloud' the result with rhetoric.
Power can also be assessed by analysing the distribution of the 
symbols of power. Pfeffer has argued that these symbols
"include things such as titles, special parking places, special 
eating facilities, rest-rooms, automobiles, airplanes, office size, 
placement and furnishings, and other pre-requisites of position and 
power. Such symbols are particularly likely to be employed to 
distinguish among vertical levels of power within organisations". 
(1981: 50)
Thus the main problem with this form of power assessment is that it 
tends to focus upon the formal power and authority structures and 
ignore other less formal sources and distributions of power.
The fourth method of assessing power listed by Pfeffer is the repu­
tational method used by sociologists (e.g. Hunter 1953) in the 
Community Power Debate. This consists of asking various respondents 
to list and rank other social actors in terms of the power they possess
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This method has also been extensively used in the field of organi­
sational theory. It has been used by Perrow (1970) and by Minings 
et al (1974) in their empirical testing of strategic contingences 
approach. Pfeffer and Salanicik (1974) in their study of the power 
of academic departments at the University of Illinois asked depart­
ment heads to rate the relative power of the various other departments. 
A similar process was used in the later replication study (Moore 1979). 
This approach makes two assumptions both of which may be problematic. 
Firstly the method assumes that social actors are knowledgeable about 
the distribution of power within their organisations. This is inter­
esting as Pfeffer and Salanicik were members of staff at the University 
of Illinois at the time of their study. The second assumption is 
that respondents will be willing to disclose what they know about 
power distributions. But why should they do this? They have little 
to gain and could lose by sharing, and thus decreasing, the scarcity 
value of their knowledge.
The final method of assessing the power of organisational actors is 
the use of representational indicators. Pfeffer has defined repre­
sentational indicators as assessing, "the position of social actors in 
critical organisational roles such as membership on influential 
boards and committees or occupancy of key administrative posts".
(1981: 57). It is argued that these positions provide their incumbents 
with power because they gain control over resources, information, ahd 
decisions as a result. These 'sources’ of power will be developed 
later.
Pfeffer argues that after the relative power of the various organisa­
tional actors has been assessed, we need to examine the conditions
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necessary for the use of power. The factors which produce power and 
enable its used in organisations are shown in a model in diagrammatic 
form in Figure 2.4.
Pfeffer identifies three main conditions which produce the use of 
power in organisations. The first is interdependence which is defined 
as "a situation in which what happens to one organisational actor 
affects what happens to others". (1981: 68). The second is the 
existence of heterogeneous goals, or goals which are incompatible. 
Associated with this condition is a related one which suggests that 
there needs to be disagreement between the actors in terms of technology, 
Pfeffer uses technology to refer to "the relationship between 
decisions and outcomes" (1981:69). The final condition producing the 
use of power is scarcity. Pfeffer postulates that the greater the 
scarcity, the greater the power and effort will be expended in order 
to resolve the decision. These three conditions, interdependence, 
heterogeneous goals and beliefs and scarcity thus produce conflict. 
Whether this conflict actually results in the exercise of power depends 
upon two other factors. Firstly, the degree of importance attached to 
the issue, decision or resource by one or more of the organisational 
actors. Thus is the issue a 'key' one or merely trivial? The second 
condition is the distribution of power. Pfeffer suggests that the 
greater the dispersal of power throughout the organisation, the greater 
the visible exercise of power in political activity. Thus, by impli­
cation, Pfeffer is postulating that the ultimate form of power is one 
where power is centralised and possessed by one group or actor 
(domination) and in this situation power will tend to be invisible, 
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There are two other factors in Pfeffer’s model. Differentiation refers 
"to the fact that in most large organisations, there is specialisation 
of the participants and sub-units by task - a division of labour which 
enables the organisation to achieve certain economies but which also 
entails some costs". (1981: 71). This differentiation obviously is 
related to interdependence through the division of labour and also 
leads to the holding of different goals and beliefs. Pfeffer also 
suggests that these goals and beliefs can be environmentally shaped 
in that organisational actors join the organisation with certain 
preferences and beliefs related to their previous experience.
What then are the sources of power in organisation? Pfeffer lists 
five main sources of power. Firstly he acknowledges the notion that 
power resides in the other's dependence, an idea developed by Emerson 
(1962) and, later, Blau (1964) and Thompson (1967). This notion has 
been further developed by Pfeffer and Salanicik (1978) in the 
organisational context.
Secondly, power arises from the control of resources. It is argued 
that organisations require a continuous provision of resources in 
order to survive. Thus those individuals or sub-units who can 
provide the most scarce resources will become powerful. Pfeffer 
suggests that such resources include "money, prestige, legitimacy, 
rewards and sanctions, and expertise ..." (1981: 101). Thirdly, as
we have already seen, some theorists argue that power derives from 
the ability of an actor or sub-unit to cope with uncertainty, (cf 
Hickson et al 1971). Fourthly Pfeffer argues that power can derive 
from being irreplaceable. Thus, "the argument is that power accrues 
to those social actors who provide a critical resource for the
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organisation and who cannot be readily replaced in that function". 
(1981: 112-113). This factor has been mentioned by many writers in­
cluding French and Raven (1959) in terms of ’expert power’; Mechanic 
(1962) as the concept of ’replacability’; and Hickson et al (1971) 
as ’substitutability’. Pfeffer points out that the degree of 
substitutability is not fixed but can be varied by use of certain 
strategies.
All the preceding views of the sources of power take a rather static 
perspective on the determination of power. Pfeffer’s final factor is 
a more dynamic one. He argues that power can accrue from the ability 
to affect the decision process. Thus, decisions, "are made in a 
sequential process, and it is possible for a social actor within the 
organisation to have power because of his or her ability to affect 
some part of the decision process". (1981: 115). Organisational 
actors can affect the decision process in several ways. The actor 
may be able to affect or control the premises or assumptions that 
are used in making the decision and thus ensure a favourable decision 
result. Alternatively, as any decision is usually a choice between 
alternative courses of action, then, the ability to control which 
alternatives are presented for discussion confers power. As Pfeffer 
argues,
"It is clear that the final choice among alternatives will be heavily 
dependent on the alternatives which are considered at all and which 
survive the initial winnowing process... Those in a position to 
define the alternatives to be considered have tremendous impact on 
the final decision outcome, regardless of the voting or decision 
rules used to make the final choice". (1981: 119)
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Finally, the ability to control the information presented to the 
decision-makers confers power and enables the decision outcome to be 
affected.
During his discussion of political strategies and tactics Pfeffer 
discusses both unobtrusive and more obtrusive strategies for the 
exercise of power. Pfeffer agrees with Bachrach and Baratz (1962) 
that one of the least obtrusive ways of exercising power is to prevent 
a decision issue from emerging in the first place. Thus power is 
related to the process of * non-decision-making* and 'control of the 
issue agenda*. On a more obtrusive level power can be exercised by 
the use of coalitions formed around specific issues. Thus a typical 
political strategy involves the building of both external constitu­
encies and internal allionees or coalitions. A final strategy in­
volves giving a representation of a group or sub-unit, whose support 
is required, a position on some committee or other body. As Pfeffer 
argues such 'cooptation*,
"is so often effective because it exposes the coopted representatives 
to informational social influence, and confronts them with conformity 
pressures and the necessity of justifying their actions. Cooptation 
provides labels and expectations that increase identification and 
commitment to the organisation, gives the representatives a stake 
and legitimate position in the organisation, and motivates them 
to be interested in the organisations survival and success". (1981: 167)
What, then, does Pfeffer*s work tell us that is novel or illuminating 
concerning the concept of power? Pfeffer's work can be said to represent 
current thinking about power within American organisational theory and 
administrative science (especially that tradition which is located within
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the pages of Administrative Science Quarterly). Yet Pfeffer’s work 
does not provide an addition to our knowledge of the processes of 
power. His work consists merely of a review and catalogue of the 
power literature reiterating many of the theories and notions of 
power that we have already discussed including the issue and repu­
tational approaches, dependencies, resource bases, control of 
uncertainty and substitutability. However his model of power and 
politics in organisational decision making is incapable of uniting 
these diverse threads into a coherent and comprehensive model of 
power.
2.4 Organisations as bargaining and influence systems
If we turn our attention from the situation in the U.S.A, we can 
consider the most recent 'school' of power theorising on this side 
of the Atlantic. Peter Abell et al (1975) have attempted to develop 
a distinctive theory of power in organisations, rejecting the control 
of resources approach and the reputational model of power in favour 
of a focus on decision making processes. In doing this he chooses to 
concentrate upon one of the sources of power later identified by 
Pfeffer and thus locate himself in a Dahlian position. Abell views 
organisations as,
"complex mechanisms for arriving at collective decisions through 
bargaining and influence processes amongst a set of power-and-in- 
fluence holding units. In short, we view an organisation (...) as 
a bargaining and influence system". (1975; 11)
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Abell proposes the stress on bargaining for two main reasons. Firstly, 
because power and influence are characteristically involved in the 
process of decision making. Secondly, because all organisation! tasks 
involve varying degrees of discretion which allows 'room' for power 
and influence to be exerted. Both these statements are true because 
organisations are systems faced with uncertainty. In this Abell 
follows Crozier (1964), Thompson (1967) and Hickson et al (1971).
Having stated his theoretical position Abell proceeds to delineate 
concepts of power which can be operationalised. He states that these 
concepts are to be considered in relation to the epistemological 
notion of 'globalism' which means the surrender of "local complexity 
for a global relevance in the study of complex structures". (1975: 13). 
He is also very much concerned with questions of 'which' groups possess 
power; 'what' degrees of power they hold; and 'what' issues they 
exercise power over. He is less concerned therefore, with questions of 
'why' the group is powerful. Abell's general definition of power is 
as follows:
"So, expressing it rather crudely, the power and influence of an 
actor will be defined in terms of his ability to obtain his objectives 
in the face of others with competing objectives (....). Intraorgani- 
sational conflict is thus a necessary (though not sufficient) 
condition for the empirical study of bargaining power and influence 
as we construe them". (1975: 14).
Influence occurs where A influences B to change his objectives in a 
given situation. Put more formally, the influence of A over B is,
"the ability of A to modify B's preferred outcomes in a bargaining and 
influence situation, all other influences 'held constant". (1975: 15)
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Bargaining power occurs where B retains his objectives but 'loses 
out' and A achieves his objectives. Abell, therefore, defines the 
bargaining power of A as, "his ability to obtain his preferred out­
comes, when facing competing preferred outcomes, in a bargaining 
situation". (1975: 15). It can be seen from these definitions that 
Abell's view of power is a 'one-dimensional' one, in that for him 
the absence of observable conflict means that power cannot be studied 
even though it may exist. Thus Abell's work focuses upon observable 
decisions, identifiable decision-makers or protagonists and an 
observable conflict of interests between them. However it may be 
argued that this approach might have several problems. It ignores 
the fact that power can be exercised by preventing certain issues 
from arising (Bachrach and Baratz 1962; Pfeffer 1981). It fails to 
deal with possible 'concealed' decision makers and does not take 
account of Lukes' three dimensional argument that the most serious 
form of power is the very shaping of people's preferences and the 
creation of an artificial consensus. Abell's approach also presents 
an 'all or nothing' perspective to the measurement of power. Thus the 
actor who prevails on an issue is seen as 'powerful'. Yet other actors 
many lose had a certain degree of power but not enough to 'win' the 
decision.
However Abell is fully aware of such challenges to his work. Later in 
his book he argues that,
"Power and influence are not only related to the degree to which 
actors can obtain their objectivés, but also to 'forces' that engender, 
maintain and establish the persuasiveness of the constraining norms.
For instance, if top management are in a position in various ways to 
limit the perceived feasible objectives of lower participants despite
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their participation in decision making, then this is very much an 
aspect of managements power". (1975: 27)
Yet, despite this understanding, Abell argues that such facets of 
power lie outside the range of his model. Indeed he explicitly 
acknowledges that power within the organisation is constrained and 
affected by the wider social systems within which the organisation is 
located, but simply notes that,
"The present model does not formally handle these very wide-ranging 
issues except to observe that influence and bargaining take place 
within the constraining limits of a normative system which can be 
more or less well described". (1975: 27)
It may be suggested that Abell is unable to fully develop the limi­
tations which affect his work because of an overriding attachment to 
a particular espistemology and derived methodology. Not only is Abell 
locked within a positivist, behaviourist epistemology but he is also 
limited by the associated desire for quantifiable, empirical measurement 
This leads him to omit variables and facets of power which he himself 
acknowledges are of importance.
2.5 The development of industrial relations theory
As in many disciplines, the theoretical development of industrial 
relations is not open to straightforward simple description because 
the development has been disjunctive, obtuse and lacking in consensus. 
Thus in order to explore the way in which the concept of power has been 
handled in industrial relations theory it is necessary briefly to 
analyse that theoretical development.
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The last two decades have, for the subject of Industrial Relations, 
been a period of re-orientation. This has taken the form of attempts 
to develop a theoretical model or approach suitable for the subject.
The need for such an approach arose largely because of the way in 
which industrial relations research had developed since its inception 
in the United Kingdom. Bain and Clegg in their survey of industrial 
relations research suggest that for the most part such research had 
been, "characterised by fact-finding and description rather than by 
theoretical analysis and generalisation". (1974: 103). Most of the 
early work in industrial relations (and indeed a good deal of the 
more recent) can be classified as empiricist and positivist in 
nature. Researchers assumed that knowledge of industrial relations 
could be extended by the addition of more 'facts' concerning the 
'institutions' involved in the field. It may be argued that this 
early descriptive phase of the development of industrial relations 
can be described as its 'pre-theoretical' stage. In the 1950's many 
writers in the field recognised that if industrial relations was to 
develop and obtain discipline status, then a theoretical framework 
had to be established to systematise and integrate the large amount of 
data already available. Prior to this period researchers had simply 
selected discrete areas for study when faced with the enormity of the 
industrial relations field. This led to an absence of macro level 
theory. As most researchers concentrated upon the major organised 
bodies (trade unions, employers associations and Government 
machinery) it is not surprising that this was labelled the 'institu­
tional' approach to industrial relations. The purpose of theory was, 
therefore, "to relate isolated facts, to point to new types of inquiries 
and to make research more additive". (Dunlop 1958: 6). In a famous 
passage that is worth quoting at length, Dunlop argues that theory is
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necessary because:
"the field of industrial relations today may be described in the words 
of Julian Huxley: 'Mountains of facts have been piled upon the
plains of human ignorance .... The result is a glut of raw material. 
Great piles of facts are lying around unutilised, or utilised only 
in an occasional or partial manner'. Facts have outrun ideas. 
Integrating theory has lagged far behind expanding experience. The 
many worlds of industrial relations have been changing more rapidly 
than the ideas to interpret, to explain and to relate them". (1958:vi)
While this is the argument which led to the development of theory, it 
should be noted that the idea of a 'mountain of facts' in industrial 
relations has been recently criticised (Wood 1978) despite its 'taken 
for granted' status by most writers in the field. He argues that we 
might be better off to accept that the assumed 'mountain of facts' 
does not exist, because the claim that theory can integrate the 
existing facts assumes that they have been collected in a highly 
competent and 'fastidious way'. As Wood correctly points out,
"If theory and concrete analysis are linked in some way, then surely 
the appeal for theory, if it is to amount to more than a retreat to 
sterile taxonomy building and fancy phrases, amounts to a criticism of 
the kinds of questions that past researchers have been asking: if 
this is so, how can we be complacent and uncritical about the facts 
we purport to know?" (1978: 52)
The other main incentive for theoretical development was its supposed 
necessity if industrial relations was to achieve the status of a 
discipline.
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Thus theory was a means of delineating the field of industrial 
relations. Many writers agreed that the survival and development of 
industrial relations as a discipline was dependent upon the creation 
of a broad conceptual or theoretical framework serving to integrate 
the disparate strands of thinking and research now roughly juxtaposed 
under the banner 'industrial relations'. (Somers 1969: 39)
What, then, have been the theoretical developments in the field of 
industrial relations? A number of attempts have been made to classify 
the theoretical concepts used in industrial relations (Blain and 
Gennard 1970, Walker 1976), but for the purposes of this section the 
scheme adopted by Schienstock (1981) will be used. This delineates the 
following threads of theoretical development;
a) The systems model
b) The action theory model
c) The politico-economic or Marxist model
It is recognised that one of the problems with classification systems 
such as the above is that they tend to deflect attention away from the 
subtle divisions and differences within each 'school' and direct 
attention toward basic similarities. Thus within the Systems model 
are located general systems theorists (Dunlop 1958), open systems 
theorists (Craig 1973) and the 'Oxford School'. There are wide 
differences between each of these and indeed within the 'Oxford School' 
itself. However, the scheme provides a framework within which a 
discussion of the theoretical developments of industrial relations is 
possible.
Running parallel to the three theoretical and methodological strands 
identified by Schienstock are three political or ideological approaches
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to industrial relations. These are;
a) The unitarist perspective
b) The pluralist perspective
c) The radical perspective
These political perspectives are interrelated and intertwined, 
sometimes implicitly, in other cases explicitly, with the theoretical 
and methodological strands. During this chapter all six approaches 
will be described and their use of the concept of power analysed.
2.6 Systems models of industrial relations
The first major theoretical work in industrial relations was that of 
John T. Dunlop. In 1958 he published his seminal "Industrial Relations 
Systems" in which he proposed a theoretical framework designed to 
free industrial relations from,
"the preoccupation, if not the obsession, with labour peace and 
warfare". (1958: 380)
The basis of his approach is his use of the concept of a 'system' 
which he largely derives from Parsons' (1956) discussion of the 
interactions of the social and economic systems. It should be noted 
that this is a very general use of the term 'system' and is not related 
to the more scientific use of the same term as in the work of Von 
Bertalanffy (1950) or Buckley (1967).
Dunlop argues that society can be considered as a total social system, 
sub-divided into its constituent parts; the industrial relations, 
political and economic sub-systems. These sub-systems are interrelated 
and interact both with each other and the total social system.
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Dunlop suggests that this ’systems approach* helps to distinguish 
three separate analytical problems;
"(a) the relation of the industrial relations system to the society 
as a whole (b) the relation of the industrial-relations system to 
the subsystem known as the economic system and (c) the inner 
structure and characteristics of the industrial relations sub­
system itself". (1956: 7)
The details of an industrial relations system have been described by 
Dunlop as follows :
"Every industrial relations system involves three groups of actors: 
1) workers and their organisations, 2) managers and their organi­
sations, and 3) government agencies concerned with the workplace 
and the work community. Every industrial relations system creates 
a complex of rules to govern the workplace and work community ... 
The actors in an industrial relations system are regarded as con­
fronting an environmental context at any one time. The environment 
is comprised of three interrelated contexts: the technology, the 
market or budgetary constraints and the power relations and status 
of the actors .... The system is bound together by an ideology or 
understandings shared by all the actors. The central task of a 
theory of industrial relations is to explain why particular rules 
are established in particular industrial relations systems and how 
and why they change in response to changes affecting the system". 
(1958: viii-ix)
From the above we can see that power plays a central part in the 
industrial relations theory of Dunlop.
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The industrial relations system comprises various actors whose 
behaviour is influenced by the environment of which an important 
part is the relative power and status of the actors themselves. This 
relative power or status thus affects the crux of any industrial 
relations system; the production of a complex of rules. Thus the 
nature of the rules produced at any time will partially reflect the 
power and status of the actors in the system.
How then does Dunlop define the notion of power? Unfortunately, given 
the centrality of power in his theory, Dunlop makes no attempt to 
define power at all. He simply notes that the distribution of power 
in the industrial relations system will reflect to a certain degree 
the distribution of power among the actors in the wider society. This 
neglect of the concept of power itself obviously weakens Dunlop’s 
theory.
It is also important to note at this juncture that Dunlop’s use of 
ideology signals that on another dimension he is adopting a ’pluralist 
position. This will be discussed in detail later in this chapter. It 
is sufficient to note at present that, while he argues that each of 
the actors in the industrial relations system has a different ideology, 
it is a prerequisite of the theory that these ideologies are reducible 
to a basic consensus. As he argues,
"An industrial relations system requires that these ideologies be 
sufficiently compatible and consistent so as to permit a common set 
of ideas which recognise an acceptable role for each actor".
(1958: 17)
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Since the publication of 'Industrial Relations Systems' in 1958 there 
have been attempts to re-appraise and develop the systems approach to 
industrial relations and this trend has increased in recent years.
Craig (1973) and Blain and Gennard (1970), for example, have attempted 
to refine and improve the concept of an industrial relations system. 
Craig utilises the 'open systems' approach derived from the natural 
sciences and the work of Von Bertalanffy (1950) in order to improve 
upon Dunlop's less specific use of the term system. Open systems 
theory assumes that the subject matter (industrial relations) consists,
"of a set of interrelated parts which operate in an environment. This 
implies that the system, in addition to its own inputs (within-puts) 
also receives inputs from the environment and, through a process of 
transformation, produces outputs for the system itself and emits 
them into the environmental sub-systems". (1973: 8)
The open systems model used by Craig contains four basic elements; 
inputs, the procedures for converting inputs into outputs, the outputs 
and a feedback loop which is required if the system is to be dynamic.
Craig defines an industrial relations system as including,
"a complex of private and public activities, operating in an 
environment which is concerned with the allocation of rewards to 
employees for their services, and the conditions under which services 
are rendered". (1973: 8)
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It can be seen from this diagram that, as with Dunlop, Craig assigns 
power a central place in his schema. The various environmental systems 
affect the goals and power of the actors and thus the outputs of the 
system. Unlike Dunlop, however, Craig offers a definition. Power,
"refers to the ability of an actor to satisfy his goals despite the 
resistance of others". (1973: 9-10)
This definition of power mirrors that of Weber. Craig says little else 
concerning power except to point to the difficulties in operational­
ising the concept.
Blain and Gennard (1970) point to two interrelated faults with the 
systems approach. Firstly, they suggest that it is simply a structural 
concept which merely shows the relationships between the various sub­
systems but does not explain the dynamics of their behaviour. In order 
to introduce a dynamic element into the model they suggest the use of 
comparative static analysis which compares the system at two different 
points in time. Secondly they argue that the approach ignores the 
level of the individual. While this is fair, their attempt to add the 
individual into the model, by the simple addition of a 'personality 
factor' to the components of the industrial relations system listed 
by Dunlop, is too simplistic. Blain and Gennard do not discuss the 
concept of power in any more detail than Dunlop.
During the 1960's there developed in the United Kingdom a group of 
writers based upon Oxford who became extremely influential in the 
development of the academic study of industrial relations and upon 
policy especially through the Donovan Report. This group of academics 
which included H.A. Clegg, the late Allan Flanders, Alan Fox,
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Lord McCarthy and G.S. Bain became known as the 'Oxford School'.
Their general approach to industrial relations can be characterised 
by a concentration on job regulation, the voluntary reform of the 
regulation system and its relationship with pluralist thought. Because 
of this it has been variously termed the liberal-pluralist approach, 
the voluntaristic-pluralist approach or the reformist movement.
However the existence and coherence of the school should not be un­
critically assumed. It may be argued that they were not as internally 
homogeneous as they have been portrayed and that the school never 
approached the position of a dominant perspective because of the 
existence of dissenting voices such as H.Â. Turner.
However, the group do exhibit certain pertinent similarities in their 
work. As Wood and Elliot have argued,
"At a practical level they were, amongst other things, concerned to 
defend trade unions from public hostility in the changing economic 
and political context, opposed to the widespread use of law as an 
instrument for the reform of labour relations, committed to the 
principle of collective bargaining as the best means of conducting 
industrial relations and involved in attempting to develop industrial 
relations as a distinctive and legitimate academic pursuit". (1977:107)
While they were generally distrustful of theory, it may be argued that 
their practical approach masks an undisclosed set of theoretical 
assumptions.
Perhaps the most theoretical writer in the 'Oxford School' was Allan 
Flanders. Flanders argued that industrial relations is the study of 
the institutions of job regulation.
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Thus, following Dunlop, he focuses upon the output of the industrial 
relations system; that is the 'web of rules'. Unlike Dunlop,
Flanders does not take into account the environmental contexts.
Instead he sees the system of rules as being determined by the process 
of collective bargaining which is regarded not as a purely economic 
phenomenon as in the work of the Webbs (1902) and Dunlop (1944) but 
in essence as a political institution following Ross (1948). Thus, 
for Flanders, the process of joint regulation is "primarily a 
political institution". (1970: 220) in which,
"the parties have many other considerations in mind apart from the 
conflicting interests of their constituents as buyers and sellers 
of labour". (1970: 226)
Despite this focus upon the political nature of the joint regulation 
process and thus the centrality of power to his conception of 
industrial relations, Flanders fails to explain his use of the concept 
or indeed to address it directly, seemingly content to utilise it as 
an unexplicated common sense term. It may be argued, however, that 
there is in Flanders work, an unspoken but inherent notion of power 
which is similar to that of the 'Bargaining Power' theorists to be 
discussed later.
The systems approach of Dunlop and his later followers combined with 
the 'Oxford School' has come to form one of the major strands of the 
orthodoxy of industrial relations. It can be argued that these 
approaches have created several problems for the understanding of 
industrial relations phenomena in general and the notion of power in 
particular.
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The first problem is that the systems approach concentrates upon the 
output of the system rather than the inputs. Thus both Dunlop and 
Flanders concentrate upon what they see to be the output of an 
industrial relations system; a 'web of rules'. This leads to a 
concern with effects, results and outcomes rather than with causes. 
Singh has drawn attention to the fact that although Dunlop has 
"defined an output, little or nothing is said about his input or 
system transformation". (1976: 62).
As an example of this kind of thinking, industrial relations research 
into strikes has tended to concentrate upon a description of their 
incidence and an evaluation of their effects (Turner 1969, McCarthy 
1970, Silver 1973) while the more vexing and problematic notion of 
causation has been largely ignored. Similarly most studies of work­
groups have concentrated on the effects of group size or work task 
upon behaviour rather than any analysis of how workgroups arise and 
attitudes are generated. Thus the production and nature of rules is 
the focus of attention while other parts of the system such as the 
relative power of the actors is largely ignored or 'taken for granted'
Secondly, the idea of a 'web of rules' and the subsequent focus on 
job regulation appears to reflect a conservative bias in the theoreti­
cal framework used by Dunlop and Flanders. Drawn as they are from the 
wider theories of structural functionalism via Parsons (1951) and 
social systems theory via the work of Dunlop's later followers (e.g. 
Craig 1973), these approaches are based upon organismic or mechanical 
analogies of human conduct which emphasise the tendencies to equili­
brium or homeostasis. Thus the approaches assume the existence of 
order, stability and regulation rather than conflict and charge.
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As Fatchett and Whittingham point out,
"the practical application of the theoretical framework had led to 
an inability or reluctance to deal with conflict and change".
(1976: 53)
Indeed, Fatchett and Whittingham argue that while the focus of the 
systems approach on job regulation,
"has increased our understanding of the rules of job regulation, 
it has been achieved at the cost of an almost total disregard 
of the causes of conflict". (1976: 55)
It is for this reason that Margerison has suggested that conflict 
should be "the basic concept that (forms) the basis of the study of 
industrial relations" (1969: 274). This conservative or consensual 
bias is illustrated by Dunlop's treatment of the concept of ideology. 
While recognising that the actors in the industrial relations system 
may have differing ideologies he insists that these must be reduceable 
to a single consensual ideology which binds the system together.
Several authors have argued, however, that the allegations of a 
conservative on consensual bias are unfounded. Blain and Gennard 
(1970) have suggested the use of comparative static analysis to 
introduce a dynamic element into the systems approach. This would 
enable the approach to deal with the problems of conflict and change. 
Singh (1976) on the other hand rejects the conflict/consensus dichotomy 
He suggests that conflict and consensus are ends of a continuum and 
and that the use of terms 'stability' and 'equilibrium' do not imply a 
static system. A true 'open-systems' approach should, he argues, be 
able to both recognise and account for conflict and consensus.
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Therefore, "It is permissible and useful to use a systems model for 
industrial relations because a system is not only neutral in its 
explanation of phenomena, but it explicitly recognises the part 
played by human beings in society and therefore avoids reification". 
(1976: 69). Craig (1973) explicitly argues that his model assumes 
neither consensus or conflict.
"... in this framework neither harmony nor conflict is assumed among 
the actors. Rather these variables are set out separately as 
problematic and are to be determined by reference to the empirical 
reality of the system under study". (1973: 10)
Wood (1978) argues that while Dunlop can be located as a functionalist,
there is nothing inherent in functionalism, especially in Parsons, 
which implies that "order is inevitable, normal, or non-problematic". 
(1978: 46). Indeed he suggests that the central concern of functional­
ists is in how order is achieved, which presupposes the existence of 
conflict. While many writers would disagree with this reading of 
functionalism (Gouldner 1970, C. Wright Mills 1959) there are some who
would support Wood (Rocher 1974, Martins 1974).
One of the problems of this argument is that it is carried out on two 
levels. Some participants (Singh 1976, Craig 1973) are referring to the 
more sophisticated 'open-systems* theories and models. To the extent 
that these move away from mechanistic and organismic analogies of human 
conduct to embrace factional or catastrophic analogies, it may be argued 
that they can be developed to meet many of the previous criticisms. 
However most of the theoretical work in industrial relations is still 
grounded in less developed, cruder, systems models to which the 
criticisms still apply.
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The third difficulty is that the systems approach tends to ignore the 
level of the individual and the workgroup. Thus it has been demon­
strated that "personality, motivation, status and small-group inter­
actions have no place in Dunlop's system ... Dunlop is silent on these 
complexities of human behaviour". (Shimmin and Singh 1973: 38).
Dunlop (1950) in a discussion paper classifies three different levels 
of industrial relations behaviour; collective bargaining, the operations 
of management and of union organisations, and the conduct of 
individual workers in the work situation. Dunlop suggests that 
theorists should focus most of their attention on the first and 
second levels. However, he does not deny the relevance of the third 
level. Indeed he argues that "it is precisely in the area of the 
relation of individuals to organisations that it is hoped that 
disciplines like sociology and psychology have a contribution to make 
to industrial relations. There are very large gaps to be filled".
(1950: 391)
Flanders in his development of industrial relations theory has taken 
a much stronger line:
"Personal, or in the language of sociology 'unstructured' relationships 
have their importance for management and workers, but they lie outside 
the scope of a system of industrial relations". (1965). The result 
of these views is that most systems approaches have "tended to 
suggest a structural determinism in relation to the behaviour of the 
actors within the system" (Fatchett and Whittingham 1976). Yet it 
may be argued that it is this very level that is crucially important 
to any discussion of power in industrial relations. This is supported 
by the increase in studies at this level which make use of the concept
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of power as an explanatory variable. (Marchington 1975a, 1975b;
Poole 1974, 1976; Partridge 1975, 1976 and Batstone, Boraston and 
Frenkel 1977).
At this point it is appropriate to summarise the argument so far 
presented. It is suggested that the systems approaches (widely 
construed) have inherently within them certain ontological, epistem- 
ological and methodological assumptions and stances. These will be 
discussed in more detail in a later chapter. It is then argued that 
these assumptions and stances, rather than advancing the understanding 
of industrial relations phenomena, have in fact tended to obscure and 
hinder such understanding. This is particularly true in relation to 
the understanding of power in industrial relations which occupies the 
position of a totally neglected concept.
2.7 The action theory model
Schienstock (1981) suggests that it is very difficult to identify a 
imiform action theory model. However it is possible to delineate two 
nain areas of analysis. The first concerns the "analysis of the 
decision situation of the various actors" (1981: 174) and for the 
purposes of this chapter we will focus upon economic bargaining theory 
and the concept of bargaining power derived from it. The second area 
concerns the analysis of interaction. Schienstock is not the only 
theorist to have focused upon the action theory model. Somers (1969) 
has suggested that the concepts of exchange and interaction should 
form the basis of a theory of industrial relations and focuses upon 
tie notion of bargaining power. Somers suggests that relations at the 
workplace should be viewed as an exchange conditioned by relative 
bargaining power. Thus,
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"Management and labour will attempt to achieve these necessary ex­
changes on the best possible terms for themselves. Their success in 
doing so will depend on their relative bargaining power; and the 
rules, decisions and agreements which govern their relationship will 
be a reflection of their relative bargaining power in the exchange 
negotiations". (1969: 48)
In order to consider how this strand of industrial relations theory 
has conceptualised power we can review the development of economic 
bargaining theory. Traditional or classical economic theory 
contracted on the notion of a 'contract-zone’ or a 'range of inde­
terminateness? . In Figure 2.6, D is the employer's labour demand 
curve, while S and MC are his labour supply and marginal cost curves.






If we assume profit maximisation then the employer will operate at 
point B where the marginal cost of additional labour equals the marginal 
revenue product of that labour (as shown by the demand curve) . From the
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supply curve it can be seen that this will result in the employment 
of workers at wage rate W^. However given that the unions may 
have other ’poltical* considerations they may develop a preferred 
wage of W^. Thus and form the basis of the ’contract zone’ and 
the final wage rate decided will be between these two points. The 
contract zone is often referred to as ’the range of indeterminateness’ 
because within the outer limits the actual wage rate to be finally 
agreed between the parties is indeterminate. Thus the final rate 
depends upon non economic factors including the behaviour patterns 
and attitudes of the bargaining parties. As Schienstock argues,
"It is precisely here, in this assumption that wage regulation is 
socially influenceable and is ultimately explicable by way of an 
analysis of the behaviour of the various actors, that the theory 
of the bilateral monopoly becomes significant for an action theory 
approach to industrial relations". (1981: 174)
The Hicks (1932) theory of wages is an attempt to improve upon the 
classical theory and its indeterminateness. In Hick’s theory the 
readiness of the trade union to maintain industrial peace replaces 
labour as the essential object of bargaining. His central notion is 
that there is a relationship between the wage that the parties will 
accept and the length of strike that would be necessary to establish 
that wage.
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Thus in Figure 2,7 A is the wage that the employer would prefer to pay. 
However, he will concede more to avoid a strike and the size of his 
concession is partially related to the anticipated length of any 
threatened strike. This gives us the employer’s concession curve. The 
wage desired by the union is B but they will be willing to take less in 
order to avoid the costs of a stoppage. This is represented by the 
union’s resistance curve. Thus in Figure 2.7 both parties would agree 
to wage rate C rather than face a strike of S weeks in length. However 
there are problems with this approach. It assumes that there is 
perfect knowledge and that the parties agree on the probable length of 
any strike. Thus the theory ignores the prevalence of uncertainty in 
collective bargaining. Alternatively, the theory can be considered as 
a post hoc description of the history of a strike in which case it 
appears to be of limited utility.
Several authors have attempted to improve upon or refine the Hicksian 
theory. Here we shall concentrate on those who have developed notions 
of bargaining power.
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Chamberlain (1951) sought to broaden the concept of power implicit 
in the Hicksian theory. He therefore defines the,
"bargaining power (of A, let us say) as being the cost to B of 
disagreeing on A's terms relative to the cost of agreeing on A's 
terms. (1951: 220-221)
This definition can then be applied to consider the power of B. Thus 
it may be stated that,
"if the cost to B of disagreeing on A's terms is greater than the 
cost of agreeing on A's terms, while the cost to A of disagreeing 
on B's terms is less than the cost of agreeing on B's terms then 
A's bargaining power is greater than that of B". (1951: 221)
This notion of power has been developed by Levinson in the form of 
two ratios of 'costs' to the parties. They are as follows;
"Bargaining Power = The costs to B of disagreement with A's terms
of A The costs to B of agreement with A's terms
and conversely
Bargaining Power = The costs to A of disagreement with B's terms
of B The costs to A of agreement with B's terms" (1966:8)
Chamberlain's model of bargaining power can be seen to be a definite 
improvement upon the previous theories of bargaining power. The amount 
of power possessed by each party is variable and dependent upon the 
tactics adopted by the other party, the passage of time and the nature 
of the demands made. It also takes into account, not only the threat 
to strike or the resistance of the parties, but also the wider economic, 
political and social influences in so far as these affect the costs of 
agreement or disagreement.
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This concept of power, originating in economics, has become fairly 
standard, although taken for granted, in the industrial relations 
literature especially amongst those who concentrate upon the 
bargaining process. To reiterate the argument advanced in this 
section; it has been suggested that there exists a distinctive 
action theory model of industrial relations. This approach,
"... examines the question as to how bargaining based regulation 
processes in industrial relations proceed and the extent to which 
the contending parties are in a position to realise their respective 
objectives within the framework of a collective regulation of work". 
(Schienstock 1981: 184)
One aspect of this theoretical development has been the emergence of 
a notion of bargaining power.
However as we have seen the notions of power implicit in both tradi­
tional economic theory and the Hicksian approach are open to 
criticism. While the developments of Chamberlain and Levinson are 
considerable improvements, they are not above criticism. Firstly, by 
focusing on a diadic relationship the theory ignores, and cannot cope 
with, complex power structures. Secondly it measures power at a 
specific point in time in a specific situation and therefore cannot 
easily cope with the processual nature of power. The theory does not 
appear to take much account of interpersonal or persuasive power 
although this is mentioned by Walton and McKensie (1965). Finally this 
approach to power explains power by reference to the resources po­
ssessed by each party which enable costs to be inflicted on the other, 
but does not explain the prior distribution of such resources.
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2.8 The unionist and pluralist frames of reference
The second major strand of industrial relations orthodoxy can be said 
to be the ideology of pluralism. Its use in industrial relations is 
developed from its use in political science and its centrality in the 
so-called 'Community Power Debate*. Pluralism was introduced to 
industrial relations in a coherent manner by Fox (1966) who was 
interested in the use of ideology as a tool of industrial relations 
reform. In the Royal Commission Research Paper 3, Fox argues that 
the ’unitary* ideology, held by many managers and enshrined in many 
managerial theories, was not a realistic ideology for industrial 
relations as it denied the legitimacy and even existence of deep 
seated conflict and resisted the roles of trade unions and the process 
of joint regulation. He instead advocated the adoption of a 'plura­
list* approach which would recognise the existence of conflict and 
rival power groups within the industrial enterprise. In general terms, 
pluralism refers to a system where decision-making is a result of 
conflict and compromises between a plurality of different interest 
groups. This view stands in contradistinction to the elitist or 
sovereignty views which suggest that a single group or individual 
exists in the system whose decisions are definitive because of the 
power superiority that they possess. In the industrial setting, 
'pluralist* managements are seen as 'balancing* the 'coalition' of 
interest groups that have a 'stake* in the organisation.
In developing the pluralist frame of reference Fox has argued that,
"full acceptance of the notion that an industrial organisation is 
made up of sectional groups with divergent interests involves also 
a full acceptance of the fact that the degree of common purpose 
which can exist in industry is only of a very limited nature.
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In the sense that the groups are mutually dependent they may be said 
to have a common interest in the survival of the whole of which they 
are parts. But this is essentially a remote long-term consideration 
which enters little into the day-to-day conduct of the organisation 
and cannot provide that harmony of operational objectives and methods 
for which managers naturally yearn". (1966: 4)
Thus whereas the unitary frame of reference views conflict as illegi­
timate or a temporary remedial phenomena, the pluralist approach 
places conflict at the very heart of industrial relations. Therefore, 
conflict is an inevitable and essential feature of industrial 
organisation. However the conflict between the interest groups only 
takes place within certain limits. It should not be allowed to threa­
ten the very existence of the system so that, despite their conflic­
ting objectives the parties must have certain common goals. This 
view mirrors Dunlop's use of the concept of ideology. While the 
actors in the industrial relations system are seen as having 
differing ideologies, they must possess a certain consensual ideology 
in relation to the continuous existence of the present industrial 
relations system.
As we have already briefly mentioned, there are connections between 
the theoretical and methodological approaches to industrial relations 
on the one hand and the ideological perspectives on the other. Thus 
it is possible to argue that the systems theories of industrial 
relations including the 'Oxford School' are firmly located within the 
pluralist frame of reference. It is possible to demonstrate that 
Dunlop is firmly located in this pluralist tradition not only because 
of his ideas in "Industrial Relations Systems" but also in view of his 
work on 'pluralistic' industrialism' with Clark Kerr et al (Kerr,
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Dunlop, Harbison and Myers 1964). One of the leading members of the 
'Oxford School' has put forward a defence of pluralist (Clegg 1975) 
and of course Fox himself as a member of the 'Oxford School' was the 
initial exponent of the pluralist frame of reference (Fox 1966).
Since then Fox has changed his views and adopted a 'radical' frame of 
reference and criticised pluralism in several works (Fox 1973, 1974a, 
1974b). However, it has been suggested by Wood and Elliot (1977) that 
Fox does not actually embrace a fully radical stance and that his 
recent work represents, not a break with pluralism, but a re-working 
of the concept. It may be argued that the 'Oxford School' is 
characterised much more by its ideological commitment to pluralism 
than by its theoretical alignment to systems theory. Finally the 
action theory of industrial relations containing elements of both 
exchange theory and interaction theory may be argued to be located, 
implicitly rather than explicitly, within the pluralist tradition.
The concept of power can thus be seen to be of central importance to 
the pluralist frame of reference. As Fox has argued,
"pluralism is often associated with a belief that there can and should 
be, or indeed even is, a balance of power as between the principal 
interest groups of society". (1973: 307)
Or as Wrong has suggested:
"The various conceptions of 'pluralism' in contemporary sociology and 
political science are models of systems of intercursive power rela­
tions". (1968: 47)
Intercursive power relations are those characterised by a balance of 
power where the power of each party is 'countervailed' by that of
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the other. While this can be said to form the 'strong' view of 
pluralism there also exists a 'weaker' variant. This argues that 
each actor may have a different amount of power on a specific issue 
and that the power of the actors will vary from issue to issue. 
However some actors may be more 'powerful' than others as long as in 
the long term no actor is totally subordinated or dominated. Critics 
of the 'strong' thesis of pluralism such as Fox (1973) and Hyman 
(1975) have themselves been criticised for mistaking the pluralist 
assumption of equilibrium of power for equality of power. Regardless 
of the 'correct' reading of pluralism, it can be seen that power is 
of crucial importance to the ideology. Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
provide a useful summary of the unitary and pluralist frames of 
reference in the following table.
Figure 2.8 The unitary and pluralist views of interests, conflict 
and power
The unitary view The pluralist view
Interests
Conflict
Places emphasis upon the 
achievement of common object­
ives. The organisation is 
viewed as being united under 
the umbrella of common goals, 
and striving towards their 
achievement in the manner of 
a well integrated team.
Regards conflict as a rare 
and transient phenomenon 
which can be removed
Places emphasis upon the 
diversity of individual and 
group interests. The 
organisation is regarded as 
a loose coalition which has 
but a remote interest in 
the formal goals of the 
organisation.
Regards conflict as an in­
herent and ineradicable 
characteristic of
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managerial action. Where it 
does arise it is usually 
attributed to the activities 
of deviants and troublemakers.
Largely ignores the role of 
power in organisational life. 
Concepts such as authority 
leadership and control tend 
to be preferred means of 
describing the managerial 
prerogative of guiding the 
organisation towards the 
achievement of common 
interests.
organisational affairs and 
stresses its potentially 
positive or functional 
aspects
Regards power as a variable 
crucial to the understand­
ing of the activities of 
the organisation. Power is 
the medium through which 
conflicts of interest are 
alleviated and resolved.
The organisation is viewed 
as a plurality of power 
holders drawing their 
power from a plurality of 
sources.
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979:204) 
Yet, despite this central significance, the concept of power has been 
largely ignored or taken-for-granted by most pluralists in industrial 
relations. In the leading ’pluralist’ text on the subject (Clegg 1970, 
1979) power is not included in the index and although in the 1979 book 
there is a section on 'Power in Bargaining', the actual concept of 
power being used remain stubbornly unexplicated. It should not be 
assumed that this is an oversight or minor lapse. As Hymen has noted, 
Clegg’s,
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"theoretical presuppositions - which reflect the empiricist-pluralist 
school long predominant in British academic writing on industrial 
relations - are not explicitly stated". (1975: 205)
While they are not explicit, they are not excluded,
"they are merely hidden below the surface ... certain criteria of 
selection are applied which are not made explicit and are therefore 
shielded from criticism". (1975: 10)
Thus the concept of power remains largely problematic and equivocal 
in pluralist industrial relations.
2.9 The Marxist or radical theory
Whilst the systems approaches and the pluralist frame of reference 
have together constituted the dominent orthodoxy of industrial 
relations, the Marxist or 'radical' theories have been seen as the 
genesis of a 'new' industrial relations. However despite their 
similarities there are differences between the radical frame of 
reference on the one hand and Marxist industrial relations on the 
other.
The radical frame of reference or perspective was initially developed 
in reaction to, and during the critique of, the prevailing pluralist 
orthodoxy. Perhaps the most famous example is the work of Fox (1973). 
While recognising the pluralist portrayal of a balance of power and a 
situation of 'checks and balances' as being useful to describe certain 
phenomena, he argues that it confuses our understanding of society and 
industrial relations since.
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"it obscures the domination of society by its ruling strata through 
institutions and assumptions which operate to exclude anything 
approaching a genuine power balance" . (1973: 309)
Thus society is more convincingly described,
"in terms of the over-arching exploitation of one class by another, 
of the propertyless by the propertied, of the less by the more 
powerful". (1973: 308-309)
Within this situation the pluralist ideology, which seeks to portray 
the dominant class as just another interest group, becomes an 
ideological tool of the subordination and legitimation used semi- 
purposively to condition the subordinate class into accepting the 
status quo.
Fox argues that society is characterised, not by a power balance or 
equilibrium, but by the presence of a great disparity of power between 
the owners and managers of economic resources and those who depend 
upon those economic resources for their livelihood. The fact that 
the elite class do not wish to acknowledge this situation is not 
surprising. However the greater majority of the subordinated class 
either do not perceive the situation in these terms or legitimate 
the position of the elite class. This leads Fox to make some further 
points. Firstly the dominant class very rarely need to exert openly 
the full force of the power available to them. In this statement Fox 
is adopting a view of power as 'capacity*. Power can be possessed over 
time as the property of an individual or a group and remains 'latent' 
until a situation arises where the power needs to be 'exercised'. Fox 
also tentatively suggests that the existence of a large power imbalance 
can, of itself, prevent any challenges to that power emerging.
- 155 -
Another reason why the dominant class rarely need to utilise their 
power in an obvious manner is that,
"all the social institutions, mechanisms, and principles which it 
is crucially important for them to have accepted and legitimised 
are accepted and legitimised already and come under no serious 
threat". (1973: 311)
This legitimation exists because,
"their very power affords them the facilities for creating and main­
taining social attitudes and values favourable to that acceptance". 
(1973: 311)
This notion of power is similar to the three-dimensional approach 
advanced by Lukes (1974).
In the industrial relations sphere. Fox argues (against his previous 
pluralist position), that to view collective bargaining as a means of 
normative adjustment between competing groups with a rough power 
balance is mistaken. Any adjustments are only marginal and are 
conditional.
"upon the interest groups concerned being prepared to accept as given 
those major structural features which are crucial for the power, 
status, and rewards of the owners and controllers". (1973: 219)
Thus Fox sees collective bargaining as ’shaping* or ’filtering out* 
conflicts which could threaten the major structural features of 
domination.
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It has been suggested by Wood and Elliot (1977) that while Fox's 
radical stance represents a move away from the pluralist perspective, 
it does not constitute a total break with it or a full acceptance of 
a Marxist approach despite Fox's use of the term. It is to the 
Marxist approach to industrial relations that we now turn our atten­
tion. It is not possible, or appropriate, in a work of this nature 
to attempt a full analysis of the Marxist position or a description 
of Marxist theory. However, in order to discuss the position and use 
of power in Marxist analyses of industrial relations, a brief resume 
of the Marxist position will be presented.
The Marxist approach assumes that structure and form of industrial 
relations at any given time are the outcome of a power conflict 
between the forces of capital and labour. Thus industrial relations 
are in essence market relations. The Marxist approach focuses on the 
historical development of the power conflict between Capital and 
Labour and thus conflict and change form essential parts of any 
Marxian analysis. The Marxist perspective views capitalists and 
workers; the buyers and sellers of labour, as standing in an antan- 
gonistic unequal exchange relationship. Workers are forced to sell 
their 'labour power* as a commodity on the labour market in exchange 
for the financial means of survival. To them the 'labour' is worth­
less until it is combined with the means of production. However as 
the means of production are controlled by the capitalists, workers can 
only utilise their labour by selling it. The wage rate thus becomes 
the focus of the conflicting interests of the two parties. While, the 
capitalist seeks to increase the 'surplus value' that he receives by 
keeping the wage rate low, the worker seeks to raise the wage rate in 
order to try and obtain the full value of the services that he renders.
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Moreover this exchange relationship is characterised by an asymme­
trical distribution of power because the individual worker faces the 
capitalist as a representative of a collective force.
This unequal power relationship is seen as having other implications 
besides the wage rate. Thus the worker is seen as having to subject 
himself to the domination and 'control* of the capitalist. One of 
the possible results of this situation is the 'alienation' of the 
worker. Trade unions are seen as an attempt by workers to redress the 
balance of power viz a viz the owners of the means of production. Yet 
it may be argued that,
"Trade unionism has failed to have any substantial impact on the 
power relationships governing the labour market and in-firm 
processes because the power basis of the capitalists, namely, their 
ownership of the means of production, is not thereby diminished". 
(Schienstock 1981: 182)
Against the argument that trade unions have in fact increased their 
power and their role in the economic and industrial relations systems, 
it may be suggested that,
"it is precisely this increasing integration into society which casts 
doubt upon the validity of any view of the role of trade unions as 
the critical force in the abolition of the capitalist system". 
(Schienstock 1981: 182)
Finally the Marxist approach assumes that the State is not a neutral 
body as supposed in pluralist theory but instead operates to preserve 
the dominance of the capitalist class.
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In order to summarise this brief exposition of the Marxist approach, 
it is worth quoting again from Schienstock.
"The Marxist position investigates the question as to which power 
positions capital and labour hold in the conflict over the structures 
of industrial labour and how far the organised working class has 
advanced in its struggle for the abolition of a situation in which 
they as wage workers are obliged to accept conditions dictated by 
others". (1981: 184)
Given, then, the centrality of power in the Marxist tradition, how have 
theorists of this perspective in the field of industrial relations 
utilised the concept? To find the answer to this question we can turn 
to the work of Richard Hyman as an example. Hyman has attempted to 
produce an explicitly Marxist perspective on industrial relations in 
his text-book; "Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction". (1975). 
The problems of simultaneously trying to develop a new framework while 
writing for the general reader in this fashion have been the subject 
of criticism by Wood (1976) and Hyman's work therefore needs to be 
treated cautiously.
Starting from a critique of the systems approach and the focus on job 
regulation of the 'Oxford School' Hyman proceeds to offer his own 
definition of industrial relations. Thus, "industrial relations is 
the study of processes of control over work relations". (1975: 12).
Yet despite the importance of control in this definition Hyman pays 
little attention to the concept. He mentions the notion of the 
'frontier of control' but fails to develop this and nowhere does he 
really discuss the different forms of control which he hints at in a 
footnote to his definition.
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What then, of his treatment of power? He argues in his first chapter 
that "an increasing power struggle is ... a central feature of 
industrial relations" (1975: 26) and defines power as the "ability of 
an individual or group to control his (their) physical and social 
environment" (1975: 26) as a sub-process, the "ability to influence 
the decisions which are are are not taken by others". (1975: 26)
Power is thus seen as the result of a power 'base* which is related to 
a control over certain material resources. But Hyman also acknowledges 
that the control of ideological resources can be a source of power, 
whereby the dominant class are able to shape and mould attitudes and 
values so as to ensure that challenges to their position are unlikely 
to occur.
In this he is very close in the three dimensional position of Lukes 
(1974). As Hyman argues,
"the ability to overcome opposition is one sign of power; but a more 
subtle yet perhaps even more significant form of power is the 
ability to preclude opposition from even arising-simply because, for 
example, those subject to a particular type of control do not 
question its legitimacy or can see no alternative". (1975: 26)
Hyman also distinguishes between 'power for' where power is seen 
primarily as a "resource used in the service of collective interests" 
(1975: 26) and 'power over' where an individual or group wields 
power over others.
Finally during his discussion of the role of the State in industrial 
relations, Hyman adopts an 'incorporation' thesis.
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As part of this thesis he introduces the notion of 'ideological 
hegemony' derived from Gramsci (1971). This concept is very directly 
related to his previous notion of power. Hegemony is seen as having 
two separate but inextricably related parts. Firstly it refers to 
the dominance in social, cultural and ideological spheres of a 
particular group in society. Secondly it refers to the 'spontaneous' 
consent given by the great masses of the population to the direction 
and control of social by the dominant group. The concept of hegemony 
will be developed later in this thesis.
As we have seen in this section, while the 'radical' and Marxist 
approaches may have certain theoretical and conceptual differences, it is 
fair to assert that they both have a similar notion of power. The views 
of both these approaches to the concepts of interests, conflict and 
power are summarised in Figure 2.9.
Figure 2.9 The radical and Marxist views of interests, conflict 
and power
Interests Places emphasis upon the dichotomous nature and
mutual opposition of interests in terms of broad socio­
economic divisions of the 'class' type within social 
formations as a whole, which are also reflected in 
organisations in the middle range of analysis.
Conflict Regards conflict as an ubiquitous and disruptive motor
force propelling changes in society in general and 
organisations in particular. It is recognised that 
conflict may be a suppressed feature of a social 
system, not always evident at the level of empirical 
reality.
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Power Regards power as an integral, unequally distributed,
zero-sum phenomenon, associated with a general process 
of social control. Society in general and organisations 
in particular are seen as being under the control of 
ruling interest groups which exercise their power through 
various forms of ideological manipulation, as well as 
the more visible forms of authority relations.
(From Burrell and Morgan 1979: 338)
This Figure can be compared with Figure 2.8 which illustrates the uni- 
tarist and pluralist approaches to the same concepts. It can therefore 
be seen that the radical/marxist conception of power is similar to the 
three dimensional approach described by Lukes (1974).
2.10 Power in industrial relations research
Having described the concepts of power used in the various theoretical 
developments in the subject, we can now turn our attention to the use 
of power in industrial relations research as monitored in the major 
journals and research reports. In order to facilitate this objective 
the two major industrial relations journals (British Journal of 
Industrial Relations and Industrial Relations Journal) were reviewed 
from their inception until 1981. What emerged quite clearly from this 
review was the poi^ity of articles dealing with power directly or 
indirectly, either as a topic to be discussed or as a variable for 
exaplanatory purposes. Even restricting attention to the post 1970 
issues one can only identify around 10 articles, from the approximately 
400 published, that actually deal with power. These articles can be 
divided into three rough categories. Firstly these dealing with
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'economic power*; secondly those dealing with aspects of control; 
and finally those of a more general nature.
In the first category falls the work of Buchanan and Gray (1970) who 
seek to test the union-management conflict of Dubin (1960) by measur 
ing the level of strike activity and the power balance in specific 
industries. Escheiving any theoretical discussion they develop a 
Power Index which is a factor,
"reflecting the strength of supply and demand for labour as shown in 
the annual percentage rate of growth of supply and demand for 
labour; the annual difference between the two percentages i.e. demand 
minus supply, (is taken) to indicate a balance of power in favour of 
labour or management according to which side the net difference 
(lies)". (1970: 88)
Thus for Buchanan and Gray, power at the industry level is to be 
measured operationally by the proxy variable of the supply and demand 
for labour. Power is therefore seen as being related to labour 
market factors and, indirectly, to product market factors as the 
demand for labour is a derived demand.
Armstrong, Bowers and Burkitt (1977) also focus upon the area of 
bargaining power and attempt to evaluate the previous literature.
They reject the model advanced by Chamberlain (1951) and modified by 
Levinson (1966) because of its subjective nature. Thus the parties 
have to make their own judgements of the relative costs of agreement 
and disagreement or these costs have to be inferred by an outside 
observer. They also discuss and evaluate the use of proxy variables 
for the measurement of trade union power.
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These include the rate of change of unionisation and the level or 
rate of change of strike activity. However these variables are re­
jected and the authors call for more reliable measures to be 
developed. In later works Burkitt (1977, 1981) has sought to defend 
the trade unions from the charge that they are 'too powerful' or 
'more powerful than management'. Adopting an unacknowledged semi- 
Marxist position Burkitt seeks to argue that most unorganised labour 
markets are characterised by "some degree of employer dominance". 
(1977: 17) because of the individual position of the worker in re­
lation to the forces of capital. Thus unions "are at most a counter­
vailing force generated by the employers' bargaining strength" (1977: 
17). Therefore Burkitt seeks to distinguish between the surface level 
of power 'balances' and 'checks' as illustrated in collective bar­
gaining and the deeper more structural nature of domination by 
employers and Capital. In the course of his argument, and in order 
to demonstrate the deficiencies of the 'over-might trade unions' 
thesis, Burkitt re-examines the concept of 'economic power'. He 
suggests that the traditional view of power being derived from the 
ability of the parties to impose costs upon each other is only one 
form of power. Thus,
"power derives not only from collective organisation imposing costs 
upon other parties, but also from acquisitive ability within markets 
measured by the rewards that individuals can obtain when acting 
independently ... Power resides in anonymous social institutions as 
well as in identifiable individuals and groups, and derives more 
from the routine application of effectively unchallenged assumptions 
than from domination after public conflict". (1981: 68)
Burkitt then offers a new definition of economic power as,
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"the aggregation of influences determining the pressure that indivi­
duals and groups can exert, so that the earnings capacity of claims 
arising from property rights becomes crucial, whatever the degree 
of organisation in the market where they are exercised". (1981: 68)
It may be argued therefore, that Burkitt is adopting a ’three-di­
mensional' view of power very similar to the views advanced by Lukes 
(1974), Hymah (1975) and Fox (1973, 1974).
The number of articles dealing with the 'control' aspects of power is 
rather small. William Brown in 'A Consideration of Custom and Practice' 
(1972) does not explicitly define power but in the course of his 
analysis power is seen as the ability of workers or workgroups to 
dispute mangerial prerogative by use of custom and practice. Ramsay 
(1980) recognises that participation and worker control concerns 
decision making processes and thus that any meaningful attempt to 
analyse participation must consider the nature of power. However 
neither author actually develops the concepts of power any further.
Finally we need to consider the work of Hill (1974) and Leijnse (1980). 
Hill identifies power position as being one of the four major variables 
in the explanation of workgroup activity and identifies several possible 
sources of workgroup power. He suggests that workgroups can derive 
power from their position in the production process; from the nature 
of the product market that their organisation is located in and from 
managerial structure and policy. Leijnse identifies the concept of a 
'transfer of power' which means the process by which an organisation 
uses its power base on a particular bargaining level to strengthen its 
bargaining position on a higher level.
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Thus Leijnse holds an implicit view of power as existing on a series 
of levels. He seeks to examine whether power on the shop floor 
derived from structural position or scarcity of skills can be utilised 
by transfer to the meso or macro levels to improve the position of all 
workers. Leijnse uses a modified version of Dahl's notion of power. 
Thus,
"power is the possibility to delimit the behaviour of alternatives of 
a person or group in accordance with the goals of another person or 
group". (Leijnse 1980: 67)
While the above works all recognise the importance of power, they all 
adopt inevitably a notion of power derived from a different tradition 
of power theorising and fail fully to develop or explicate the concepts 
of power that they are using. However there are some recent works 
which explicitly focus upon power in the workplace and attempt to 
develop concepts of power which would aid our understanding of 
industrial relations processes at this level. Thus we can examine 
and evaluate the work of Marchington (1975a, 1975b), Poole (1976) and 
Edwards (1975, 1978).
Marchington in his development of a model of workgroup power generation 
uses a notion of power which is partially derived from the behaviour- 
alist tradition of Dahl and partially from the exchange tradition. Thus 
management and individual workgroups are seen to be in a power-depen- 
dence exchange relationship which continues over time. Marchington, 
however, introduces the concept of perception or awareness of the 
other party's need into the analysis. Thus his conceptualisation 
includes A's realisation of B's need for the thing A possesses. He 
suggests that:
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"A*s power over B is;
1) a function of B's need of the thing,
2) a function of B ’s ability to acquire the thing outside the
A-B relation,
3) a function of A's awareness of the degree to which B desires 
the thing and,
4) a function of B's perception of A ’s awareness". (1975a: 4)
Marchington also argues that power can refer to capacity as well as 
exercise. In this he appears to be following Bachrach and Baratz and 
Lukes rather than Dahl.
Utilising this notion of power, Marchington proceeds to develop a 
'path model' of workgroup power. He suggests that workgroup power may 
be viewed as a process of several distinct but related phases. The 
first phase in the path model concerns the 'power capacity' that any 
workgroup may possess. This power capacity is derived from structural 
factors relating to the dependence of other parties (other workgroups 
and especially management) on that workgroup for the provision of 
vital services. The next step in the path model is the phase of 
'power realisation'. This is the realisation by the workgroup that it 
possesses a certain power capacity. A correct realisation of low 
power capacity would halt the model at this point. However the 
correct realisation of high power capacity can lead to the third phase 
of the model; 'power testing', where the workgroup tests its perception 
of its own power capacity by some form of action. This will result in 
the final phase of the model, which is a 'power outcome' of an un­
successful or successful nature.
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In a later paper Marchington expands upon the concept of power 
capacity; the first stage in the path model. (1975b). In this he 
relies extensively on the strategic contingencies theory of sub-unit 
power developed by Hickson and his colleagues. Marchington attempts 
to transpose their ideas into the industrial relations context. Thus 
he suggests that their four main variables (coping with uncertainty, 
substitutability, workflow pervasiveness and workflow immediacy) can 
be grouped into two main factors. The first. Disruption (workflow 
pervasiveness and immediacy) refers to the ability of the workgroup 
to halt production. This is a measure of short term power capacity. 
The second, Replaceability (substitutability and coping with un­
certainty) is related to the ability of the workgroup to increase 
indispensibility. This is a measure of long-term power capacity.
It is, of course, possible at this stage to develop more or less 
simple operational indices for these factors in the industrial 
relations context. The result of this type of analysis is a form 
of power capacity league table where workgroups are ranked according 
to their combined scores on the two main factors. This ranking can 
then be compared with indices of instances of power testing or power 
outcomes to further develop the model.
It should be noted that Marchington suggests that the path model is a 
tentative development needing more research. He notes that the power 
capacity phase is concerned mainly with structural factors, while the 
later phases can only be explained in terms of consciousness factors. 
This inevitably involves a different type of methodology and research. 
Indeed, Marchington agrees with Hyman when he argues that what is 
needed is a 'structural dialectic of social structure and social 
consciousness". (1972: 72)
— 168 —
Marchington's model is interesting as it recognises the action/ 
structure dichotomy that we have already discussed. Yet it fails to 
follow up this insight and concentrates upon structural factors 
alone. As Marchington's theory of power is extensively based upon 
the strategic contingencies approach it is therefore open to the 
same criticisms that were voiced earlier in this Chapter.
One particular criticism relates to the adoption of the workgroup as 
the appropriate level of analysis and its validity in all situations. 
This will be discussed in more detail later in this work. However the 
major criticism is that Marchington's model relates power to structural 
position and yet ignores the origins of that structure and the pro­
cesses which created it.
Poole's attempt at a power analysis of workplace labour relations is 
tantalising in that it suggests several important ideas yet ultimately 
falls back upon an analysis which is inadequate. Poole chooses the work­
place rather than the workgroup as his level of analysis. He notes 
the recent increase in the use of power as a major explanatory 
variable in workplace industrial relations and also the problems of 
theory and operationalisation associated with the concept. Indeed he 
argues that a common deficiency of all previous approaches,
"has been that the gulf between theoretical and operational issues 
has remained difficult to bridge and, above all, that the principle 
theoretical arguments have been frequently unrelated to classical 
formulations of this concept". (1976: 31)
Unfortunately in his desire to construct operational indicators, Poole 
neglects to make explicit his theoretical definition of power.
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He does inform the reader that it is a "general notion of power"
(1976: 31) and that his approach is an improvement over the "so- 
called issue and reputational techniques which are the principle 
approaches to power measurements". (1976: 33). Yet his notion of 
power remains stubbornly unexplicated. At several points in his 
analysis he appears almost implicitly to adopt a two or three 
dimensional approach to power especially during his discussion of Marx 
and Weber and during his critique of the issue and reputational 
approaches. However despite these insights Poole falls back upon a 
theory of power which is behavioural and one-dimensional in nature, 
focusing upon decision making and outcomes and utilising the notion 
of power resource bases.
Thus Poole identifies three dimensions of power;
"first, the exercise of power in industrial relationships; second, 
the underlying or latent, bases or sources of power which may have 
ultimate roots in general economic and technological structures; 
and third, at a level of values, the beliefs, orientations and 
perspectives of the partners to industrial relations in so far as 
these affect the stability ot otherwise of particular distributions 
of power". (1976: 32)
He also identifies three major issues in the actual exercise of 
management - trade union relations which are considered important. 
These issues are,
"the levels at which decision making takes place, the ranges and scope 
of issues influenced by the respective parties, and the outcome of 
particular power conflicts in which sanctions are employed". (1976: 33)
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It is interesting to compare the dimensions of power specified by 
Poole and the phases in the path model mentioned by Marchington (see 
Figure 2.10). Both authors appear to use different terminology to 
describe similar concepts. Thus Pooles 'latent power' and Marchingtons' 
'power capacity' both refer to the notion of power as potentiality. 
The concepts of 'power realisation' (Marchington) and 'values' (Poole) 
are concerned with the effect on power of consciousness factors. Both 
authors also use the notion of a separate 'exercise' of power. Thus 
they both appear to subscribe to the use of a dialectic of social 
structure and social consciousness. However Marchingtons path model 
is focused on sub-units or workgroups, While Poole concentrates on the 
level of the workplace or workforce and especially on unionisation as 
an important variable.
Figure 2.10 A comparison of the models of Marchington and Poole





a) Latent power (Bases of power)
b) Values (beliefs, orientations)
c) Exercise of power
Despite his intention of constructing operational indicators in line 
with theoretical ideas in the mainstream of sociological theory, it 
may, in fact, be argued that his operationalisation of latent power is 
rather weak precisely because he relies upon Bienstedt (1950), who is 
essentially a political scientist, for his operational framework, 
rather than the purely sociological literature. Bienstedt's variables 
(numbers, organisation and resources), while applicable and appropriate
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to analyses of pressure group power or social power, are not exactly 
compatible with the industrial relations context, despite Poole’s 
insistence. These variables force the researcher to concentrate 
upon the formal structure of power which in the case of industrial 
relations translates into a focus upon trade unions and their officials 
and formal systems of collective bargaining. Therefore in an attempt 
to operationalise his concept of latent power, Poole uses complete­
ness of unionisation (as a measure of numbers), average constituency 
of shop stewards (for organisation) and factors such as size of the 
national union (for resources). Poole uses two different indices 
for his variable of values. Firstly the willingness of the work­
force to challenge or sanction managerial decision-making and secondly, 
the degree of militancy considered by the workforce in the pursuance 
of trade union aims.
Poole can also be criticised for his choice of indices. In the case 
of latent power, they exclusively concentrate upon trade unions and 
the formal structure of power which divests attention from the power 
possessed by non unionised workforces or workgroups and actors outside 
the formal power structure. His use of simple either/or scales is also 
limiting. For example he scores workplaces either 'plus' or 'minus' 
depending upon whether they are 100% unionised or not.
It can now be suggested that both of the above analyses of power in 
workplace labour relations are inadequate and only partial in their 
coverage. Both Marchington and Poole are crucially concerned with the 
development of operational indices designed to represent the various 
facets of power. The result of this concentration on the empirical is 
a subsequent neglect of the theoretical base of power.
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Both authors use content to utilise a specific definition of power, 
derived from a particular tradition, in a largely uncritical manner.
Marchington*s definition of power is derived from the exchange 
tradition. He links this with the idea of power as the control of 
'strategic contingencies' which is derived from Hickson and his 
colleagues. Discussion of the definition of power by Poole is rather 
brief. He commences with the definition from Weber but instead of 
pursuing this fruitful line of thought he moves away into the 
behaviouralist tradition. Thus his indices of the dimensions of power 
focus on decision-making and the resolution of issues, while for his 
indices of latent power he uses notions derived from the political 
science tradition. In spite of this Poole suggests that his indices 
are an improvement upon those used by the traditional 'issue' and 
'reputational' techniques. While they are certainly different, they 
are still located within the same tradition. It is suggested that 
because of their adoption of a single tradition of power both Marching­
ton and Poole have failed to fully explicate the concept of power and 
account for some of its occurrences in the workplace.
In some ways Marchington's choice of exchange power and strategic 
contingencies theory as the basis of his model is quite appropriate. 
Exchange power assumes the creation of dependencies through the con­
ferring of benefits in a pre-existing continuous relationship between 
the parties. This description appears to characterise management-union 
/worker relationships quite well. The strategic contingencies theory 
elaborates upon the notion of dependancy and enables the researcher to 
focus on sub-units such as the workgroup. However these views of power 
have some unintended results. Power comes to be seen as totally
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related to structure which is unexplicated. Thus Marchington 
attributes power to workgroups according to their position in the 
organisation. This ignores any discussion of the origins of this 
structural arrangement. This situation can be rectified by studying 
the 'power' needed by certain workgroups to achieve this current 
'powerful' position in the organisation. The researcher also needs 
to study the reciprocal power of management in their ability to 
structure and control the situation through their 'power' to set the 
'rules of the game'. These concerns are largely ignored by Marchington,
Marchington's use of exchange power is compatible with those theorists 
who assume that for power to be exercised a conflict of interests must 
exist between parties. All exchange may be characterised as antagoni­
stic because each party is assumed to be maximising their own benefits 
from the exchange relationship. This is a fairly typical character­
isation of management - union/worker relations. However this 
definition of power does exclude the situation where a shop steward is 
said to be 'powerful' because of his ability to further the interests 
of his members. This situation does not imply a conflict of interests 
and seems a valid form of power. More generally, Marchington's use of 
exchange power and its concentration on social relationships precludes 
any analysis of personal power vested in individuals whether involving 
a conflict of interests or not.
Poole's concentration upon observable 'issues' or 'disputes' leaves 
him open to the criticisms directed at Dahl by both Bachrach and Baratz 
and also Lukes. Power can be exercised in situations where one party 
acts to limit the scope of decision-making so that only issues that are 
'safe' to him actually arise.
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This is the process of ’mobilisation of bias' or 'non-decision' 
making. Management may, for example, be able to restrict the type 
of issues that arise in participation machinery to those that do not 
threaten them. Thus the concentration on observable issues leads to 
a 'one-dimensional' view of power.
One problem that affects both authors' theories of power is the 
question of potentiality. This refers to the situation where A makes 
no attempt to alter the behaviour of B but may still be said to 
possess power. Thus, for example, a workgroup may simply not need or 
not choose to take action to alter the behaviour of management. 
Similarly, the formal structure of rights and obligations may ensure, 
for management, compliance by workers without recourse to action.
This notion of potentiality is mirrored by Marchington's power 
capacity and Poole's latent power. The notion of power potential 
necessitates the related concept of the exercise of power. This view 
of potentiality conflicts with the exchange tradition used by 
Marchington. Potential power does not necessarily imply any pre­
existing relationship or exchange between the parties. Thus power is 
seen as an individualistic conception rather than as the property of 
a social relationship. The notion of potentiality is also extremely 
important. Using this notion, the lack of exercise of power by an 
elite group can be explained by the possession of high potential 
power (as in situations of domination or hegemony) rather than in
terms of the absence of power.
A final example of research into power in the workplace setting is 
provided by the work of Edwards et al (Edwards and Harper 1975, Edwards
1978) which consists of an attempt to apply the notions of bargaining
power and influence developed by Abell (1975) in the industrial
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relations setting. Thus the researchers define organisations as 
bargaining and influence systems and therefore the first stage in 
the research process involves the identification of bargaining 
zones. These are defined by Abell and comprising,
"a group of individuals Cperhaps representing organisational sub­
groups, in other bargaining zones), normatively constrained, 
but with different objectives, attempting to arrive at collective 
decisions through a complex process of influence and bargaining". 
(1975: 17)
Edwards and Harper focus upon the interface between the National Coal 
Board (NOB) and the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) in a number 
of collieries. They are then able to identify ten different bargain­
ing zones between these two parties at a variety of different levels. 
They then proceed to analyse both the relationships between the zones 
and the communications within the zones between the parties in order 
to identify the contentious issues.
In a later paper these divisive and contentious issues are examined 
in detail and two measures of power are applied to them. The first 
measure is bargaining power which is defined as,
"... the ability of an individual or, group to get his or its own way 
in the face of others' competing objectives, and is measured by 
reference to the ability of the colliery manager or NUM representative 
to get their own way in cases of decisions where the objectives of 
the two sides are in conflict". (1978: 3)
However by itself this measure is not sufficient, so Edwards develops 
a second measure termed 'control' which is,
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"... based on the manager's and NUM representative's ability to get 
their own way in the decision making process, regardless of whether 
the decisions were the subject of the conflict". (1978: 3)
These measures were then applied to the NCB/NUM bargaining zones and 
were said to successfully analyse and compose the power relations in 
the management union relationship.
Several criticisms can be made of this approach to power. Firstly 
the very nature of the definitions forces attention to be paid solely 
to the formal management - union channels and thus to the formal 
structure of power. Secondly power is seen in a 'win - lose' manner. 
Thus the party that 'wins' a decision is accorded power while the 
party that 'loses' is not. This however ignores the fact that power 
is a variable concept and ignores the 'sources' or 'bases' of power.
Thus power is defined as the ability to 'win' contentious decisions 
but no explanation is given as to the origins of that power. Therefore 
while Edwards' work succeeds in mapping out the 'winning' of decisions 
it fails to explain the origins of power which make such 'winning' 
possible.
2.11 An evaluation of the use of power in the organisational and 
industrial relations literature
Having examined the use of the power concept in the literature of 
organisational theory and industrial relations, we are now in a 
position to evaluate the extent to which this literature has contributed 
to our understanding of power in the organisation. Firstly, the 
organisational literature can be evaluated. As Clegg (1977) puts it.
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"If one knew nothing of organisations in our contemporary capitalist 
society, yet one was willing to absorb what knowledge one could 
from the existing scholarly texts on the topic, what picture of 
power would these present?" (.1977: 29)
The dominant orthodoxy (Hickson et al 1971, Abell 1975, Pfeffer 1981) 
views organisations as open 'systems' interacting with their 
'environment' which can lead to 'uncertainty'. The organisation is 
composed of 'sub-units' engaged in a power struggle ('organisational 
politics') as they attempt to increase their 'control of resources'; 
increase the 'dependence' of others on them by 'controlling un­
certainties'; and ensuring their irreplaceability. At the same time, 
by the use of various 'political strategies and tactics', the sub­
units attempt to affect the decision making process. How useful is 
this view of power in organisations?
Firstly it may be suggested that this notion of power is predicated 
upon an organisational theory and literature which is open to 
criticism. Several writers have argued that much of organisational 
theory is 'biased' in one way or another. (Clegg 1977, Allen 1975, 
Burrell and Morgan 1979). Some have argued that organisational theory 
is 'biased' in that it is partial, one-sided and exists to serve the 
interests of the 'status quo'. Thus Clegg argues that,
"the texts of organisational theory share a mutual interest with the 
world they purport to depict. Their explanations are merely glasses 
which simply serve to reproduce this world. They do not account 
for this world, nor can they. In their theorising, just as in the 
theorising that is that organisation that they attend to, these texts 
exhibit an 'interest'". (1977: 21)
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Thus it is argued that organisation theory serves the interest of 
'Capital* and the preservation of the system. Because of this it is 
unable to come to grips with the concept of power. Others such as 
Burrell and Morgan C1979) have argued that organisational theory is 
weak because of its attachment to certain epistemological and 
methodological positions.
Much organisational theory, developing the ideas of Parsons, views 
power as a deviation from the formal organisational authority 
structure. This leads to the formal structure of power being taken 
for granted and not being an area for investigation. Defining the 
notion of power in this way has important consequences. Thus in 
Hickson et al (1971) and, to a lesser extent, Pfeffer ( 1981), the 
formal vertical structure of power and authority is ignored in favour 
of a focus on the horizontal power struggle between sub-units. The 
concentration on deviations from the formal structure and thus on the 
bases of power possessed by the various sub-units has another problem. 
It fails to explain why some sub-units or people have access to these 
resources while others do not. As Clegg has argued, the "prior 
possession of resources in anything other than equal amounts is 
something which a theory of 'power' has to explain" (1977: 25). As 
we have already seen the Strategic Contingencies approach provides an 
excellent example of such failings, in that it ab%;*acts from discussion 
the formal power and authority structure and in its treatment of sub­
units assumes the power of management.
It may also be argued that the body of organisational theory fails to 
acknowledge or understand the three-dimensional view of power developed 
by Lukes (1974). Thus Abell C1975) suggests that power can be analysed
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by firstly identifying organisational actors 'initially preferred 
outcomes' to a decision and then observing the extent to which these 
can be modified by other actors. Yet Abell fails to appreciate that 
peoples 'initially preferred outcomes' are in a sense arbitrary. How 
are we to be sure that they equate with the 'real interests' of the 
actors, to use Lukes' term? The initial preferred outcome depends on 
when the researcher begins to observe and the 'history' of the 
relationship between the actors. It may well be the case that one 
dominant actor has been able to convince others that his goals are 
synonymous with and should be, their goals. As Clegg has remarked,
"To the extent that a person's theorising of the possibilities of 
their existence and participation in an organisation will be 
circumscribed within the dominant theorising power of the organic 
sation's form of life, then surely a very significant form of power 
will be the members' inability to see beyond the actuality of 
presence? In Marcuse's (.1964) phrase, they will be one-dimensional 
men embedded within the unthought consensus of everyday life".
(1977: 28)
We have already seen that the notion of a power struggle between sub­
units forms one of the basic tenets of theories of power in the 
dominant tradition of organisational theory. It has been suggested 
that this assumption of a power struggle fulfils the same purpose as 
the principle of perfect competition in economics. Thus in organisation 
theory, as in economics, the system is seen as tending towards an 
equilibrium which is in fact a taken-for-granted assumption. The 
effect of this assumption is to generate a view of power which 
ignores "the theoretically and practically prior conditions for the 
exercise of power". (1977: 30). Thus this view of powers neglects
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the concept of capacity or potential for future action. As Clegg 
has suggested,
"To abstract this latter concept is to distract our attention from 
the underlying social relations that grant to some positions in 
organisations more or less 'capacity' to ’exercise' power than 
others. Instead it focuses our attention on the 'exercise' after 
any prior structuring of 'capacity' has occurred. 'Power' is seen 
simply as the 'exercise* of an 'ability' taken after any accretion 
at diminution of 'capacity' has occurred". (1977: 30-31)
This view seems to serve the ideological purpose of preserving the 
status quo as a topic outside the scope of a theory of power.
Turning our attention to the field of industrial relations, it can 
be seen that relatively little attention has been devoted to the 
concept of power despite its central position and importance in many 
of the major theoretical developments in the subject. Thus power is 
a central, but largely unexplicated, variable in systems theories of 
industrial relations. Some theorists such as Dunlop (1958) pay 
virtually no attention to the concept while others such as Craig 
(1973) attempt a definition but little else. The theorists of the 
'Oxford School' see industrial relations as involving the creation 
of a 'web of rules' through a process of joint regulation which is 
both economic and political in nature. Yet despite the inclusion 
of this 'political' dimension, no attention is paid to the concept of 
power. As we have seen power is central to the second strand of 
industrial relations orthodoxy; pluralism. Pluralism takes power as 
a variable crucial to the understanding of activities in the organi­
sation. The organisation is seen as a plurality of power holders
— 181 —
disputing various organisation issues. However even here power 
remains undefined and unexplicated. Finally the neglect of power can 
be seen by its absence from the indexes of texts in the subject and 
from the paucity of articles referring to the concept or using it as 
an explanatory variable.
A second problem with the concept of power in industrial relations is 
that some industrial relations theories adopt, uncritically, a 
tradition of power theorising developed in another discipline. Often 
the tradition chosen is one which is open to extensive criticism.
Thus the bargaining power models are based upon the exchange tradition 
of power and are thus open to the same criticisms that were levelled 
at that approach earlier in this work. Similarly Marchington (1975) 
is engaged in the application of the Strategic Contingencies approach 
to the industrial relations sphere. Thus his workgroups gain their 
power from the 'position' that they occupy in the organisation. Their 
position is related to such factors as their control of resources, 
control of strategic contingencies and substitutability. Yet 
Marchington because of his selection of this particular tradition of 
power theorising is unable to explain the processes by which the 
present power distribution evolved or to examine beneath the level of 
surface appearances. In a like manner, Poole (1976) restricts his 
ability fully to understand the nature of power in the workplace by 
his dependence on a particular tradition of power theorising. His 
choice of indices from a political science tradition results in a 
focus upon the formal aspects of 'pressure group' power and the 
formal structure. Finally we have seen how the decision making focus 
of Abell has entered the industrial relations literature via the work 
of Edwards.
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Thus two main comments can be made at this stage. Firstly that the 
development of the concept of power represents a significant lacuna 
in the industrial relations literature. Secondly, where attempts have 
been made to articulate the concept they have generally been less 
than successful. This can in part, be attributed to their uncritical 
use of notions of power developed in Other disciplines which are 
themselves unsatisfactory. However the picture is not all bleak.
It is possible to see a certain amount of light at the end of the 
tunnel. In the work of Fox (1973), Hyman (1975), Burkitt (1977), 
and to a lesser extent Marchington (1975) and Poole (1976), one can 
see attempts, however partial, to transcend the one-dimensional and 




The epistemology and ideology 
of power
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I wish to argue that the theoretical concepts of power contained in 
the literature are influenced, or even largely determined, by the 
epistemological and ideological traditions which informed their con­
ception. This is in line with Lukes' view that power is an 'essentially 
contested' concept in both the theoretical and political arenas.
Thus, we may suggest that the notion of power is disorderly because 
power theorists have made different epistemological assumptions and 
have adopted different epistemological stances. In addition a theorists's 
understanding of power is affected by his ideological position. As 
Lukes has argued, any theory or definition of power is,
"inextricably tied to a given set of (probably unacknowledged) value 
- assumptions which predetermine the range of its empirical 
application". (1974: 26)
If we examine the literature, we can see that Weber's understanding of 
power in its widest sense can be seen to be related to his attempt to 
develop an 'interpretive sociology'. Thus his definitions of key terms 
such as 'Macht' and 'Herrschaft' and his conception of domination are 
all to be seen in the context of his wider epistemological project.
In our review of the Community Power debate we demonstrated that the 
two sides were split largely on the basis of academic discipline. On 
this basis they adopted different epistemological stances which influenced 
their utilisation of different methodologies and thus affected their 
final understanding of power. Finally, it was observed that the use by 
Dahl of a causal model drawn from classical mechanics led to the 
adoption of a behaviourist stance and a methodology based upon observable 
events. This, in turn, influenced and determined his understanding of 
power.
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Similarly, examples can be cited to illustrate the way in which the 
ideological or political position of an author can affect his develop­
ment of the power concept. Thus, in the Community Power debate, one 
of the major differences between the two sides was the ideological 
'gap' between those holding the 'pluralist' view and those with an 
'elitist' notion of power. In the same way, Lukes has argued that the 
differences between the one, two and three dimensional theories can 
partly be explained by reference to what he terms their moral and 
political positions. Thus he identifies three main moral and 
political positions; the liberal, the reformist and the radical and 
suggests that these are related to the one, two and three dimensional 
views of power respectively. Finally in the case of the industrial 
relations literature we can demonstrate that the unitary, pluralist 
and radical ideologies all hold differing notions of power.
If it is to be argued that existing theories of power are tied to 
epistemological and ideological positions, then perhaps some frame­
work for portraying, depicting and subsequently analysing such 
positions is required at this stage. Such a framework would serve 
two distinct purposes. Firstly, it would demonstrate conclusively 
the link between theoretical model and epistemological and ideological 
position and secondly, it would perhaps identify new avenues which 
might be fruitful to the development of an alternative model of power.
3.1 The philosophical arena
The work of Burrell and Morgan (1979) provides a useful framework for 
the analysis and 'mapping' of epistemological and ideological positions 
and this framework will be utilised in this section.
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They argue that "all theories of organisation are based upon a 
philosophy of science and a theory of society". (1979: 1). All such 
theories therefore adopt, explicitly or implicitly, certain assumptions 
about both the nature of social science and the nature of society.
So far in this thesis the term epistemology has been used to refer to 
the 'philosophy of knowledge' or the 'nature of social science'. In 
other words, 'epistemology' has been used as a generic term to refer 
to the first of Burrell and Morgan's set of assumptions. However 
Burrell and Morgan go further than this and identify four different 
sets of assumptions concerning social science. These are assumptions 
about ontology, epistemology, human nature and methodology. The 
extreme positions on this set of assumptions are then used to de­
lineate two distinct approaches to social science, the subjectivist 
and the objectivist. These approaches and their assumptions are 
illustrated in Figure 3.1. We can now examine and explain each of 
these opposing sets of assumptions before turning our attention to the 
assumptions which concern the nature of society.
Firstly we have the assumptions concerning ontology or the theory of 
existence. On the one hand we have Nominalism which has been defined 
as "the denial of real existence to abstract entities or universels". 
(Dictionary of Modern Thought 1977: 428). It involves the supposition 
that the social world merely consists of names, concepts and labels 
which are used to structure reality. Thus there is no other reality 
than the language which is used to make sense of the external social 
world.In opposition to this stands Realism which has been described as 
"the theory that abstract entities or universels really exist in a 
world of their own". (Dictionary of Modern Thought 1977: 526). Thus 
realism presumes that the social world is made up of real tangible
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structures which exist as empirical entities independent of our 
labelling.
3.1 A scheme for analysing assumptions about the nature of social 



















Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979: 3)
We can now turn from the ontological to the epistemological debate. 
Positivism has been described as "the view that all true knowledge is 
scientific,in the sense of describing the co-existence and succession 
of observable phenomena". (Dictionary of Modern Thought 1977: 488) 
and thus is generally applied to stances which are based upon the 
traditional approach to the natural sciences. One characteristic 
feature of positivism is the methodology of variable analysis. Walsh 
(1972) has argued that,
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"variable analysis does not necessarily deny the meaningful character 
of social phenomena but attempts to reduce social life to variables 
and their relationships. Meaning is treated as an intervening vari­
able. Such variables are structural and organisational categories 
of social life, identified as realities in terms of objective 
indices through the use of sociological concepts and models and of 
which social action is taken to be the product". (1972: 41)
Therefore the meanings of actors are turned into variables which can 
be identified in terms of objective indices. As I have argued else­
where ,
"Explanation in variable analysis is achieved by attempting to est­
ablish causal connections between the specified variables. There­
fore statistical correlations are usually sought between variables 
and those correlated relationships followed up. The correlations 
are used as a basis for the imputation of causal connections". 
(Kirkbride 1979: 331-332)
Positivist epistemologies thus seek to explain and predict the events 
of the social world by searching for regularities and causal relation­
ships between its elements.
The positivist approach has been criticised over recent years from 
many different quarters. The criticisms have not always been in 
agreement and have come from different schools of thought. However, 
it is possible to subsume them under the generic label of the 'anti­
positivist* or 'action' approach.
The action approach argues that positivism mistakes the nature of 
social phenomena in assuming them to be the same as natural phenomena.
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What then are the characteristics of natural and social phenomena?
It is argued that natural phenomena are intrinsically meaningless.
As Schütz points out:
"The facts, data and events with which the natural scientist has to 
deal are just facts, data and events within his observational field, 
but this field does not 'mean' anything to the molecules, atoms and 
electrons therein". (1962: 5)
Because natural phenomena are intrinsically meaningless, scientists 
are able to gain strong consensual agreement about the character of 
the world and the rules of procedure necessary to discover it. Thus 
the natural sciences can be "characterised in terms of the taken-for- 
granted paradigm shared by their practitioners". (Walsh 1972: 17)
In contradistinction, social phenomena are intrinsically meaningful. 
Thus to quote Schütz again:
"the social world is not essentially structureless. It has a parti­
cular meaning and relevance structure for the human beings living, 
thinking and acting therein". (Schütz 1962: 5-6)
The social world is experienced by its members and they attach 
meanings to it. Therefore in order to explain the social world access 
has to be gained to the meanings given to social relations by the 
actors involved.
Thus the action approach is concerned with understanding action rather 
than with observing behaviour as specified by positivism. By looking 
solely at observable behaviour one misses the significance and value 
that the actors place upon the behaviour. Therefore one loses the 
significance of that behaviour to both the actor and the recipient.
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Thus one should not be merely concerned with behaviour but should 
attempt to analyse the meaning behind behaviour. Weber has argued 
that we should be concerned with:
"the interpretation of action in terms of its subjective meaning"
(1964: 94).
Action in these terms is therefore all behaviour that has subjective 
meaning attached to it by the acting individual.
How then does action arise? Positivists argue that a given behaviour 
can be explained by reference to structural factors which are said to 
call forth the behaviour pattern. However, this type of analysis 
fails to take account of what Silverman calls: "the internal logic 
of the situation". (1970: 129)
By this it is meant that an individual's responses are mediated by 
his assignment of meaning to the structure and to the actions of 
others. The meanings involved are affected by the'fexpectation system" 
of the individual which is a product of present and past experiences. 
Action is therefore not determined by the structural stimulus but by 
this system of expectations, values, needs and aspirations.
Where do meanings originate? It may be argued that meanings reside in 
social institutions and are internalised by individuals through inter­
action. Silverman argues that "social reality is 'pre-defined' in the 
very language in which we are socialised". (1970: 131). Language 
enables the individual to define typical features and actions contained 
in the social world.
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It follows from this that "while society defines man, man in turn 
defines society". (1970: 126). Thus the social world is constructed 
and reaffirmed by the inter-action of individuals. The social struc­
ture therefore is only "real" in a human sense and exists only as long 
as human beings recognise it as part of their world. Therefore if 
society is regarded as having an existence separate from the actions 
of men, then the concepts of society and social structure have been 
reified. The acceptance of the thesis that society is socially con­
structed leads inevitably to the questioning of certain types of 
explanation. To relate one structural variable to another, may result 
in a failure to account for the orientations of the individuals 
involved and the meanings they attach to the concepts in their world.
As Silvermann correctly points out:
"It is out of factors like these that action is generated: to pay 
insufficient attention to them can involve the sociologist in an 
empty determinism in which things happen and processes occur 
apparently without the direct intervention of human purposes".
(1970: 126)
Society and meanings are not only socially constructed, they are 
socially changed by the interaction of individuals. The absence of 
a shared value system means that individuals attach different meanings 
to interactions. The existence of different meanings in interaction 
shows the advantages of an action approach over a positivist approach. 
As a positivist approach is concerned with the viewpoint of the 
authorities (in their concern with order), then it is unable to see 
any other points of view. The action approach enables the researcher 
to concentrate upon the existence of different meaning systems. What is 
a problem for one individual in an interaction may not be a problem for
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another.
Therefore in order to explain social phenomena the researcher must 
take account of the meanings which those concerned assign to their 
acts. Thus positivism, which argues that action is determined by 
external and constraining forces alone, is inadequate as an explana­
tion of social phenomena. Berger (1966) has accused positivism of 
viewing society as a "prison" or a "puppet theatre". Thus society 
is seen in the former as an external structure which controls men 
by social facts. In the latter society is internalised in men by 
socialisation and they are controlled by their social roles. However, 
there is an alternative view:
"Society may be seen as populated by living actors and its insti­
tutions regarded as dramatic conventions depending on the co-operation 
of the actors in maintaining a definition of the situation". (1970: 144)
This, then, is the perspective of the anti-positivist or "action" 
approach.
Turning our attention to the set of assumptions concerning 'human 
nature' we can identify two extreme positions. The 'determinist' view 
argues that man is completely determined by the environment in which 
he is located. At the opposite extreme, in contrast, is the 'volun­
tarist' view which emphasises the role of free will in decision-making 
and the autonomous nature of man. The final set of assumptions are 
concerned with methodology. The idiographic method stresses the study 
of particular cases and is based upon the idea that the social world 
can only be understood by gaining close knowledge of the subject under 
investigation.
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Thus the approach emphasises subjective ’accounts' generated by ethno­
graphic methods. In contrast the nomothetic approach is concerned 
with the search for general laws or theories which will cover whole 
classes of cases. This search involves the use of standard 
scientific methods such as tests, experiments, quantitative techniques, 
surveys and questionnaires which are all designed as research 
instruments to test hypothesis in line with scientific procedure.
These four sets of assumptions and the contrasting positions taken on 
each, produce two distinct approaches to social science. The objecti- 
vist position characterised by realism, positivism, determinism and 
the nomotheric methodology is usually referred to as 'sociological 
positivism'. This stands in opposition to the subjectivist approach 
which is characterised by nominalism, anti-positivism, voluntarism 
and the idiographic methodology. This approach to social science is 
contained in the tradition of 'German Idealism'.
Turning our attention from the nature of social science to the nature 
of society itself, it may be argued that there are two major sets of 
assumptions which are contradictory. On the one side are those 
approaches which focus upon the explanation of stability and social 
order and on the other hand there are those theories that concentrate 
upon issues of change and conflict in society. This dichotomy of 
views has been variously referred to as the 'order-conflict' or the 
'consensus - conflict' debate. As we have already seen, it was this 
split that was at the heart of the 'Community Power Debate'. It was 
also suggested in Chapter 1 that this was one of the major issues or 
problems which divided and confused the tradition of power theorising. 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) have argued that while the 'order - conflict'
- 194 -
dichotomy is still valid, it is in some respects problematic and 
therefore should be replaced by notions of 'regulation' and 'radical 
change'. Thus they use the term 'sociology of regulation' to
"refer to the writings of theorists who are primarily concerned to 
provide explanations of society in terms which emphasise its under­
lying unity and cohesiveness". (1979: 17)
This is therefore an approach which focuses upon why society is 
maintained as an entity and does not collapse into disorder. From a 
distinctly different viewpoint the 'sociology of radical change' is 
concerned to,
"find explanations for the radical change, deep-seated structural 
conflict, modes of domination and structural contradiction which its 
theorists see as characterising modern society". (1979: 17)
The 'objectivist' and 'subjectivist' approaches to social science 
and the opposing sociologies of 'regulation' and 'radical change' can 
now be combined to create four distinct paradigms for the analysis of 
social theory. These paradigms are illustrated in diagrammatic form 
in Figure 3.2
Figure 3.2 Four paradigms for the analysis of social theory






'The sociology of regulation' 
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Thus the 'sociology of radical change' is divided into its subjective 
and objective forms which are 'radical humanism' and 'radical 
structuralism' respectively. Similarly the 'sociology of regulation' 
is divided into the 'Interpretive' paradigm (subjective) and the 
'Functionalist paradigm (objective). This framework can now be 
utilised in order to 'map' the positions of the various theories of 
power that have already been discussed.
3.2 Locating the theories of power
Attempting to locate the work of Weber on the two dimensions of the 
framework is difficult because his work is confused and at times 
contradictory. Therefore, as with his concept of power, Weber's work 
leads to a variety of differing interpretations. On the one hand, 
as we saw in Chapter 1, Weber can be seen as an 'interpretive 
sociologist'. As Burrell and Morgan suggest,
"it is through the work of Weber that the notion of verstehen as 
method haî  had the greatest impact on sociological thought, and 
nowhere is the bridge-building exercise between idealism and 
positivism more evident. (...) He was dissatisfied with the 
superficialities which he regarded as characterising positivist 
explanations of society, and also greatly concerned with the sub­
jective and 'unscientific' nature of idealist thought. His solution 
to the problem is found in his methodological writings, in which he 
develops the view that explanations or social affairs must be 
'adequate on the level of meaning' and that the essential function of 
social science is to be 'interpretive', that is, to understand the 
subjective meaning of social action". (1979: 230)
Thus in relation to the methodological strand of the set of assumptions 
about social science, Weber occupies an idiographic position.
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Yet in respect of the other three strands, it may be argued that 
Weber adopts not a subjectivist, but instead an objectivist position.
He thus tends towards realism, positivism and determinism. On the 
other major dimension Weber can be seen to be a 'sociologist of 
regulation' in terms of his concern with social order and rationality. 
Thus. Weber can be located somewhere towards the fringe of the 
Functionalist paradigm. It is important to note, however, that some 
theorists have detected another tendency in the work of Weber and 
have accordingly seen aspects of his work as in the tradition of 
the 'sociology of radical change*.. This school of thought has been 
called 'radical Weberianism' (Burrell and Morgan 1979). What is 
important for these theorists, they argue is,
"not that Weber was primarily a sociologist of order and regulation, 
but that his ambivalent attitude to capitalism, and particularly to 
the place of bureaucracy within it, left open avenues for exploration 
which lead to a sociology of radical change". (1979: 332)
These theorists therefore tend to concentrate upon Weber's analysis of 
Bureaucracy and its uses as a form of domination and upon his concepts 
of dominancy, authority and power as crucial features of a capitalist 
society. As only a change on the regulation-radical change axis is 
proposed these theorists would locate their version of Weber's work in 
the radical structuralist paradigm.
In the 'Community Power' debate the positions of the protagonists are 
fairly sharply delineated. On one side stand the 'pluraliste' such as 
Dahl (1957) and on the other one the 'elitists' such as C. Wright Mills 
(1956) and Hunter (1953). We have already extensively discussed both 
these opposing theories of power.
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The pluralist approach is obviously centrally related to the debate 
over the nature of society. Whilst it is predominantly concerned 
with order and regulation, it acknowledges, in a way that unitarism 
does not, the existence of conflict in social and industrial life.
Thus in relation to the framework that we have adopted it occupies 
a boundary position just within the 'sociology of regulation' but 
located towards the edge which leads to the 'sociology of radical 
change'. Although, in itself, pluralism is not concerned with the 
nature of social science, its purveyors tend to adopt certain 
positions as regards ontology, epistemology, human nature and 
methodology. These links have been demonstrated both in our 
discussion of the 'Community Power' debate and pluralism in industrial 
relations. It is therefore possible to argue that pluralist writers 
tend to adopt an objectivist approach to social science and that this, 
together with their partial focus upon regulation, locates them within 
the 'functionalist' paradigm. On the other side of the debate, the 
'elitist' or 'conflict' theorists are obviously located within the 
'sociology of radical change'. Again while they do not directly 
consider the philosophy of social science, an examination of their 
work would locate most of them within the 'objectivist' mould and thus 
within the 'radical structuralist' paradigm.
The work of Parsons can be categqrised as structural-functionist in 
orientation and as being located in the wider social systems tradition. 
Indeed his work can be said to have introduced the concept of systems 
theory into the literature of social science. His work has been widely 
criticised (Gouldner 1959, Mills 1970 amongst others) as being con­
servative, supportive of the status quo and unable to cope with conflict 
and change and these tendencies are amply illustrated in his treatment
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of power.
In the field of exchange theory, the work of Emerson (1962) can be 
categorised as falling in the 'functionalist' paradigm. In terms of 
ideology he can be located as a pluralist focusing upon the existence 
of conflict and the existence of different forms of power. In terms 
of the philosophy of social science parameter Emerson can be cate­
gorised within the 'objectivist' approach to social science because 
of his ultimate reliance upon behavioural criteria. The exchange 
theory of Blau (1964) is characterised by Burrell and Morgan as 
being an example of 'integrative theory'. This refers to the,
"brand of sociological theorising which occupies the middle ground 
within the functionalist paradigm. In essence, it seeks to in­
tegrate various elements of interactionism and social systems theory 
and, in certain cases, to counter the challenge to the functionalist 
perspective posed by theories characteristic of the radical structur­
alist paradigm, particularly those of Marx". (1979: 87)
Because of Blau's emphasis on the role of power and exchange processes 
in sustaining social life and their integrating role in the explanation 
of social structure, he can be seen to be moving toward the 'radical 
change' side of the debate about the nature of society. Therefore he 
can be located with Emerson in the upper part of the functionalist 
paradigm.
A theorist who adopts a confusing position on the framework we are 
utilising is Martin (1977). Early in his book, during his attempted 
definition of the concept of power, he specifically rejects the 
organismic systems approach of Parsons, the pluralist view of Dahl and
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the Weberian view in favour of the morphogenic or cybernetic system 
approach first outlined by Buckley (1967). This would place Martin 
firmly in the Functionalist paradigm, albeit located towards its 
subjectivist edge. However, later in his book it becomes clear that 
Martin is using a semi-marxist approach. Indeed in the last chapter 
he states that,
"The general concepts used in this study are Marxist, involving a 
dialectic between the forces of production, especially technology, 
and the relations of production". (1977: 164)
Yet Martin acknowledges that he does not fully adopt a ̂ ^rxist 
structuralist position. It is difficult to define his actual location 
but he utilises elements of Marxist humanist, radical Weberianism and 
pluralism and thus can be seen to be moving from a position just inside 
the functionalist paradigm towards the radical dimension.
Lukes (1974) has developed a three dimensional view of power which he 
specifically argues is 'radical' in nature. Thus he can be squarely 
located within the 'sociology of radical change'. However his 
position on the other dimension is not quite so clear. In the latter 
part of his book he appears to criticise the structuralist theories 
of Althusser and Poulantzas, yet it would perhaps be inappropriate 
to locate him in the 'radical humanist' paradigm. Thus Lukes appears 
to occupy a boundary position between the 'subjectivist' and 
'objectivist' positions and thus between the 'radical humanist' and 
'radical stucturalist' paradigms. The locations of all the above 
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A careful examination and analysis of the organisational theories of 
power reveals that, despite the large number of authors cited, the 
literature can be divided into two distinct 'traditions'. The first 
group consists of those theorists who adopt a pluralist approach to 
power within organisations and in social theory in general. They 
accept that there is conflict between various interest groups within 
organisations and discuss the way in which various factors such as 
management, sub-units or lower participants attempt to gain or 
exercise power. Thus Etzioni (1961) identifies the different forms 
of power that can be exercised by a superior group as well as the 
different reactions to the exercise of power by lower participants. 
Mechanic (1962) describes the power bases available to lower partici­
pants while French and Raven (1959) discuss the range of power 
resources available to a variety of actors. Crozier (1964) analyses 
the conflict of interests and power bargaining processes which 
characterise group relationships in organisations. Thus he demonstrates 
how various groups in the organisation attempt to gain control by 
utilising the sources of power that they possess. As Burrell and 
Morgan argue,
"In line with other theorists in the pluralist tradition, Crozier sees 
the power struggle within organisations as being limited by certain 
stabilising factors, such as the need to maintain minimum standards 
of efficiency, and other social factors which ensure that the 
organisation continues as an ongoing concern. In the true tradition 
of conflict functionalism, therefore, conflict is seen as having its 
limits". (1979: 211)
The work of Hickson et al (1971), derived as it is from these sources, 
can also be classified as a 'pluralist' approach.
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The second group includes those whose theories of power are located 
within an open systems tradition of contingency theory. Open systems 
theory was developed in the late 1950's as an improvement upon the 
basic structural - functionalist approaches to organisations by 
researchers at the Tavistock Institute (Trist and Bamforth 1951, Rice 
1958, Rice 1963). The organisation is viewed as a living organism 
which is 'open' to its environment and must maintain itself through 
the process of exchange with the environment. Although an improve­
ment upon early models, this approach is still unitary in its pers­
pective and is 'locked' within the 'functionalist'paradigm. Contingency 
theory represents the contemporary synthesis of the structural - 
functionalist approaches, open systems theory and the various empirical 
studies of organisational characteristics. Its origins can be traced 
back to the work of Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) on the operations of 
organisations in a variety of environmental conditions which suggested 
that different organisational principles were appropriate in different 
environmental circumstances and indeed within different parts of the 
same organisation. One of the earliest examples of the contingency 
model of organisations can be found in the work of Thompson (1967) 
who views,
"organisations as open systems, hence indeterminate and faced with 
uncertainty, but at the same time as subject to criteria of 
rationality and hence needing determinateness and certainty". (1967:10)
Contingency theorists are concerned to understand the relationships 
between the organisation and its environment and it is assumed that 
such relationships can only be explained in terms of the organisations 
'need' to survive. Further, in line with the use of an organismic 
analogy, contingency theorists view the organisation as comprising a
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series of interdependent sub-systems, each of which has a function 
to perform within the context of the organisation as a whole. The 
work of Hickson et al (1971), Abell (1975) and Pfeffer (1981) can be 
seen to be centrally related to this perspective. The conceptual 
location of these theorists is thus within a contingency theory 
which is objectivist in its approach to social science and concerned 
with order and stability rather than conflict or change. This location 
is illustrated in Figure 3.4.
In our discussion of the use of power in the industrial relations
sphere we suggested that there were three main theoretical approaches 
and three related political and ideological viewpoints. The 
theoretical approaches included the systems approaches, the action 
approaches and the marxist approaches following the classification 
used by Schienstock (1981). The early systems theories of industrial 
relations as exemplifed in the work of Dunlop (1958) can be seen as 
the simple application of mechanistic and organismic analogies of 
human conduct to the industrial relations arena. The later, more 
sophisticated, systems theorists (Craig 1973, Singh 1976) tend to 
be moving toward more complex factional or catastrophic analogies. 
However both sets of systems theories in industrial relations can be
located within the category of social system theory discussed earlier.
As we have seen systems theories focus upon order and stability and 
are at the 'objectivist' end of the social science continuum The 
action theory model is more difficult to locate as it is rather un­
developed. In intention, it appears to be a move towards the more 
subjective end of the social science continuum . as it seeks to include 
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However, in the industrial relations literature it seems to be really 
confined to an analysis of bargaining power viewed in the manner of 
exchange theory. Thus it can be actually located within the 
'functionalist' paradigm and more specifically within the school of 
integrative theory. The marxist approach is perhaps the easiest of 
the three to locate in the framework. It is obviously part of the 
'sociology of radical change' and to the extent that most marxist 
theories of industrial relations seem to be predicated upon the work 
of the 'later' Marx, then they can be squarely placed within the 
'radical structuralist' paradigm.
The three political and ideological viewpoints are easy to position 
on one of the axes of the framework. Thus the unitarist approach 
can be located in the 'sociology of regulation; the radical approach 
within the sociology of radical change'; while the pluralist approach 
holds the middle ground but lies just within the regulation 'camp'.
In terms of approach to the philosophy of social science they become 
less clear. We have, however, already argued that the radical and 
pluralist approaches are generally associated with views towards the 
'objectivist' end of the spectrum. The unitarist approach does not 
appear to address the epistemological, ontological and methodological 
issues. It is also possible to fix the positions of the few 
industrial relations writers who have discussed power directly. Thus 
Marchington can be seen as applying the open systems and contingency 
theory of organisational power developed by Hickson et al (1971).
Poole appears, in terms of his choice of indicators of power, to adopt 
a pluralist position. Finally Edwards, whose work involves organisa­
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The positions of all the industrial relations theories are illustrated 
in Figure 3.5.
3.3 Where do we go from here?
What has emerged from our attempt to locate or ’map' the theoretical 
and ideological positions of the views of power that we have examined?
The first point is that most of the theories of power can, despite all 
other differences, be said to share certain common assumptions regarding 
ontology, epistemology, human nature, methodology and ideology. In short 
most of the theories of power are located within the broad scope of the 
functionalist paradigm. This fact has certain important implications.
Thus most theories of power tend to focus upon supposedly ’real' struc­
tures and events. They tend to propose that power only exists if it can 
be observed and if objective indices can be used to represent it. Most 
theories of power also seem to be 'determinist' in that power is related 
to resources or power bases. The roles played by individuals in 
producing or reproducing these structures and in shaping the process of 
power tend to be neglected. Finally, most of the theories utilise the 
nomothetic approach to methodology in line with their positivist view 
of epistemology. Thus many theories insist that power must be susceptible 
to empirical measurement if the concept is to be regarded as valid.
However, it is important to realise that these assumptions do not have 
to be accepted and, indeed, since they are so important, must be closely 
examined and questioned. Perhaps the concept of power would be better 
understood if some of these assumptions were challenged and new ones, 
initiated by the alternative approaches, were adopted. Perhaps power 
consists not simply of 'real' structures and events but also can be seen 
as a process whereby reality is structured through the use of language.
It is possible that power can exist even though it cannot directly be 
observed as is envisaged
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in the three dimensional view of Lukes. The concept of power might 
be enriched if the role of individuals, as active subjects in the 
processes of power, were considered. Finally perhaps the use of the 
idiographic methodology would reveal new and subtle facets of the 
notion of power. Thus, in terms of the framework, there exist three 
other paradigms which could be explored and which may offer useful 
insights into power. As Burrell and Morgan have argued in respect 
of organisational theory;
"One of the major conclusions prompted by our journey through the 
realms of social theory, therefore, is that organisational theorists 
face a wide range of choices with regard to the nature of the 
assumptions which underwrite their point of view. For those who 
wish to leave the functionalist orthodoxy behind, many avenues 
offer themselves for exploration". (1979: 398)
Thus the radical humanist, radical structuralist and interpretive 
paradigms offer themselves as relatively unexplored territory as far 
as the concept of power in industrial relations is concerned.
The second point to emerge from this 'mapping* process is that the 
few excursions that have been made outside the functionalist orthodoxy 
have been marxist or radical approaches(generally located within the 
'radical structuralist' paradigm). It may be argued that these theories 
from both the general social and political and industrial relations 
literature have offered new and novel insights into power theorising.
What position will be taken during the remainder of this thesis 
regarding the epistemology and ideology of power? It will be argued 
firstly that a clearer understanding of power would emerge if more
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attention were to be paid to the 'subjective' view of social science. 
Indeed it has already been proposed that the nominalist, anti­
positivist, voluntarist and idiographic positions could illuminate 
the study of power. However, the objectivist position should not 
be ignored as it has generated some illuminating insights into certain 
facets of the operation of power. Secondly it will be argued that 
greater, attention needs to be paid to the 'sociology of radical 
change'. Theories in this category have already produced novel views 
of the processes of power.
Thus what is being proposed at this point can best be understood as a 
synthesis of the 'radical structuralist' and 'interpretive' paradigms 
together with the existing knowledge about power derived from the 
'functionalist' paradigm. The 'radical structuralist' paradigm is 
necessary because of its focus upon structures of domination and 
power conceived in a structural manner. The 'interpretive' paradigm 
is useful because of the need to incorporate 'action' elements into 
a model of power. The results of this synthesis of action and struct­
ural elements can be seen in the following chapter. It should be 
noted that this is not a plea for a 'neutral' emasculated social 
theory but instead is a plea which recognises the fact that power 
operates on many levels and possesses many facets and thus cannot be 
truly represented by one paradigm.
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Chapter 4
An alternative view of power
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4.1 Action and structure in social theory
If we are to explain an alternative perspective of power we have to 
step back from the concept itself and instead consider the essentials of 
social theory. Indeed some of the theories of power already discussed may 
be criticised precisely because of their uncritical 'common-sense' or 
'taken-for-granted* definitions and understanding of power. It will 
be suggested in this work that power is not simply 'another* concept 
or variable to be isolated, defined and measured, but is inherently 
entwined in the very fabric of social life and its processes. Thus 
in order to understand power we need to move back from the level of 
appearances to deeper levels of social understanding. This brings us 
back to the dichotomy of 'objective' and 'subjective' approaches to 
social science. We have already seen that nearly all the theories of 
power can be located toward the 'objective' end of that continuum. 
However in recent years there has been an increase in work which 
focuses upon the 'subjective' or 'action' end. Unfortunately, such 
work has generally ignored the topic of power. It will be argued 
here that any new model of power will have to reconcile and synthesise 
the 'structural' and 'action' approaches. Only from such a synthesis 
will a deeper understanding emerge.
Several authors have drawn attention to the differences between 
theories of action and theories of structure and have suggested methods 
of synthesis. Giddens (1976, 1977, 1979) has written at length and in 
great detail about both theories of action and structure. He suggests 
that,
"'Action' and 'structure' normally appear in both the sociological and 
philosophical literature as antinomies. Broadly speaking, it would 
be true to say that those schools of thought which have been pre-
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occupied with action have paid little attention to, or have found 
no way of coping with, conceptions of structural explanation or 
social causation; they have also failed to relate action theory to
problems of institutional transformation ....  Functionalism and
structuralism are alike in according a priority to the object over 
the subject or, in some sense, to structure over action". (1979: 50-51)
Clegg (1975) in his analysis of power in sociological theory and 
organisational life also identifies the two approaches, albeit in a 
more concrete form. Thus he discusses the, "structural concept of 
'domination' and the action concept of 'power'". (1975: 67). 
Interestingly, both Giddens and Clegg proceed to their resolution of 
the theoretical dichotomy by use of similar linguistic analogies.
Giddens develops his theory of 'structuration' by arguing that,
"Sociology is not concerned with a pre-given universe of objects, but 
with one which is constituted or produced by the active doing of 
subjects .... The production and reproduction of society thus has to 
be treated as a skilled performance on the part of its members".
(1975: 160)
Giddens then uses a comparison with language to demonstrate this 
process of production and reproduction. Language is used not because 
social life 'is' a language but because language exemplifies some, 
and only some, aspects of social life. Language, as with social life, 
is produced and reproduced. Language, suggests Giddens, has three 
important facets. It is 'mastered' as an act; it is used as a medium 
of communication between members of a community; and it forms a 
'structure' of rules which are creatively employed by the community of 
speakers. Applying these points to social life, Giddens argues that,
- 213 -
"Social life .... may be treated as a set of reproduced practices. 
Following the threefold approach distinguished above, social practices 
may be studied, first, from the point of view of their constitution 
as a series of acts, 'brought o f f  by actors; second, as constituting 
forms of interaction, involving the communication of meaning; and 
third, as constituting structures which pertain to 'collectivities' 
or 'social communities'". (1976: 104)
The implications of this analysis will be considered shortly. Clegg, 
on the other hand, uses the notion of deep and surface rules derived 
initially from structural linguistics and the work of Chomsky (1968) 
into transformational grammar. He then considers the ethnomethodo- 
logical use of this concept by Cicourel (1973). Cicourel adopts the 
deep/surface model referring to deep structure as interpretive 
procedures. Thus Cicourel argues that,
"'Interpretive procedures' as opposed to 'surface rules' (norms) are 
similar to, but in many ways different from, Chomsky's distinction 
between 'deep structure' (for rendering a semantic interpretation to 
sentences) and 'surface structure' (for designating phonetic inter­
pretations to sentences), for interpretive procedures are consti­
tutive of the members sense of social structure or organisation. The 
acquisition of interpretive procedures provides the actor with a 
basis for assigning meaning to his environment or a sense of social 
structure, thus orienting him to the relevance of 'surface rules' or 
'norms'". (1973: 44-45)
Clegg adopts the view of deep/surface structures from both Chomsky and 
Cicourel and uses them, as we shall see later, to construct a model of 
power in organisations. Indeed Clegg views the idea of 'rule' as the 
crucial link between theories of action and theories of structure.
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Giddens and Clegg are not the only writers to have addressed the 
problems caused by the conflicting theories of action and structure.
In recent years there has developed a very small corpus of research 
in the United States which deals with this problem. This appears 
largely to have arisen in the field of organisation analysis and 
studies. Thus Benson (1977a), in an introductory article to a journal 
issue dealing with organisational theory, suggests that the study of 
complex organisations is in a period of crisis and that this crisis 
manifests itself in the theoretical, epistemological, methodological 
and practical aspects of the field. Benson argues that the orthodoxy 
of organisational theory (which he criticises in similar ways to 
those advanced in this work) has been increasingly challenged in 
recent years by work which threatens the established functionalist 
paradigm. One major contribution to the crisis is the increased focus 
upon action as opposed to structure. Thus Benson sees much of the 
newer research as focusing,
"attention upon the production and reproduction of organisational
reality in the ongoing interactions of people . (.......... ). Recent
developments have thrust the action issue to center stage. It can 
no longer be shunted aside as a peripheral matter or the domain of 
some other discipline. The established approaches have been under­
mined by critiques in which the grounding and production of organi­
sational realities are central". (1977a: 6)
Benson cites critiques from ethnomethodology, phenomenology and 
marxism including Bittner (1965), Silverman (1971), Jehenson (1973) 
and Giddens (1976). Benson himself, in another paper (1977b), has 
added to the crisis by proposing a dialetical theory of organisations 
which, drawing upon a general marxist and radical perspective on social
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life, challenges the theoretical and epistemological orthodoxies 
current in the field. Benson states the case for his dialectical 
theory as follows ;
"Dialectical theory, because it is essentially a processual pers­
pective, focuses on the dimension currently missing in much 
organisational thought. It offers an explanation of the processes 
involved in the production, the reproduction, and the destruction of 
particular organisational forms. It opens analysis to the processes 
through which actors come out and stabilize a sphere of rationality 
and those through which such rationalised spheres dissolve". (1977b:2)
For Benson, dialectical analysis is guided by four principles. These 
are social construction/production, totality, contradiction and praxis. 
These principles will be discussed later in this chapter. However, if 
we focus attention upon the first principle we can clearly see parallels 
between the work of Benson and that of Giddens. By social construction/ 
production Benson refers to the fact that the social world is not 
given as an objective fact but is instead constantly constructed and 
produced by human activity. This clearly corresponds to the views of 
Giddens (1976: 160). Benson also argues that this process of 
production is constrained by the existing social structure. Thus he 
states that,
"People produce a social world which stands over them, constraining 
their actions. The production of social structure, then, occurs 
within a social structure". (1977b: 3)
In a similar manner Giddens has argued that,
"The realm of human agency is bounded. Men produce society, but they 
do so as historically located actors, and not under conditions of
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their own choosing". (1976: 160)
The two authors differ in so far as Benson proceeds from this analysis 
into an explicitly marxist analysis of the way in which structures 
are changed by the process of 'the negation of the negation’.
Another American organisational theorist concerned with the differences 
and conflicts between the action and structural approaches is Brown 
(1978). He identifies the domains of 'social structures' and 
'structures of consciousness', which refer to the Marxian approaches 
to macro societal issues and the neo-Durkheiraian phenomenological 
and ethnomethodological sociologies of consciousness in micro settings, 
respectively. Brown suggests that these separate domains could be 
linked by the use of appropriate strategies and sees the field of 
organisational theory as providing the correct level and location for 
such a union. The strategies would thus be scaling the marxist 
theories down to the organisational level and the scaling up of the 
micro sociologies to the level of organisational structure. The 
implications of Brown's analysis will be considered later in this 
chapter.
4.2 Levels in social analysis
Despite the differences in their analyses, Giddens, Clegg, Brown and 
Benson all attempt to reconcile the seemingly contradictory theories 
of action and structure by reference, either expressly or implicitly, 
to the notion of different 'levels' in social life.
The concept of levels derived by Giddens refers back to his discussion 
of language and some of its similarities to social life. It may be 
recalled that Giddens identified the notions of social reproduction as
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an act, an interaction and as a structure. He then proceeds to examine 
in more detail the notion of structure as used in structuralism and 
functionalism which he finds to be deficient. However, the concept of 
structure can be saved from the failings of its usage in both these 
theories. This is done via his theory of structuration. Giddens argues 
that to,
"study structuration is to attempt to determine the conditions which 
govern the community and dissolution of structures or types of 
structure. Put it another way: to enquire into the process of repro­
duction is to specify the connections between 'structuration and 
'structure'. The characteristic error of the philosophy of action is 
to treat the problem of 'production' only', thus not developing any 
concept of structural analysis at all; the limitation of both struc­
turalism and functionalism, on the other hand, is to regard 'repro­
duction' as a mechanical outcome, rather than as an active constituting 
process, accomplished by, and consisting in the doings of active 
subjects". (1976: 120-121)
This notion of structuration is then enshrined in one of the new rules 
of the sociological method where Giddens refers to the 'duality of 
structure'. By this he means that structures have both constraining and
enabling features. Or to put it another way, social structures are
constituted by action, whilst at the same time action is constituted 
structurally. This is a difficult yet important notion. Giddens 
representation of this 'duality' of structure is contained in Figure 
4.1 below.
INTERACTION Communication Power Sanction
(MODALITY) Interpretive scheme Facility Norm
STRUCTURE Signification Domination Legitimation
Figure 4.1 Giddens model of the 'duality of structure' (Giddens 1979:82)
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This diagram reflects the ’duality of structure' because the first 
line refers to properties of action and interaction while the third 
line refers to properties of structures. By 'modalities' Giddens 
means the 'mediation of interaction and structure in the processes of 
social reproduction*. (1976: 122). Returning to the original 
premise that social life can be viewed as a process of reproduction 
or a set of reproduced practices, we can then proceed to explain the 
rest of the diagram. Giddens has suggested that,
"The production of interaction has three fundamental elements: its 
constitution as 'meaningful'; its constitution as a moral order; 
and its constitution as the operation of relations of power".
(1976: 104)
The reader will see that these elements are reproduced (in a different 
order) in the last three columns of the diagram. These are all 
important and deserve explanation although detailed investigation of 
the constitution of interaction as the operation of relations of power 
will be reserved for later.
The second column draws upon ideas and concepts developed from the 
previous discussion of the properties of language and the similarities 
to social life. Thus the communication of meaning in the process of 
interaction is achieved by use of interpretative schemes by which 
members make sense of what each says and does. Such interpretative 
schemes are drawn from a common cognitive order whilst at the same 
time reconstituting that same order. As Giddens explains,
"The communication of meaning in interaction involves the use of 
interpretative schemes by means of which sense is made by participants 
of what each says and does. The application of such cognitive
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schemes, within a framework of mutual knowledge, depends upon and 
draws from a 'cognitive order' which is shared by a community ; but 
while drawing upon such a cognitive order the application of inter­
pretative schemes at the same time reconstitutes that order".
(1976: 122)
In a similar manner power in interaction is created by the use of 
facilities which enable participants to gain outcomes favourable to 
them by affecting the conduct of others. These facilities are 
derived from the structure of dominancy. This is dealt with in the 
third column. The final column deals with the constitution of inter­
action as a moral order. As Giddens argued,
"the moral constitution of interaction involves the application of 
norms which draw from a legitimate order, and yet by that very 
application reconstitute it". (1976: 122-123)
Thus in a similar manner to properties of interaction, we can now 
suggest that signification, domination and legitimation are integral 
properties or characteristics of structures.
Giddens illustrates this theory of the 'duality of structure' by 
reference to class in capitalist society. Thus the 'legitimacy' of 
the class structure is seen as being connected with private property 
and a set of rights defined in general by the state. These rights 
also form the basis for the system of class 'domination', and the 
'signification' of the class structure is provided by the 'class 
consciousness' or 'class awareness'. Therefore,
"Each of these features of class structure is routinely drawn upon 
by actors in the course of constituting class relations as inter-
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actions; in drawing on them as modalities of interaction; they also 
reproduce them as that structure. Class structure is both the medium 
and the outcome of social reproduction". (Giddens 1976: 123)
Giddens is not the only theorist to have addressed the issues of the 
'duality of structure' and the existence of different 'levels' in 
social life. Similar themes have been discussed by Stewart Clegg 
(1975, 1979). We have already seen that Clegg starts from a discussion 
of deep and surface rules developed from structural linguistics and 
ethnomethodology. To this he adds the concept of 'form of life' 
derived from the philosophical work of Wittgenstein (1968). It is 
unclear as to exactly what either Wittgenstein or Clegg mean by this 
phrase. The original reference in Wittgenstein reads as follows,
"It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree 
in the language they use. This is not agreement in opinions but in
forms of life ....  What has to be accepted, the given is-so one
could say 'forms of life'". (1968: 226)
Clegg appears to view the 'form of life' as a 'standard'. Thus the,
"behaviour glossed over by the phrase 'form of life' indicates that 
it is behaviour which may be seen as the embodiment of actions 
oriented towards a standard or measure of activity". (1975: 35)
He also suggests that the 'form of life' can be seen as both a 'bedrock' 
for social investigation and as iconic by which he means "a material 
thing whose being is inexplicable apart from the idea(l) projected on 
to it". (1975: 35). Clegg uses the notion of a 'form of life' to 
show that this is not just another of 'n' levels of analysis, but is 
in fact the 'deepest'level. Finally if we return to our discussion
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of Weber in Chapter 1 it will be remembered that Clegg, by a re­
definition and re-translation of Weber’s original German concepts, 
produced a trilogy of power, rule and domination. These elements 
together with the notion of ’rules' and 'form of life' form the 
basis of his model of the 'duality of structure' and the 'levels' 
of social life.
Clegg's argument can be summarised by the following quotation and 
diagrammatical representation.
"Domination in everyday organisational life is effected through both 
'an objective principle' and a 'concrete object'. Theorising under 
the icon of this provides a substantive rationality, having point, 
purpose and regularity, exhibited in the deep structure of rules 
which enable the surface display of exchanges". (1975: 77)
The first column of the diagram represents the three different levels 
of social life. The level of surface action and appearances, the 
level of deep structure and interpretative schemes and, finally, the 
level of ultimate structure or the form of life. Clegg then relates 
these levels to the concept of power. Thus he argues that,
"Power is about the outcomes of issues enabled by the rule of a sub­
stantive rationality which is temporarily and institutionally located. 
Underlying this rule is a specific form of domination". (1975: 77-78)
The diagram can be viewed both vertically in terms of the identification 
of a series of levels and horizontally in terms of the relationships 
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The similarities between the analyses of Giddens and Clegg in respect 
of the ’duality of structure’ and 'levels' in social life are clear to 
see. Indeed in a later work Clegg (1979) appears to alter his 
description of the levels of social life and adopts the terms;'action, 
mediation and structure'; which more closely resemble those of Giddens. 
However, there are important differences between the two authors 
which we need to be aware of. Clegg, as his diagrammatic representation 
suggests by its use of arrows, seeks to argue that the structural 
concept of domination is the 'key' concept in understanding both 
power and social life. Thus Clegg proceeds to adopt a version of 
marxist structuralist theory in order to develop his ideas. Giddens 
is criticised by Clegg because he appears to argue that social 
structure is dependent upon social action to a certain extent. Thus 
Clegg suggests (surely incorrectly) that despite his protestations 
Giddens is in fact adopting a 'quasi' individualist and voluntarist 
position.
If we return to the work of Benson (1977a, 1977b) we can see that he 
identifies the problem of 'levels' as one of his four problems leading 
to a crisis in organisational analysis. Benson points to the 
challenges to the orthodox assumption that the organisation is a 
distinct entity and level for study. These challenges come from 
below, in the form of work into micro-processes (Silverman 1971) and 
organisational reification and from above in the form of work which 
focuses upon inter-organisational relations and ultimately the world 
economy. In this Benson adopts a similar perspective and understanding 
to Brown (1978). He develops his notion of levels in his discussion 
of the second principle of a dialectical organisational analysis; 
namely, totality.
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Benson argues that the organisation needs to be studied much more 
widely and yet at the same time more narrowly. As he suggests,
"Organisational phenomena must be understood as wholes in all of
their interpenetrating complexity ....  The conventional separation
between organisation and environment must be critically examined.
The essential continuity, the relational character of social life 
must be analysed and not overlooked in a search for analytical 
boundaries and units of analysis. The processes through which such 
conventional boundaries are produced and sustained must be pursued. 
The interests and power relations on which the conventional boundaries 
rest must be examined". (1977b: 9)
Another theorist who has hinted at the existence of a series of power 
’levels’ is Lukes (1974). His three dimensions of power can be read 
as a series of levels upon which power can be said to operate. In so 
far as the one dimensional approach to power is behaviourally based, 
one could suggest that this was a surface manifestation of power on 
the level of 'action*. The two and three dimensional approaches, 
successively attempt to probe deeper into 'structural' forms of power.
4.3 Reconceptualising power
So far in this Chapter we have seen how the notion of a series of 
levels in social life has developed from the analysis of the duality 
of action and structure. We can now attempt to demonstrate the 
applicability of this analysis to the concept of power.
As with social theory in general, the voluminous power literature 
exhibits a dualism between action and structure.
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Thus one group of theories treats "power as a phenomenon of willed or 
intended action". (Giddens 1979: 88), while another suggests that 
power is the property of institutions, communities or structures.
Thus there,
"are effectively two versions of how power structures are constituted,
and two versions of ’domination' (.....  ). The first tends to treat
domination as a network of decision-making, operating against an un­
examined institutional backdrop; the second regards domination as itself 
an institutional phenomenon, either disregarding power as relating to 
the active accomplishments of actors, or treating it as in some way 
determinea by institutions ". (Giddens 1979: 89)
How, then, are we to escape from this dilemma and transcend this 
dualism? The answer lies in returning to the basics of social 
theory. Giddens has argued that the production of interaction has, 
as one of its fundamental elements its constitution as the operation 
of the relations of power. Later he seeks to emphasise that the 
notion of action and interaction is "logically tied to that of power" 
(Giddens 1976: 110). At the same time he seems to imply that 
domination is a fundamental aspect of structure. However, rather than 
simply asserting that one or the other is 'really' power, he attempts 
to relate the two and view them both together as representing 'power' 
in use. In order to facilitate this we need a clearer understanding 
of 'power' and 'domination' and a linking device.
When considering the action level, Giddens seeks to replace the term 
'power' by referring to the 'transformational capacity' of human action. 
This is defined as the.
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"capability of the actor to intervene in a series of events so as to 
alter their course; as such it is the ’can' which mediates between 
intentions or wants and the actual realisation of the outcomes 
sought after". (1976: 111)
As such, transformational capacity is implicit in the very notion of 
action. 'Transformational power' then becomes a sub-set of capacity. 
Thus in this sense 'power' refers to,
"interactions where transformative capacity is harnessed to actor's 
attempts to get others to comply with their wants. Power, in this 
relational sense, concerns the capability of actors to secure 
outcomes where the realisation of these outcomes depends upon the 
agency of others". (1979: 93)
The concept that links together the notion of power as transformational 
capacity and the notion of power as domination is that of resources.
As Giddens argues (and it is worth quoting at length),
"Resources are the media whereby transformative capacity is employed 
as power in the routine course of social interaction; but they are 
at the same time structural elements of social systems as systems, 
reconstituted through their utilisation in social interaction. This 
is therefore the correlate, in respect of power, of the duality of 
structure in respect of the communication of meaning and of norma­
tive sanctions: resources are not just additional elements to these, 
but include the means whereby the meaningful and normative content 
of interaction is actualised. 'Power' intervenes conceptually between 
the broader notions of transformative capacity on the one side, and 
of domination on the other: power is a relational concept, but only 
operates as such through the utilisation of transformative capacity
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as generated by structure of domination". (1979:92)
Giddens* understanding of power is illustrated in Figure 4.3





Power is thus seen as existing on a series of levels in a number of 
different forms. Power is both an 'action* concept in the form of 
transformational capacity and a 'structural' concept in the form of 
domination. The structure of domination obviously places limits upon 
the transformational 'acts' that can occur, whilst at the same time 
such 'acts' reinforce and reproduce that structure. The medium by 
which these processes are achieved is the use of resources. Power is 
thus not 'a' resource but instead resources are the means through 
which power is exercised and by which structures of domination are 
reproduced.
Taking this view it is possible to make some further points concerning 
power which relate back to issues raised earlier. Firstly, power is a 
capacity to act which depends upon resources. Thus power can be 
'stored-up' for future use and is therefore 'latent'. Secondly this 
theory of power does not necessarily imply the existence of conflict. 
This accords with the original view of Weber who argued that power 
was,
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"the chance of a man or of a number of men to realise their own will 
in a communal action even against the resistance of others 
(1948; )
Finally this view of power seems to suggest that there is no necessary 
connection between 'intention' or 'will' and power in the manner 
specified by Weber. Therefore it is possible for power to be 
exercised without its being intended.
Despite some basic similarities, Giddens takes issue with Lukes'
(1974) notion of three-dimensions of power, arguing that, instead of 
adding in a political element through the notion of interests, Lukes 
would have done better to address the problem of how to incorporate 
'structure' into the treatment of power.
"Rather than adding on another 'dimension' to the decision-making and 
non-decision making approaches, we need to do what Lukes advocates, 
but does not in fact accomplish: this implies attempting to overcome 
the traditional division between 'voluntaristic' and 'structural' 
notions of power". (Giddens 1979: 91)
Therefore it is argued by Giddens that, despite further efforts in a 
later paper (Lukes 1977), Lukes is unable to transcend the dualism of 
action and structure. Thus he
"is unable satisfactorily to deal with structure as implicated in power 
relations and power relations as implicated in structure". (Giddens 
1974: 91)
The irony is that this is the very charge levelled at both Lukes and 
Giddens by Clegg (1979) when he points out that each,
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"wants to talk about power and structure, but ends up talking mainly 
about power; each subsumes structure to power". (1979: 74)
Giddens, of course, feels that he is relating power to structure as 
he recognises that
"power must be treated in the context of the duality of structure:
if the resources which the existence of domination implies and the
exercise of power draws upon, are seen to be at the same time 
structural components of social systems". (1979: 91)
However it does seem correct to point out that despite his clear 
analysis of power, Giddens does appear to neglect the concept of 
domination in his earlier work.
In a later work Giddens (1979) develops his notion of domination from 
his initial discussion of the duality of agency and structure. Firstly 
he identifies four major elements of social life. These are shown in 
diagrammatic form in Figure 4.4
DOMINATION Asymmetry of resources
POWER Relations of autonomy/dependence
CONFLICT Relations of antagonism or struggle
CONTRADICTION Opposition of structural principles
Figure 4.4 The four elements of social life
Domination is seen as involving "asymmetries of resources employed in 
the restraining of power relations in and between systems of interaction" 
(1979: 93) while power can be seen as "involving reproduced relations 
of autonomy and dependence in social interaction". (1979: 93)
— 230 —
Finally,Contradition is defined as "an opposition or disjunction of 
structural principles of social systems, where those principles operate 
in terms of each other but at the same time contravene on another". 
(1979: 141). The relationships between these concepts are clearly 
shown in the diagram. Thus both domination and contradiction are 
structural concepts and domination is produced in and through contra­
diction. Power is related to domination but is only linked to 
contradiction via domination. Similarly, conflict is directly related 
to contradiction but only indirectly to domination via power.
Giddens then attempts to introduce the concept of ideology and to 
show how this is related to domination. Returning to his original 
model of the duality of agency and structure he argues that,
"To analyse the ideological aspects of symbolic orders .... is to 
examine how structures of signification are mobilised to legitimate 
the sectional interests of hegemonic groups". (1979: 188)
Thus ideology relates to all three characteristics of structures: 
signification, domination and legitimation. However it is possible, 
as with power, to recognise two distinct forms of ideology. The 
first is a view of ideology as an action concept, where it involves 
the direct manipulation of communication by those in the dominant 
class or elite in order to pursue their own sectional interests. The 
second method involves examining ideology.
"institutionally (....... ) to show how symbolic orders sustain forms
of domination in the everyday context of 'lived' experience .......
To study ideology from this aspect is to seek to identify the most 
basic structural elements which connect signification and legiti­
mation in such a way as to favour dominant interests". (1979:191-192).
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Having satisfactorily delineated these forms of ideology we can return 
from that level of abstraction to examine some of the ways in which 
ideology is actually used in society. We will see ideology being used 
in two ways. Firstly on the structural level we will see it used to 
conceal domination as domination. Thus ideology is a structural 
factor and forms part of the system of domination, existing in order 
to conceal itself and that very structure of dominancy. Secondly 
on the action level it will be used in conjunction with power to 
conceal sectional interests. One common usage is the representation 
of sectional interests as universal ones. This, of course, links to 
the use of 'national interest' arguments as well as to Marx's famous 
theorum that 'the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the 
ruling ideas'. A second usage involves denying the existence of 
contradictions or obscuring their true nature so that ordinary actors 
can achieve little penetration into the structural conditions of their 
existence. A good example of this would be the insistence by the 
Government that 'political' and 'economic' issues be kept separate 
in the industrial relations field and the argument that trade unions 
should confine themselves to 'economic' activities. A final ideological 
strategy that can be adopted by the dominant elite is concerned with 
the preservation of the status quo. Thus forms of 'signification' are 
found which 'legitimise' the structure of 'domination'. Giddens 
refers to this process as the "naturalisation of the present" or 
"reification". (1979: 195).
As we have already seen Clegg produced his theoretical framework in 
the process of a discussion on power in organisational life. He 
proceeded to identify the related concepts of 'power', 'rule' and 
'domination'.
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We can now examine these in more detail and compare and contrast 
them with those of Giddens. Clegg defines his use of power as
"the ability to exercise control over resources which, when subjects 
engage in practices, produce effects on other subjects". (1979: 95)
Although the formulations are different and the authors, at times, less 
than specific, it appears that Clegg’s notion of power, to a large 
extent, coincides with that of Giddens. When we examine Clegg's use 
of the term 'rule' we find that the situation is rather different. 
Deriving his notion from linguistics, ethnomethodology and philosophy 
Clegg sees instances of power as displaying, when viewed collectively 
an "underlying rule" (1979: 96). This rule emphasises the 'sameness' 
of the activities despite the surface 'difference' in terms of "the 
underlying mode of rationality of the production of the phenomena of 
the surface of social life by subjects". (1979: 96). This of course, 
does not parallel the work of Giddens who uses 'resources' to mediate 
between power as 'transformational capacity' and power as domination. 
Yet this confusion can be resolved if one returns to Gidden's 
original diagrammatical representation of his model. Here he listed 
the three fundamental elements of interaction and the three main 
characteristics of structures. It may be argued that in focusing 
upon 'power' as an action concept and 'domination' as a structural 
concept Clegg has failed to appreciate the other elements mentioned by 
Giddens. Thus in discussing the production of interaction Giddens 
identifies three fundamental elements. These are 'meaning', 'moral 
order' and power. Clegg merely concentrates upon power. Yet his use 
of 'rule' mirrors Gidden's's 'interpretive scheme' which is related to 
'meaning' (See Figure 4.1). Finally Clegg discusses what he terms 
'hegemonic domination' which he sees as inextricably linked in Marxist
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structuralist terms to the mode of production. This links easily to 
Gidden's notions of 'domination' and 'ideology' although these are 
perhaps a little underdeveloped in Giddens. Clegg summarises his 
revised argument in terms of a diagram (See Figure 4.5).
Figure 4.5 Clegg's view of power
















As we can see Clegg delineates the - by now familiar - three levels of 
social analysis, action, mediation and structure. He then identifies 
the base of hegemonic domination in the form of the mode of production 
and demonstrates how this is manifested in a mode of rationality and 
thus reflected in organisational structure. He also shows how rules 
exist on this series of levels. Thus instances of organisational 
practice ('acts' or 'events') reflect selection rules which are in 
turn determined by the ground rules embedded in the structure of 
domination.
4.4 Hegemony and ideological domination
From our reconceptualisation of power, through the analysis of the 
duality of action and structure and through the introduction of levels
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in social life, there have emerged several new and related concepts 
which need to be explored and examined. Thus^attention ̂ was directed 
towards the concepts of hegemony and ideology. We can now consider 
these in more detail.
The notion of hegemony is related to a wider debate in social theory. 
This concerns whether coercive or ideational factors provide the 
central basis of social order. It is possible to identify two fairly 
clearly defined positions on this debate. Firstly the classical 
Marxian view which suggests that social order is determined by economic 
factors. Thus the technological base or substructure of the forces 
of production determine the form of consciousness. Or, to put it 
another way the,
"ideological superstructure emerges in response to the existing 
social structure defined in terms of coercive economic and political 
social relations". (Sallach 1974: 38)
Marx, had of course, suggested that the ruling elite would perpetrate 
their ideas as the ruling ideas of the age. However, for him, this 
process was secondary to the fact of coercive economic domination.
The second view of the debate on ideational or coercive factors can 
be largely attributed to Gramsci who is responsible for the emergence 
of the concept of hegemony. Gramsci, the jailed General Secretary of 
the Italian Communist Party, develops the notion of hegemony as the 
underlying theme of his prison notebooks. While acknowledging the 
position of Marx, Gramsci was more influenced by ideational factors.
As Bates (1975) argues,
"The homo economicus of industrial England, which had captivated Marx
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in the British Museum, cast less of a spell in the economically back­
ward land of Saint Francis, Vico and Croce. The tug of this idealist 
tradition can be seen in Gramsci*s estimation of the power, both 
creative and conservative, of ideas". (1975: 351)
Thus Gramsci appears to argue that the technological base of the 
forces of production determine what forms of consciousness are possible. 
In contradistinction to classical Marxism, Gramsci seems to present an 
'open' Marxism. This argues that,
"The economic base sets, in a strict manner, the range of possible out­
comes but free political and ideological activity is ultimately 
decisive in determining which alternative prevails". (Femia 1975: 38)
Thus Gramsci argues that social order is, in the last resort, determined 
by ideational factors within a basic economic coercive framework.
Running parallel to the coercive/ideational debate is another controversy 
in social theory. This is between those who hold a consensual model of 
society (consensus theory) and those who argue that conflict predominates 
(conflict/coercion theory). The consensus view can be attributed to 
Parsonian functionalism, while the conflict approach can be traced back 
to Marx. These two schools differ in their answer to the Hobbesian 
question; Why does social order exist? The consensus theorists argue it 
is because of shared norms, values and beliefs whilst the conflict 
theorists suggest that it is because of conformity due to the threat of 
power by an elite group. This controversy was alluded to in Chapter One. 
Yet there are difficulties with both these views. The consensus theory 
and conflict theories have both been extensively criticised on many 
grounds. For our present purposes one simple criticism can be malde of 
each approach.
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The consensus theory assumes a total monolithic convergence of norms 
and values which, as we shall see later, appears to be at variance 
with the facts. On the other hand the conflict view by focusing 
upon the differentiation of norms and values can be said to underplay 
the extent to which the dominant value system actually wins 
acceptance. Thus we will seek to argue that the notion of hegemony 
remedies the deficiencies of both theories. It may be judged that 
the concept is closer to a conflict position yet it stands between 
both theories and to a certain extent acts as a bridge between them.
What, then, is to be understood by the term hegemony (egemonia)? It 
is defined by Williams (1960) in his introduction to Gramsci's use of 
the concept as,
"a ’moment', in which the philosophy and practice of a society fuse 
or are in equilibrium; an order in which a certain way of life and 
through is dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused 
throughout society in all its institutional and private manifestations, 
informing with its spirit all taste, morality, customs, religious and 
political principles, and all social relations, particularly in their 
intellectual and moral connotation". (1960: 587)
It has also been defined in more succinct terms by Bates as meaning,
"political leadership based on the consent of the led, a consent 
which is secured by the diffusion and popularisation of the world 
view of the ruling class". (1975: 352)
We can examine these notions in more detail. Gramsci seems to be 
describing a situation in which a dominant class, which has control 
over the basic economic and political institution, attempts to utilise
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its monopoly access to those institutions in order to propagate 
values and norms which reinforce its own position of dominance. This 
process has three basic facets. Firstly there is the dissemination 
of the values and norms favoured by the elite group; secondly there 
is the denial, refutation and ultimately censorship of beliefs, values 
and norms which threaten the position of the elite group; and finally 
there is the attempt to define and limit the parameters of permissible 
and normal discussion of beliefs, values and norms. The last of 
these facets thus corresponds to three dimensional notion of power 
described by Lukes (1974). Indeed Femia has suggested that Gramsci, 
"eventually came to view hegemony as the most important face of 
power". (1975: 31). Similarly Sallach has argued that the,
"most effective aspect of hegemony is found in the suppression of 
alternative views through the establishment of parameters which 
define what is legitimate, reasonable, sane, practical, good, true 
and beautiful". (1974: 41)
Obviously, as the notion of hegemony is so strongly rooted in the 
ideational 'corner', Gramsci was forced to re-appraise the Marxist 
concept of 'superstructure' and its relationship to the economic base. 
We have already seen that Gramsci adopted a more 'open' Marxism where 
the economic base sets a range of possible outcomes which are actually 
decided by ideological activity. As a result of his re-appraisal and 
his study of the role of intellectuals in society, Gramsci divided 
the superstructure into two parts which he described as 'civil society' 
and 'political society'. These have been described by Bates;
"Civil society is composed of all those 'private organisms' - schools, 
churchs, clubs, journals, and parties - which contribute in molecular
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fashion to the formation of social and political consciousness. 
Political society, on the other hand, is composed of those public 
institutions - the government, courts, police and army - which 
exercise 'direct dominion'. It is synonymous with the 'state'". 
(1975: 353)
The dominant class exercise 'power' in both forms of society but at 
different times and by different methods. Civil society is the 
ideational field where the ruling class attempt to gain the consent 
of the ruled by the construction of an ideological hegemony. They 
therefore attempt to secure the 'free' consent of the masses to their 
domination. Where the hegemony breaks down, or is in danger of doing 
so, the ruling class will fall back upon the coercive power of the 
political society or state machinery in order to reassert its domi­
nation. Thus political society describes the realm of coercion. This 
can be illustred by Figure 4.6.
Figure 4.6 The realms of hegemony and domination
Civil Society Political Society (State)1 I
sent Coerci1 1
Hegemony <-------------------------------» Domination
Gramsci thus saw hegemony and domination as mutually related phenomena 
and suggested that while hegemony characterised bourgeois rule in an 
advanced capitalist society, it was always underpinned by economic 
domination which could be re-asserted in times of crisis.
We have seen that hegemony consists of rule via 'consent', but what is 
exactly meant by the term 'consent'? We can differentiate two separate
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forms of consent. On the one hand there is 'active* consent which 
occurs when individuals totally internalise the dominant ideology.
On the other hand there is 'passive' consent which occurs when 
individuals recognise the iniquity of the present state but are unable 
to envisage its replacement or indeed any viable alternative. The 
degree of social stability is obviously related to the degree of 
social consensus as reflected in the 'mix' of 'active' and 'passive' 
acceptance of the structure of domination. Gramsci acknowledges both 
forms of consent. For example, he characterises hegemony as the,
"spontaneous consent given by the great masses of the population to 
the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fund­
amental group, consent 'historically' caused by the prestige (and 
therefore by the trust) accruing to the dominant group because of 
its position and function in the world of production". (1949: 9)
Elsewhere in his work he adopts a passive view of consent. As Femia 
has argued such passive consent,
"emerges not so much because the masses profoundly regard the social 
order as an expression of their aspirations as because they lack the 
conceptual tools, the 'clear theoretical consciousness', which would 
enable them effectively to comprehend and act on their discontent - 
discontent manifest in the activity uniting them 'in the practical
transformation of reality'. (....... ) The 'active man-in-the-mass'
lacks the means with which to formulate the radical alternative
'implicit in his activity' (....... ) The very framework for his
analysis of the existing system is fixed by the dominant vision of 
the world. The apparent limits of the possible are defined by the 
existing order". (1975: 33)
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Thus Gramsci sees consent as being both active and passive, and this 
is more easily understood if we also realise that he saw the values 
and norms of individuals as neither consistent, coherent, or constant. 
Gramsci viewed m o d e m  capitalist societies and their systems of 
economic dominance as no longer being able to ensure total acceptance 
and allegiance from the the masses. These systems were in a pre­
carious position where social disintegration could easily occur.
Within the consciousness of the average member of society "elements 
of intellectual and moral approbation coexist in unsteady equilibrium 
with elements of resignation and even hostility". (Femia 1975: 34). 
This is the balance of hegemony and consent.
Gramsci used the concept of hegemony to explain a phenomena which had 
worried him (as indeed it had worried others including Lenin). This 
was the 'apathy' and 'indifference' of the masses in the face of their 
economic subjugation. Gramsci explains this by arguing that the masses 
are not only dominated in an economic and coercive manner but are 
ideologically dominated and are therefore unable to see the true nature 
of their condition. To achieve revolution the ideological blindfold 
must be removed from the workers by 'proletarian intellectuals'. Thus 
'false consciousness', which in terms of strict economic determinism 
is inexplicable, is illuminated by Gramsci's notion of hegemony.
An important point needs to be made at this juncture. This is that the 
concept of hegemony not only reflects the duality of action and 
structure but also the dichotomy of 'power' and 'consciousness' 
introduced in the prologue. This hegemony can on the one hand be 
considered as a form of a 'tool' of power. It can be used purposively 
on the level of action in order to create values and attitudes which do
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not threaten the dominant group. It can also exist structurally 
tied in to the operation of a social elite and reflected in the very 
fabric of society. In order to demonstrate the existence of power 
as hegemony one needs direct evidence of its utilisation. This may 
be gained from the observation and examination of 'action* or from 
the analysis of 'structures'. On the other hand hegemony can be 
viewed as a 'result' of the operation of power thus describing the 
reactions of the subordinated to their domination or their state of 
'consciousness'. The existence of certain forms of consciousness 
would therefore provide indirect evidence of the operation of 
hegemonic power.
In terms of the model of power to be advanced later in this work, the 
concept of hegemony will be treated as a 'form' or 'tool' of power 
and an attempt will be made to show how one management utilised such 
ideological hegemony as a power weapon. However, other researchers 
have considered the other facet of hegemony. Thus from Beynon's 
classic study of the Ford plant at Halewood emerged the existence of 
a specific 'factory consciousness'. According to Beynon this factory 
consciousness,
"understands class relationships in terms of their direct manifestations 
in conflict between the bosses and the workers within the factory. It 
is rooted in the workplace where struggles are fought over the control 
of the job and the 'rights' of managers and workers. In as much as it 
concerns itself with exploitation and power it contains definite 
political elements. But it is a politics of the factory".
(1973: 98)
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From a study of auto workers at the General Motors plant at Fram- 
lingham, Massachusetts, Garson (1973) argues that they possess a 
'multiple' consciousness. Thus,
"Rather than possessing a coherent ideology, whether reactionary, 
liberal, or radical, one finds them to be full of ambiguity and 
overlays of consciousness. Different and seemingly contradictory 
orientations will be evoked depending upon the context". (1973; 164)
Garson also notes an apparent dichotomy in that general surface level 
satisfaction is underlain by specific dissatisfaction with various 
aspects of the work situation. He thus argues that,
"The phenomenon of surface satisfaction veiling far-reaching sources 
of oppression reflects the need to reconcile oneself to 'what has 
to be done'". (1973: 173)
This then mirrors the notions of 'passive consent' (Gramsci) and 
'pragmatic acceptance' (Mann 1970). In the same vein, Chinoy (1965) 
has demonstrated the existence of the ruling ideology of opportunity 
side-by-side with job aspirations and expectations quite at variance 
with it. Finally Garson links the overall expression of satisfaction 
to the inability to transcend the present situation induced by the 
hegemonic domination of thought. Thus he argues that,
"Satisfaction is perpetuated on a superficial but enduring basis by 
the absence of attractive models capable of raising expectations beyond 
the level presently satisfied by the firm". (1973: 174)
Nichols and Armstrong (1976) studied the ChemCo chemical plant in the 
south of England. They found that the
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"Chemco workers are internally divided. They lack solidarity, are 
isolated from one another, are stratified by a grading system, lack 
experience of active trade unionism, and certainly lack any radical 
political tradition. Moreover, for them to develop a socialist 
consciousness would require the rejection of a whole 'commonsense* 
world of conventional (official) wisdom". (1976: 127)
They also found that the value system of the workers at ChemCo was 
characterised as inchoate, inconsistent and incomplete. Their work 
although not centrally related to power appears to find evidence and 
echoes of hegemony. Thus the authors state that,
"at least in the case of this apparently quiescent workforce, we see 
that the world of work is structured in such a way that workers can 
get little purchase on it". (1976: 16)
They also describe this situation in more detail. Thus,
"in order for workers to see politics and society in a different way 
to that projected by the dominant ideology - the way fostered and 
broadcast by the dominant class and institutions of this society - 
they have to negotiate a way through existing ideological structures. 
Whereas the structures are not 'suspended in mid-air', there is a 
sense in which they do not exist 'over the heads' of particular 
individuals; a sense in which they are given. They provide, if we can
put it like this, readymade and well trodden thoughtways (..... )
Such clusters of theory and value may not be entirely successful in 
directing activity toward the maintenance of the existing order but 
for those who wish to challenge it, they represent a conceptual 
miasma which it requires a very sharp knife to cut clearly through. 
(1976: 19)
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This evidence on the inconsistencies and contradictions in value 
systems both demonstrates the attempt by the ruling elite to inculcate 
dominant values and at the same time the limits of such a hegemonic 
strategy. Thus in a situation where 'normal' values are 'squeezed' 
and 'challenged' by dominant values we would expect, not a value 
consensus to emerge, but a fragile quasi consensus, built upon both 
active and passive consent with perhaps the dominant values being 
'taken' but not legitimised. Yet at the same time this demonstrates 
the limitations to hegemony in that it must be constantly re-affirmed 
and reproduced. This re-emphasises the need for attention to be paid 
to the study of ideological and hegemonic processes at the level of 
'action' as well as at the level of 'structures'.
In order to recapitulate we can make several points about hegemony 
that have emerged from our discussion. Firstly, as we have seen, 
ideological hegemony is always partial, never absolute. Secondly the 
origins of such hegemony can be clearly traced to a specific situation 
of economic domination by a particular group. Finally, hegemony is 
not natural or spontaneous, but is the product of a continual process 
of production and reproduction.
4.5 Hegemony and domination in organisational life
We can now move our focus down to the level of organisation and seek 
to examine the ways in which ideological hegemony and domination are 
produced. The notion of rationality has been seen by some writers to 
be interwoven with such concepts as ideology, hegemony and domination. 
Weber has traditionally provided the starting point for any discussion 
of rationality by dividing social conduct into four forms, two of which 
he designated 'rational' and two 'non-rational'.
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Instrumental rational (Zweckrational) conduct he defined as being,
"determined by expectations as to the behaviour of objects in the 
environment and of other human beings; these expectations are used 
as 'conditions' or 'means' for the attainment of the actor's own 
rationally pursued and calculated ends". (1948: 24)
Thus this form of rationality requires the choice between means in 
order to pursue a specific 'end' or 'goal'. On the other hand, 
value-rational (Wertrational) conduct is,
"determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of 
some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behaviour, 
independently of its prospects of success". (1948: 24-25)
What unites both forms of rational conduct is the connection between 
means and ends and the notion of choice.
In the organisational literature a notion of 'formal rationality' has 
arisen based upon the Weberian notions of instrumental rationality and 
bureaucracy. There appears to be two different interpretations of 
this 'formal rationality'. One sees it as the property of individuals 
who are seen to identify goals and then choose the most efficient 
of the available means in order to achieve them. The second view sees 
rationality as a property of organisations. Thus organisations are 
seen as having goals or objectives and to the extent that the behaviour 
of the individuals within them is perceived as 'in line' with these 
goals then it is seen as rational. Both these formulations have 
obvious problems especially the second which can be said to reify 
human motives to organisations. (For detailed criticisms see Argyris 
1973, Brown 1978).
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However what unites these two views is that they adopt, at different 
levels, Weber’s notion of instrumental rationality and thus see actors 
as choosing effective means to achieve ends prior to action. Thus 
rationality is seen as prospective and an antecedent to action.
However these are not the only views of rationality. Recent work in 
the field of ethnomethodology has produced a third view. As Brown 
has argued, such studies have revealed the non-rational basis of much 
rational conduct. Thus,
"when subjected to micro analysis by ethnomethodologists, the supposedly 
rational procedures of formal organisations turn out to be absurd 
and yet, in their very absurdity to provide the rhetoric and 
rationale for their own legitimacy". (1978: 368)
Therefore rationality can be seen as retrospective rather than 
prospective. For,
"In theoretical as well as in detailed observational studies, Garfinkel 
and others have demonstrated how social actors employ rationality 
retrospectively as a rhetoric to account for actions that, from a 
rationalist point of view, were chaotic and stumbling when performed. 
Moreover, Garfinkel has shown this to be the case in the actor's 
lives, in their group processes, and in their roles as members or 
spokesmen of institutions". (1978: 369)
Thus rationality may not be a prior assessment but may instead emerge 
during or after any interaction. In this form, rationality may be 
used retrospectively to legitimise what has already happened or what 
is presently happening.
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This concept is important for several reasons. Firstly it focuses 
our attention on the fact that rationality is socially constructed and 
is not absolute in any way. Thus rationality can be used by the 
dominant group to impose their definition of the situation upon a 
subordinate group. The notion of rationality has 'power' because 
people consider it to be neutral. Yet we have seen that it can be 
constructed 'post-hoc' to rationalise and legitimise that which has 
gone before. Therefore the dominant elite can use rationality to 
legitimise their rule. As Brown puts it,
"The study of reality creation is a study of power, in that definitions 
of reality, normalcy, rationality and so on serve as paradigms that 
in some sense govern the conduct permissable within them".(1978: 371)
Despite the fact that organisations are in a constant state of flux 
and can be viewed as a process of ongoing organising, the ruling group 
present a picture of the organisation as neutrally rational and as 
a static facticity.
Secondly it introduces the notion of rhetoric into our discussion.
This is a useful term in our analysis of ideology, hegemony and 
domination. The notions of rhetoric and ideology have been outlined 
and distinguished by Ball (1967).
"Sociologically, a rhetoric is a vocabulary of limited purpose; 
that is to say, it is a set of symbols functioning to communicate a 
particular set of meanings, directed and organised toward the 
representation of a specific image or impression. Such vocabularies 
are not only verbal but also include visual symbols such as objects, 
gestures, emblems etc. As a theoretical point it should be noted
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that rhetorics are not necessarily the same thing as ideologies, 
although this may empiricially be the case. The conceptual difference 
between the two is that rhetoric speaks to communication, both style 
and content, while ideology refers to perception and justification in 
terms of the ideologue's conception of the relevant portions of the 
world. It is quite conceivable that individual actors will utilise 
a rhetoric without any ideological convictions as regards its 
validity, but with a recognition of its pragmatic efficacy; and 
similarly, that ideological dedication does not automatically 
assume any developed rhetoric to attempt its maintenance or further­
ance". <1967: 296)
In a later Chapter we will seek to demonstrate and describe how the 
management in the company which was studied for this thesis utilised 
rhetoric in order to create a form of ideological hegemony. The concept 
of rhetoric will be used to draw attention to the importance of 
linguistic resources in the workplace.
We have already seen how instrumental or means-end rationality can be 
used to provide a rhetoric for legitimising past conduct from the stand­
point of ethnomethodology. However this is not the only branch of 
sociology which has focused upon the notion of rationality in a 
critical manner. Running parallel with the work of Garfinkel, we have 
the neo-Marxist or 'critical theorists' of the 'Frankfurt School' such 
as Marcuse (1964), Horkheimer (1974) and Habermas (1970) who have 
argued that the traditional notion of rationality has provided an 
instrument for technocratic domination. For these theorists rationality 
is used purposively as a prospective rhetoric for the restriction of 
alternative goals and for the advancement of the goals and agenda of 
the dominant group. This is what Lukes (1974) appears to be
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referring to when he asks,
" ....  is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to
prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by 
shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way 
that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either 
because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because 
they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as 
divinely ordained and beneficial? (1974: 24)
Thus it may be suggested that organisations throughout the industrial 
world attempt to suppress the ability of their members to 'grasp' the 
reality of their positions. The members of such organisations work 
in 'blinkers' which prevent them from seeing or understanding 
alternatives to the present order. As Brown has put it;
"Members of such organisations are limited to mundane experience as 
it is predefined largely by the official categories of that system.
(...... ) In such systems the determinants of action are not freely
accessible to the consciousness of the actors; they must act instead 
under intentions formed behind their backs". (1978: 372)
Another aspect of this argument is that the ruling class, by focusing 
attention upon the efficiency of various means via the notion of 
instrumental or technical rationality, can direct attention from the 
fact that certain ends serve their own interests.
Finally on a theoretical level. Brown (1978) has argued that 
organisations as entities can be viewed as paradigms in a manner 
analogous to the use of that term by Kuhn (1970). By paradigm, we 
refer to,
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"those sets of assumptions, usually implicit, about what sorts of 
things make up the world, how they act, how they hang together, 
and how they may be known ... Paradigms, in other words, may be 
understood not only as formal rules of thought, but also as rhetoric 
and practices in use". (1978: 373)
Such paradigms can act as a control mechanism in that they define the 
nature and meaning of organisational life and as such form a legitimising 
ideology. Thus in any study of organisational power, attention should 
be directed to the process by which a powerful group imposes a 
paradigmatic reality and establishes an 'ideological hegemony'.
Most of the work on hegemony and domination has been located at a 
fairly macro level of analysis. Concepts such as rationality, ideology 
and rhetoric have been generally discussed in terms of hegemonic 
domination at the level of society. Very little work has so far been 
done on the ways in which an ideological hegemony is reproduced in 
industrial organisations. (This being one important reason why my 
empirical work was located in this arena). One of the few researchers 
to have paid attention to this area is Golding whose qualitative research 
work in the 'Electrical Contracting Company' and the 'Wemslow Manu­
facturing Company' is reported in a series of articles (Golding 1979, 
1980a, 1980b). His work is obviously important in that it addresses 
centrally issues that are related to the concerns of this thesis. Yet 
it is possible to argue that he fails to develop a model which would 
enable the exploration of the process of domination within organisations.
The unifying theme of Golding's articles is that he variously terms 
the 'sovereignty of management', 'authority', 'legitimacy' and the
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'right to manage'. Golding argues that the "'sovereignty of 
management' .... has important symbolic elements in industrial 
hierarchical organisations" (1979: 169) and "is symbolically tied 
to the way in which individuals structure and organise their worlds." 
(1979: 170). He suggests that the 'soveignty of management' is seen 
as 'given' and is therefore unquestioned. As a result many theories 
of power have been concerned to examine the 'need' of 'some' to 'control' 
others and have therefore missed the more hidden faces or facets of 
power. It is further argued that the 'sovereignty of management' 
provides a means whereby domination in the organisation is supported 
and acquires a symbolic permanence and that this structure of 
domination in the organisation creates and perpetuates the structure 
of dominancy in the wider society. Thus in a rather different and 
more 'micro' fashion, Golding attempts to link the notions of hegemony 
and domination and demonstrate the relationship between domination 
in organisations and in the wider society. Using specific qualitative 
data Golding seeks to illustrate his argument. From this data he 
concludes that,
"In the way that 'control', and those 'in control', remained elusive 
to 'K ' (in Kafka's The Castle), so the structure of domination 
remains elusive to the employees of the Electrical Contracting 
Company." (1979: 175)
Golding also seeks to argue that one of the symbolic elements which 
helps to perpetuate the structure of domination is the fact that 
because issues are personalised and related to one person (the 
managers) then this person can be fallible and thus replaced without 
undermining the structure of managerial authority itself.
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In a later paper Golding addresses a topic that we have already 
raised in this chapter. That is the use of a form of rationality 
as a prospective rhetoric for the restriction of alternative courses 
of action and for the advancement of the goals and agenda of the 
dominant group. Golding, however, seeks to illustrate this process 
at the micro level by use of qualitative data. Thus Golding 
suggests that his paper,
"examines one such example of the process of abstraction and simplication 
involving the production of an 'absolute* as a transformation of a 
'possible', and of the 'erecting of barriers' to prevent access to 
the derivation of the absolute and thereby to alternative 
'possibles'". (1980b: 764)
The example in question is, of course, the 'sovereignty of management' 
or the 'right to manage'. Golding argues that this notion is related 
historically to a specifically advantageous division of labour.
"Thus the originally perceived economically advantageous division of 
labour has been transformed into an absolute, and is maintained as an 
absolute by the very structure of domination produced, whereby certain 
members have more control over the transformation process and the 
blocking of access to derivations. The idea of 'some' having control 
over 'others' suggests an acceptance of the principle of control as 
a fundamental component of organisational life, and this acceptance 
is clearly grounded in a belief that it is 'the done thing', and part 
of'what everybody knows'". (1980b; 772-773)
However it is obvious that the notion of the sovereignty of management 
is not an 'absolute' or 'given' but is a 'myth' in that it is only one 
of many possibilities but it endures because a rhetoric has enabled
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the other possibilities to be 'closed-off'.
What then, does Golding's work tell us about managerial domination 
within organisations? Whilst he may be said to draw attention to 
the symbolic nature of the 'sovereignty of management' he does not 
really explain the various ways in which domination is constructed 
and re-produced. Several specific criticisms can be made. Firstly, 
the precise nature of his data collection method is unclear. It 
appears as though his qualitative research data was collected while 
he was a member of the organisations described. However it is left 
unexplicated and one does not know whether this was 'full organi­
sational membership' or a more temporary 'research membership'. The 
research data is presented in a series of 'scenarios' which on 
occasion appear rather anecdotal. It is also unclear whether the 
(sometimes detailed) interactions reported in the scenarios were 
tape-recorded or merely recalled from memory. A second major 
criticism is that Golding develops no framework or model which would 
enable the reader to understand the operation of ideological hegemony 
at the organisational level. Thus Golding proceeds directly from his 
scenarios to assertions of managerial dominance without the use of any 
conceptual apparatus. Therefore the way in which the ideological 
hegemony is sustained remains stubbornly unexplicated. Finally 
Golding's work focuses upon the way in which the 'sovereignty of 
management' is reflected in organisational life but ignores the many 
ways in which it is purposively created by managerial action involving 
the use of rhetoric, ideology and rationality.
Returning to the theoretical level several writers have discussed the 
various control strategies that are available to management in order
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to maintain their power. Friedman (.1977) has identified two 
alternative strategies for dealing with worker resistance to 
domination and the problem of labour force co-ordination. The first 
of these is the 'direct control' strategy. This involves,
"maximising the separation of conception from execution of work tasks 
for the vast majority of workers, the centralisation of conceptual 
activities into few hands closely related to those with high 
managerial status, and the maintenance of managerial authority 
through close supervision and financial incentives: in short the 
Taylorian ideal of scientific management". (1977: 48)
The second, and opposite strategy, is that of 'responsible autonomy'. 
This involves,
"allowing individual workers or groups of workers a wide measure of 
discretion over the direction of their work tasks and the maintenance 
of managerial authority by getting workers to identify with the 
competitive aims of the enterprise so that they will act 'responsibly' 
with a minimum of supervision". (1977: 48)
Thus the 'direct control' strategy aims to restrict labour power by 
use of the coercive and remunerative power available to managements to 
use Etzioni's terms (Etzioni 1961). Thus management might use the 
threat of coercion, restrictive and 'tight' supervision and intensive 
control systems. In contrast the 'responsible autonomy' strategy 
attempts to utilise the flexibility of labour's power by the use of 
moral or normative power. Thus,
"top managers give workers status, authority, responsibility and try 
to win their loyalty and co-opt their organisations to the firm's 
ideals (that is, competitive struggle) ideologically". (1977; 49)
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Friedman also draws attention to the useful distinction between 
workers who are 'central* and those who are 'peripheral*. Central 
workers are those who, through their skills or position, are essential 
to the organisation or alternatively are those whose potential 
resistance ensures their 'crucialness' to it. Friedman seeks to 
argue that management will tend to use different control strategies 
for these different groups.
The difference between 'direct control' and 'responsible autonomy' 
mirrors a distinction that I wish to make later in this work between 
the use of 'physical' resources on the one hand and 'linguistic' 
resources on the other.
Five different managerial control and power strategies have been 
identified by Goldman and Van Houten (1977). Firstly they identify 
the division of labour into specific tasks as one form of control.
This, of course, relates indirectly to Friedman's 'direct control' 
and to the theory of 'scientific management'. (See Braverman 1974, 
Marglin 1974). Secondly they identify the use of organisational 
hierarchy as a managerial strategy. As Goldman and Van Houten argue,
"Hierarchy and the concept of a claim of command supports super­
specialization by isolating workers from one another and from 
management. Hierarchical distinctions, emphasizing individual 
rather than collective rewards, exemplify the social control function 
of corporate firms. Individualism, invidious comparison of status 
and salary, and consumerism mutually reinforce hierarchy". (1977; 116)
In a similar manner to Golding (1980b), Goldman and Van Houten suggest 
that the concept of hierarchy occupies a symbolic or mythical role in
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organisations. It provides the illusion, if not the reality, of 
upward social mobility for workers. Failure to rise through the 
hierarchy thus becomes an individual rather than a systemic mani­
festation. Hence attention is diverted to the failings of individuals 
rather than to the arbitary nature of hierarchy itself. Thirdly 
Goldman and Van Houten suggest that rules, regulations and supervision 
can comprise the 'hegemony of bureaucratic procedure'. Hence it is 
argued that rules and procedures which appear to be simple neutral 
attempts to rationalise work are, in fact, instruments of social 
control. The fourth managerial control strategy consists of secrecy 
and the hoarding of knowledge while the final strategy involves the 
creation of secondary labour markets, discrimination against ethnic 
minorities and the sexual division of labour. These five strategies 
can be seen to focus upon the structural level of domination and upon 
the creation of an ideological hegemony.
Clegg has attempted to take these strategies of managerial control 
and link them back into discussions about power and domination.
(Clegg 1979; Clegg and Dunkerley 1980). As we have already seen Clegg 
uses the notion of rule to mediate between power on the surface level 
of appearances and domination on a deeper structure level. Three 
forms of rule are identified, technical rules, social-regulative 
rules and 'extra' - organisational rules. The notion of technical 
rules is similar to Friedman's concept of 'direct control' and, on a 
certain level, to the first three of Goldman and Van Houten's 
strategies. Social-regulative rules are seen by Clegg in a manner 
similar to Friedman's notion of 'responsible autonomy'. Thus 
economic domination and coercion is replaced by ideological hegemony 
and integration.
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Clegg and Dunkerley see the recent work humanization and quality of 
working life movement as an example of such a process. Thus 
participation and job enrichment experiments are,
"Clearly intended to change the surface structure of power relation­
ships between management and labour whilst leaving the underlying 
structure of social relationships and hegemony intact. Indeed, what 
is lost by management hierarchically will be more than gained 
hegemonically, to the extent that 'interest' is generally attached 
to the profitability of the enterprise". (1980: 516)
Finally 'extra' - organisational rules refer to such things as the 
division of labour on grounds of sex or race.
4.6 A new approach to the concept of power
In this Chapter we have attempted to explore and examine some themes
which we have suggested are related to power and which we propose to
use in the development of a model of power. At this stage we can
perhaps recapitulate the main points of our discussion in order to 
lay out the basis for our model.
During the chapter three different levels of social life were 
identified. These were the levels of action, mediation and structure. 
It was then possible, by this notion of independent but interrelated 
levels, to transcend the persistent and confusing duality of action 
and structure. Power was therefore not to be found at the level of 
structure on the level of action in isolation, but instead existed at 
different times and in different forms at all three levels. Thus the 
fluid, processual and complex nature of power could be captured. Two 
different forms of power were then delineated and tied to particular
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levels of social experience. Firstly power is transformative 
capacity which is located at the action level and secondly power 
as a structure of domination. These two different views are related 
via the concept of resources. Resources are the media through which 
transformative capacity is utilised but at the same time are 
structural elements, the distribution of which reflects the prevailing 
structure of domination. Thus the exercise of transformation capacity 
is contrained by the prevailing structure of domination while at the 
same time constituting or reproducing that structure. Finally we 
have considered the ways in which an ideological hegemony can be 
created and used to preserve the structure of domination and identified 
the importance of the concepts of rationality and rhetoric. We now 
need to consider how these elements can be integrated and related in 
a coherent model which might provide a sound basis for a better under­
standing of the operation of power in the workplace and remedy some of 
the previously identified deficiencies of earlier theories.
The understanding of power that I wish to propose is represented in 
Figure 4.7. This represents and encompasses the elements and 
dimensions that are involved in different ways in the operation, 
exercise and process of power. Following Giddens, three levels of 
social life are identified and related to the three facets of power 
that we have already discussed. However some differentiation is made 
both at the level of resources and domination. Resources can be divided 
into those resources which are physical in one sense or another and 
those which are linguistic. They also form the means by which the 
meaningful and normative aspects of interaction are actualised. 
Domination, as we have seen, describes a situation of assymetry of 
resources and therefore can be either economic domination imposed
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via coercion or hegemonic domination imposed by consent.
However the process of interaction does not solely consist of the 
operation of power. As Giddens has noted it also has two other 
elements. These are elements concerning its meaning and normative 
elements. These are represented in the last two columns of the 
diagram. Transformative capacity is rendered meaningful by the use 
of rhetoric and argument whilst domination is sustained by ideologi­
cal means including the use of rationality. Mediating between 
rhetoric and ideology is the concept of 'legitimising principles'.
Thus Armstrong, Goodman and Hyman argue that in,
"any cultural setting there are certain acceptable motives for action 
(what we will call 'legitimising principles') which are, in turn 
embedded in the characteristic world view (ideology) of that 
culture". (1981: 36)
These legitimising principles are obviously related to linguistic 
resources and are in certain facets similar to Giddens' notion of 
'interpretive schemes'. Legitimising principles are articulated at 
the level of action as rhetoric.
Finally we have the normative elements of interaction. In this sense 
norms are seen as either enabling or constraining interaction. Norms 
are embedded in, and drawn from, the legitimate order, and yet by their 
use actually reproduce that order. Sanctions, of various types, can 
be seen as the means, at the level of action, whereby norms are upheld. 
Thus sanctions can be related to forms of resources. A classification 
of sanctions could, of course, be constructed based upon the elements 
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The diagram can also be read horizontally to show the relations 
between the elements of interaction (power, ideological, normative) 
at different levels of social life. Thus, power as transformative 
capacity involves action and the utilization of rhetoric and 
sanctions in order to achieve a result or change an outcome. Trans­
formative capacity is thus dependent upon the use of resources which 
can include physical or linguistic elements. The linguistic elements 
are 'legitimising principles' and 'social norms'. We can see that 
resources, legitimising principles and norms are drawn from a 
structure of domination in the form of an assymetry of economic 
resources, a mode of rationality or a legitimate order respectively. 
Finally it will be argued that in the industrial relations context the 
process of interaction (and thus power) is centrally related in one 
way or another to the production of 'rules'.
In what senses is the model developed here different to the previous 
theories of power that have been described in this work? This can be 
answered by returning to the criticisms that were advanced earlier in 
terms of both epistemology and theoretical concerns. As we have seen, 
most of the theories of power described have been 'structural' in terms 
of epistemology and methodology and have therefore been located 
within the radical structuralist or functionalist paradigms. These 
theories adopted a positivist epistemology and a nomothetic methodo­
logy and can therefore be classifed as 'structural' or 'objectivist' 
in approach. Yet on another level most of the previous theories of 
power were 'action' based on behavioural. Thus they focused upon 
observable behaviour in the form of decision-making and its outcomes 
and tended to ignore the structural level of domination. These 
theories have been criticised for restricting themselves to the level
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of surface appearances.
The importance of the model of power advanced in this work is that it 
seeks to depart from these established foci. This is proposed in two 
different ways. Firstly in terms of epistemology and methodology an 
attempt is made to direct attention towards the possibilities offered 
by the subjectivist positions. Secondly the model aims to illuminate 
the role played by structure in the operation of power. Thus, it 
seeks to move from a total preoccupation with action in the form of 
observable decisions to an equal focus upon structure in terms of the 
production and re-production of domination. The model thus seeks to 
create a rapprochement between the previously mutually exclusive action 
and structural approaches.
The benefits of the model can also be illustrated by a return to the 
issues surrounding power theorizing which were raised in the first 
Chapter. On a whole series of 'issues' the model enables the 
theorist to acknowledge that both forms of power may exist. Thus, 
obviously the model addresses both behavioural and structural 
conceptions of power. It resolves the old dilemma as to whether 
power exists only in its exercise or as a potential. Power can thus 
be seen in terms of its exercise as transformative capacity while the 
notions of resources and domination draw attention to the possibility 
of power as a potential force. Again, whilst power as transformative 
capacity will generally be observable in the form of decisions and 
outcomes, power as domination may, in Lukes' three dimensional sense, 
be 'hidden' from view. The model also encompasses both intended and 
unintended manifestations of power as well as both legitimate and 
illegitimate forms.
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On the questions of whether power is intercursive or integral and 
whether conflict is necessary for power to exist the model enables 
the opposing views to be seen as appropriate in different senses. Thus 
a situation of domination by an elite group can co-exist with a 
situation of surface level pluralism, the two forms of power being 
located on different levels of social life. Secondly while the model 
assumes a basic structural economic conflict between 'rulers' and 
'ruled', the conflict is not always manifest at the level of action.
Thus it is possible for a situation of 'power' to exercise in the 
absence of immediate conflict but this could only be explicated by 
reference to the operation of power as domination and hegemony. One 
great advantage of the model is that it moves away from the association 
of power with causation and its associated problems and focuses instead 
upon social interaction. Finally it should be noted that the model 
confines itself to resources bases (whatever their form) although it 
could be extended to consider the motive bases for compliance.
One next objective is to consider the extent to which this model can 
enable us to understand the operation of power with the industrial 
relations context and specifically in terms of power in workplace 
industrial relations. We can facilitate this by considering each part 
of the model in turn. On the level of action, power as transformative 
capacity refers to the ability of actors to alter the course of 
events by intervention. To what does this correspond in the industrial 
relations field? The answer would appear to be the creation of rules. 
All the three major theoretical strands in industrial relations base a 
focus in this area. The systems approach has as its central focus the 
creation of rules, while the 'Oxford' approach also focuses upon
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the processes of job regulation. The action approach according to 
Schienstock concerns the "analysis of the decision situation of the 
various actors". (1981; 174). Even the Marxist approach has a 
concern in this area. Hyman has defined industrial relations as 
"the study of processes of control over work relations" (1975: 12). 
This is again a focus (albeit in a very different way) upon the 
processes of decision making with organisations. Thus power as 
transformative capacity refers in industrial relations to the ability 
of actors to influence or make decisions which alter the course of 
events or the status quo. These decisions or rules are of course 
of substantive or procedural nature. Thus if we were to concentrate 
upon power in this form we would wish to examine which actors in­
fluenced or took decisions and which actors were able to ensure that 
rules or decisions taken were in line with their goals or objectives. 
If the work on power in the industrial relations context is reviewed 
it can be seen that this is the traditional and common approach. Thus 
Poole focuses upon,
"the levels at which decision-making takes place, the ranges and 
scope of issues influenced by the respective parties, and the outcome 
of particular power conflicts in which sanctions are employed".
(1976: 33)
Abell and his team also focus upon decision making. For Abell the 
power of an actor refers to his ability to obtain his preferred out­
comes, when facing competing preferred outcomes. Thus Abell focuses 
upon observable decisions, identifiable decision-makers and on 
observable conflicts of interest between them. Using Abell's model 
in the industrial relations context Edwards measures power by 
reference to decisions 'won' in the process of conflict between the
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parties. Thus in the industrial relations arena the operation of 
power as transformative capacity involves attempts to create or 
charge rules. These attempts are reinforced by the use of rhetoric 
and sanctions. Rhetoric would in this sense cover concepts such as 
'negotiating skill', 'personal power' and charisma.
The level of mediation consists of the control of resources. Resources 
are both the means by which transformative capacity is utilised and 
at the same time, in their distribution, expressions of the structure 
of domination. There exist at this level two types of resources. 
Firstly, and most commonly described, are physical resources. Thus 
French and Raven (1959) suggest that the ability to exercise power 
(in our sense of transformative capacity) can be based upon rewards, 
coercion, position in the organisation, personal charisma and special 
knowledge and skills. Similarly Etzioni (1961) distinguishes 
coercive power, remunerative power and normative power. Pfeffer (1981) 
lists such resources as money, prestige, legitimacy, rewards, sanctions 
and expertise. He also begins to discuss some resources which are 
wider in scope. These include dependencies, control of uncertainty and 
substitutability or irreplacability. It would appear, however, that 
there is some conceptual confusion here. Some of these resources are 
obviously physical in that they consist of 'things' such as money or 
position or 'negative things' such as sanctions which involve the 
withdrawal of a reward. Others are physical in the sense that they 
are tangible and measurable and can be used as threats in order to 
achieve one's own objectives. These would include substitutability 
and control of uncertainty. Yet there are others which should be 
included in a separate category. These can be termed linguistic 
resources and would include parts' of Etzioni's normative power and
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French and Raven's category of personal characteristics. This area 
has recently been the subject of attention. In their study of rule 
making and rule changes Armstrong, Goodman and Hyman (1981) identify 
the crucial role played by what they term 'legitimising arguments'.
Of course they are not the first theorists to consider the role of 
such legitimising arguments. Thus Bachrach and Baratz (1962) refer 
to the 'mobilisation of bias' in decision making; Walton and McKersie 
(1965) refer to 'attitudinal structuring' as a stage of the bargaining 
process and Fox (1971) to the 'ideologies of management and 
collectivities' which constitute a resource in the power struggle.
Armstrong et al (1981) argue that in,
"any cultural setting there are certain acceptable motives for action 
(what we will call 'legitimising principles') which are, in turn, 
embedded in the characteristic world view (ideology) of that culture" 
(1981: 36)
Thus representatives of both workers and management must link their 
policies and proposed rule changes to acceptable motives which already 
exist in the cultures of their constituents. There are several key 
points that need to be made at this stage. Firstly 'legitimising 
principles' or 'vocabularies of motive' are embedded in a more macro 
level ideology which is more or less comprehensive and stable. The 
largely micro level legitimising principles are issue specific and 
not totally general in application. Secondly there are two dimensions 
to legitimising principles. Firstly the mobilisation dimension where 
the representative attempts to convince his constituents and secondly 
the tactical dimension where the representative attempts to convince 
the group (or groups) opposing him.
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In situations where legitimacy is contested, there may well be both 
public and private aspects to legitimisation. As Armstrong et al 
suggest,
"Suppose, for example, that a worker objects to a new management 
rule but can find no publicly acceptable legitimising principle 
to justify his objection. However personally aggrieved he may feel, 
there is then no way of mobilising his colleagues* support on the 
issue. It is even possible for such feelings to be shared, for a 
group of workers to feel individually ill-used, but, unless there 
is some means of transforming their private grievances into a 
public issue, they will not be able to mobilise effectively". (1981: 37)
Finally when a rule is created or changed the legitimising principle 
which 'lost* does not disappear but remains for future conflicts over 
this issue. This is similar to the position of power in general terms.
If one party 'loses* an issue it does not mean that they do not have 
any power; it simply means that the other party had more. Thus as 
Armstrong et al argue, "the practical legitimisation of an operational 
rule is generally a question of degree" (1981: 38). To return to 
our starting point, the level of mediation thus consists of control 
over resources. Such resources are either physical or linguistic in 
the form of legitimising arguments or principles. These legitimising 
principles are then used to reinforce power as transformative capacity. 
However they arise in part from the structure of dominancy and are 
thus a component part of the ideology at the macro level.
Whilst both physical power resources and legitimising principles are 
located at the same level in our model they are used in slightly 
different ways.
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Physical resources are ’possessed' in a fairly static and stable 
way and can be mobilised over a variety of 'issues'. However the 
question as to which 'issues' or conflicts between the parties are 
taken up and become 'live' is explained by reference to the role of 
legitimating arguments. Thus only those issues for which strong 
legitimising arguments exist will be taken up by the parties. As 
Armstrong et al argue,
"By suggesting issues on which one's own side can be mobilised and 
one's opponents ideologically out-manoeuvered,so to speak, the 
available legitimising principles serve to channel the application 
of power". (1981; 38)
Legitimisation therefore shapes the issues on which power is de­
played. In another sense, the tactical and strategic deployment of 
legitimising arguments may actually be used instead of the exercise 
of power itself.
The structural level of our model is represented by domination which 
involves, "asymmetries of resources employed in the sustaining of 
power relations". (Giddens 1979: 93). This concept is obviously 
related to the radical or marxist notions of power that we have 
already discussed. This view can be illustrated byFox's comment that 
society is best described,
"in terms of the over-arching exploitation of one class by another, 
of the propertyless by the propertied of the less by the more 
powerful". (1973: 308-309)
Industrial relations is simply another arena in which this asymmetry 
of resources is manifested. Thus in a similar manner to Dunlop's
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treatment of power, domination is seen not to exist in isolation in 
the industrial relations sphere but is instead partially a reflection 
of the situation in the wider society.
Domination can, of course, take on economic or hegemonic form. In 
its hegemonic form it is closely related to the concept of ideology. 
At this structural level we refer to ideology as ideology; a set of 
values and beliefs which sustain and rationalise forms of domination. 
As Giddens has argued,
"To study ideology from this aspect is to seek to identify the most 
basic structural elements which connect signification and 
legitimation in such a way as to favour dominant interests".
(1979: 191-192)
To what do these concepts of hegemony, ideology and rationality 
refer in terms of the industrial relations arena and the workplace? 
The dominant group is the management of the firm or enterprise.
Whilst their dominance is ensured by the asymmetry of economic 
resources in the long term, it has to be constantly re-produced and 
re-inforced daily, by ideational means. Thus a managerial ideology 
is created which produces a sense of legitimacy and shapes meanings 
in such a way as to preserve the status quo. The managerial ideology 
thus attempts to assert the 'naturalness' or 'efficiency' of mana­
gerial dominance. In this way a situation of hegemony is created 
whereby workers are prevented from challenging the bases of their 
domination. In so far as the legitimising principles and arguments 
of management are drawn from the dominant ideology then they are 
generally superior. Thus the workers face both an asymmetry of 
physical and linguistic resources.
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Hegemony at the workplace is therefore manifested in such notions as 
'Managerial prerogative', the 'sovereignty of management', the 
'right to manage' and 'managerial authority'. On different levels 
these general ideological beliefs will be found used in particular 
forms as legitimising arguments and expressed within the rhetoric 
used by management.
The central thrust of this Chapter and of our model of power is 
neatly summarised by Clegg when he suggests that,
"individual power relations are only the visible tip of a structure 
of control, hegemony, rule and domination which maintains its 
effectiveness not so much through overt action, as through its 
ability to appear to be the natural convention. It is only when 
control slips, assumptions fail, routines lapse and 'problems' 
appear that the overt exercise of power is necessary. And that is 
exerted in an attempt to reassert control. (Clegg 1979: 147)
It is to the ways in which one management attempts to sustain such 
hegemony and domination that we now turn our attention.
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Chapter 5
Bestobell Mobrey Limited 
Background and Methodology
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5.1 Bestobell Mobrey Limited
Having decided to study the operation of power within the workplace, 
the first question to be considered was the choice of a research 
site. What type of company, plant and indeed industry would be 
suitable for such a study? As the purpose of the research was to 
attempt an understanding of power within the workplace and develop a 
model of power which might be of general applicability, it appeared 
that there were few constraints. If one accepts, as I do, that power 
is an innate element of social interaction, then almost any situation 
could be examined. Yet I wished to exclude certain types of situation. 
Even at this early stage in the research process, I was sure that 
power could not simply be represented on the level of surface appear­
ances. Thus it was not necessary to study a plant where there were 
plenty of ’issues' and a good deal of conflict. In fact my early 
concerns had instead been with workgroups who did not exercise power 
in a situation despite the possession of a structural power base.
Power could be studied even in the absence of 'anything happening' in 
the normal sense. I was also concerned not to perpetuate the prevalent 
tradition in industrial relations research, which appears to regard 
large engineering or vehicles plants with fully developed shop steward 
networks, highly unionised workforces and developed collective bargaining 
arrangements as typical (Cf Batstone, Boraston and Frankel, 1977).
Plants of less than 1,000 employees are generally ignored in the 
literature, despite the fact that around two-thirds of manufacturing 
employees work in plants of this size. Moreover, most studies of 
power in the workplace tend to focus upon observable conflict in the 
form of articulated 'issues' which enter the bargaining arena and upon 
the degree to which the parties achieve their goals and objectives in 
relation to these 'issues' (Cf Edwards 1975, 1978).
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Yet it may equally be argued that smaller plants with unorganised 
and quiescent workforces may provide equally, if not more interesting, 
insights into the concept of power. A more practical constraint on 
choice was the problem of access to a research site. Always a 
difficult problem, this was likely to be exacerbated by the prolonged 
nature of the research involvement, the specific nature of the research 
methodology and the part-time status of the researcher.
After discussions with various companies I was eventually introduced, 
by a colleague, to Mr. P.G.D. Naylor, the Group Personnel Manager of 
Bestobell Limited. As a result of an initial meeting, a subsidiary 
company, Bestobell Mobrey Limited, was selected as being appropriate 
to my research interests and therefore contact was made with Mr. K.A. 
Mackney, Personnel Manager for Bestobell Mobrey. Bestobell Mobrey 
is one of the major manufacturing units within Bestobell Limited. 
Bestobell Limited is an international group operating in the United 
Kingdom and Continental Europe, Australia, South and Central Africa, 
North America and South East Asia. (See Figure 5.1 for breakdown of 
the structure of Bestobell Limited). The Group's activities can be 
broken down into three major areas; Engineering, Chemicals and Consumer 
Products. In the Engineering field the work of the Group can be 
divided into three categories. Firstly, there is manufacturing. 
Bestobell manufactures products mainly concerned with the transmission 
and control of fluids, and thermal and acoustic insulation. These 
include valves; pipeline fittings, boiler, liquid level and process 
controls; flow measurement and control; temperature controls, steam 
traps and ancillary equipment; air conditioning controls; acoustic 
enclosures; industrial seals; aircraft components and ducting systems. 
Secondly, there is the Merchanting business.
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On a worldwide basis Bestobell provides a distribution network, which 
is strongly developed overseas, for equipment biased towards pipeline 
requirements and insulation products. This business operates in its 
own right, but also provides a supplementary means of promotion and 
distribution for some of the Group's manufactured products. Finally, 
there are the contracting activities which are mainly concerned with 
thermal insulation (marine and land) and the maintenance of industrial 
plant and control equipment, but some overseas companies carry out 
engineering, air conditioning and other related forms of contracting.
Bestobell also manufactures and distributes a range of paints, surface 
coatings and wood preservatives for industrial and domestic users; 
solvents and surface treatment products for industrial, marine and 
institutional applications; Venetian and roller blinds and waste 
disposal units.
Bestobell's products are sold to almost every industry. The Group's 
engineering components, both of own manufacture and those from agency 
principles, are sold to original equipment manufacturers such as the 
mechanical handling, mining and earth moving equipment, the automotive 
and aviation industries, through to products for primary installation 
in major projects in the chemical, petro-chemical and power generation 
fields. Engineering components and services are supplied for factory 
maintenance and the extension of factory services, covering all 
industrial users from large chemical plants and mining operations to 
engineering marine supplies for the off-shore oil and gas industries. 
The Group is a major supplier to the process industry including food, 
steel, chemical, industrial gases, petro-chemical, ship building, 
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Bestobell Mobrey, as bas already been mentioned, is one of the main 
manufacturing units of Bestobell Limited and is located upon the 
Slough Trading Estate. Bestobell Mobrey has a quite diverse product 
group within the general fluid engineering area. Basically there can 
be said to be three product families. Firstly, there are the Boiler 
Controls which consist of water level controls and low water alarms. 
Secondly, one can distinguish the Electro-Mechanical family comprising 
magnetic level switches, vertical reed switches and magnetic safety 
switches. Finally, and most recently, come the Ultrasonic control 
systems based upon the 'doppler effect'. This term refers to the 
change in the perceived frequency of a wave which results when the 
observer moves relatively to the source. Thus the ultrasonic control 
systems are attached to a pipe and can measure the flow of materials 
(solids, gases, or liquids) within it by emitting and receiving sonic 
impulses and measuring the distortion. The Boiler control product 
family is the oldest and is now in decline and largely restricted to the 
U.K. and 'Old Commonwealth' countries. The Electro-Mechanical level/ 
switch market is fairly stable but growth is not envisaged. There is 
a steady replacement market which aids sales. The level of sales of 
safety switches has shown an increase as a result of the Health and 
Safety at Work Act 1974. Finally the Ultrasonics market is in its 
introduction and growth stage and it is expected that this side of 
the business will become increasingly dominant. In 1978 Mobrey had an 
overall market share in the UK for all products of 40% and approximately 
20% in the world market. Export sales accounted for roughly 65% of 
volume in the same year.
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As can be seen the company has a total labour force of approximately 
500 of which around 180 are direct production operatives. This 
balance reflects the particular nature of Bestobell Mobrey's products. 
Because of the rather unusual nature of Mobrey*s business we need to 
examine some of the Departments in more detail before moving on to the 
focus of the research study; that is the production area.
As Figure 5.2 shows the Chief Engineer is responsible for a large 
number of staff. The Function is broken down into five major areas.
The Model Workshop manufactures specimens, samples and design 'mock- 
ups' and consists of very skilled craftsmen. The Quality Department 
is responsible for the control of the quality of all raw materials as 
well as the assurance of the quality of the finished products. As 
customers' requirements and specifications become more rigorous then 
this is an increasingly important area. The New Product Research 
Engineer is responsible for the production of new product ideas and 
liaison with the academic sector. Product Development is split into 
electrical and mechanical areas each headed by a highly qualified (PhD) 
engineer and is responsible for bringing new product ideas to the 
development stage. Products are then taken over by Marketing who 
gain Government approvals and standards and are then sold by the Sales 
Department. Finally there is the Drawing Office containing around 30 
staff.
The Sales function is split into the home and export markets. The UK 
market is divided into regions geographically plus a special division 
for petro-chemical sales. The fields sales teams are backed up by 
technical service staff based at Slough. The Export Sales Department 
is split up again on a geographical basis and is controlled by two
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regional sales managers. The sales force is again supported by 
internal sales staff located elsewhere on the Slough Trading Estate. 
Exports are either direct or are conducted via agents and distributors 
and encompass around 60 countries.
The structure of the Production Function can be seen from Figure 5.3.
The Machine Shop can be divided up into several different sections
containing different types of machines. Firstly there is the
automatics section which contains numerically controlled and computer 
controlled automatic machines such as Batchmatics, Cimex, Rotary 
Transfer and other automatics. Secondly there is the Capstan section. 
Thirdly the Milling machines and lastly the Drilling section. The 
Specials department produces small batch and 'one-off work both for 
internal use and customer requirements. The Welding Shop produces 
high quality welding work to Lloyds standards. The tool room consists 
of seven toolmakers plus supervision,all of whom are on weekly staff.
The Assembly area houses the only female operatives in the Production 
Department. This area contains approximately 7 fitter/assemblers 
(male) and around 20 female assemblers as well as packers and 
labourers. Finally the Stores (Raw materials, Components and Finished 
Stock) consists of storekeepers, warehousemen, packers and van drivers.
Bestobell Mobrey is interesting in terms of its manual workforce.
Despite employing engineering workers and being located on a trading 
estate alongside other companies with substantial union presences, 
Bestobell Mobrey does not recognise any trade unions and indeed appears 
to have few workers within the plant who are union members. There have 
been several tentative approaches by trade unions and one request for 
recognition but these have been rejected by the management and unsupported 
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The payment system in operation at the time of the research study 
consisted of six grades for the manual (non-staff) workers. Jobs 
were evaluated by a grading committee and allocated to one of the 
grades with grade 6 being the highest and grade 1 the lowest. (See 
Figure 5.4 for details). Each grade also had a series of incremental 
steps within it which were labelled A to D. D was the lowest point 
within a grade and all new workers to the company or to that grade 
started on that level. After a probationary period, the worker was 
usually moved up the grade to point C. After that progression was 
based upon performance and merit and was decided by the departmental 
manager.
In addition to the basic wage structure a series of bonus schemes 
were adopted and then replaced. In September 1978 management introduced 
a two part Productivity Scheme which they argued would enable workers 
to increase their earnings by between £7 and £10 per week. The first
part consisted of an Attendance Bonus. This comprised a £1 per day
bonus for attendance payable monthly subject to certain conditions and 
penalties for non-attendance;
(1) No payment for uncertified illness (lose £5 per day).
(2) No payment for certified illness, unless a National Health
Certificate was produced (lose £1 per day).
(3) No payment for absences of more than half a day whether or not
agreed beforehand (lose £5 per day).
(4) No special cases or circumstances considered.
(5) No payment for holidays (lose £1 per day).
(6) No payment for absences of less than half a day (lose £1 per day).
(7) No payment if lateness (morning or afternoon) exceeds half an hour
(lose £1 per day).
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Figure 5.4 Manual worker grade structure and payments (21.9.1979)
Grade Hourly/
Weekly
A B C D
H6 P 242.00 235.00 227.50 219.50
£ 96.80 94.00 91.00 87.80
H5 P 219.50 212.50 204.50 198.00
£ 87.80 85.00 81.80 79.20
H4 P 198.00 191.00 184.00 176.50
£ 79.20 76.40 73.60 70.60
H3 P 176.50 170.00 163.00 155.00
£ 70.60 68.00 65.20 62.00
H2 P 155.00 148.00 141.50 134.50
£ 62.00 59.40 56.40 53.40
HI P 134.50 130.50 126.50
£ 53.80 52.50 50.60
The second part of the Productivity Scheme was a productivity/performance 
bonus. The basic rates at the time were increased by between 6.3% and 
6.5% subject to certain constraints and a performance increase from 71% 
to 86%.
In September 1979 a new Productivity Scheme was launched. The Attendance 
Bonus continued but the Performance Bonus was consolidated into the basic 
rates (as listed in Figure 5.4). In its place a new Productivity Bonus 
was introduced. In this case efficiency norms were established for each 
of the main production departments as follows;
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Machine Shop (including Specials) .. 71%
Welding Shop .. .. .. 82%
Assembly Shop
For each one half percentage improvement in efficiency above these 
rates a 1% bonus was payable. The bonus resulting from the first 
improvement in productivity was guaranteed and consolidated into the 
basic rates (see figure 5.4). Therefore bonus was only payable after 
efficiency had exceeded 73g%, 84^% and 87i% respectively. In the 
Stores, Warehouse, Goods Inward, Packing and Despatch a flexibility 
and mobility deal was concluded and in return the workers were to be 
paid an average additional bonus when the efficiency levels in the 
three shops rose above the averaged level of 79t%. In a similar 
system in the Maintenance Department and Toolroom, efforts towards 
improved flexibility and productivity were rewarded by the consoli­
dation of an additional 5&% into basic salaries, in addition to which 
the workers were to receive the average additional bonus when 
efficiency in three shops rose above 79^%. The inspection department 
were paid an additional bonus in accordance with a special formula 
and supervision (chargehands) were to receive their departmental 
bonus.
Traditionally, the production department had operated on normal day 
shift basis (8 - 5). However in the mid 1970’s a two shift system was 
introduced, firstly into the Machine Shop, but later into other sections 
This was the common 6 am - 2 pm and 2 pm to 10 pm double day shift 
format and was available to anyone who wished to transfer. All new 
employees were recruited to the two shift system. There was also an 
occasional nightshift. Shift premiums were payable at a rate of time 
and a quarter for the double day shifts and time and a third for the 
nightshift.
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An additional element to the employee's remuneration package was 
provided by the Annual Bonus. This was paid on a calendar year basis
and was equal to 4% of the annual wage based upon the most recent rate
applicable. Management retained the right to vary the percentage of 
the bonus but expected it to remain at the 4% level. The bonus was
not guaranteed and was only payable at the discretion of the Directors.
The main production area problems were identified by the Production 
Director as being related to the labour market. One particular 
problem concerned the availability in the local labour market of 
sufficiently skilled workers. Whilst much of the work was fairly 
standard some work in the Machine and Welding shops required extremely 
high levels of skill. Yet such skill levels were hard to procure in 
the Slough labour market. The problem was generally perceived as a 
general decline in the skill of workers which coincided with a situation 
where the demands made by customers were for better quality products 
to higher tolerances. Related to this was the problem of competition 
for labour upon the Slough Trading Estate. This had led to the 
'bidding up' of the wage rates to an artificially high level and the 
subsequent recruitment problems. Finally the workforce at Bestobell 
Mobrey on the production side was ethnically 'mixed' and there were 
undercurrents of racial discontent within the workforce on occasions.
5.2 Research Methodology
In Chapter 3 it was argued that theories of power which utilised the 
'positivist' methodology and thus embraced an 'objectivist' approach to 
social science were inadequate because these perspectives limited their 
ability to get to grips with the complex nature of power. Power could 
only be explicated through a synthesis of both the 'subjectivist' and
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'objectivist' approaches, and therefore, of the concepts of 'action' 
and 'structure'. This research study was therefore not conducted 
using the prevalent survey methodology and associated questionnaire 
techniques. Instead a version of the 'ethnographic research method' 
was adopted as this method claims to focus attention upon a more 
subjectivist approach to social science.
What, then, comprises the ethnographic method? It is not the place 
here to go into a detailed discussion of the ethnographic method and 
qualitative research (See Bogdan and Taylor 1975, Lofland, 1971, 1976 
for detailed expositions). However, we can consider some of the 
major facets, especially to the extent that they relate to our research 
study. Whilst there are varieties of ethnographic research, there is 
a certain set of assumptions or commitments which they all share.
Thus the ethnographic method focuses upon the problem of understanding 
social actions and acknowledges the distinctive character of social 
life and the social world. This method is also concerned with 
'naturalism' or the investigation of phenomena in their natural settings 
This strategy seeks to decrease procedural reactivity or the degree to 
which individuals withdraw from normal behaviour while under study.
This, of course, can only be achieved by an associated increase in 
personal reactivity or the degree to which the personal characteristics 
of the researcher impact upon the research data. Finally the ethno­
graphic method emphasises the processual nature of social life and the 
study of social phenomena in their context ('holism' as it is known).
Having described the basic features of the ethnographic approach, it 
is now possible to discuss in detail the chronology of my research 
activity in the field.
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The field research within Bestobell Mobrey can be seen as comprising 
four phases. These will be termed the orientation phases, phase 1, 
phase 2 and the analysis phase.
The orientation phase consisted largely of the ethnographic process 
of 'entering the field'. This process entails gaining access to a 
research site, establishing the parameters of the study and developing 
a relationship with organisational members. In the organisational 
sphere, entry is normally facilitated by a 'gatekeeper' who is 
sympathetic to the researcher's objectives and who wields enough 
influence and authority to ensure that entry is achieved. As already 
stated I was originally introduced to the Group Personnel Manager of 
Bestobell Limited, P.G.D. Naylor by a mutual acquaintance. I met 
Mr. Naylor in February 1978 at Bestobell Group headquarters and as a 
result of that meeting he arranged that I should be contacted by 
Bestobell Mobrey Limited. I was eventually contacted in April 1978 by 
Keith Mackney, the Personnel Manager and a meeting was arranged. At 
this meeting I explained in outline terms what I proposed to do in the 
course of the research project. The project was provisionally agreed 
but was confirmed in May 1978 after the Works Committee (which will be 
described in detail later) had been consulted about my presence.
After the Managing Director (who was extremely busy and often absent 
at this time), the Personnel Manager appeared to be one of the most 
influential people within the management hierarchy and was, because of 
his academic and professional background, extremely well disposed 
towards academic research activity.
The objectives of this initial phase of the research study were two­
fold.
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Firstly, I hoped that, over a period of time, I would become a 
’neutral’ and ’taken for granted' part of the organisational scene.
It was my intention to develop a relationship of trust with members 
of the organisation so that they would be completely at ease in my 
presence and familiar with my activities. Thus, in line with the 
concern for naturalism, I hoped that a situation could be attained 
where I did not 'affect' or 'taint' the processes or phenomena that 
I wished to study and record. Secondly, I also wished to use this 
period to begin to 'sense', receive and record attitudes, behaviours 
and events which appeared to be important to an understanding of 
the ways in which power was utilised, exercised and perceived within 
Bestobell Mobrey. This technique of waiting to be impressed by re­
current themes has been variously labelled in the literature as 
'sensing', 'engaging in free-floating attention'or'listening with the 
third ear'.
However the persuance of this strategy presented several practical 
problems and difficulties. Firstly I was unable to spend long 
continuous periods of time in the company because of my teaching and 
other commitments at the Polytechnic where I work and because of my 
inability to conclude a 'contract' with the Personnel Manager which 
would have allowed me totally unrestricted access. My 'contact' 
concerning research access was rather vague, d^^^te attempts to 
detail it, but it basically meant that appointments for interviews had 
to be made and that visits to the company were for meetings or 
specified purposes only. As a result of these problems, the process 
of becoming 'taken for granted' took a rather long time. The second 
problem that occurred concerned how much to disclose to organisational 
members about the research project.
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This is a standard problem in the ethnographic method and is well 
documented in the literature. As I have already stated it was my 
intention simply to observe the processes of power and interaction 
at Bestobell Mobrey and let concepts, ideas and even hypotheses 
emerge from the data collected in the manner of a 'grounded 
research' style. However it soon became clear that this strategy 
was going to present practical difficulties. Organisation members 
wished to know about my 'theory' when in fact no theory existed 
apart from some, at that time, undeveloped ideas and suppositions. 
Management, especially the Personnel Manager, increasingly required 
some description of the 'research design' and in discussions it 
became clear that they were confused and ill-at-ease with my research 
style. I therefore decided that, in order to maintain organisational 
access, I would adopt, from a limited period, a more understandable 
research style. Thus I decided to take the model of power described 
by Marchington (see Chapter 2) and operationalise it at Bestobell 
Mobrey. This strategy succeeded in resolving both my problems. The 
theory required the collection of certain data and this was facilitated 
by a structural programme of formal and informal interviews and some 
observation of work processes. Secondly the various members of the 
organisation (management and workers) were perfectly happy with this 
explanation of my purpose and never again seemed inquisitive about the 
nature of my research. From that point onwards my requests for access 
to meetings or individuals were no longer subject to query.
The methods used during this phase of the fieldwork were numerous. 
Initially I arranged a series of formal interviews with various members 
of management in an attempt to familiarise myself with the structure 
and organisation of Bestobell Mobrey.
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Thus I interviewed the Managing Director, Personnel Manager, Training 
Officer, Financial Controller, Marketing Manager, Sales Manager,
Systems Manager, Chief Engineer, General Works Manager and Production 
Manager. These interviews lasted from between one and a half to 
three hours and detailed notes were made as a result. I also had 
formal interviews with the negotiating members on the Works Committee. 
In addition to these interviews I also collected documentary evidence 
and material concerning the company, its structure, its operation and 
its products. As a result of my attempt to operationalise the 
Marchington model of power I also had a series of informal interviews 
and discussions with managers and workers. For example, I had a 
series of four meetings with the Production Manager, Geoff Reid, in 
which we explored the structure and operation of the Production 
Department. These meetings usually lasted around two hours. In 
addition some time was spent in observation and discussion on the shop 
floor in each of the major sections or shops. Finally, during this 
phase of the research, an attempt was made to record any interesting 
or unusual ideas or items which I heard during conversation or noted 
from records or documents and which I thought might be useful or 
important at a later stage. This activity was part of the process of 
'sensing'.
This orientation phase lasted from April 1978 until October 1978. It 
was during this period that I gradually realised that the existing 
theories of power were inadequate and could not explain the processes 
of power that I was beginning to observe in Bestobell Mobrey. Thus 
the theories which I was beginning to realise were theoretically 
deficient or partial, were also weak in that they did not fully explain 
the operation of power in the workplace.
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This was brought into stark relief by my attempt to operationalise 
the Marchington model. Despite other advantages, this model did little 
to advance my knowledge of power processes within the company. (For 
details of how the model was operationalised and the results see 
Appendix A). It was also during this period that I decided that, 
given the limitations upon research time and the constraints of a 
single researcher working part-time, the research would have to focus 
upon a single forum where the operation of power was most clearly 
manifested and visible. It became clear that the Works Committee
system was the ideal focus for the observation of power within
Bestobell Mobrey because this was the forum where all the major 
organisational decisions were discussed and debated. In so far as 
both sides articulated their positions on the issues then this forum 
provided useful insights into both the ideologies of the parties and 
aspects of their power.
After the orientation phase the bulk of the fieldwork was done in two 
phases. Phase one ran from January 1979 until April 1979. Fieldwork 
was then interrupted by two separate events. Firstly, there occurred 
a take-over bid for the Bestobell Group (including Bestobell Mobrey) 
by the British Tyre and Rubber (B.T.R) Group. As a result of this bid 
and the ensuing activity I was informed by the Personnel Manager that 
it would be best if I discontinued my involvement with the company for
a short time. This was unfortunate but there was no way in which I
could prevent this temporary exclusion. After the resolution of the 
bid in which B.T.R failed to gain control of the Bestobell Group, I 
was prevented from resuming field research by a protracted illness and 
associated recuperation period. Fieldwork finally resumed in January 
1980 and was completed in December of that year.
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This comprised Phase two of the research project.
Both phase one and phase two of the fieldwork were concerned with the 
observation and analysis of power within the forum of the Works 
Committee system. This system (together with the Staff Committee) 
had been founded in 1977 partly as a result of a one day dispute and 
the threat by a minority of workers to gain a trade union. The Works 
Committee consisted of both management and worker representations.
The Management were represented by the General Works Manager ('Dick' 
Rumens) as Chairman, the Personnel Manager (Keith Mackney), the 
Production Manager (Geoff Reid) and the Training Officer (Peter Botell) 
as Secretary. The elected worker representatives were divided into 
negotiating and consultative members. The Negotiating members, of 
which there were three, represented respectively, the skilled, the 
semi-skilled and the chargehands in the plant. In addition to their 
participation in the normal monthly Works Committee meetings, they 
also negotiated with management separately on such issues as the 
annual wage award. The Consultative members were elected to represent 
specific areas or 'shops' within the plant. In addition they also 
effectively acted as health and safety representatives. The Works 
Committee met monthly to discuss a pre-circulated agenda that was 
compiled by both sides of the committee. The worker representatives 
held, one week before the Works Committee meeting, an Agenda Meeting 
where issues and problems were raised and formulated for the Works 
Committee agenda. The precise roles of the Negotiating and 
Consultative members and the scope of negotiations and discussions 
were contained in the written constitution of the Committee. This 
stated that the Works Committee existed to 'provide a recognised and 
direct channel of communication between employees represented by the
- 292 -
Committee and management on matters affecting their joint interests'. 
The Committee also attempted 'to secure the degree of co-operation 
for the prosecution of measures undertaken in the mutual interest 
of the employees and the Company by both representative negotiation 
and consultative practices'. (For further details of the Works 
Committee see Appendix B (Sections 2 and 3) and Appendix C).
As a result of the focus on the Works Committee system certain methods 
were used during these two phases. Firstly the agenda meetings, 
management briefings and the Works Committee meetings themselves were 
observed and notes taken. After a few months a portable tape recorder 
was used to tape both the worker agenda meetings and the Works 
Committee meetings. This was used openly after consultations with 
the management and workers, but was used in an unobtrusive manner so 
as not to interfere excessively with the 'naturalness' of the data. To 
my surprise the recorder aroused little interest or suspicion among the 
members of the committee and its use was virtually ignored by them.
The recorder was also used for all further formal interviews. In 
addition to the observation and recording of the workings of the Works 
Committee system, several other methods of data collection were used. 
Further formal interviews were held with members of management and 
negotiating Works Committee members. Informal discussions and 
conversations were held after agenda meetings, management briefings 
and Works Committee meetings. Finally, further documentary material 
was collected including policies, procedures and Works Committee 
minutes.
It was during these phases of the research study that concepts and 
insights into the operation of power within Bestobell Mobrey began to
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emerge. These ideas were noted and catalogued. Attempts were made 
to 'feed back' these notions to the participants in order to see 
whether they perceived them in the same way or disagreed with my 
assessments. It may therefore be argued that the research study 
conforms to some of the basic tenets of the ethnographic style. Thus 
methods were combined in an attempt to 'triangulate' data and results 
were 'fed-back' to the subjects in an attempt to ensure the validity 
of the data collected. Several problems emerged from this process, 
all concerned with the notion of 'false' consciousness. Thus to 
what extent can participants agree upon or acknowledge processes of 
which, by their very nature, they might be unconscious? One would not 
expect, for example, individuals who were subject to hegemonic control 
to be fully or even partially aware of the process of their subjugation. 
On the other side of the coin, management often agreed with my inter­
pretation of their actions (or non-actions) in specific situations but 
generally were unwilling or unable to discuss their more general 
strategy in such terms. Finally there was the ethical and moral 
dilemma of disclosure. Was it fair or reasonable to expose individuals 
to the other possible interpretations of their position, when such 
revelations could increase conflict between the parties or increase 
dissatisfaction?
The final phase of the research programme was the analysis phase.
Here the data collected was assembled, collated and reviewed several 
times in an attempt to reveal underlying themes. It was at this stage 
that the model of power was constructed from insights gained from 
theoretical study and insights derived from the data. The data bank 
at this stage in the research process included approximately 30 hours 
of taped meetings, interviews and discussions; notes of interviews
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6.1 The processes of power in Bestobell Mobrey
What, then, emerged from the research study? What was discovered 
about the processes of power in Bestobell Mobrey in general and 
within the Works Committee in particular? The reader will remember 
that the theoretical model advanced in this thesis was created as a 
result of a complex interaction and synthesis between data and themes 
uncovered in the field research and the theoretical concepts and 
notions derived from the literature. Therefore, although, for the 
purposes of exposition and clarity, the field research data has been 
left to this stage in the thesis, this in no way implies that the 
data emerged after the theory in a post hoc manner. The process of 
production of the power model must be borne in mind. We are now in a 
position to analyse and review the themes, and ideas that emerged 
from the research data at some length. The final chapter will then 
attempt to relate and integrate these themes back into the model of 
power already discussed.
6.2 The ideological hegemony of Bestobell management
During the field research it became clear to the researcher that the 
management of Bestobell Mobrey Limited had succeeded in establishing 
an ideological ascendency over the workforce. Given the general 
asymmetry of resources, the absence of a collective focal point in the 
form of a trade union and the comparatively high level of wages paid, 
then this is perhaps not surprising. Yet in other ways it was
perhaps rather unexpected. The workforce at Bestobell Mobrey
possessed, in Hill's (1974) terms, a certain degree of structural 
power because of the nature of the product and labour markets. As 
we have already seen the products made by Bestobell Mobrey have to
be of a high quality due to their use in
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potentially dangerous situations in the gas, oil, chemical and 
nuclear industries. This quality level is frequently tested in 
plant by outside (Government and Lloyds) inspectors. This focus 
upon quality should have given the workforce, many of whom were 
skilled craftsmen, a degree of power over management subject to the 
development of a group consciousness and cohesiveness. Secondly, in 
terms of the labour market, Slough was (and is) an area of compara­
tively low unemployment and therefore workers found it relatively 
easy to find buyers for their skills. As a result management often 
found it difficult to recruit as many skilled workers as they would 
have liked. Certain groups of workers also occupied central positions 
in the workflow from which they could have exerted a certain degree 
of power. (For details of the structural power position of various 
workgroups in the plant see Appendix A).
Despite the availability of these sources of power, the workers at 
Bestobell Mobrey generally did not use their potential power. It may 
be argued that in Marchington's (1975) terms, the workforce had not 
achieved any ’power realisation'. It will be argued here that this 
was not due to any natural barriers to the development of group 
consciousness, but was largely attributable to a strategy of 
ideological domination and structuring by management.
Ideological hegemony is obviously based upon a managerial ideology or 
frame of reference. What was this ideology and in what ways did it 
operate within Bestobell Mobrey? As we shall see, and in common with 
most other industrial organisations, the managerial ideology was 
founded upon notions of 'managerial prerogative' and the 'right to 
manage'.
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Thus as we shall see the ideology of Bestobell Mobrey management is 
firmly located within the unitarist frame of reference despite 
pluralist pretentions. This ideology of ’managerial prerogative' was 
sometimes so ingrained that it was completely 'taken-for-granted' by 
the workforce and went totally unchallenged. Thus one of the annual 
tasks of the Works Committee system was the negotiation, in a series 
of special meetings, of the annual wage award. The negotiations were 
conducted by two or three members of management and the three 
negotiating members of the committee. The procedure for negotiations 
was fairly informal and was not committed to writing. Initially these 
negotiations took place in December but during the course of the 
research study this date was moved, unilaterally, by management to 
July. For the Works Committee meeting of April 1980 the worker 
representatives tabled the question of the July annual review on the 
agenda. In response the Personnel Manager said,
"We promised you that there would be an annual review in July. We are 
currently in the Personnel Department doing a survey of local wage 
rates, just for backup information for ourselves and this should be 
completed by the end of April. We should have formulated our line on 
the pay review, I think, by about mid May. We do have problems as 
far as our negotiators are concerned, on our side; not your side but 
on our side because one of our negotiators is going to be 'swanning' 
off to the States for a few weeks .... But we would hope to be talking 
to you toward the latter part of May and certainly before the 
beginning of June".
In the next meeting on the 13th May the worker representatives felt it 
necessary to raise the matter again. They pointed out that mid May had 
arrived and yet negotiations had not started.
- 300 -
The Personnel Manager and the General Works Manager both stated that 
the management side was not yet ready to negotiate and when they were 
then negotiations could commence. One of the worker representatives 
pointed out that a late start in negotiations would lead to running 
over the established deadline but management simply responded by 
stating that they were not yet ready. A while later I asked Ron 
Rowland, one of the negotiating members why they had not pushed 
management harder on this point. He replied by arguing,
"It's up to them (Management) in the long run isn't it? We can try 
and get them going but they set the date".
Thus in discussions with various members of the committee it became 
clear that, at least on certain issues, it was accepted that management 
had an absolute right to manage.
However, in other areas workers were willing to challenge the managerial 
prerogative. One interesting example concerned the National Engineering 
Agreement of 1979 to which Bestobell Mobrey as a non-unionised and non­
federated firm were not a party. The background to the issue was that 
the Management at Bestobell Mobrey have for many years pledged to keep 
terms and conditions of employment in advance of those specified in the 
National Engineering Agreement. Thus for many years the workers have 
enjoyed a situation where there has been a positive differential 
between their terms and conditions and those proposed in the National 
Agreement. This was perceived by the workers as one of the 'benefits' 
of employment at Bestobell. In the National Agreement signed in late 
1979 an extra two days holiday were instigated. In terms of holiday 
entitlement workers at Bestobell Mobrey had always enjoyed an extra 
day over and above the national agreement.
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Thus workers expected that management would grant two extra days as 
a result of the agreement, thus preserving the one day differential. 
However in December 1979 Management announced, via written channels, 
that they would only be awarding an extra day. Unknown to the 
workers and their representatives. Management at Mobrey were making 
this decision against their will at the direction of Bestobell Group 
who were attempting to standardise terms and conditions within the 
Group. As the Personnel Manager put it later,
"It might have been apparent at the time that my heart wasn't in it 
anyway, because it wasn't ..( ) .. That was a decision that was
actually made by Group, not by us in this company. I think the 
executive of this particular company was split almost fifty/fifty 
on what we should do... Being the soft personnel person my attitude 
was that we were getting away with murder, frankly, in leaving it as 
it was, and my heart certainly wasn't in it. Although, you know, when 
you are representing a 'line' you have to represent it".
Management, therefore, found it very difficult to construct any 
reasonable legitimising arguments to defend their position and were 
forced back upon the simple assertion of managerial prerogative.
The issue was the first agenda item for the Works Committee meeting 
on the 9th January 1980. Management began by outlining the situation 
and by putting forward the argument that they were still in line with 
the engineering agreement. Thus the Personnel Manager, Keith Mackney, 
stated,
"...We've said that we will bring ourselves into line with the 
engineering , er .... general conditions applying within the 
engineering industry".
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However, this argument was soon refuted by the worker representatives 
who draw attention to the erosion of their traditional extra days 
holiday. As Ron Rowland put it,
"So really, that privilege, fringe benefit, that we've all enjoyed for 
years has been eroded".
During the argument and discussion that followed, management 
increasingly fell back upon the simple assertion of managerial 
prerogative and eschewed any attempt to legitimise their decision on 
any other basis. Witness the following statement by the General Works 
Manager, 'Dick' Rumens,
"I think you've got to bear in mind ... (arguing in background) 
wait a minute! lets not get carried away about this, you've got to 
bear in mind that there is no obligation on our part, on the company's 
part, to do a single solitary thing".
Indeed a few moments later he stated,
"We are giving an extra day's holiday; there is no earthly reason why 
we should have given an extra day's holiday, let alone arguing about 
whether it should be one or two days".
He was backed up in this line by Keith Mackney.
"The company, as Mr. Rumens has said, is under no obligation at all 
to do anything about holidays".
The issue was finally closed by Dick Rumens, who summed up the 
discussion by suggesting,
"You can continue this argument for a long, long time. The situation 
at the moment is that it's four weeks and two days holiday
- 303 -
and the company is not going to change that. Is that correct,
Keith? I mean, you know, we can talk about it and we can all 
express an opinion. You've expressed your opinion very strongly 
about it ... and we will minute that as such please Peter. (Peter 
Botell, Training Officer and Committee Secretary). But beyond that 
the company isn't going to change on this one".
It is fair to say that the management of Bestobell Mobrey, during the 
course of the research study, did not often resort to the simple 
assertion of managerial prerogative. In fact their general style, at 
least in public, was shaped by weak and vague notions of pluralist 
ideology. However, this did not prevent some more unitarist notions 
such as the 'sovereignty of management' from sometimes emerging. As 
Keith Mackney once remarked,
"I mean, after all, management are there to manage and make the 
decisions. That's their job, it's not open to anyone else".
Thus in this situation the 'right to manage' over a specific issue was 
not taken-for-granted by the workforce but was instead challenged.
Thus management had vigorously to defend and assert their prerogative 
in order to legitimise it.
Another theme to emerge from the observations of the Works Committee 
system was the way in which the assertion of prerogative sometimes 
developed into the creation of a 'principle' which could be used to 
reinforce managerial ideology and thus domination. Two separate 
examples can be cited of this process in operation. One concerns Keith 
Mackney's often repeated statement that there could be 'no negotiation 
under duress'. He argued that management would not continue negotiations 
whilst the workers were taking any sanctions, whether it be an overtime
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ban or strike action. Keith often put this argument over in Works 
Committee meetings and in informal discussions. For example in the 
Works Committee meeting in January 1980, Keith was outlining the events 
of the previous wage negotiations which were interrupted by a one day 
strike. Thus he described the situation,
"Where the workers were actually taking sanctions against the manage­
ment. And as you are all aware, one thing that the company will not 
do, and no company will do this, is to negotiate in formal negotiations, 
on any topic where there are sanctions being taken against them".
This line of argument was never to my knowledge questioned or challenged 
by the worker representatives. Most of the worker representatives with 
whom I had discussions accepted this as a statement of the 'norm'.
Yet this is more than an assertion of managerial prerogative in as much 
as it forms the basis of a principle which legitimises the right of 
management to define the rules. As Keith admitted when I put the point 
to him;
"Certainly, I'm trying to build it into this lot as a point of 
principle".
A second example concerned the format of the Works Committee. The worker 
representatives on a number of different occasions and for a number of 
different reasons requested that the negotiating panel on the workers 
side should consist of more members in order to ensure a more equitable 
representation of the various interest groups within the plant. Each 
time that this question was raised management responded in the same way. 
Instead of arguing about the 'equity' of representation they raised the 
problem of size. Keith Mackney attempted to establish the principle 
that three was the
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maximum number of negotiators that any management would wish to deal 
with. This tactic usually resulted in a discussion or argument between 
the worker representatives about which groups or departments should 
provide the negotiating members.
However at the Works Committee meeting on 9th January 1980 the issue 
was raised again, but this time with more force, by the worker 
representatives. In the face of this increased opposition management 
were forced to retreat from the simple assertion of managerial 
prerogative to the use of several legitimising arguments. Thus Dick 
Rumens argued,
"...there is no way that we can have a negotiating committee, or a 
body of people the size of this committee, to negotiate. Otherwise 
we’re going to have the situation where every department negotiates 
for itself, and our workforce isn't the size to do that".
Keith posed the problem as follows;
"... why don't we have more on the committee? It's interesting that, 
in fact, normally a negotiating party is not more than two. It's 
quite often two. Two is certainly the number which I'm familiar with. 
But three is the optimum number and if you start getting beyond that 
you don't have negotiations. You know, during what can be quite 
heated times, and I don't know whether your reps feed back to you just 
the sort of bloody times that we do have on occasions, when the chips 
are down, but, you know, what can be a heated time really becomes 
quite unmanageable when you've got large numbers at negotiations. Like, 
I would not negotiate with the numbers of people around this table, 
because you frankly couldn't control that sort of meeting when you're 
talking about negotiations. Now what should be happening is what seems
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to be happening in some areas. You should be feeding representatives 
with what they should be saying to us. We then give our replies and 
feed it back to you, and with that chain working, you can get the 
Information out to the works at large, to the people you represent.
I'm pleased to see that it's working in Ivor's area. If its not 
working in other areas I'm sorry to have to say this, but to a certain 
extent its your own fault. Your negotiating members, of course, come 
up to see us and, of course, they represent the views of the works.
But if you feel that you are not represented, you should hammer your 
negotiating members for that information".
Later, as the discussion drew to a close, Keith argued that, given the 
relative 'newness' of the system, it was performing very well.
"I've been with Bestobell Mobrey for about a year and a half. I came 
from a highly unionised organisation at which the system worked no 
better than the system in this company. So it's a credit to you as 
consultative members and its certainly a credit to your negotiating 
members that the thing is working as well as it is".
These legitimising arguments were, in the end, sufficient, given the 
lack of co-ordinated and concerted pressure from the worker repre­
sentatives, to ensure that the managerial decision to have only three 
negotiating members was preserved. Thus the principle that 'three is 
the maximum number for negotiations' was legitimised by a series of 
arguments stressing problems of size and emotion and pointing out the 
efficiency of the present system. Of course in these situations both 
sides are actively involved in advancing legitimising arguments. They 
are both attempting to strategically define the situation and impose 
their definition on the other party. Management were generally 
successful on these issues for several reasons.
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Firstly because they had a broader repertoire of argument than the 
worker representatives. This would appear to reflect the ideological 
hegemony of management. Secondly they tended to articulate and 
present their arguments with much more force than the worker repre­
sentatives were able to muster. Finally workers on occasion, appeared 
reluctant to challenge a specific managerial argument even when they 
had a good counter - argument, because to do so would have in some way 
entailed a more general rejection of managerial prerogative.
6,2.1 The use of legitimising arguments
So far we have examined the ways in which the management at Bestobell 
Mobrey asserted their managerial prerogative and how, in certain 
cases, this was purposively reinforced by the creation of principles 
which legitimised their position. We can now turn our attention to 
the way in which linguistic resources were used in the form of 
legitimising arguments, derived from managerial ideology, in order to 
reproduce the structure of domination.
A regular agenda item at the Works Committee was the Chairman's 
Monthly Report. Early in the meeting the General Works Manager, Dick 
Rumens, would report upon the position of the company in general and 
of the performance of the works in particular. The general drift 
and tenor of these reports can perhaps be demonstrated by some written 
examples extracted from the minutes of the Works Committee.
"During April, the efficiency of the manufacturing division was un­
satisfactory. Indications were that the standard period to complete 
jobs was being exceeded by up to 30%. This apparent inefficiency had 
a direct effect on profitability and also meant that time was being lost 
which could be used for other jobs. The Production Manager would
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examine means of improving efficiency and controlling non-productive 
time more effectively".
(Minute 94, 8th May 1978)
"Unfortunately, overdues rose to an unacceptable level after success­
fully reducing them in previous months. This situation should be 
rectified during September as delivering late damages the Company's 
reputation which we can ill-afford .... It is also necessary to 
contain costs and ensure that they do not exceed budgeted levels.
The revised Productivity Scheme was an essential feature in 
containing unit costs and future sales depended upon remaining 
competitive".
(Minute 131, 12th September 1978)
".... This was a very poor performance especially as the previous two 
months were unsatisfactory. Orders available were now sufficient to 
enable the Company to meet the revised profit forecast for the year. 
This achievement would only be possible by all employees making extra 
effort and being more flexible ... Our future depends upon hitting our 
targets and providing a much improved and reliable delivery service 
to our customers and that would mean delivering on time. This must 
be the responsibility of us all and continued efforts are required 
throughout the remainder of the year and 1979, when economic conditions 
will continue to be difficult. All employees must be made aware of 
the Company's position".
(Minute 140, 17th October 1978)
The content, and indeed the implications, of these reports were never 
challenged by the worker representatives who tended to receive them in 
respectful silence. This could perhaps be characterised
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as a situation of unconscious compliance by the workers to managerially 
imposed definitions of organisational reality. On several occasions I 
asked various members of the Committee why this was so and obtained a 
number of different answers. Some were simply confused by the figures 
and arguments and felt that management were in the best position to 
analyse the situation. "They're the experts aren't they? I mean I don't 
know the facts, do I? It's up to them to get the facts and let us 
know the situation". Others felt that the general level of the reports 
was a little abstract and did not directly relate to their department 
or section and were as a result indifferent. Finally, several of 
them implied that even if they did have a point they would be rather 
afraid of challenging the General Works Manager.
This pattern of unquestioned compliance was broken only once in the 
course of the research study. This occurred in the case that I, and 
later others, came to know as 'Dick's Rocket'. During the General 
Works Manager's report of January 1980, Dick Rumens outlined, as 
usual, the general position of the company and the performance of the 
works. In view of the poor position he proceeded to deliver a strongly 
felt lecture on the need for increased effort.
"... now so far this month we've not done very well at all. It seems 
to be peculiar that everybody makes a big push for the end of the 
year and, of course it drops off a bit in January. But we've got to 
pick this one up! And its really to get the message out to everybody 
throughout the place that, you know, we can't all sort of sit back 
and become complacent! Especially this year".
After a few technical questions John Moule, at that time a negotiating 
member, responded to Dick's statement.
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John "You were saying a minute or two ago about people becoming
complacent or that they shouldn't become complacent because 
of what you want to get out of the door ..."
Dick "No we shouldn't become complacent because we won't achieve 
the ...."
John "But I don't see where it affects any of these people here?
It's not them that have become complacent ..."
Dick "... no, no, no"
John "We're not getting the work to do ..."
Dick "Exactly I mean ..."
John "Well why all the, why are they, why are we being told we
shouldn't become complacent? ..."
Dick "I'm not - you're making it ... you're under a misapprehension.
... At these meetings I state the position of the Company, I 
don't just look around the table and say everybody here, I say 
the Company. It's a message for the company because these 
minutes don't only go to the works. I don't just look at the 
works and say don't become complacent. We look throughout the 
Company ; at say. Engineering and Sales and Production Control
and Purchasing. It's not just, no, don't take it personally"
(confused, many people talking)
Dick "... there is no doubt that in the beginning of January the 




(Several people talking, all expressing dissent)
John "There is nothing of any note coming through the, er ..."
Dick "I know. I'm not ..."
John "... packaging department"
Dick "I hear what you say, and as I say ..."
John "You can only pack what's given to you but at the moment
theres nothing substantial coming through"
(Dick protests in the background)
Dick "I'm not directing it at people around the table. I'm talking 
about the situation which faces this Company ..."
John "Well I'm just trying to answer about everybody being asleep. It's
shortage of component parts as far as I know ..."
Dick "Exactly. So they're asleep"
John "No. It's rather people that deliver to us"
Dick "So they're asleep"
John "We can't help that"
Continues for a while in the same fashion
John "If you put £50,000 worth of work through the packaging
department, you'll get it packed. But if you put £10,000 in 
front of them that's all you'll get packed ... (Dick interrupts) 
... so therefore I don't think you should really say ..."
— 312 —
Dick "I will always say (rather heated) at this meeting, I'm not 
saying its your fault. I'll always at this meeting express 
what is going on in the Company. I want to get away from 
this attitude ... (unclear) .. talking about the works and 
the staff".
Goes into detailed figures and repeats his arguments. States 
that the Company is in a poor position.
John "Well, it's not the workers fault"
Dick "I'm not. I'm not talking about workers. We are all workers"
John "Well what I mean is that you've got to get stuff through the
finished part of stores into assembly ..."
Dick "Yes"
John "... if you've got no sheets in the finished part of stores 
because of shortages; what can we do about it?"
Dick "I'm not saying you can do anything"
John "Well I'm just trying to point out that its not really the
workers fault"
The issue continues and Dick outlines the need for more 
production and despatches.
John "The onus is on you to get that work in this company"
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Dick "Right, which is why ... (John interrupts) .. Which is why
John I’m talking about the Company and not the machine shop, 
because the machine shop's got more than enough work to cope 
with. The, the welding shop has got some work, the assembly
department's got very little because we haven't got a lot of
stuff from outside and we haven't got it all off the machine 
shop, therefore the stores are going to run flat, therefore 
the despatch is, but the Company I'm talking about ... I'm 
not interested in just looking at the works, because I don't 
care if the works are up to their eyeballs and very busy 
because if we're not selling the stuff we are none of us 
doing very well ..."
John "It's up to management to sort this out"
Dick "Wait a minute, wait a minute, we're all part of this Company"
John "I know that, Mr. Rumens, but ..."
Dick "So let's not all ..."
John "We're doing our bit, what's available but no more, so therefore 
you've got to make some available. Management not workers.
We only work here, we do the work as good as ..."
Dick "I only work here (said with force)".
John "And therefore I say it's managements ... The onus is on
management to get that problem sorted out and get the
work inside the door ..."
Dick "It is the responsibility of management to ensure that what the 
company is trying to do is achievable and it is being done.
- 314 -
Dick "Sometimes it will depend on .... (unclear) .... and sometimes 
stock control and sometimes sales and sometimes other people. 
What I would hope we are trying to do, but I don't want to 
continue this argument, is we're all working to the same end, 
which is by hook or by crook to achieve the numbers we set 
ourselves".
Discussion then drifts off to some of the technical problems 
which have been experienced.
Several interesting points emerge from this discussion. Firstly we 
can see the managerial ideology reflected in the use of legitimising 
arguments and rhetoric. Underlying Dick's argument is a unitary frame 
of reference which is contained in the very nature of the language he 
uses. Thus he seeks to suggest that everyone is on the same side and 
is in pursuit of common objectives. Therefore he is not 'picking on' 
anybody but simply telling everyone what they need to do in order to 
achieve the common objective. John, on the other hand, seeks to resist 
this by a series of arguments which seek to suggest that there are many 
'sides' within the firm and that as far as this forum is concerned,
Dick is pointing his finger in the wrong direction. Thus John seeks to 
refute the unitarist definition by drawing upon an ideology which 
stresses divergence of goals and divisions between groups. However, 
John was unable or unwilling to sustain his challenge to managerially 
imposed definitions of reality partly because he was not actively 
supported by other members of the Works Committee. The way in which 
this issue was brought to a close also illustrates the tactical 
superiority of management in such situations. John identified a 
specific problem area and was invited by Dick to describe it in detail.
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The discussion then proceeded to detailed matters and the focus moved 
away from the 'right* of management to blame workers for poor 
performance in the works.
This, of course, was not an issue where one side or the other was 
going to 'win'. Indeed, it may be argued that Dick was merely 
attempting to structure expectations and inculcate certain values.
At a later date I questioned Dick on this point and put my inter­
pretation to him. He agreed that this had been one of those rare 
cases where his right to define organisational reality had been 
challenged but insisted that they had got the message.
PSK "So it's largely a case of message?"
Dick "That's right. They got the message. That the Company had a 
bloody awful January. And that was the message I was getting 
over ... I don't care if they like the message or not, that 
'is' the message. They can agree with it or disagree with it. 
They'll get the message and they'll recognise that all is not 
as well as it should be".
The issue of 'Dick's Rocket' also touches upon the important distinction 
between the content of a legitimising principle or argument and its 
form. Thus in an attempt to achieve their objectives management can 
explicitly use legitimising arguments or more subtly can encode these 
arguments in the very language and rhetoric of discussion. In general, 
the management at Bestobell Mobrey tended to avoid certain types of 
legitimising argument and certain forms of expression. Thus they did 
not appear to use the fairly standard argument that workers could 
leave and go elsewhere if they were unhappy. Similarly, they tended to 
make very little direct reference to arguments centred around their
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distinctive managerial competence or their delegated authority as 
the representatives of shareholders. However the absence of the use 
of certain arguments in a direct manner did not mean that they were 
totally missing. Rather than use the form of direct explicit 
announcement, the management at Bestobell Mobrey appeared to favour 
a more subtle approach. Thus the legitimising arguments were enmeshed 
and encoded into the language of discussion. Management on many 
occasions appeared to be attempting to structure definitions of 
organisational reality as Dick Rumens was in the case cited. Indeed 
managerial success in this strategy can be guaged by the extent to 
which their arguments penetrated and permeated the organisational 
culture and the consciousness of the workforce. For example one of the 
negotiating members during an agenda meeting once argued that management 
decisions had to be respected because,
"they know what they are doing. They can see the whole picture".
Of course, the General Works Manager's report was not the only part of 
the Works Committee agenda where management attempted to define 
'reality'. The management appeared very keen, on numerous occasions 
to acquaint the workforce with what they saw as the 'economic facts 
of life'. One example of this process concerned the failure to issue 
diaries to employees with over ten years service. This issue was 
raised by Ron Rowland who pointed out that there had been no consul­
tation or even advance notice. Keith Mackney responded by stating 
that no diaries (for staff or customers) had been produced as a result 
of cuts in the Marketing department budget. As discussion drew to a 
close, Joe Kapadia, a consultative member, joked that the Company really 
should be able to afford the diaries in view of their 37% profits. This 
provoked laughter and agreement from other worker representatives.
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At this stage Dick Rumens, visibly rather exasperated, interjected.
"I don't know where we get this idea from that this Company makes 
37% profit".
Joe said that he saw the figure in a newspaper but during discussion 
it becomes clear that the report referred to a 37% improvement. Just 
then in an aside one of the representatives, who appeared rather 
confused, mentioned again a 37% profit level. Dick again interjected 
with some force;
"... no, no, 37% improvement, and just to allay all those sort of 
... (drowned out) ... The Company makes about £10 million sales. Out 
of that we will have made, before tax and interest, about a million.
By the time the tax man and the interest has been paid we'll be lucky 
to wind up with half a million. So lets not get carried away that we 
made 37% profit. We make 5, and you would do better to take your money 
out and shove it in the building society. You'd get a better return. 
So let's not run away with the idea that this Company's making millions 
... (interruptions) ... and that's why, again, I go back to the point 
that you cannot pass on cost increases willy nilly ..."
Joe "How can we run the company when we're getting 5% profit on
(amazed)
such a big investment and when we could put it in the 
building society and get ..."
Dick "You're answering your own question Joe, actually. This is
why companies go bust! Because people put their money 
elsewhere".
When I questioned Dick he agreed that this was a fair example of his 
general strategy of attempting to structure expectations and attitudes 
in line with management thinking. This was part of the 'message' that
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he wis^eed| to ’get across’. Sometimes 'profitability' was raised 
directly and explicitly by management both as an argument to legitimise 
their ideological position and as a rhetoric to rationalise actions. 
For example Dick saw the Works Committee as fulfilling an 'educative' 
role. Part of that educative role was to press home to worker 
representatives the need for increased profitability. As Dick 
suggested,
"Well certainly, if you take the last wage negotiations and indeed 
at other times in discussions with negotiating members, the 
profitability point is pushed all the time. And with the nego­
tiating members, if you talk to them, that is usually the argument 
we put forward. We cannot afford it, the profitability will be 
affected, de dah, de dah, de dah".
A good example involves the use of an external threat to reinforce 
the managerial ideology and notions of 'profitability' and 'efficiency'. 
This occurred when a takeover bid was made for the whole Bestobell 
Group by the British Tyre and Rubber Group (B.T.R.). Unfortunately the 
researcher was excluded from Bestobell at this time but the effects of 
the B.T.R bid can be seen in the Works Committee minutes and were 
verified by later interviews.
The takeover bid was announced to a Works Committee meeting in early 
June 1979 by the Company Secretary (Minute 201) and the Board 
recommendation of rejection was noted. Subsequent meetings also 
received progress reports on the takeover attempt. By the August 
meeting one finds management appearing to use the bid as a 'threat' 
in order to reinforce the 'economic facts of life'. Thus in a 
discussion of the B.T.R bid Dick Rumens stated that,
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"there was a need for a change in attitude and approach for the 
future development of the company and the Group who would be putting 
considerable pressure on individual companies to obtain greater 
profits".
(Minute 218)
In a discussion of the Wage review, Dick,
"emphasised to representatives that the Company was not able to meet 
excessive wage demands which would reduce the Company's competitiveness 
and its ability to maintain the necessary profit margins for future 
growth".
(Minute 219)
Finally, during the course of the Chairman's Monthly Report, Dick 
stated that;
"Regardless of whether or not B.T.R are successful in their take-over 
bid, our first priority will be to achieve our sales/profits forecasts. 
Failure to perform will mean that B.T.R (if they are unsuccessful now) 
could make another attempt at a take-over after the year end results.
As well as achieving our despatch targets, we must improve our overall 
effectiveness.
(Minute 220)
Later in the year, after the failure of the bid, B.T.R were still being 
used as a justification for managerial drives for efficiency and 
profitability. Thus in discussions over the curtailment of overtime 
Dick Rumens stated that;
"Costs were being closely examined with the intention of maintaining 
the present level as part of Bestobell's continuing fight against B.T.R" 
(Minute 224)
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Again in his monthly report Dick argued that;
"Following the successful defence against the B.T.R take-over, it 
was essential to deliver our despatches on time; failure to do so 
would mean that B.T.R would be back"
(Minute 225)
If one examines the past Works Committee Minutes one can find similar 
exhortations but without the 'threat' element provided by B.T.R.
Indeed as Dick commented later,
"Well yes, the B.T.R bid was serious and worrying. But on the other 
hand we used their presence to help achieve our objectives".
As a result of this strategy B.T.R was in the minds of the worker 
representatives nearly one year after the 'bid'. Thus in April 1980 
during a discussion about the corporate plan, Ray, a consultative 
member, put the following question to Dick Rumens.
"The thought occurs, actually, that B.T.R's chairman has just said that 
they are in the market for new acquisitions; is there any danger of 
them trying again?"
So far, we have examined examples of managerial ideology being in­
corporated into a strategy for joint action. Thus we have seen the 
assertion of managerial prerogative and the ways in which this is 
supported by legitimising arguments and principles and expressed in 
terms of a rhetoric. I have characterised the managerial ideology as 
unitarist in perspective. This perception was checked in a series of 
in-depth interviews with senior managers. Although there were dif­
ferences, they generally agreed upon a weak unitarist perspective over­
laid with pluralist aspirations.
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Thus they tended to see themselves as neutral ’stakeholders’ holding 
the ring between the various interest groups yet at the same time 
conceived of the organisation as a ’team’ which had a ’common objective’ 
and where everyone was pulling in the same direction. Thus presented 
with the two approaches they tended to select the pluralist. Yet 
when presented with a series of detailed questions they moved to adopt 
unitarist stances. Perhaps the culture or ethos of the management at 
Bestobell Mobrey is best summed up by this description and explanation 
from Dick Rumens.
"If you take a company like Bestobell Mobrey, I mean obviously it has 
certain objectives and those objectives are common whether it is for 
the workers or management. It's a question of understanding and 
realising that the objectives that management might be seeking to solve 
are in the best interests of everybody ... Now, management's view; 
if you take management's view, the objective is to make a profit. If 
you don't make a profit then nobody is going to benefit. Now the 
workers may not accept that view, and they may not like that view, but 
it happens to be true ... Now, the way we earn our salary is by 
ensuring that the company is successful and makes a profit. That's 
my objective, that would be Graham Woodhead's objective; that the 
company is going to grow. Now, having said that's the objective of the 
company, the way you’re going to achieve that objective is by saying 
'well we ought to do x, y and z'. You can argue that, alright then, 
the workers can have some influence on that. I accept that the workers 
can have some influence on that. They should have some influence on 
that, provided they accept the overall objective, which is to make 
money".
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6.3 Processes of worker resistance
So far we have argued that the management at Bestobell Mobrey enjoyed 
a situation of ideological domination over the workforce. This was 
characterised by a general acceptance of managerial authority and by 
the prevalence of unilateral managerial rule-making. This ideologi­
cal hegemony has been demonstrated by reference to the few occasions 
when it has been challenged. Such challenges have generally been weak 
and ineffective. The ways in which the management deployed certain 
legitimising arguments and principles in the form of a rhetoric have 
also been described. We can now turn our attention to an examination 
of the nature of the processes by which workers sought to challenge 
managerial authority.
Challenges to managerial prerogative and authority are usually focused 
around an 'issue' and the process usually involves the deployment, by 
the worker representatives, of some legitimising arguments. If they 
are sucessfully to challenge managerial hegemony they need to combine 
linguistic resources with physical resources in order to exercise 
transformative capacity. Yet it may be suggested that it is the 
linguistic resource which enables the deployment of physical resources 
in specific situations. Given the reluctance or inability of the 
workforce at Bestobell Mobrey to utilise their physical resource power 
base it is therefore the linguistic resources which become crucial.
One further important point concerns the nature of the 'issues' that 
arise between the parties. Given the dominance of management in this 
company, then 'major' issues are relatively unlikely. The worker 
representatives are unable directly to challenge managerial authority 
and therefore most issues appear as 'minor' or unimportant. Yet it may 
be suggested that this is precisely the mistake of much previous
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research which has tended to assume that power can only be studied in 
situations of a balance of power resources and through the resolution 
of major contentious issues. However power can equally, and more 
subtly, be observed in situations where there exists an asymmetry of 
resources and a relative absence of major issues. Also the fact that 
only minor issues emerged from the Works Committee forum can perhaps 
be explained in two ways. Firstly because of the inability of the 
worker representatives to mount resistance to the managerial prerogative 
either in ideological or purely physical terms. Secondly, the absence 
of major issues may simply reflect the dominance of management and 
their ability to prevent certain issues from arising or being recognised,
Worker resistance to managerial domination can take two distinct 
forms. Firstly workers can attempt to resist or change a specific 
managerial decision or rule. Thus we have already seen how management 
had to defend their decision to reduce the customary holiday differen­
tial enjoyed by the workforce at Bestobell Mobrey. Secondly worker 
resistance can sometimes be simply directed at refuting expressions 
of managerial authority. Thus we have seen how John Moule attempted, 
unsuccessfully, to refute the definition of organisational reality 
that was being proposed by Dick Rumens. As we have suggested, worker 
resistance involves the utilisation of linguistic resources in the 
form of arguments and principles. These arguments may be derived from 
elements of worker ideology, from societal norms or from elements of 
the managerial ideology itself.
6.3.1 Resistance based upon legitimising principles; From*efficiency* 
to 'morality*
What forms and types of legitimising principle and argument were used
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by the worker representatives to challenge managerial decisions? A 
regular agenda item on the Works Committee was Health and Safety 
matters. In fact the Works Committee and the consultative members 
’doubled’ as a Health and Safety committee and representatives.
Health and Safety hazards were raised by the worker representatives 
and noted by management. The health and safety issues raised appeared 
to be divided into two types. Firstly issues which were relatively 
simple and could be quickly remedied by management and secondly issues 
which were rather more intractable. Management usually acknowledged 
these issues as important but pleaded lack of money, resources, and 
space or pointed to negative effects on productivity. In May 1980,
Bob, a consultative member, had just returned from a ’Health and 
Safety at Work’ course for safety representatives. When the health 
and safety agenda item was reached he raised the problem of fumes in 
the Welding Shop. This was not a new problem and management had 
previously installed extractor bays and fans in an attempt to cure it. 
However, Bob argued that these were often not used by the welders 
because of the difficulties of maneouvering work pieces into the bays.
To overcome the problem Bob proposed the purchase of a new helmet with 
a self-contained battery operated ventilation system. Whilst management 
agreed to investigate the helmet they intimated that they would not be 
prepared to buy them and scrap the present extraction system. What 
made this particular issue different from the others was that Bob 
attempted to utilise elements of managerial ideology and arguments in 
order to pursue his case. Thus he accepted the high cost outlay on the 
helmets but sought to argue that such costs might be recovered through 
better attendance, lower sickness rates and greater productivity.
As he stated,
"It must be safer and more profitable for the firm in the long run".
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Therefore, although unsuccessful in this instance, workers can 
utilise managerial ideology against itself in an attempt to challenge 
managerial decisions or rules.
By returning to the holiday entitlement and differential issue we can 
examine the use of other forms of legitimising argument and principle. 
During the Works Committee discussion, management were forced to resort 
to the simple assertion of managerial prerogative because the decision 
was imposed upon them by the Group Personnel Director. In response the 
worker representatives, led by Ron Rowland, attempted to use a series 
of legitimising arguments in order to get the decision reversed.
At an early stage Ron argued,
"This extra day that we've enjoyed has gone back something like twenty 
odd years".
He proceeded to describe the history of the extra day from its origins 
as two half days (one at Easter and one at Christmas) to its consoli­
dation into one day at the joint agreement of both parties.
"So really that privilege, fringe benefit, that we've all enjoyed for 
years has been eroded".
In response to the management's point that they were still in line with 
the national agreement, Ron argued,
"... that fact is that we've always enjoyed here an extra day. In fact 
we've always led this part of the area in holidays. About the only 
thing we have led them in, but we have. About the only extra fringe 
benefit we enjoyed was an extra holiday".
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At this point it became clear that several worker representatives 
were confused and unclear as to the precise nature of the present 
holiday arrangements. This allowed management the opportunity to 
describe them in great detail and thus deviate the discussion. Ron, 
however, attempted to focus attention back upon the precedent of the 
differential.
Ron "But this extra day has been going on for years and years and 
years. Why, why, why have you suddenly decided that we’re 
having too much ..."
Dick "We haven't decided that ..."
Ron "You have, because always beforehand when any additional holidays 
became nationally agreed, you automatically granted it, but you 
still kept that extra day on. Now you've suddenly said 'no, we 
are going to take it off,we'll only give you one instead of two!'
Finally at the end of the debate Ron attempted to use some comments 
attributed to the Managing Director to reinforce his precedent argu­
ment .
"... you've just mentioned that you're under no obligation to 
honour these agreements at all. But the Managing Director stood 
up in the Assembly Department and his own verbal words were,
'We always have and we always will honour these agreements. We 
intend to be one step ahead ... '. His word is as good as his 
writing surely?"
Surprisingly Ron received no support for his comment about the word of 
the Managing Director and Dick Rumens was able to move quickly on to 
other business. Management made no comment on Ron's statement.
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This incident illustrates the use of several legitimising arguments. 
Firstly Ron uses the notion of consistency which refers to the fact 
that similar individuals or groups should be treated in a uniform 
manner and that similar events should evoke similar treatment. Thus 
he suggests that because in the past Bestobell have responded to new 
National Agreements by preserving their differential, then they should 
do so in this case. Ron also uses the principle of precedent which 
states that a decision or rule in a particular case may be cited in a 
subsequent case as a reason for identical treatment. Underlying his 
arguments, but not directly explicit in the extracts quoted, is the 
notion of 'fairness' or 'equity'. Management are seen as unfair by 
withdrawing a customarily enjoyed benefit. Naturally, these arguments 
or principles emerge in a confused manner and are woven together in the 
rhetoric of the speaker.
The use of the principle of precedent as a linguistic resource is 
illustrated by the 'diary' issue. This concerned the non-appearance 
of diaries which had traditionally been given to all employees with 
over ten years service as well as to customers, clients and suppliers. 
These were not produced for 1980 as a cost control measure by the 
Marketing Department. Unfortunately, this information was not relayed 
tc the rest of the management team and they were therefore slightly 
enbarassed when the worker representatives raised the issue on the 
agenda. As far as they were concerned all that they could do during 
the Committee Meeting was to explain the reasoning behind the decision 
ard make re-assuring comments. As Keith Mackney put it later,
"That wasn't managed very well, the whole business ... It was funda- 
nental mismanagement, the whole thing".
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Ron Rowland stated his case in the Works Committee meeting as follows,
"It has been the custom of this company for many years for anybody 
who reaches ten years service to be given a present of a diary every 
year with initials inscribed on it. Suddenly this year we didn't get 
it, there was no mention that we weren't going to get it, now why?
... This is a long service award".
Ron reiterated and rephrased his point several times and drew attention 
to the lack of consultation and communication. Later in the discussion 
he attempted to force management back to the point.
Ron "Does this mean then, that's the end of the diaries, then?"
Keith "I can't, well I can't answer that one"
Ron "It comes back to what we started off the meeting with. It's
another fringe benefit lost".
It can be seen that the principle of precedent is very similar to 
the concept of the legitimacy of custom and practice.
The Health and Safety section of the Works Committee agenda demon­
strated the existence of a 'covert' legitimising principle which 
justified resistance to managerially imposed rules. As Geoff Reid, 
the Production Manager, pointed out, despite raising and being involved 
in attempting to remedy a large number of safety hazards,
"There are other things that they don't really want to get too involved 
in. For example. I've raised on a number of occasions, although 
perhaps it's worn thin even for me now, this business of hard hats in 
the stores. You see, they will not wear them. And a lot of people 
will not wear protective spectacles in the Machine Shop. Now, you know,
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we've raised this a number of times with the Works Committee and 
again, although they will pay semi lip-service to it, they'll always 
find reasons why they're not going to wear a hard hat in the Stores.
Or a reason why they're not going to wear protective spectacles.
They say, 'we're not going to wear hard hats in the stores, they're 
too uncomfortable and the guys won't wear them'".
The managerial rules imposed by management but reinforced by legis­
lation requirements are resisted by the workforce. Peter Botell, who 
was responsible for health and safety matters, takes up the issue of 
enforcement of the rules.
"Now, you can say, 'OK, we are going to insist as part of the company 
rules that everybody will wear safety shoes and everybody will wear 
safety glasses' ... (...) ... Anybody found not wearing those, and
also, say, hard hats in the stores,is in a deliberate breach of 
company rules and therefore one invokes the disciplinary procedure 
and you ultimately fire them ... (Pauses) ... That was more than 
likely the intention of the Act. But, you know what people are like 
(laughs) ... The vast majority of people do wear safety shoes, for the 
simple reason that they're getting a free pair of shoes, which means 
that they don't have to supply them. And, of course, anybody who has 
got prescription glasses wears safety glasses because they are getting 
free glasses. They are not damaging their glasses at work. Our 
problem area is really those who, like you and I, don't wear glasses. 
We're trying to persuade, and it is persuasion rather than force, 
we're trying to persuade people to wear safety glasses".
Therefore workers were willing to abide by the safety rules if they 
gained something from this observance. Thus management offered the 
inducements of a £9 subsidy on safety shoes and free safety glasses
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for those with prescription lenses. The two remaining problem areas 
were thus safety glasses for other than spectacle wearers and hard 
hats. The rules in respect of these two were ignored and resisted by 
workers and their representatives. As Geoff Reid pointed out the 
arguments usually referred to lack of comfort and similar problems.
I put the question to Tony Allen who at the time was a negotiating 
member.
PSK "Come on Tony. How valid is that argument? After all they
wear the safety shoes don't they? And they're not all that 
comfortable".
Tony "Yeah, but they get nine quid for the boots. And it saves
them ruining a pair of shoes with the acid and so on.
Anyway, some of the blokes think it's a bit much. They'll be 
making rules on everything next. Can't even decide what to 
wear".
Thus when questioned the arguments of comfort or ease of operation 
evaporate and are replaced by a simple refusal. This is not a general 
rejection of managerial prerogative but a specific rejection of mana­
gerial authority where it stretches into areas which are seen as 
'irrelevant'.
A discussion about stores reorganisation in the March 1979 meeting 
provided the occasion for one of the only uses of ethical or moral 
arguments that was observed. There had been a long history of dis­
cussions about the problem and the workers had begun to argue that the 
lack of space in the stores was resulting in poor working conditions 
for stores staff. The Production Manager opened the discussion.
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"Not a lot of movement on this, unfortunately".
He reported that the stores personnel had suggested a re-organisation 
scheme designed to improve conditions in the stores area. The scheme 
had been examined by management and the Stores Supervisor but it in 
fact resulted in a 20% loss of storage space. This would be made 
worse by the fact that the new boiler conversion programme would 
result in an increase in the sale of air brakes and thus the need for 
more, not less, space. In the light of these problems management 
proposed to shelve the re-organisation plan and wait until the building 
of a new office block released space for a stores extension.
At this point. Bill Leach, one of the senior negotiating members, 
became extremely angry. Firstly, he categorically rejected the 
argument that the proposed re-organisation would result in a 20% loss 
of space. In this he was supported by Ivor Phillips the consultative 
member for the Stores. "There's no bloody way that you're going to 
lose 20% of the space, no bloody way". He also suggested that manage­
ment should be able to come up with a plan for re-organisation.
"Anyway you keep telling us you're the management. It's your job to 
manage. Well manage! You bloody well come up with a better plan!" 
The bulk of Bill's anger was reserved for what he saw as the 'uncaring' 
attitude of management. Thus he argued that "this proposed block is 
bloody pie-in-the-sky. Nothing's been done and nothing's likely to be 
done". (Indeed as of 1982 the block has still not received planning 
permission). "What about the lads working in those conditions now?
I suppose they've got to wait for years. Those conditions are awful. 
It's time something was done for the lads! They need a better working 
atmosphere". Why, he argued, should the men always hear the brunt of 
any problem? It was about time that the company translated its words
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into deeds and put its hand in its pocket in order to provide a fair 
deal for the storemen.
Bill was finally calmed and the issue was redirected to the question 
of the loss of space. A working party was arranged to consider the 
staff plan and other possible methods of reorganisation. However, 
although the issue had been temporarily resolved it continued to have 
its legacy. The use by Bill of moral and ethical arguments appeared 
to have touched a nerve. His criticisms 'jarred' against the manage­
ment's purported 'caring and pluralist' style. From that meeting 
onwards the issue was referred to as 'Bill's issue or 'Bill's argument 
by Dick Rumens whenever it was discussed. There was always a 
reference to 'Bill's position before any detailed discussion of the 
problem. For example the issue was raised on the agenda in February 
1980 and Dick Rumens commented,
"There's not much we can do in the short term, but it causes all sorts 
of problems. You see, we've raised the question that Bill (Leach) 
used to raise, the point about doing something in the stores. Well, 
of course, you don't want to go spending vast amounts of money to 
know that then you're likely to be moving to the end of number two 
building".
This device appeared to serve the purpose of preventing any repetition 
of the argument by worker representatives and demonstrating that 
management were aware of the problems.
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6.3.2 Resistance by reference to a formal rule: 'King Kong's 
bananas'
We have seen, then, how worker resistance to managerial authority can 
stem from legitimising principles which form linguistic resources and 
which are drawn from what might be termed 'consensual' or 'societal' 
norms. However, workers can sometimes resist a managerial decision, 
action or initiative by reference to a formal written rule. Workers 
could, for example, resist by claiming a written right to be consulted 
over an issue. However, the resistance does not have to be directed 
to a specific decision or action. Workers can resist when management 
appear to be deviating from a written rule, even though no immediate 
problem has arisen.
For example a continual aggravation to the worker representatives was 
the quality of external recruits on the one hand and the lack of internal 
promotion prospects on the other. They saw this problem as being 
exacerbated by the desire of management to get workers onto shift work.
As one of the works committee members said at an Agenda meeting,
"If King Kong walked into the factory with a bunch of bananas for his 
toolbox he would be taken on as long as he would work shifts".
This argument was strenuously denied by Keith Mackney. The workers 
thus found it difficult to challenge management, partly because they 
knew Keith's response and partly because some of them really perceived 
such matters as falling squarely within the managerial prerogative.
"They ain't going to discuss that with us, that's their business".
Thus their only way to express concern involved bringing to the atten­
tion of management incidents where the procedures (unilaterally decided 
by management) had not been followed.
- 334 -
This process is reflected in the following Works Committee minutes,
"The representatives said that they were concerned that certain Works 
vacancies had recently been advertised externally without internal 
advertising. The Personnel Manager said that it was the Company's 
policy to advertise all Works vacancies internally and he would ensure 
that this happened".
(Minute 117)
"The Personnel Manager said that the normal procedure for recruitment 
advertising was to advertise vacancies internally and in the local 
media. Representatives felt that procedures had broken down in a 
recent incident and that management had failed to notify employees 
of an existing vacancy. The Personnel Manager and Production Manager 
said that they would investigate the alleged incident".
(Minute 194)
Another example illustrates the situation where a managerial decision 
is challenged by reference to a written rule or procedure. In this 
case an employee was dismissed for poor performance and among the 
reasons given by the representatives for his retention and the rever­
sing of the dismissal decision was the fact that the correct procedures 
had not been followed. This is reported in the Works Committee minutes.
"Representatives said that they were concerned that an employee with 
two months service was dismissed after only being verbally warned that 
his work was not to a standard expected by the Company.
The Personnel Manager replied that the employee had received a number of 
verbal warnings regarding sub-standard work and was dismissed as there 
had been no improvement".
(Minute 231)
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It is interesting that the Personnel Manager makes no formal denial 
of the allegation concerning the lack of a written warning despite 
the fact that it is stipulated in the disciplinary procedure. (See 
Appendix B). The extent of managerial domination within Bestobell 
Mobrey is perhaps aptly illustrated by the way in which management 
handle and resolve this issue.
6.3.3 Issue definition and rehearsal: 'Bloody stock control*
The legitimising principles and arguments utilised by both sides do 
not just 'crystallise' at the Works Committee meetings but/cm^instead 
rehearsed in advance. Issues are identified, refined and linked to 
appropriate legitimising arguments by a process of rehearsal. The 
worker representatives held meetings one week in advance of the Works 
Committee meetings in order to collect items for the agenda. Several 
different processes appear to |td occur in these Agenda meetings.
Firstly the meetings provide an opportunity for issues to be reworded 
in appropriate language for the agenda. This is usually performed by 
one of the older, more experienced, worker representatives. Thus the
issues are discussed and tabled and then summarised by one of the
representatives. Three other processes can be illustrated by reference 
to one agenda meeting in February 1980. John Moule raised a problem 
concerning the lack of stillages and standard cages and suggested 
that it be put on the agenda for the February meeting of the Committee. 
Hovever, Ron Rowland who was compiling the agenda appeared to favour 
a different tactic.
'"It's a question of what he comes up with tomorrow, next week rather, 
isn't it? ... When he goes through the Chairman's Monthly Report it'll
probably say something that we can fire a hole in, fire a rocket at".
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Thus the agenda meetings often served the purpose of enabling tactical 
decisions to be made about the best way to pursue issues. Similarly, 
at the same agenda meeting the representatives all complained that 
they had not received the minutes of the last Works Committee meeting. 
Ron Rowland stated that he would take it up with Peter Botell when 
he went up to Personnel to finalise the agenda. However, Ivor 
disagreed,
"I don't think it's worth you seeing to it, Ron, when you go up there.
I think it should be fetched up in the meeting, so that we can really 
get at them about it, because it's all 'lackadaisy' again ain't it?
If it comes up in the meeting and we gives 'em a row about it, maybe 
more will be done, than just you telling 'em that we haven't got 'em 
... Cos, as I say, as soon as they get outta that meeting they've 
forgotten everything, that's the way it seems to me".
Another process that was observed in the agenda meetings was the 
identification of 'real' issues or issue 'definition'. Thus Meg 
Surgeon raised the issue of delays in assembly which were caused by 
charges in material issue procedures by the component stores. On 
certain jobs the female assembly operatives have to go to the stores 
to withdraw certain expensive components as and when they are required. 
At one time they could simply walk in and take what they wanted. The 
new procedure meant that the stores were locked and the operatives 
had to wait to be 'served' by stores personnel. During the agenda 
meeting the representatives spent a long time discussing the 'correct' 
procedure and reaching a common understanding of the problem. During 
this discussion it became clear that the 'real' problem was not the 
change in procedure per se, or the delays, but the fact that the 
standard times for assembly jobs were now 'tight' due to the extra 
waiting time involved.
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This was eventually noticed by Ron who suggested that, "really what 
we’re talking about is longer times on the assembly jobs".
One final process to emerge from the agenda meetings was the fact 
that issues are rehearsed, not only to achieve a common approach in 
negotiations, but because the process of rehearsal itself can serve 
to strengthen group cohesiveness. Items and issues are discussed which 
unite the worker representatives and provide them with a common 
perception. Thus Meg Surgeon raised the problem of fluctuating 
workloads in the Assembly Department. This was duly noted for 
inclusion on the agenda. However, the representatives began to discuss 
the source of the problem.
Ivor "That is the fault of Stock Control"
Meg "It is Stock Control ..."
Ivor "Stock Control is, everything that happens here ..."
Meg "It is ..."
Ivor "... is their fault and Rumens won’t have it because it’s his
baby. And that is the fault all the way through this place
Meg "It is ..."
Ivor It’s a management problem again"
Ralph "... at the last meeting they said it was our fault. It's
nothing to do with the blokes, it's entirely their fault. They
expect the shop floor to get them out of the mire every bloody
month".
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The representatives then began to quote from their own experiences, 
evidence of managerial incompetence. The effect was mutually to 
reinforce their perceptions and their definition of organisational 
reality. Ivor cited the case of a job worth £15,000 held up for four 
small washers. Meg described assembly jobs held up by the absence of 
metal earthing tags, while Ralph maintained a job held up by a lack
of studs. Whilst most of these stories could be apocryphal, or have
some perfectly reasonable explanation, they served to generate a group 
consciousness.
Ivor "It is, it’s, well, it’s disgusting..."
John "It’s Stock Control again isn’t it?"
Ivor "And they’ve always been the same"
Roy "The problem area’s Stock Control"
John "... and you can't run Stock Control down. I've run it down
to Rumens and 'Reidy' and they're, they look at me ..."
Ivor "John, I've ... you know that I've pressed it, up in meetings,
haven't I, about stock control don't exist ... but Rumens won't
have it because that's his baby".
The representatives then moved on from the failings of Stock Control to 
the more general problems of management, making statements as follows.
Ivor "It is definitely bad organisation by management ... (unclear)
... It still goes on the same way; once they get out of our 
meeting there, they forget everything".
( )
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Ivor "If you remember last month now, when that oil ... the boiler
had gone up the creek. Now in the meeting they said, 'yes'
I could have a boiler in my place, didn't they? 'Yeah, no 
problem, yeah'. There's a month gone now. I haven't got 
nothing, and some of the days in my place it was 47 degrees. 
It's a month. 'Yeah, we'll get you one easy'. Have I got 
one, have I hell!
( )
Ron "It don't do to tell them exactly what goes on because they
got an answer for it. They're such a devious bloody lot they 
cover up for one another".
What is interesting is that, despite the rehearsal and agreement, the 
issues often failed to materialise in the rehearsed form at the Works 
Committee meeting. Obviously there are areas in the procedure where 
issues can get 'lost' or wordings can get changed. After the agenda 
meeting one of the negotiating members takes the list of items to 
Peter Botell and a joint agenda is agreed which is published by 
management. There appear to be two possiblities which could explain 
how issues get 'lost' or become 'changed'. The first refers to the 
well-known psychological fact that when isolated from the support of 
the reference group the individual becomes reticent and vulnerable.
Thus management may be able to dictate the form or wording of items 
for the agenda. Or the representative may be unable or unwilling to 
put the group point of view when confronted by management. Secondly, 
management have a certain degree of latitude in the final wording of 
the items for the agenda as they publish it. Thus the wording of items 
could be changed in order to 'slant' them in a particular direction.
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What happened to the issues that we have seen rehearsed above? The 
issue of lack of stillages and cages appeared on the Agenda (Item 4a) 
despite Ron Rowlands intention to keep it off and to raise it instead 
during the Chairman’s Monthly Report. Similarly, despite having agreed 
that the real problem of the delays in assembly was job timings and 
loss of bonus, it was not raised in this form. The item appeared on 
the Agenda (Item 4b) as 'Change of Switch System in Assembly'. When it 
was taken in the Works Committee meeting it was easily resolved by 
management and the representatives made no mention of the effect on 
job times and thus bonuses. The issue about the fluctuating workloads 
in assembly also passed off quietly and without any reference to the 
failings of Stock Control. The main point here is the key importance 
of linguistic resources. If workers are to challenge managerial 
hegemony they need to identify 'strong' issues and link these to 
appropriate and powerful legitimising principles. These have to then 
be pursued in the appropriate forum in terms of rhetoric with a degree 
of skill. Perhaps the inability of the worker representatives at 
Bestobell Mobrey to achieve this explains the high degree of hegemonic 
domination by management. In fact, as we shall see, the only issue 
mentioned above to be vigorously pursued at the Works Committee meeting 
was the rather trivial issue of Ivor's heating in the stores.
6.3.4 Active resistance: The ultimate sanction?
Whilst most of the resistance to managerial domination took the form 
of the mobilisation and utilisation of linguistic resources, there 
were occasions when the workforce attempted to utilise their physical 
resources and power base. Thus the workforce called strikes twice 
during the period covered by the research study. The first occasion 
was in the course of the 1979 Wage Review.
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After a mass meeting on the 8th January 1979, the worker representatives 
called a one day strike for all employees in the Machine Shop, Welding 
Shop and Inspection to be held on Wednesday 10th January 1979. 
Simultaneously, it was decided to instigate a policy of no overtime 
working and non co-operation from Monday 15th January for all employees 
in the Assembly and Stores areas. The next day, the 9th January, in 
a special negotiating meeting, the Personnel Manager stated,
"that should sanctions take place, management would not negotiate under 
duress and would cease overtime with immediate effect. No payments 
would be made to any employee who took part in any stoppage, attendance 
bonus and sick pay included. If a policy of non-cooperation resulted 
in a reduction of output, the 6.9% Productivity Bonus would be reduced 
accordingly ... The Personnel Manager concluded by saying that con­
frontation was not in either side's interest and he asked representa­
tives to reconsider any action regarding sanctions".
(Minute 163)
After another mass meeting the representatives agreed to withdraw 
sanctions in the light of the intention to continue negotiations.
This has to be viewed in the context of the negotiations. The starting 
position was that management initially offered 5.5% on basic rates, 
while the workforce asked for a restructuring of the grade system, the 
consolidation of a 6.9% Productivity Bonus and a 10% increase on the 
new consolidated bonus rate. The result of the final settlement was an 
average increase of 8% and the introduction of a new grade. However, 
there was no consolidation of the Productivity Bonus. (For details of 
the 1979 Wage Review see Appendix E).
The second time that a strike was called was during the Wage Review in 
July 1980. On this occasion the negotiating representatives were led
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by a newly elected and relatively unexperienced negotiator, Peter 
Dormer. Again a strike was called but this time the workers actually 
went out of the gates. However, management repeated their argument 
about not negotiating while sanctions were in operation and the 
workforce returned to work the next day. In both these situations 
the prime moving force for the strike action was the Machine Shop but 
their support in both cases evaporated after management’s statement 
about no negotiations under duress.
Keith Mackney thought that the one day strike had been a useful 
educative event.
"In a way it was quite productive in that I think that they would 
think very strongly before ever trying that again, which has to be 
the right approach".
This indeed seemed to be the view of the majority of worker representa­
tives to whom I talked. "We should never have done that". "We were 
pushed into that, it was wrong". "It was a waste of time. They won". 
These were some of the typical comments. Dick Rumens took a more 
objective and philosophical view of the workers’ attempts to use their 
physical resources by the withdrawal of labour. He argued that the 
basic problem with the negotiating members was their lack of strategic 
and tactical knowledge and awareness.
’’... you see, that’s what bothered me about the Committee. They could 
have chosen better times. They chose the wrong issues and the wrong 
times. It’s no point in having a one day strike at times when it 
suits the Company".
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6.4 The exercise of transformative capacity
So far we have sought to demonstrate how the parties utilised legiti­
mising principles and arguments in order either to preserve managerial 
domination or to challenge it. This, of course, refers to the level 
of mediation. We have also seen how these principles and arguments 
are related to ideology on the structural level particularly in the 
case of management. However, legitimising principles and arguments are 
only used as linguistic resources in an attempt to exercise transforma­
tive capacity on the level of action. At this level it is often the 
way in which such principles and arguments are expressed in rhetoric 
that becomes important and influences the result of the conflict. 
Obviously such conflicts arise only in cases where the prerogative 
and legitimacy of management are contested. As we have seen the 
legitimacy of management may be contested in two different ways. The 
first is where a managerial rule or decision is opposed by the work­
force. Thus the substantive or procedural content of a rule or 
decision may become the subject of negotiation between the parties.
The result of this negotiation will be a function of the strength of 
the legitimising arguments utilised and the reserves of power resources 
held by both sides. The second encompasses situations where what is 
contested is an argument, principle or ideological position. Thus 
while at the micro level, principles and arguments are contested as a 
preclude to a substantive result; at the macro level they can exist on 
their own, independent of any specific and immediate substantive decision. 
We are now in a position to study some of the contested issues that 
arose in the Works Committee forum. We can examine which side, through 
the exercise of * transformative capacity', managed to achieve its 
objectives and analyse why this actually occurred. We can also examine 
the reasons why other outomes to the issues did not result.
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6.4.1 Issue One - "The one that got away"
The major issue upon which the workers were most likely to be success­
ful has already been mentioned in earlier sections. This was where 
the customary holiday differential was removed by management. The 
management at Bestobell Mobrey were generally not in favour of the 
decision but were constrained by orders from the Group Personnel 
Director. Thus the management felt that there was little else they 
could do other than fall back upon the simple assertion of managerial 
prerogative. Thus, in this situation there were very few legitimising 
principles that management could deploy. On the other hand the worker 
representatives, and Ron Rowland in particular, used a lot of legiti­
mising arguments and principles which, as we have seen, were drawn 
from what we might term 'consensual' or 'societal' norms. Thus the 
worker representatives enjoyed a considerable advantage in terms of 
linguistic resources. Yet in the end it was management who were 
successful and the holiday differential was lost. Why did this happen? 
In order to answer this we have to move from legitimising arguments 
and resources to the use of rhetoric on the level of action. Thus 
during the discussions and negotiations several factors prevented the 
worker representatives from pressing home their advantage in terms of 
principles and argument.
Firstly Ron Rowland was continually prevented from developing his 
arguments and principles, not by management, but by his own side. Thus 
at several points in the discussion different worker representatives 
interrupted to ask factual questions about the holiday entitlement. 
These questions revealed their confusion and ignorance regarding the 
existing holiday arrangements and the Personnel Manager was thus able 
to respond a long time explaining the detail and by doing so took the 
steam out of the discussion.
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Secondly management were able to deflect the discussion onto another 
topic and thus defuse worker resistance to the rule change. In 
response to Ron Rowland's arguments about the precedent of an extra 
days holiday Keith Mackney interjected to state;
"Well, you know, the company, as Mr. Rumens has said, is under no 
obligation at all to do anything about holidays. The situation at the 
moment, interestingly enough, is that quite a lot of people don't 
manage to take their holidays in any case".
If this was the case, argued the representatives then management were 
not enforcing their own rules. Some representatives suggested 
management were in fact allowing people not to take their full 
entitlement and were then 'buying it back' off them. This discussion 
continued for some time enabling Keith Mackney to talk at length on the 
application of the holiday rules.
"I think you'll find that since I've been here, and I know that last 
year we were living out something which was already in existence, but 
really since I've had effect in this place, the rules have been 
applied and the only way that anybody can be able to hold any 
holiday back is ... is if they actually booked it at the end of the 
year and through pressure of work they have not been able to take it 
at that particular time" ... (moves on to details of the rules).
As a result of these lengthy digressions Ron Rowland found it very 
difficult to resurrect the original issue. He tried to bring the 
discussion back to the holiday differential but none of the other 
worker representatives appeared ready to back him up and management 
were able to move quickly on to the next item.
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Looking back on the issue, management were both surprised that they 
had upheld their decision and unhappy about what they had done. Geoff 
Reid remembered the issue as follows,
"I was surprised actually that they, that it really sort of petered 
out, didn't it? Because as I remember it Ron Rowland was really 
trying to push to retain his extra day and I think there may have 
been one or two murmurs from the other members of the Committee. But 
in fact management seemed to be, in the form of Keith Mackney, very, 
very determined on this one ... And Ron put up a good argument there. 
I mean, he sort of put up an argument with regard to the fact that 
he felt his fringe benefits were being eroded away. And, yeah, I 
believe that in this instance they really let go. They let go very 
easily".
He suggested that if the worker representatives had rehearsed their 
arguments properly and presented a united front then they would have 
come a lot nearer to achieving their objectives.
"I believe that we got away lightly with that".
Dick Rumens was also questioned about the way in which management had 
succeeded on this issue.
Dick "Well, my view ... er (laughs) ... officially or otherwise?
(laughs)".
PSK "Well I've already talked to Keith and he's been sort of frank
over the issue ..."
Dick "Well, I think we did the dirty"
PSK "Yeah?"
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Dick "I think we really played that wrongly. I mean not from our
position. I mean, OK, you see there are situations. I mean 
Keith would probably agree with me and ... but I have a hat 
to wear and I wear it. I supported the management's view on 
the basis that, 'look you haven't lost a day', so, you know 
... I think we were petty, I think we should have given it.
... They should have pushed the argument that we were being 
petty".
PSK "If you had been facing union members, shop stewards, would
the result have been different?"
Dick "Oh I don't think so, I don't think it's a question of being
union members or not. It's a question of keeping your eye on 
the ball. I mean don't get sidetracked into totally other 
issues when you can stick. Know what argument you're going 
to put forward and stick to it, don't get sidetracked".
Ron Rowland remembered the issue in a similar way.
"Yeah, they had 'em totally bamboozled didn't they! Couldn't 
stick to the point. They're always the bloody same. We 
could have pushed them harder on that".
This issue demonstrates the importance of tactical skills in the 
exercise of transformative capacity. If worker resistance had been 
united and solid management would probably have conceded despite the 
edict from Group. The worker side showed a lack of negotiating skill. 
They had obviously not rehearsed their arguments and would have done 
much better if Ron had been left to lead the issue all the way through 
the discussion.
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Thera was very little 'negotiating discipline' on their side of the 
table. Management, however, were skilful enough to exploit the 
confusion in the ranks of the worker representatives and deviate 
discussion from the major issue. It may also be suggested that the 
infrequency of worker 'victories' at these meetings might partly explain 
the reluctance to pursue issues such as this one. This reluctance is 
thus a function of managerial domination.
6.4.2 Issue Two - 'Steamrollered'
We can now move from an issue where management were prepared to give 
ground,given the right degree of forceful opposition to an issue where 
they were totally unwilling to concede at all. This issue was the 
switching of the date of the ann(^^ Wage Review from January to July. 
When the 1980 Wage Review started, management offered a 'package deal' 
to the workforce. Firstly they wanted to change the date of the 
annual review to July. Secondly they were willing to offer 3&% on 
basic rates for the period January to July 1980. Finally this increase 
was to be subject to an acceptance by the workforce of management's 
use of contract labour where necessary. During the course of nego­
tiations management, faced with total opposition to their proposals, 
gradually increased their offer. They raised the percentage gradually 
from 3i% to 4&% and finally to 6%. They also guaranteed to start 
negotiations in July 1980 from a minimum figure of 8%. Eventually, in 
early January, the workforce accepted the offer.
Durinig tho course of the negotiations Keith Mackney informed the 
reseairche; that the reason for the change in the review date was in 
order* to ninimise the effect of wage increases upon the company's 
accouints Cor the year 1979/80.
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This was deemed by the Group management to be important if another bid 
from B.T.R was to be resisted. An additional benefit from this change 
was that the review was now in the summer holiday period and at a time 
of year which was usually relatively slack. This, therefore, had the 
effect of reducing the potential power of the workforce. Interestingly 
this was not the only action of this kind that management had considered. 
Thus at one stage management actively pursued the idea of altering the 
technological lay-out of the Machine Shop and related operation in an 
attempt to disrupt or reduce the power base of the Batchmatic operators.
Management had to find other legitimising arguments in support of the 
change of review date. In fact they used a variety of arguments and 
these are reflected in the minutes of the negotiations.
"The Personnel Manager said that management were keen to pursue their 
original approach of a six month review ... and to adopt a fresh 
fields approach in July. Management realised that this was a new 
approach ..."
(14th December 1979)
"The Personnel Manager replied that Management felt very strongly that 
the change of review dates should take place to bring both the Works 
and Staff Reviews in line. There was a lot to be gained by works 
employees from such a move. Management were not looking for a cheap 
settlement. There would be greater protection for works employees 
by achieving a six month agreement as there may well be a government 
clamp down on wage increases towards the end of 1980".
(18th December 1979)
"Management were now feeling very strongly that the review date must 
change to July and were concerned that there may be a pay freeze at
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the end of 1980... Management had strong reasons for wishing to 
stick to this intention to bring the Staff and Works reviews together 
as this would eliminate the bad feeling which occurred when one set 
of employees leapfrogged over the other".
(21st December 1979)
These, then, were some of the arguments presented to the worker 
representatives in an attempt to persuade them of the need for a move 
in the review date.
As far as I could ascertain, the negotiating members did not question 
the validity of these arguments, perhaps because of their concentration 
upon the percentage increase. Another point which the negotiating 
representatives did not appear to appreciate was that the acceptance 
of contract labour was only a managerial bargaining counter. As Keith 
Mackney argued,
"... its the ritual lamb. And when they do eventually come back and 
we do start to reach agreement and they say 'but we're not accepting 
that', then we shall say, then, alright".
However Keith suggested that the use of contract labour was a useful 
legitimising principle designed to convince the workforce that 
management was serious when it argued that they could not have 
'something for nothing'.
"... it backs up the fact that we've said, you know, that we can't give 
anything for nothing".
This, then, appears to be an issue upon which management were totally 
unwilling to concede. As Dick Rumens argued.
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"You see the areas that we did steamroller through if you think about 
it are things like the switching of the date from January to July.
We steamrollered that through; we just pushed it through. We were 
going to do it and that was that, you know, without negotiation".
Whilst they were totally unwilling to move on the issue of the date, 
management did include in the 'package' one issue upon which they 
would move and a bargaining counter that they were prepared to drop.
Even if the negotiating members had questioned the validity of the 
legitimising arguments supporting the move date, it is unlikely that 
they could have been successful on this issue. However, it is possible 
that they could have forced management to a large percentage deal for 
the six month period. This again illustrates the superiority in terms 
of strategy and tactics by management in negotiations.
6.4.3 Issue Three - 'Take it or leave it'
Perhaps the major price of procedural rule making occurred during the 
research study concerned the development of an Extended Leave policy.
As we have already described, Bestobell Mobrey employs a large number 
of immigrants of which the highest proportion by far are Asian in 
origin. For a long time an informal custom and practice arrangement 
hac existed whereby workers could take extended leave of absence to 
visit relatives in other continents. While generally applied to 
immigrant workers visiting the Indian sub-continent, other workers 
also utilised the arrangement to visit the U.S.A, Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand. This informal practice was being threatened in two 
ways. Firstly the numbers of workers using the arrangement was 
increasing and this sometimes caused staffing problems in production 
departments. Secondly there had been several recent incidents concerning 
workers returning long after their expected date of return.
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The extended leave arrangements were raised on the Works Committee 
Agenda by the worker representatives. When the item was taken, Keith 
Mackney was, however, the first to speak.
"Following a spate of problems with extended leave, I and my 
department have been considering the whole policy of extended leave, 
so I'm now taking the opportunity, as somebody has raised it through 
the agenda, of passing a few comments on it. Interestingly, Group 
are also interested and they've come up with a draft policy as well 
for extended leave and we're taking one or two ideas from their policy 
as well, which we'll then put into a draft policy and submit to you 
for discussion. Very likely at the next Works Committee meeting in a 
month's time. And we'll put it before you for your comments, adjust­
ments, whatever and discussions.
He then proceeded to outline the main points of his draft policy. Thus 
it appeared that the committee was going to be used in its consultative 
role over what was essentially an important procedural set of rules.
The representatives appeared to accept most of Keith's points but 
discussion focused upon one proposed clause which stated that if a 
worker did not return by the expected date then his contract would be 
held to have been frustrated and he would therefore be dismissed.
Bob, one of the consultative members, asked what would happen if an 
individual was unable, for whatever reason, to return on time and 
whether any reasons would be acceptable. Keith admitted that dismissal 
would not, in fact, be automatic. These were grounds for lateness which 
were reasonable and which management would accept. Bob then attempted 
to discover what management considered reasonable and what they would 
accept by listing possible reasons including airline strikes and 
sickness. Keith agreed that management would probably accept the former
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but not necessarily the latter even if supported by a medical 
certificate. The illness would have to be fairly serious to be 
accepted as an excuse by management. This aroused a certain degree 
of discontent amongst the worker representatives.
At this stage the particular case which had in fact initiated the 
formalisation of the policy and informed much of the preceeding 
discussion came to the surface. It was raised by Ron Rowland and 
concerned a worker called Raja in the Welding Shop.
"We have a case, one fellow, who received a warning letter. You’re 
probably aware, most of you are aware of this, and he feels that he’s 
been unjustly treated and he wants it put, discussed here 
(General discussion all at once)... You did say that you were going 
to put it on (the agenda) anyway, so, I mean, he insisted. I went 
to see Peter and I asked him if he could rephrase the letter. He 
(Raja) feels that the letter is badly worded; its loaded against him. 
He feels that this was unjust. I went to see Peter who said that no, 
the company was adamant that the letter was fair and would remain as 
it was. Now, he (Raja) wanted it discussed here. He wants it 
recorded for some reason better known to himself that it has been 
discussed".
It seems fairly clear here that Ron is letting it be known that he 
feels that he has done his job by raising Raja’s case but he does not 
really support it. However, as we shall see there are differences 
on the side of the worker representatives.
At this point the Chairman was asked if he would allow the issue to 
be discussed. Before he could reply, Keith intervened;
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"Well in fact yes, that would be my first comment, it is the sort of 
problem which should be raised really through the normal grievance 
procedure if he feels he’s got a grievance; rather than as a point 
across the table here. But since it has been raised I will pass 
comment on it. And that is that, in fact, in the particular case 
that we're talking about I think that the company would have been 
totally justified in saying that the particular contract of employment 
And indeed we would say this on another occasion, ... that the 
contract of employment had been terminated, had been frustrated by 
that particular employee not having returned to the UK. And I think 
the fact that he has been given only a warning, hasn’t had his 
employment terminated, frankly means that he’s got off pretty lightly. 
And when we do tighten this policy up and were he to have done, you 
know, were it to have operated under the new arrangement, he would 
have indeed been deemed to have terminated his employment with the 
Company. So I reckon he’s got off pretty lightly but if he does want 
to raise it, he ought to raise it through the normal grievance 
procedure".
Ivor "But the letter ’e got is a final warning... It sounds a bit 
bitchy for someone being four weeks overdue".
Keith " It doesn’t for somebody, it doesn’t, it doesn’t ..."
Dick (Incredulous and interrupting) "... for somebody being four 
weeks overdue. And you think that’s tough!"
The discussion then focused upon the minutiae of the Raja case until
Dick attempted to summarise the feelings of management.
Dick "I think there’s a total lack of responsibility on the
individual’s behalf either to let the company know what was
- 355 -
going on when he was still away, and he had every opportunity 
to do that and made no effort, but no effort was made. The 
company have then to go to a lot of trouble to find out 
whether this particular individual was back by Peter having 
to go round to this person's house to see if he was in; and 
then not to come in when he said he was going to come in was 
a total lack of responsibility on the individual's part 
towards his employer. And that in my book is enough grounds 
for the man to have frustrated and terminated his own contract 
of employment. And I think we took a very lenient view and 
I doubt whether next time we would take such a lenient view".
Keith "Well, we certainly wouldn't"
Dick "You know, I wish, we've got to get away from this attitude of
talking about rights of individuals because just as individuals 
have rights, they have responsibilities, not only to the 
company but to the people they work with".
What then emerges from the above discussion? Firstly while the 
representatives are generally happy with the outlined policy they are 
unhappy with the dismissal clause because they feel that it does not 
allow for 'unavoidable' lateness. They are also upset that management 
will not necessarily accept certain normally reasonable excuses such 
as certified illness as valid. Bob stated after the meeting that he 
had been trying to reject the automatic dismissal and to get management 
to provide guidelines for valid and invalid reasons for lateness of 
return. Some of the representatives (such as Ivor) are willing to use 
the Raja case to argue that the final warning is too harsh a penalty 
for this particular offence.
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Faced with these arguments and possible ’slippage’ of the rules, Keith 
Mackney attempts to summarise the debate.
"The only really concrete way to make this absolutely foolproof is to 
say ’look, if you don't come back on that day, you've done it,' and 
that's that. And then if you want to re-apply when you do come back 
to the UK, fine, we'll consider you for re-employment. Now that is
one way of doing it ....  If that's what you're saying round this
table it will certainly fit in with the thinking of the management".
Thus in effect Keith was saying to the worker representatives that 
they could take it or leave it. Whilst the item had been introduced 
in a consultative light, if they persisted in their disagreement 
then management would simply impose their own policy. When I 
questioned Keith later he argued that he was unwilling to change the 
policy to allow greater flexibility.
The issue closed but it was obvious that the majority of the
representatives were still not in favour of the automatic dismissal 
clause. This undercurrent was still present in the next meeting when 
Keith presented his final written version, distributed it and asked 
for comments within 48 hours. (See Appendix F for details). Bob 
asked what the agreement mentioned in section 9 of the policy consisted 
of.
Bob "I just wondered, what sort of agreement have they got to sign 
before they go on holiday, like..."
Keith "It's a letter. Have you not seen one? It's ah ..."
Bob "No. Is it just a normal ..."
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Keith "It’s just a letter that says, it points out most of the points, 
thats all and explains what money you’ll get when, and what 
money you’ll get when you get back. And it really just states 
the main points that are in the policy".
Jan "It states in the letter that if you’re not back in time you 
could be dismissed".
Keith "Well thats item 11 on the document"
The representatives were unable to mount any further challenge to the 
policy and so it was accepted in the form originally proposed by 
management.
6.4.4 Issue Four - ’Ivor’s heating*
While the three issues that we have examined so far were reasonably 
important, this next issue is in comparison rather trivial. However, 
it does make some useful points about the lack of power of the workforce 
at Bestobell Mobrey and in particular their lack of understanding of 
the dynamics of a power relationship.
Ivor Phillips was a consultative member of the Works Committee 
representing the Stores areas. All through the winter of 1979/1980 
Ivor had complained to supervision about the lack of heating in a 
Portakabin store where he spent part of his working day and also in 
other parts of the Stores. A series of heaters had broken down in 
the main stores area and temporary jet heaters promised by supervision 
and management never materialised.
The issue was first raised during the Health and Safety agenda item in 
the January Works Committee meeting. Ivor raised the problem but received
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the fairly standard management response which was observed on numerous 
occasions. That is, management argued that it was a problem for local 
supervision who would sort it out. This, however did not generally 
seem to happen. This led to the worker representatives being cynical 
about managerial response on the health and safety issues. As Dick 
Rumens commented,
"There's also a great tendency to believe that management don't do 
anything about some of these things. I think that is also partly true.
I think that's a failing of people further down the scale - supervisors 
again and managers - just not doing what they should do".
In this particular case nothing was done about the heating problem by 
the time of the next meeting. Hence Ivor raised the issue again.
"A month ago, we had this oil business, this furnace wasn't working 
properly. It was 47 degrees in where I was working. 'Oh don't worry 
Ivor' (said ironically) in the meeting, 'you can get a fire any time'
... (pauses) ... That was a month ago. I suffered for a fortnight with 
the cold in there. I think I even talked to you about it (turns to 
Dick) and that's about as far as it's gone. I think it's bloody 
disgusting".
Dick referred the problem to Geoff Reid who agreed with Ivor and 
stated that he had actually set in motion the order which should have 
resulted in Ivor getting his heater. Dick suggested that local 
supervision be chased over the issue. None of the other representatives 
intervened to support Ivor and to suggest that management had badly 
failed to resolve a simple trivial issue. Indeed instead there was a 
general air of hilarity around the table. The representatives appeared 
from their jokes to view this as 'Ivors problem' rather than viewing 
it in the context of a power relationship.
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Ivor did not see the funny side of the issue and began to utilise a 
persuasive legitimising argument that had been generally agreed by 
the representatives at previous agenda meetings.
"Now if it was one of the office staff, they did threaten to come out
once in there, didn't they? If they hand't have got any heaters by
eleven o'clock they were going out. Was it there by eleven o'clock?
... it was? But when you come down to us then ... (interrupted)".
Despite invoking this argument, Ivor still got no support from his 
fellow representatives.
The interesting point about this issue, despite its triviality, was that 
it afforded the representatives an opportunity to achieve a 'victory' 
and 'success* from the committee system. As we have seen on most 
issues, even ones which they should have won, the worker representatives 
were generally unsuccessful. This issue, which was exacerbated by 
basic managerial incompetence, offered the chance for the representatives 
to restore some of their credibility. Yet it became clear that they 
did not perceive it in this way. "Oh that was just Ivor being Ivor!"
Yet the issue was not perceived in exactly this way by Dick Rumens. He 
interjected to stop the hilarity.
"No, we must watch this because it means, really, we're not doing what 
we said we'd do. So there is a serious side to that. You know, if it 
is brought up here we must ensure that a satisfactory answer is given".
This can be viewed in two ways. On the one hand, in the late Vic 
Feather's terms, he is 'giving the other side the bus fare home'. As 
Ivor was unable to force his point or arguments home, Dick responds by 
acknowledging the seriousness and importance of the complaint. Secondly 
it may be suggested that he is seeking to preserve the effectiveness of
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the committee. This will be explored later. It emerged later in an 
interview with Geoff Reid that there was another reason behind the 
unwillingness of management to solve at least part of Ivor’s heating 
problem. The area concerned was a Portakabin store.
"So we tried to avoid putting in some form of heating into that area 
because, bear in mind, that it was in fact purely a carry-over store. 
It wasn't something that you had to go in there ideally and sit and 
do your paperwork. You just went in there, picked the jobs off the 
shelf and you brought them back and put them into your area where you 
worked. So we tended to try and avoid putting heating into this big 
metal box. Because if we had have done, we felt that he would have 
probably sort of gone in there and ... well ... you never know 
(in a low voice)".
6.4.5 The transformative capacity of the parties
The obvious point to emerge from our examination of some of the issues 
which arose at the Works Committee is that it was management who were 
able to achieve their objectives through the exercise of transformative 
capacity. However, that power was based not directly upon physical 
resources but much more so upon linguistic resources. Management 
achieved their desired result on all the issues described above. On 
some, such as the moving of the date of the Annual Wage Review and 
the Extended Leave policy this is perhaps not surprising. On the cases 
of the holiday entitlement and the heating in the stores, it is perhaps 
more surprising but still understandable. It can be seen as a 
reflection of managerial dominance. A dominance which is reproduced 
within Bestobell Mobrey hegemonically by the use of ideology.
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What also emerges from this analysis is the weakness of the worker 
representatives in terms of interactive negotiation skills. Hence 
even when they have a set of good legitimising arguments they fail to 
exploit them around the Works Committee table. Several deficiencies 
have been noted. Firstly there was generally an inadequate level of 
issue rehearsal in Agenda meetings and the arguments identified and 
rehearsed often failed to materialise. Secondly, too many representatives 
spoke on any one issue. This degree of interaction combined with a lack 
of knowledge of the major legitimising principles often led to the 
worker side being sidetracked from the issue at hand.
Finally the transformative capacity of management can be seen to be 
based upon the degree of acceptance of managerial authority by the 
workforce. On several issues management were simply able to assert 
managerial prerogative and this was not challenged to any great extent 
by the worker representatives. The only exception to this pattern was 
the case of 'Dick's Rocket'. Thus the dominance of management on the 
structural and ideological level is reflected in their success in 
exercising transformative capacity and this success, in turn, rein­
forces their dominant position.
6.5 The hegemony of management
From observational and other evidence gathered during the research 
study, I wish to argue that the management at Bestobell Mobrey during 
this period pursued a strategy of hegemonic domination. As we have 
seen this was pursued on many occasions purposively by the management. 
However as the 'right to manage' and 'managerial prerogative' are 
'taken-for-granted' in the managerial philosophy there is a sense in 
which this strategy or 'line' was unconsciously pursued. More 
specifically I will seek to suggest that this hegemony took a
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particular form and was operated and perpetrated by particular members 
of the management team. The particular 'brand' of hegemony in operation 
in Bestobell Mobrey is probably best illustrated in Chapter 4 by 
Goldman and Van Houterfs notion of the. 'hegemony of bureaucratic 
procedure' and Friedman's concept of 'responsible autonomy'. The 
members of management responsible for this hegemonic domination were 
Keith Mackney and Dick Rumens.
In order to understand the nature and form of this hegemony it is 
necessary to trace the history of its development. Both Keith Mackney 
and Dick Rumens were relatively new to their respective posts at 
the beginning of the research study. Keith was new to the company, 
having arrived from EMI where he was Personnel Manager for a small 
production unit. The background in EMI was, of course, completely 
different from Bestobell Mobrey, being fully unionised and with a 
fairly sophisticated set of personnel policies and procedures. As 
Keith described it,
"The environment's completely different because you had procedures which 
you followed, quite closely defined ones. And you were getting the 
'line' all the time from the central personnel function".
Upon arriving at Bestobell Mobrey, Keith suffered what he described as 
'culture shock'. The company was non-unionised and underdeveloped in 
terms of policies and procedures. From what evidence is available it 
appears that there was a fair degree of unrest among the workforce and 
in response to this, and the threat of unionisation, Keith's predecessor 
had established the Works and Staff Committee systems. By the time 
Keith arrived the Works Committee was dominated, on the worker side, 
by a group of skilled workers including the Batchmatic operators and
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led by Jan Arends. Dick, on the other hand, had previously worked 
in Mobrey in charge of purchasing and stock control and before that 
in Bestobell Seals.
One of the major points to strike the outside observer about Bestobell 
Mobrey was the rapid increase in the number of formal rules, policies 
and procedures in recent years. It may be suggested that this increase 
in rule-making activity formed part of a wider strategy of 'incorpor­
ation*. Rules are, of course, mechanisms of control. They lay down 
prescribed behaviours and, to the extent that they are legitimised, 
they serve to control the workforce. Several points need to be made 
about the use of rules in Bestobell Mobrey. Firstly, formal rules, 
policies and procedures, tended to be introduced in situations where 
'informal' rules had lost their effectiveness and where management 
needed to regain lost control. Perhaps an example of this would be 
the introduction of the Extended Leave Policy. Secondly, management 
tended to stress in Works Committee discussions that the rules were 
absolute and could not be 'bent' even in special circumstances. Two 
relatively minor incidents can be used to demonstrate this point. A 
rule had been established that each employee in the Production area 
was entitled to a £9 allowance each year towards the cost of a pair 
of safety shoes. After a couple of years the worker representatives 
began to argue that as shoes in different departments wore out at 
different rates (some departments using acids for example), the 
allowance should be paid and not annually, but upon the wearing out 
of the individual's shoes. This could be as short a period as six 
months or as long as eighteen months or more. Thus it was argued that 
this would not result in an overall increase in costs. However, 
management resisted this proposal vigorously arguing that the rule was
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inflexible and could not be changed. Similarly there was a rule that 
if dental appointments were booked in company time then wages would be 
deducted for the amount of time absent. One case occurred where an 
employee was requested by management to transfer from his 2 pm to 
10 pm shift to work a twelve hour shift from 6 am to 6 pm as a favour 
to help them out of a production problem. As a result his 10 am 
dental appointment was now in company time. Despite remonstrations, 
management refused to 'bend' the rule and insisted that wages would be 
deducted for the dental visit. When the representatives argued that 
this was unfair because the shift change was to suit managements 
interests, management simply replied by stating that the rules could 
not be broken.
Both of these issues were relatively minor and in both cases management 
could have conceded at little or no cost to the company. However, it 
appeared that management were attempting to establish the inflexibility 
of rules as a point of principle which could then be used later as a 
legitimising argument to preserve managerial authority. As Keith 
suggested in a later interview,
"Having set up these rules, which are agreed rules on both sides, you 
do really have to stick to them, because if you don't, it's like 
anything you start breaking down the rules and they cease to be rules".
Implicit in this statement is an argument about the legitimacy of rules. 
Keith repeatedly refers to the jointly agreed nature of some rules 
which gives them their legitimacy. He also argues that some rules 
gain their legitimacy from their consistency of application and their 
fairness.
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"... in particular here it's a question of fairness. You have to be 
seen to be scrupulously fair and if you start making exceptions you 
start becoming unfair".
Despite their public insistence upon the inflexibility of rules, 
management often ’bent’ their own, or jointly agreed, rules when it 
suited their purposes. If these transgressions went unnoticed or did 
not really affect the workforce materially then they did not surface 
at the Works Committee. There were, however, several instances of 
worker representatives raising cases of the managerial transgression 
of rules. Thus, as we have already seen, on two occasions the worker 
representatives pointed out that management had broken their own 
policy on the internal advertising of vacancies. On another occasion 
they exposed a management failure to follow their own dismissal 
procedure correctly. Finally, in the Works Committee meeting in 
March 1979 there was a clash over a management transgression of the 
rules regarding working hours and shift times. This paradox of the 
insistence on the sanctity of rules on the one hand and managerial 
transgression on the other hand was put to Dick Rumens.
Dick "I agree"
PK "It’s a valid comment?"
Dick "(Laughs) It is valid"
PK "It seemed to me to be valid"
Dick "Well it is, that's a fact of life"
Rules played a major part in the process of social control within 
Bestobell Mobrey. Most nascent rules were passed through the Works 
Committee system for approval. However, rules only have efficiency to
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the extent that they are legitimised. In Bestobell Mobrey many rules 
derived their legitimacy, other supporting arguments apart, from their 
origins in management hierarchy. Thus some rules are simply legitimised 
by managerial authority and prerogative. Since management are organised 
hierarchically it is reasonable for workers to assume that rules, 
policies and procedures which originate from the upper echelons have 
the requisite managerial authority and are thus legitimate and natural. 
In Bestobell Mobrey many of the issues which come before the Works 
Committee were in fact rules dictated by management and were not jointly 
agreed with the worker representatives but were imposed upon them. 
Examples would include the holiday issue, the moving of the Annual 
Review date and the Extended Leave Policy. In only one of these 
cases was managerial legitimacy seriously challenged.
Some rules, however, do gain their legitimacy from their jointly 
agreed origins. Indeed, the creation of the works committee system 
can be seen as a move towards joint regulation. Yet very little joint 
regulation on serious issues ever occurred in the Works Committee.
Thus it may be suggested that in certain situations the move from 
unilateral to joint regulation may represent an increase rather than a 
decline in managerial authority and domination. We can therefore 
argue that the management at Bestobell Mobrey, and in particular Keith 
Mackney and Dick Rumens, pursued a deliberate policy of incorporation 
via the Works Committee system. By persuading the workforce that they 
were participating in the rule making process they were regaining 
control. We can now consider the evidence for this assertion.
Bestobell Mobrey had a very large number of joint management - employee 
committees for an organisation of its size. There were, of course, the 
two major committees, the Works Committee and the Staff Committee.
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In addition, during the course of the research a Canteen Committee 
was created as a result of a proposal by Keith Mackney. This consisted 
of two works representatives, two staff representatives, two members 
of the Canteen staff and two members of management. Also in existence 
during the research study were the Job Evaluation Committee (see 
Minute 84) and the Suggestion Committee (see Minute 174).
Not only were there a large number of committees but their structure 
was tightly controlled by the management. For example, management 
controlled the size of the Works Committee. As we have already seen, 
on several occasions, and for different reasons, the worker representa­
tives proposed increasing the number of negotiating members. This 
was always rejected totally by either Keith Mackney or Dick Rumens.
Thus, Dick argued that,
"there is no way that we could have a negotiating committee or a body 
of people the size of this committee to negotiate".
As Keith argued,
".... normally a negotiating party is not more than two. It’s quite 
often two. Two is certainly the number which I'm familiar with. But 
three is the optimum number ..."
Indeed this management position on the size of the negotiating member­
ship was so strong and rehearsed that during one meeting it had humorous 
consequences. In the Works Committee meeting in April 1980, Ray, the 
consultative member for the Penn Works (a small ancillary production 
unit some miles from the Slough site), raised the problem of the general 
lack of involvement of workers at Penn in the consultative committee 
system. Jan Arends, (who had raised the question of an extra negotiating
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representative for shift-workers) agreed with Ray and proposed that 
Ray be given an existing negotiating member as a direct contact in an 
effort to improve communications. Keith Mackney appeared completely 
to misunderstand the proposal because he launched immediately into 
his customary defence of the three man negotiation team. Dick was 
forced to interrupt and point out that an increase was not being 
suggested and that, indeed, the proposal was eminently sensible.
Secondly management controlled the composition of the committee and 
the roles of its members. It was Keith Mackney who had introduced 
the format of negotiating and consultative members in what was in 
essence a two tier committee. Peter Botell suggested that the reason 
for this change had been to disrupt the influence on the committee at 
that time enjoyed by Jan Arends and the Batchmatic operators. Keith 
Mackney was also in the habit of defining the roles to be played by 
the worker representatives. He used to remind the negotiating members 
that they represented the whole plant and not just a particular 
sectional interest. He would also take every available opportunity to 
outline the way in which he saw the system of consultation operating. 
Thus he repeatedly pointed out that the negotiating members should 
feed information back to the consultative members who should disseminate 
it to their respective workgroups. For example in one Works Committee 
meeting, Keith stated,
"...now what should be happening is what seems to be happening in some 
areas ... You should be feeding your representatives with what they 
should be saying to us. We then give them our replies and feed it 
back to you. And with that chain working, you can get the information 
out to the works at large, to the people you represent".
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Similarly in the Committee meeting in May 1980 Keith took the 
opportunity of a health and safety issue to reiterate the powers and 
duties of members of the committee in their roles as health and safety 
representatives and to encourage them to make a positive contribution 
and thus ensure that the committee 'worked'.
One of the results of this managerial control of the Committee structure 
was a certain degree of confusion amongst the worker representatives. 
Several times they raised questions about the roles that they were 
supposed to be fulfilling. Perhaps the best illustrations and 
evidence of this confusion are provided by the following extracts from 
Works Committee minutes.
"The representatives felt their role had not been clearly defined and 
in fact they had been unable to negotiate changes which management had 
implemented during the last 12 months. The Personnel Manager said that 
it was his understanding that the Committee members present had 
negotiation rights on all items which came before the Committee and 
gave examples of items which had been resolved by negotiation".
(Minute 88 Negotiating Members)
"The Chairman said that the role of Consultative Members had been 
clearly established when the constitution for the new committee 
was established in 1977. The Consultative members drew the Chairman's 
attention to certain incidents which they felt had been dealt with by 
Management and the negotiating members without full consultation with 
the Consultative Members".
(Minute 116 Role of Consultative Members)
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Another reflection of the desire of the management at Bestobell Mobrey 
to create the impression of joint regulation and participation in 
decision making was the use of ballots to decide minor issues. The 
following are some examples taken from the Works Committee minutes.
"The Assembly representatives proposed a change in the duration of the 
lunch break to facilitate early finishing on Fridays. It was 
decided that proposals would be put forward reflecting the various 
alternatives suggested by representatives and a ballot would be 
arranged at a future date. However, any change to working hours would 
need to be agreed by a substantial majority (75%) of the employees 
affected ..."
(Minute 57 Change of Working Hours)
"The representatives said that they were still concerned that they had 
not fully appreciated the holiday arrangements and proposed that a 
ballot of all employees be organised to establish employee acceptance
The Managing Director said that he understood that the Staff Committee 
would also wish for a ballot and he would discuss this with them at 
their next meeting. It was subsequently agreed at the Staff Committee 
to hold a ballot on the holiday arrangements".
(Minute 59 May Day Bank Holiday)
"The Chairman said that arrangements had not yet been made to ballot 
employees on a change in their hours, but this would be arranged in the 
near future".
(Minute 60 Change in Working Hours)
"The Chairman said that a ballot on the possibility of re-arranging 
working hours in all Production areas (.including Penn works) would
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shortly be arranged".
(Minute 86 Change of Hours)
It will be noted from these examples that ballots were generally 
confined to non-contentious issues such as preferences over holiday 
arrangements. For rule changes or issues where management desired a 
specific objective, ballots were not considered and other strategies 
were adopted.
Management appeared very concerned to demonstrate to the worker 
representatives that the committee system was taken seriously by them 
and was important. We have already seen how, in the case of Ivor's 
heating, Dick Rumens was quick to intervene and preserve the serious­
ness of the committee, even if no action was ever intended to be taken. 
Similarly in another Committee meeting the worker representatives 
raised the problem of the lack of first aid cover on the night shift 
and the associated safety implications. Keith Mackney immediately 
halted the meeting and from a telephone in the conference room contacted 
the ambulance centre and medical centre on the trading estate to 
ascertain their hours of operation. This apparent concern was not 
translated into action, however, and the shift was allowed to run on 
for two months without any first aid cover whereupon it was withdrawn. 
Finally in another meeting Peter Dormer, at the time a negotiating 
member, complained that he had arranged an interview with Geoff Reid 
to sort out a problem and had been kept waiting for hours and was 
ultimately never seen. He used this as an opportunity to argue that 
management were not taking the worker representatives or the committee 
itself seriously. This was quickly refuted by Keith Mackney and Dick 
Rumens who apologised for the incident.
- 372 -
Towards the end of the research study the above arguments were put to 
some of the managers involved in a series of extended interviews.
^Vhen questioned about the plethora of committees, Keith Mackney 
responded,
"I think there was also the feeling that if you didn't give the sort 
of rights that they might have had if they'd had a trade union, then 
we would have had a trade union in the company ... Not that, in fact, 
having discussed it with Graham Woodhead, the Managing Director, 
there would be any objectives to having a trade union in the company.
We are quite open about the fact that we don't care if we do or if we 
don't. Except that the workforce as a whole seem to be against union 
membership. And the fact that the recent campaigns by some of the 
trade unions have failed abysmally indicates that. And it was felt 
that if they haven't got a trade union then maybe they ought to at 
least have the facilities that they would have if they had one ... 
and so the thing is very much kept in house".
Thus, despite the hasty contradiction, it would appear that the Works 
Committee system is in part a defence against unionisation. If a 
company wishes to prevent union encroachment then it needs to provide 
both the substantive and procedural benefits that unionisation might 
bring for the workforce. Thus the Works Committee system can be 
seen as an attempt to provide a procedural channel for worker aspirations 
in that direction. On the substantive side Bestobell Mobrey also 
adopted a policy of paying terms and conditions above the national 
and local averages (although in terms of holidays this deteriorated 
during the period as we have seen). Keith Mackney was not the only 
manager to advance this view of the rationale behind the Works Committee. 
As Geoff Reid argued,
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"For many years the people within the company have had a Works 
Committee set up and I don't think they've ever considered getting 
themselves organised from a union point of view".
This view was endorsed by Peter Botell who went on to suggest that the 
strategy would be successful in the future.
"... And I think that management will be able to keep the union out so 
long as it goes along with national agreements and keeps pace with 
salaries".
If this was the function of the Committee system as a whole, what were 
the purposes of the meetings themselves? Keith Mackney argued that 
when he first arrived the Works and Staff Committees,
"tended to be more consultative organisations rather than negotiating 
ones ... They had been set up for the free flow of information. It 
was a method of communication".
Geoff Reid described the system of Works Committee meetings as follows;
"Well I think to a large extent it's a very, very useful tool for 
communication. ... And of course, communication leads to 
consultation ... It gives people the opportunity to raise through 
their members all the little bits and pieces that probably they might 
not have the confidence to raise with their supervision".
Peter Botell suggested that the Works Committee system existed to 
provide "a communication medium between management and employees".
Thus the management at Bestobell Mobrey involved in this area saw the 
system as being based upon communication and consultation. Keith 
Mackney was quick to point out that he had started the system of 
negotiating members on the works committee but this had not been
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extended to the «Staff Committee.
"We do talk salary packages to them ... and we do take notice of their
comments ... but it is not in a negotiating way. It is in the role
of a consultative committee. Whereas we actually negotiate to read 
a point with the Works Committee, we don't with the Staff Committee. 
We tell them, we listen to their feedback and maybe even adjust the 
final figure. But it's not a negotiating figure. They have no right 
to expect a joint approach on this".
The explanation offered for this difference in approach was the 
reluctance of staff to be 'bargained about'. Thus Keith argued that 
while the works were 'collective' in orientation the staff were 
'individualist'.
Thus Bestobell Mobrey saw the Works Committee as comprising communi­
cation, consultation and some negotiation. But what form of consul­
tation was it? Was it 'open' consultation on the one hand or 'pseudo­
consultation' on the other? Peter Botell appeared to suggest that it 
was the latter when he argued that,
"It is consultation while hopefully steering them down the line you
want".
Others including Geoff Reid and Dick Rumens agreed with that view.
Dick argued that consultation did occur but significantly not on large 
issues. He also stated that if consultation is to be taken seriously 
it needs to be worked at by both sides. It is perhaps worth quoting 
Dick's arguments at some length.
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"I mean we didn't consult them about going to Swindon (referring to 
the opening of a new production unit). You could argue that it was 
wrong not to do so. They would have a bigger role if ... I don't 
know which way round to put this one ... If both sides were to take 
it much more seriously. Say on things like productivity. I mean 
there are a whole lot of matters that should be discussed in it 
that don't get discussed in it. I mean, even when I took over they 
never used to publish any figures. I mean I regularly produced all 
the numbers because I think they ought to know what the numbers are.
... If you don't tell them the numbers they're not going to ask for 
them. If you tell them they might take an interest. Like anything 
else, unless you tell people things they're not going to ask; they're 
not motivated to ask".
From this it may be suggested that the consultation at Bestobell Mobrey 
was largely 'pseudo' consultation designed to create the impression 
that the views of the workforce were being taken into account. It 
can also be classified as being largely an information channel.
Dick's description of the Works Committee can be easily juxtaposed with 
the views of Clegg and Dunkerley (1980). Discussing consultation and 
participation they suggest that,
"... what is lost by management hierarchically will be more than 
gained hegemonically to the extent that 'interest' is generally 
attached to the profitability of the enterprise". (1980: 516)
Thus Dick argues that at present 'real' consultation does not exist 
in Bestobell Mobrey. One move toward such consultation would involve 
the provision of more information for the worker representatives so 
that they could appreciate the 'true' picture. Thus, in conversation, 
Dick largely saw the role of the Works Committee as an 'educative' one.
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What about the joint agreement argument so dear to Keith Mackney?
I asked Dick to what extent the workers actually negotiated or 
participated in decision making through the mechanism of the Works 
Committee.
"I think there is some, but I think it is done on the basis of making 
them feel that they're participating. I think you know the result 
you want, you see."
Thus the Works Committee was seen as a body designed to gain agreement 
to management proposals or managerially imposed rules.
Management were also concerned about the type and level of issues 
being discussed by the Works Committee.
Keith "There was a lot of time spent in the earlier meetings when 
I first joined this company which really revolved around 
the classic tea and toilets syndrome ... I think the quality 
of debate has improved considerably (since then). I think 
that on the other hand the agenda has become shorter so that 
the items raised are ones which are generally more important".
Geoff Reid, on the other hand, was not so optimistic in his reading of 
the level of the issues.
"Most of the issues are important to the people who raise them but, in 
actual fact, in stature, they're fairly small".
The fact that the structure of the committee was not jointly agreed 
but was fairly tightly controlled by management was fed back to 
individual managers for comment. Keith Mackney agreed that this was 
the case, arguing that it was necessary to give stability to the system.
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He summed up his position as follows;
"So, you know, management really have to take a lead in structures of
this nature. And that's exactly what we have done".
Dick on the other hand suggested that the consecution of the committee 
could be changed if anyone came up with some ideas. I therefore put 
to him the idea of an extra negotiating member as previously suggested 
by the committee members. Dick was unable to accept this idea.
"No, well I wouldn't agree with that. I'd never agree with that".
In this more adamant line he was supported by Keith Mackney who stated 
that,
"unless there's good reason to change the structure I won't do it". 
Indeed as Keith said later,
"We are telling them how to operate . . . They look to us ... to s t e ^
them in the right direction".
For example management had st^ared them in the direction of a system 
of negotiating members and consultative members in an effort to reduce 
the power of Jan Arends and the Batchmatic operators. As Peter Botell 
stated,
"His ascendency has diminished as we've gone away from one type of 
committee member".
I suggested to Keith Mackney that he appeared to be very concerned both 
in actions and words to ensure the continuation and 'success' of the 
Works Committee system. His reply confirmed my interpretation.
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"I'm totally, well in fact, the Management Team here generally are 
totally committed to this approach ... Really I think the main 
objective is to be seen to be on one side rather than to have two 
sides".
In order to ensure the success of the committee, Keith argued that it 
was important to get small problems resolved in order to give the 
worker representatives some 'credit' to take away from the meetings.
"There are certain items which came up and we think, "Oh God, yes" 
and we do it before the meeting. Which is probably not the best way 
of doing it but at least it's seen to be done and its something which 
the Works Committee can claim credit for, in that they have achieved 
something in that month".
Finally there appeared to be a reasonable consensus amongst the 
management regarding the lack of negotiating skill exhibited by the 
worker representatives. Peter Botell decribed them as follows;
"They don't know really the way to negotiate ... They have fair 
limitations in their ability to understand what we're saying and also 
in their ability to be able to put things forward clearly and 
concisely".
Keith Mackney agreed that their lack of skill often led to digressions 





Attention can now be focused upon the objectives and possible 
achievements of this thesis. What, then, has emerged from the 
investigation of power processes within Bestobell Mobrey Limited?
What new insights might have been generated regarding the operation 
of power? To what extent does the alternative model of power presented 
here enable a clearer understanding of the complex and interrelated 
processes of power within workplace industrial relations? An attempt 
can now be made to answer these questions by means of a summary of 
this work. In doing this the artificially separated strands of theory 
and field research data will be re-united.
It may be suggested that from the examination and analysis of the 
processes of power in Bestobell Mobrey and from the analysis of the 
lacunas and omissions in the existing literature has emerged an 
alternative model of power, which, although preliminary, offers several 
advantages and new insights. (See Figure 7.1). Firstly, it recognises 
that power exists in different forms at each of the different levels 
of social life. Power can, of course, be exercised to achieve 
individual objectives and goals but it also rests in the very structure 
of organisations. As we have already seen, previous theories and models 
of power tended to be concentrated upon only one facet of power. Some 
merely considered power in terms of behaviour and ability to use force 
or control resources. Others focused solely upon the power located 
within the structures of society (Cf Poulantzas 1969, 1973). Yet power 
does not have to be only one of these alternatives. Power does not 
exist solely on the level of action or on the level of structure. The 
model advanced in this work transcends this restrictive duality of 
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It enables the diverse theories of power to be encompassed within a 
single dynamic model. Power can be seen to operate at each level of 
social life; action, mediation and structure. Some typologies of 
power have, of course, focused upon the level of mediation. Such 
typologies classify power in relation to the 'resource base' which 
generated it. Yet such typologies fail to demonstrate the ways in 
which resource bases are mobilised and power exercised or explain the 
a priori distribution of the structure of resources. These defects 
are remedied in the alternative model of power presented in this thesis.
Secondly, the model draws attention to the ideological and normative 
elements of power. For example, it highlights the use of linguistic 
resources both as means of mobilising power and as forms of power in 
their own right. This thesis is, of course, centrally concerned with 
power in the field of industrial relations. In this context, the 
model enables the traditional static bargaining theory view of power 
as a product of physical resources, costs of disagreement, deprivations 
and sanctions to be linked to the more processual study of negotiation. 
The normative element of the model enables the relationship between 
rules, as the output of an industrial relations system, and power (a 
relationship tentatively, but rather vaguely, sketched by Dunlop 1958) 
to be more clearly expressed and understood.
Thirdly, the model demonstrates the centrality of power to the processes 
of social life and in particular to the process of social interaction. 
Fourthly, it suggests that what is immediately and directly observable 
is only one part of the power process and structure. As Clegg has 
remarked, the insights that the existing literature.
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"can obtain are on the surface level of appearances, on power as 
manifested in the outcomes of particular exchanges". (1975: 54)
Such theories ignore the "'deep structure' of these appearances".
(1975: 54). Finally it is hoped that the model enables the processual 
nature of power in organisations and the workplace to be more clearly 
examined and understood.
From direct observation of the Works Committee system; from interviews 
and conversations, from documentary evidence, and from analysis, it 
became apparent that Bestobell Mobrey management enjoyed a position of 
dominance over their workforce. In Giddens' terms, Bestobell Mobrey was 
characterised by an "asymmetry of resources" (1979: 93) with management 
occupying the favourable position. Domination can, of course, consist 
of economic subjugation or ideological hegemony. It has been suggested 
that management at Bestobell Mobrey were in a position of economic 
domination over the workforce. However, the economic dominance of a 
single management group in a specific workplace or organisation cannot 
be examined in isolation because it is, at least in part, a reflection 
of a more general system of domination existing in the economic system 
and the wider society. Thus Bestobell Mobrey cannot be divorced from the 
context of the environment which impinges directly upon it. As Benson 
has argued,
"People produce a social world which stands over them, constraining 
their actions. The production of social structure, then, occurs 
within a social structure". (1977b: 3)
The construction of economic domination within Bestobell Mobrey is not 
novel but is partly the reproduction of the existing social structure. 
Yet some theorists have attempted to analyse power within organisations 
without reference to the environment in which they operate.
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An example would be the Strategic Contingencies theory. It may be 
suggested that this is a large theoretical omission. Indeed Benson 
has argued that the,
"conventional separation between organisation and environment must be 
critically examined. The essential continuity, the relational 
character of social life must be analysed and not overlooked in the 
search for analytical boundaries and units of analysis. The processes 
through which such conventional boundaries are produced and sustained 
must be pursued. The interests and power relations on which the 
conventional boundaries rest must be examined". (1977b: 9)
Thus the system of relationships between employer and employee in a 
specific instance cannot be divorced from the more general relationships 
between capital and labour as collectivities in the wider society.
We have seen, from the radical and marxist perspectives, that this 
relationship between capital and labour is an antagonistic exchange 
relationship characterised by asymmetrical distribution of resources. 
This system of 'pure* economic domination is reflected in specific 
forms in individual firms and workplaces. It is manifested in terms 
of managerial style. Thus one could, to a certain extent, infer the 
existence of such domination from the presence of 'direct control' 
strategies or the use of unrestrained managerial prerogative. As we 
have seen from the research data, the management at Bestobell Mobrey 
frequently resorted to assertions of managerial prerogative in order 
to achieve their own objectives in relation to a particular issue. An 
example of this was provided by the managerial removal of a custom and 
practice holiday differential.
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We have suggested that the Bestobell Mobrey management were also in 
a position of ideological domination over the workforce, created, in 
part, by the pursuance of hegemonic strategies. It was argued, for 
example, that both the emergence of formal rules and procedures and 
the creation and manipulation of a system of worker consultation and 
negotiation were evidence of, and manifestation of, this managerial 
hegemony. The first of these manifestations parallels Goldman and 
Van Houten's (1977) notion of the hegemony of bureaucratic procedure 
where rules and procedures are used as instruments of social control.
The second manifestation can be seen as a superficial attempt to share 
power while in fact retaining, and perhaps even increasing, control.
As Clegg and Dunkerley (1980) have clearly noted such systems are,
"clearly intended to change the surface structure of power relationsips 
between management and labour whilst leaving the underlying structure of 
social relationships and hegemony intact. Indeed, what is lost by 
management hierarchically will be more than gained hegemonically, to 
the extent that 'interest' is generally attached to the profitability 
of the enterprise". (1980: 516)
Again it has been widely suggested that the hegemony of a particular 
management, or group of managers, is inextricably linked to, and is 
in part a reflection of, the wider ideology or value system of the 
dominant class.
As we have already seen, domination consists of an asymmetry of resources 
which are located at the level of mediation. These resources are 
drawn upon and utilised to achieve 'transformative capacity' or the 
ability to intervene in a series of events so as to alter their course 
to one's own advantage.
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At the same time such resources reinforce the structure of domination.
It was also suggested that there were two types of resources; physical 
resources and linguistic resources. Given our initial assertion about 
managerial domination we would expect the management to enjoy a 
superiority of both types of resource. While this was indeed the case, 
it was noted that, in terms of physical resources or power bases, the 
workforce could have had significant power, yet these power bases were 
not utilised. Perhaps this is not surprising, given the asymmetry of 
ideological resources comprising the hegemony of management. This 
gave them the ability to control the issue 'agenda* and, perhaps more 
importantly, to shape the values and attitudes of the worker represen­
tatives in such a way as to prevent them considering the utilisation 
of their power bases. Thus the workforce and their representatives 
at Bestobell Mobrey were 'blinkered' and thus unable to identify 
alternatives to the present structure of power. As Brown has argued,
"Members of such organisations are limited to mundane experience as it 
is predefined largely by the official categories of that system ...
In such systems the determinants of action are not freely accessible 
to the consciousness of the actors; they must act instead under 
intentions formed behind their backs". (1978: 372)
Similarly Golding has described how the structure of domination remains 
elusive to those subject to it.
"In the way that 'control' and those 'in control', remained elusive to 
'K' (in Kafka's The Castle), so the structure of domination remains 
elusive to the employees of the Electrical Contracting Company". (1979:175)
In the case of Bestobell Mobrey it may be argued that, whilst the worker 
representatives were vaguely aware of the resource and power imbalance, 
they were unable to conceptualise, articulate or directly confront on a
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sustained basis, this dominancy.
What, perhaps, characterised Bestobell Mobrey most of all was the way 
in which the utilisation of linguistic resources predominated. Both 
management and, to a lesser extent, worker representatives, used 
legitimising arguments and principles. As Armstrong et al have 
pointed out, in,
"any cultural setting there are certain acceptable motives for action 
(what we will call 'legitimising principles') which are, in turn, 
embedded in the characteristic world view (ideology) of that culture". 
(1981: 36)
The legitimising arguments and principles of management were generally 
powerful because they were derived from what might be termed the 
'dominant value system'.(See Parkin 1972). Thus these legitimising 
arguments were based upon principles such as 'managerial prerogative' 
which is largely 'taken-for-granted' in industrial organisations. 
Obviously these managerial arguments and principles gained further 
effect due to the extent to which the 'dominant value system' was 
internalised by the worker representatives and the workforce. The 
worker representatives also, on occasion, employed fairly powerful 
legitimising arguments and principles to support their objectives in 
relation to an issue. However their arguments and principles also 
were drawn from the dominant value system or from what might be termed 
'consensual norms or values'.
While legitimising arguments and principles are generally used as a 
resource to enable the exercise of transformative capacity, there is a 
sense in which they can be a substitute for power as transformative 
capacity. As Armstrong et al have argued,
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"Considerations of legitimisation shape the issues on which power 
is deployed and the tactical deployment of legitimising arguments 
may also serve as a partial substitute for the exercise of power 
itself". (1981: 48)
Indeed it may be argued that the management at Bestobell Mobrey 
preferred to use legitimising arguments strategically rather than 
deploy their other power resources. This created the partial impression 
of a power balance while at the same time concealing the structure of 
domination.
At the level of action the exercise of transformative capacity was 
directly observed and recorded. As we have see the management 'won', 
or gained their objectives, on each of the major issues that were 
discussed in the Works Committee. This occurred even in issues where 
the balance of linguistic resources favoured the worker representatives. 
This imbalance of ability to exercise transformative capacity reflected 
the asymmetry of resources and the dominance of management. Managements 
superiority in transformative capacity was a function of several factors, 
Firstly, it can be explained by the degree to which the notion of 
'managerial prerogative' had permeated the 'culture' of the organisation 
and the 'consciousness' of the workforce. Secondly, it was due to the 
superior negotiating skill exhibited by the members of the Works 
Committee, and to take the obverse to the inability of the worker 
representatives to translate legitimising arguments into a clear and 
coherent rhetoric. Finally, one also has to take into account the 
ability of management to manipulate the agenda as well as the divisions 
which existed within the worker ranks in terms of both interest and 
negotiating skill.
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Having considered transformative capacity, resources and domination 
we can now turn our attention to the ideological elements of power. 
Following Golding (1979), one can argue that the principles of 
’managerial prerogative’ or ’sovereignty of management’ have an 
important symbolic purpose in industrial organisations. Thus, as 
Giddens has argued, to examine the ideological aspects of such 
symbolic orders,
"... is to examine how structures of signification are mobilised to 
legitimate the sectional interests of hegemonic groups". (1979: 188).
As far as Bestobell Mobrey is concerned v/e have seen how one group of 
managers attempted (with great success) to inculcate an ideology by 
use of legitimising principles expressed in various rhetorics in 
order to legitimate their dominancy. Thus the relevant members of 
management shared a common ideology upon which rested a number of 
legitimising arguments and principles including notions of ’managerial 
prerogative’, superior managerial competence, profitability and the 
need for efficiency. These arguments and principles were then 
articulated in the form of different rhetorics during the course of 
the Works Committee meetings observed. On these occasions, whereas 
the management exhibited a reasonable degree of proficiency in 
articulating their principles, the worker representatives, in many 
instances failed to translate their legitimising arguments into a 
successful rhetoric. This is perhaps predictable given the inequality 
of ideological resources available to the two sides. As Armstrong et 
al have pointed out,
"Whereas managerial ideology comprises a relatively coherent body of 
thought, comprehensively expressive of management interests, this is 
far from the case with the fragmentary counter - ideology available to
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the workers. Whereas managers can justify their actions, at least 
to themselves and often to workers as well, by citing the principles 
of managerial prerogative and profitability, either of which will 
justify virtually any rule change, workers must ordinarily make use 
of legitimising principles which are relatively specific". (1981: 43)
It is important to note that almost all of the legitimising arguments 
or principles employed by the worker representatives at Bestobell 
Mobrey were either derived from elements of managerial ideology itself 
or from consensual principles such as precedent or consistency. For, 
as Armstrong et al have suggested, if,
"... managers continually justify their positions and action in such 
terms, it is not surprising that workers should eventually use them 
(in conjunction with their own conception of what is fair) for their 
own purposes". (1981: 101)
None of the legitimising arguments or principles employed by the worker 
representatives were built upon elements of a radical value system 
which would thus challenge the domination of management. Such 
'resistance principles' would,
"... do rather more than set specific limits to the scope of managerial 
prerogative. In fact they (would) confront the assumptions and tenets 
of managerial ideology itself, quite systematically and over a wide 
range". (1981: 112)
Yet at Bestobell Mobrey such 'resistance principles' were conspicuous 
only by their absence. Thus we can tentatively suggest that the worker 
ideology at Bestobell Mobrey was too weak and too fragmented to provide 
the basis for its own legitimising principles and that this forced the
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worker representatives to draw their arguments from elements of 
'managerial* or 'common' value systems.
We have already seen how the worker representatives utilised consensual 
norms in order to reinforce their position on certain issues. This 
draws our attention to the normative elements of power. Both management 
and worker representatives attempted to translate legitimising 
principles into general norms of action and behaviour. Thus the 
Personnel Manager attempted to convince the worker representatives 
that no management would 'negotiate under duress' and that the maximum 
size of negotiating team that any management would deal with was three.
The purpose of establishing such norms is that they legitimise the 
position or actions of a particular group. Thus norms are drawn from 
the existing order while at the same time re-producing it. The chief 
advantage of such norms lies in the extent to which they are 'removed' 
from elements of ideology. Thus legitimising arguments and principles 
are drawn from ideologies and then translated into norms which serve 
the purpose of legitimising the ideology which produced them.
In industrial organisations such norms are often raised to the status 
of 'rules', whether formal or informal. We have seen that the creation 
of rules and their use as a managerial defence was an important phenomenon 
within Bestobell Mobrey. It has been suggested that this use of rules 
formed part of the managerial strategy of incorporation and thus 
domination. Rules gain legitimacy not only from their content (derived 
from norms and ideological elements) but also from their origin. As 
Armstrong et al have pointed out,
"The legitimacy of 'formal' rules, supportive arguments apart, resides 
largely in their origin .... Since organisations generally reserve the
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capacity to issue written rules to those fairly high in the hierarchy, 
the assumption that all written instructions have behind them the 
appropriate degree of managerial prerogative is natural". (1981:149-150)
Although, at the level of action, sanctions can be imposed to enforce 
norms or rules, this was generally not the case in Bestobell Mobrey. 
Management appeared able or willing to forsake sanctions and rely 
instead upon the 'ideological* and 'normative* weight of their 
arguments.
Any work needs to be reviewed in the context of its objectives and 
aims and in the light of the existing state of knowledge in the area.
This thesis is no exception to that rule. The thesis represents an 
attempt by an industrial relations academic and practitioner to develop 
a clearer understanding of a concept which is the central core of that 
discipline. This objective was made more difficult because, on closer 
examination, power seemed, in fact, to be a major lacuna, taken for 
granted in the existing industrial relations literature. Such theories 
that did exist were fairly narrow in scope and offered only partial 
enlightenment. Yet the more general writings of some theorists in 
industrial relations, although few in number, did appear to provide 
potential for improved insights into power and avenues for further 
research.
Research into the literature of sociology, political science and 
organisational theory served perhaps rather to confuse than to 
elucidate. No single theory or model could be found to explain the 
many facets of power. Indeed, at times the existing literature was 
contradictory. These contradictions and alternative approaches were 
identified and discussed in Chapter 1. As a result of field research
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and theoretical analysis an outline model of power was developed which 
appeared to resolve many of the problems associated with the existing 
literature. To the extent that this model provided new insights into 
power processes in the workplace it seemed to represent a small, but 
important, advance in industrial relations theory.
However it must be made clear that the model is preliminary and more 
work needs to be done in this area. The model could be developed and 
refined by further field research in the workplace and theoretical 
analysis. In particular, attention needs to be focused on several 
areas. Firstly, at some point, an attempt needs to be made to integrate 
and reunite the concept of power with the concept of consciousness.
The latter was identified earlier in this thesis and represents the 
reactions of the power subject. Thus consciousness refers to the 
reactions and perceptions of subordinated or dominated individuals 
or groups in respect of their subordination or domination. This 
concept is, of course, related to Etzioni's second usage of compliance 
as 'the orientation of the subordinated actor to the power applied'
(1961: 4) as well as to Marchington's notion of 'power realisation'.
It is possible to suggest that this consciousness would consist of 
macro and micro components. At the macro level consciousness would 
refer to the perceptions of actors or groups to the structure of the 
wider society and, as such, would link close to the voluminous 
literature on 'class images' or 'images of society'. However, perhaps 
more important for our purposes in industrial relations would be 
the micro level of consciousness. This would refer to the reactions of 
the specific individuals and groups to the particular method of 
domination in their workplace and is similar to Beynon's (1973) notion 
of a 'factory consciousness'.
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This focus on elements of consciousness would raise further ethical 
and epistemological questions and would perhaps lead the researcher 
into potentially explosive political arenas.
Should the researcher explain to management at the outset of his study 
exactly what he is seeking to examine? Should the workforce be made 
aware of the methods and processes of their domination? Should the 
researcher play a neutral or an active and committed role? On the 
epistemological side there is also the question of 'false consciousness' 
To what extent is an observer's assessment of the 'real' interests of 
a workforce valid? These questions have been generated during the 
course of the present study and remain to be answered. They would 
become even more crucially important in any future study of power and 
consciousness.
Other areas that would benefit from further study include the relation­
ship between the ideological aspects of power, especially the way in 
which rhetorics, used to articulate legitimising principles are 
derived from ideologies. Similarly attention could be focused on the 
links between rules, norms and ideologies. For despite the advances 
made and the increasing light that has been thrown upon the concept, 
the deeper recesses of power remain partly in the shadows.
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Appendix A
The operationalisation of the Marchington model at Bestobell Mobrey
In the early phase of the research an attempt was made to utilise the 
Marchington model of workgroup power and apply it to the production 
department at Bestobell Mobrey. It will be recollected that Marching­
ton argues that four major variables (workflow pervasiveness, workflow 
immediacy, substitutability and coping with uncertainty) can be used 
to measure the ’power capacity' of a workgroup. These variables can 
then be grouped into two separate factors. The first. Disruption, 
(workflow pervasiveness and immediacy) refers to the ability of a 
workgroup to halt production. This is seen as a measure of short term 
power capacity. The second Replaceability, (substitutability and coping 
with uncertainty) is related to the ability of the workgroup to increase 
indispensibility. This is taken as a measure of long term power 
capacity.
Workflow pervasiveness is measured by the number of links a workgroup 
has with other workgroups in the factory. Immediacy is obtained by an 
aggregation of inter-workgroup dependencies. Thus a positive figure 
indicates that a workgroup has X number of workgroups dependent upon 
it, whereas a negative figure indicates the reverse. Workgroup 
substitutability is measured by the time taken to find adequate 
replacements in the prevalent labour market conditions and to train 
such replacements to operational standards. Coping with uncertainty 
is judged subjectively after observation and discussion. The more a 
workgroup successfully copes with uncertainty, the more power it has.
Hickson et al, (1974), identified three coping mechanisms. First, there 
is coping by prevention (reducing the probability of the uncertainty)
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which also removes most of the power potential for the group in 
question. Secondly, there is coping by information (working out 
probabilities of uncertainties) which may be thought of as routini- 
sation. Finally, and this is the most potent, there is coping by 
absorption; in which the coping mechanism is internalised within the 
group; there is no possibility of routinisation.
As Marchington's model refers to workgroups, it was necessary to 
identify these within Bestobell Mobrey. Although the management did 
not normally consider the workforce in these terms and therefore 
detailed dis-aggregated statistics were hard to find, it was finally 
possible to identify 11 specific workgroups within the production 
area. These were as follows;
1. Goods Inward










Marchington divided his four variables into two main factors. The first 
factor is the Disruption factor. This consists of pervasiveness and 
immediacy of workflow and is concerned with the power a workgroup 
derives from being able to halt production, from its position in the 
workflow alone. Table A.1 shows the Disruption factor for the work­








Xa 44 * 00 l> T—I rH rH o 0) rH rH rH rHcU o w rH rHog
(N m m 0) in l> m in in m
* CO in t> O rH r4 t> 5>CO o o o o O 6 O o o o O
M0) ^
S <D•H (1)
-P  iH  >
03 ^44 -M +0 o a 00 rH rH CO CO O rH rH rH rH
-P  ? in 03 CMÆ 0
- P O T )
bfl -P  -Pa 3
0) f l
nQ w
< <N m t> o CO rH in CO <33a 44 H \ rH















u uo CO -p
H-> 0 05
CO ao CO
T3 rH a a 4-> 0
05 0 o 0 CO Q-p a •H X X I O A \
f l CO CO Ü O H-> 00 a 0 Cfl a 05 ■H a >» CO
G M -P 0 W) rH o Ü -P 0 rH 3
+J 05 03 o 0 o Ü X I o
Jh Cfl S •H •H •H +J 0 o a X
05 X3 X ! T3 Ü rH a a a 0 0a O O rH 0 O •H CQ a 0 u0 O 05 05 0 a o 05 a 0 CO
Q o S CO 54 s h4 o <
0 o rH














>>■p•HiH•H bûÆ cca "iH 0 X ü ü ca carH ÎH
&Bî
orH
IIl> IItP IItP CM CO rH CO IIo G) rHrH
a G fi fi fi fio 0 G fi fi fi fi o 0 O Oa •H ■H O O O 0 0 •H •H •H •H01 H-> -P •H •H ■H •H •H HH HH HH HHbJD -H ca ca ■P HH +J HH HH ca ca ca caÜ a a a fi fi a fi a a a a a
•H Oj u 0 0 fi 0 fi fi fi fi fia X o o > > o > o o o o o0 o 4H <H 0 0 01 0 01 4H 4H 4H 4Ho 0 a G U fi X! fi X fi fi fi fis HH t-H a a < a < HH M HH HH
%4H +J
0 fl 0 0 0
•H bC X3 XI bû bO0 ca ca > > b£ > bO ca ca >0 -p O u o 0 •H o •H O fi fi Ou u XI 0 X3 X K XI X XI 0 0 XIbù 0 > > >0 U < < <a a3
tiB 01 CO 01 01 01 CO 01 01 CO 01C a; a; fi fi fi fi fi fi X fi ca
•H 0 0 ca ca ca ca ca ca 0 o ca Xq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 HH 0 0
•H a >» >, >» >» >> >» > >> 0ca -iH a >JH -p TP tP co co 00 tP tP CO TP fi mH rH rH rH CMrH rH
-pü0 ^a 0)0 0 a;0 8 0 CD CO CM CM 00 CM CO tP tP tP COca -H 0 lO in en CMrH +J >a005
0 XIU üO -p
-P 0 caM fi aO 01
U rH a a HH 0ca o o 0 CO Q-p ca •H X! XI ü fi \ü co w fi o HH 00 C3 0 01 a ca •H fi >> COa t-H -P 0 bfl rH o fi HH 0 rH fi■p ca fi fi ca o 0 ü fi X 05h 0 s •H •H •H fi HH 0 O a X3ca T3 X! XJ ü rH fi a a 0 0a o > U rH 0 O •H 01 a CO fi0 O ca ca 0 a O ca fi o 01 caQ Ü 05 S CO H s 1—1 o <
o o rH% rH CM co tP in CO 00 G) rH rH
- 399 -
From the table, it can be seen that Goods Inwards, Specials and 
Maintenance all have high pervasiveness in terms of links with other 
workgroups but only maintenance has a strong positive dependency. 
Specials, in fact has the highest negative dependency relationship.
If one turns to immediacy, another picture emerges. Specials, Toolroom, 
Maintenance and to a lesser extent Goods Inward, are all unable to 
close down the plant quickly by industrial action, whereas most of 
the other workgroups could accomplish this in approximately one week.
S* refers to a disruption factor related to the speed with which a 
workgroup could cause a total shutdown. It measures the 'progressive­
ness' of that effect. It is calculated as follows:
n=j
S* = disruption factor = ̂  % stopped in week j
n=l j
Thus the Machine Shop, Welding shop. Inspection, Components Stores, 
Assembly and Warehouse/Despatch are the workgroups able to create the 
maximum disruption.
We can now move on to deal with Marchington's concept of replaceability, 
which deals with longer term power capacity. From Table A.2 we can 
see that Maintenance emerges as the least replaceable workgroup closely 
followed by Specials, Toolroom and the Machine and Welding shops.
Taking the two tables together, we can see that there is no one workgroup 
that appears to be clearly the most powerful. Instead there are 
several workgroups which score highly on all but one index. These are 
Maintenance, Toolroom, Specials, Machine Shop and Welding Shop.
Several practical problems emerged when attempting to apply Marchington's 
model to Bestobell Mobrey. These were as follows:
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a) The workers at Bestobell tended to act (or not to act) as a 
workforce rather than in workgroups. Thus the artificial 
creation of workgroups for analytical purposes and subsequent 
results lead away from rather than towards the true nature of 
power in Bestobell Mobrey.
b) The model takes no account of workgroup (sub-unit) size. It
may be argued that the model is best suited to workforces where
the workgroups are above a certain size (25-h).
c) The final result showed little correlation with any indices of
workgroup power, such as wage rates.
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IND USTRIAL RELATIONS POLICIES
SECTION 1 Contracts of Emnloym'e'nt
The national system of Industrial relations is 
supported by a structure of legislation which largely 
assumes contracts of employment are collectively determined 
by agreement between employers and trade unions.
The Company acknowledge the rights of employees 
in respect of trade union membership and activities. However, 
in the absence of formal relationships between trade unlon/s 
representing employees of the Company and management, the 
Company will provide facilities for discussion between employees 
or elected representatives of employees and management on 
matters of mutual Interest and concern arising out of the 
various conditions of employment and operation of the 
Company,
In Bestobell Mobrey Limited, these discussions 
take place within the policies laid down for the operation 
of the Junior and Senior Staff and Works Committees, except 
where employees are employed in field activities, where 
special arrangements are made to ensure mutually satisfactory 
discussions take place between members of mfmagement and the 
employees concerned.
All changes which may take place In the conditions
of employment will be following upon the wishes of both staff
and management to change these conditions. The question of 
enforceability of the contracts of employment tt law does not 
arise as the Company does not regard these codditions as 
legally binding as collective agreements. However, thiS'in ' ^
no way changes the liability upon the Company and the individual 
In respect of obligations defined in the terms and conditions
of employment in which, for example, the employee undertakes
to attend the place of work for pre-determined hours and the 
Company is duly committed to make appropriate payment for such 
work.
Conditions of employment, for emprioyees of Bestobell 
Mobrey Limited are in part determined directly by the management 
of the Company after discussion with employees, and in part 
determined by the management of Bestobell Limited, and In all 
circumstances must comply with the various Acts of Parliament 
which may have bearing on employment with the Company*
*See SPECIAL NOTE : Government Legislation
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Various Acts of Parliament lay down minimum terms 
and conditions of employment or other regulations affecting 
employment at the place of work, which for example, include 
the prohibition of discrimination in selection, remuneration 
and career development etc, on grounds of sex and race. As 
such legislation Is subject to change, the Company's personnel 
Policies and Procedures will be revised to ensure that the 
Company operates within such legislation. Where it becomes 
necessary to review the contracts of employment, the details 
will be brought to the attention of Committees or otherwise 
notified to employees prior to the Implementation of such 
changes.
The following policies are the responsibility of 
the management of Bestobell Limited and changés sought by 
employees are progressed by consultation through constituent 
companies. Changes in these conditions of employement, which 
may involve improvements, will require considerable consult­
ation with other interested parties within the Group of 
Bestobell companies. Changes may be Initiated by staff/ 
management of a single company and the circumstances of that 
company may justify a policy peculiar to that company, however, 
it will be generally understood that changes on the following 
must be agreed by Bestobell Limited:
Salary policies for Management and Senior Staff .
Life Assurance 
Bestobell Pension Scheme 
Company Sickness Benefit 
Redundancy Entitlements 
Holiday Entitlements 
Profit Shar^g bonuses 
B.F.W.T.
Long Service Benefits
DATE EFFECTIVE & ALTERATIONS
These terms and conditions of employment are effect­
ive as from the date of publication. Notice of further changes 
will be given in accordance with relevant State legislation.
All alterations of these terms and conditions of 
employment will be notified as follows:
Ca) by posting on the special notice board in the 
Personnel Department : Slough
(b) by copies of amended documentation to Managers,
Senior Supervision and Staff/Works Committee 
representatives,




SECTION 2 Rôle of Staff and Works Cohihitftees
The prime purpose of the Staff and Works 
Committees is to facilitate discussions between elected 
representatives of employees and members of management on 
matters of joint interest and concern arising out of 
employment within the Company, and in its general operations.
The Chairman of the Committee will normally be 
a Senior Manager of the Company, Secretary, ̂ the Personnel 
Manager or Officer, Items for discussion will be submitted 
to the Secretary, in writing, five working days before the 
date of the Meeting, together with, where practicable, a 
brief paper attached setting out the principal points 
relating to the item. Matters raised under any other 
business may be minuted at the discretion of the Chairman
The principal rule governing the contents of 
the Agenda of the Committees is laid down in the Grievance 
Procedure and an item will be accepted for discussion only 
if it can be shown that it could not have been dealt with 
effectively by a line manager or supervisor. The object 
of this rule is to ensure that any matter of potential 
dispute is dealt with expeditiously.
The Committee meetings will be held as necessary 
and with the Chairman's agreement. Non—scheduled meetings 
may be held to deal with matters of urgency or those i^iich 
cannot be otherwise dealt with during the time provided for 
scheduled meetings, »
Scheduled Meetings will be as follows:
Junior^^d^Senior . Monthly (Excl, August)
Works Staff : Monthly (Excl, August)
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Section 3 Bole of Committee Heïnbers (Employee Representatives)
The members of the Committee will be elected 
annually and represent .specified staff categories for 
specified geographical areas of the Works and Offices.
It Is required that each member'shall'be 
nominated and seconded on a Company notice board, and 
In the event of an election, the candidate with the highest 
number of votes In a secret ballot, with scrutineers 
appointed, shall be declared elected. All candidates for 
election, who must be full time workers, should have a 
minimum of six months' service with the Company and will 
work in the area, or one of the areas, for which he is the 
candidate.
The elected members will act as ISpresentatives 
on the Committees and where circumstances make this 
necessary may have the opportunity to meet, as a group, 
for matters of concern to a particular committee; facilities 
for such meetings must be sought through the Chairman or 
Secretary, As individuals, elected Committee members will 
be available in working hours and without loss of pay, to 
assist another individual employed within his area of 
responsibility to make representations to a member of 
management and raise matters of concern to employees as 
a work group subject to the over-riding need to conform 
with the Grievance Procedure,
An elected member wishing to resign from the 
Committee before his term of office is concluded, is 
expected to put his resignation, in writing, to the Chairman, 
On confirmation of the resignation the Secretary will arrange 
for the election of another member as soon as practicable.
Management members are nominated by the Managing 
Director with the sole objective of giving the work of the 
Committees the maximum possible significance and to ensure 
that the discussions are meaningful and of mutual value.




Section 4 Grievance Procedure
A grievance may be the concern of one employee or 
many; it may arise out of the terms-and'conditions of employ­
ment or the general circumstances of the employment and may 
include employment security, welfare and safety.
The procedure for discussing changes in, or 
interpretation of, conditions of employment and related 
employment matters is based upon the line authority of 
management, together with dlscussionsheld with Committee 
representatives or general meetings of employees as are 
appropriate.
The formal procedure Ibr the resolving of grievances 
is as follows, but it should be known to all concerned that 
staff of Personnel Department are available at any time to 
counsel and advise employees:
Ci) An employee considering that he has a grievance 
will first raise this with his supervisor, who 
will make every effort to resolve the matter.
In departments where staff report direct to a 
manager stage (ii) will become the first stage in 
the procedure,
(ii) In the event that the grievance is not resolved
by the Supervisor, the Departmental Manager shall 
be Informed by the Supervisor who will make arrange­
ments for the Departmental Manager to discuss the 
grievance with the employee/s concerned. If the 
circumstances justify this and it is the wish of the 
employee and /or the manager, the Personnel Manager/ 
Officer and a fellow employee, or a Committee 
Representative, may be party to the discussion which 
takes place,
(ili) In the event of the grievance not being resolved at 
this stage, the Departmental Manager will arrange 
for the employee to have a personal interview with 
the appropriate Senior Ebcecutive or arrfuige for the 
matter to be discussed at the appropriate employee 
representative Committee meeting.
(iv) In the event of the matter being unresolved by the 
senior executive or at the Committee stage, the 
employee may see the Managing Director.
If the circumstances justify this, aid the employee/s 
so wish, the Personnel Manager will make arrangements for the 
employee/s to obtain guidance from an Official of the Department 
of Employmemt or Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service 
on matters arising out of the Conditions of Employment or other 
circumstances which may be effected by State legislation on 
the Company's employment policies.
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POLICY
It Is anticipated that employees will abide by 
standards of conduct or behaviour based.on-Company policy 
as stated in the conditions of employment and general 
Industrial practice which Is accepted as being reasonable.
The following are examples of Infringements of 
acceptable conduct which may require disciplinary action:
(a) Theft
(b) Dishonesty, e,g, falsification of Expense Voucher, 
Salary Time Statement, Clock Cards or other 
necessary work records.




(f) Gambling on Company premises
Cg) Malicious or careless destruction of Company 
property
Ch) Being incapable of carrying out normal duties for 
reasons other than Illness
(i) Unsuitable conduct when representing the Company
CJ) Posting and distributing notices, cards etc, without 
permission,
(k) Consistently poor performance or bad workmanship
If discipline falls down an employee must be given an 
opportunity to mend his ways, but incases of serious misconduct 
such as theft, dishonesty, gross insubordination etc. dismissal 
without mtice can take place. In all disciplinary cases, other 
than verbal reprimand, advice must besought from the Personnel 
Department. If the individual to be reprimanded is an immediate 
subordinate the Manager's superior should be told if possible 
before such action is taken and in cases of dismissal the 
Managing Director's approval must be obtained.
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On all occasions of disciplinary action and 
dismissal, the manager concerned will encouragé"the 
employee to discuss the matter with the managers' own 
superior, particularly if he/she Is an immedi&te subordinate.
The Company Is aware of the impact-that dismissal 
may have upon the circumstances of the individual employee 
and In each case where dismissal is considered the manager 
concerned will obtain from the Personnel Manager an assessment 
of the Implications such a decision may have for both the 
Individual and the Company.
PROCEDURE
(1) The manager or supervisor Issues a verbal reprimand 
to an employee. This is a warning or can take the 
form of counselling the employee in an effort to 
correct the problem, and the employee's co-operation 
should be sought. Verbal reprimand should always 
be given in private and not within the hearing of 
others.
(ii) If, subsequent to a verbal reprimand, further 
disciplinary action Is required a second reprimand 
should be given to the employee. Details of the 
reprimand and the circumstances, e.g, nature of 
the offence and specific action required to remedy 
the situation, should be sent to the Personnel 
Department for filing on the employee's personal 
dossier. He/she should be informed of this record,
(iii) In the event that previous counselling and warnings 
have failed a foraal written warning should be given 
This will normally be by a confirmatory letter sent 
from the Personnel Department to the employee's 
home address or handed to him personally,
(iv) It is permissible for a Manager responsible to 
suspend an employee pending investigation and in 
these circumstances the employee will be paid until 
the matter is resolved. If the misconduct is 
serious enough dismissal may take place at stage
(iii).
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SECTION 6 Health & Safety
The Health & Safety Act, 1974, requires a formal 
statement of Company policy. In Implementing the provisions, . 
of this Act for the health and safety of employees and benefit 
of the Company, each manager Is required to concern himself 
with safe working conditions in the area of his responsibility. 
Elected mcnsbers of both Joint Staff and Works Committees will 
be both authorised and expected to raise matters of health and 
safety which may be relevant to the interest of their colleagues 
In the work area/s for which they have representative responsib­
ilities, this shall be through the Grievance'Procedure, In the 
absence of employee representatives, individual employees will 
be encouraged to identify and raise questions of health and 
safety through their Supervisor or Departmental Manager.
B.M.L. STATEMENT OF HEALTH & SAFETY POLICY
"It is Company policy as an employer to provide a safe and 
healthy place of work, and general working environment for all 
its employees.
"The Management will take all steps within its authority paying 
particular attention to the provision and maintenance of:
Ci) Plant, equipment and systems of work that 
are safe.
(ii) Safe arrangements for the use, handling, 
storage and transport of articles and 
substances.
(ill) Sufficient information, instruction, training 
and supervision to enable all employees to 
avoid hazards and contribute positively to 
their own safety and health at work.
(iv) A safe place of work and safe access to it.
(v) A healthy working environment
(vl) Adequate welfare facilities
"No safety policy is likely to be successful unless it actually 
involves all employees and the Company reminds employees of
their own duties under Section 7 of the Health and Safety Act
to take care of their own safety and that of other employees 
and to co-operate with the Company so as to enable it to carry 
out its own responsibilities successfully.
"The Company will welcome in particular, the co-operation of 
elected employee representatives In the implementation of not. 
only the Company policy, but also the rules and regulations of 
State legislation relating to the health and safety of employees 
at work."
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5ECTI0N 7 Disclosure of Information
Management will endeavour to provide meaningful 
Information to employee representatives which will assist them 
in making constructive comment or other observations to 
appropriate members of management when terms and conditions 
of employment are under review. Such information may include 
details of current pay structures, numbers of employees in 
respective job groups or status categories, labour stability 
and turnover rates, relevant statistical data from for example 
the Department of Employment Gazette and such other labour 
market data that management may have available and which Is 
not subject to confidentiality agreement between the Company 
and other employers.
To assist employee representatives in making their 
contribution twards the creation and maintenance of a safe 
and healthy working environment, management will report not 
less than annually upon the Company's accident record. Where 
practicable will also invite employee representatives to study 
the lessons to be learned from such accidents with the object 
of creating the maximum possible awareness on the part of all 
employees of the need to follow safe working practices and 
procedures.
The Chairmen of Works, Staff Committees and adhoc 
consultative meetings with employees will take every reasonable 
opportunity to report upon matters which may be of interest to 
the employees concerned, for example, the Chairman of the 
Works Committee will review the performance of the Company 
with particular reference to production activities, since the 
last occasion of report and will provide the Committee with 
his assessment of future prospects. These will include work 
loading and related matters such as overtime working, employee 
job flexibility needs etc.
Matters of concern to employees throughout the 
Company will be dealt with by the Managing Director who, in 
addition to providing a written annual report of the Company's 
progress and prospects, will provide also a financial statement. 
He will, as appropriate, address employee representatives and 
answer such questions as may be necessary.
The disclosure of information about the Company's 
affairs as these concern employees Is an on-going process which 
may be both formal and informal; will be communicated both in 
writing and by work of mouth. The purpose being to assist 
employees to develop a degree of awareness of the operation of 
the Company beyond that which arises from the carrying out of the 




It Is part of the Company's employment policy 
to provide stable conditions which promote job security.
It is, however, necessary that the Company responds to 
economic circumstances beyond Its control end"as the 
responsibility of determining the size of the Company's 
work force rests with management, it is necessary that 
management determine the scale and distribution of any 
reduction in manning the business.
As far as is possible, or practicable, management 
will consult with representatives of employees in the 
implementatation of significant reductions in the work-force.
It will seek to avoid redundancies by:
(i) Restrictions on recruitment
(ii) Reduction in overtime working
(ili) Retirement of employees who are beyond 
normal retirement date .
(iv) Attrition, that is internal transfers
Including retraining where necessary to 
cover essential jobs made vacant by 
voluntary termination.
Consideration would be given to short-time working.
If redundancy becomes necessary^ then the principle 
determinate in selecting the order of sevéitoce will be "first 
in last out". However, the over—riding consideration for 
management will be to successfully operate.the Company's 
business and management will have to give priority to those 
employees whose contribution is essential to the Company's 
future interests.
Having regard to the above considerations, managers 
will select individuals discharge on gjroiinds of redundancy 
objectively, aid with the detailed assistance from the Personnel 
Department, They will make recommendations to the Managing 
Director for his approval.
Where the numbers involved are 10 or more, the 
Managing Director will report the facts and circumsatnces 
to the Board of Directors and the Personnel Department will 
advise the management of the local office of the Ekip^oyment 
Services Agency,
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In cases of redundancy, the Personnel Department 
will take all possible steps to arrange transfer of 
Individuals to other compiles within the Group, The right 
to offer such employment is, however, within the authority 
of management of the sister Company as are also the specific 
and personal terms and conditions of employment. Where 
such transfers are arranged, the career interest of the 
individual will over-ride individual company job considerations 
and the time taken to arrange the transfer should not exceed 
the normal contractual period of notice,
Where redundancies inevitably result in severance 
of individuals, the terms will be not less than those laid 
down by relevant State legislation and may be subject to 
improvement dependent upon circumstances and will compare 
reasonably with current community practice.
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SECTION 9 Government Legislation
The Conditions of Employment, industrial Relations 
Policies and Personnel Policies & Procedures' acknowledge the 
statutory obligations Imposed on the Company and its 
employees by various Acts of Parliament.• Any amendments 
or additions to contracts of employment necessary, arising 
from additional Parliamentary legislation will be acted upon 
as stated in Section 1 of this document. The following 
Acts of Parliament are taken particular note of in drawing 
up the conditions of employment,industrial realtions and 
otheer personnel employment policies.
Truck Acts 1831/1940
Disabled Persons Act 1944/1958
Education Acts 1944/1973
Terms and conditions of Employment 1959
Wages Council Act 1959
Payment of Wages Act 1980
Factories Act 1961
Shops & Offices Act 1963
Race Relations Act 1965/1968
Redundancy Payments Act 1965
Attachment of Earnings Act 1971
Equal Pay Act 1970
Contracts of Employment Act 1963/1972 
Social Security Acts 1973/1975
Employment Training Act 1973 (Employment Service Agency
Training Service Agtency)
Health & Safety at Work Act 1974
Trade Union & Labour Relations Act 1974 
(Note: also Code of Industrial Relations 1974)
Sex Discrimination Act 1975
Employment Protection Act 1975
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974,
SPECIAL NOTE: Throughout all employment contracts, policy statements
and procedures, the terms 'he* may be used for 'she' 
man *>r woman and male for female except where a 
distinction is necessary and In accordance with the 
Sex Discrimination Act, 1975.
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To provide a recognised and direct channel of communication 
between employees represented by the Committee and management 
on matters affecting their joint interests. To secure the 
maximum degree of co-operation for the prosecution of measures 
undertaken in the mutual interest of the employees and 
the Company by both representative negotiation and consultative 
practices.
2. Membership
The Committee shall consist of representatives of employees 
in both status groups and specified areas together with 
representatives of management. The Chairman and Secretary 
shall be appointed by the Managing Director.
3. Co-option
The Chairman may agree to the co-option of additional person/s 
for discussion of particular items on the Agenda.
4. Election of Employee Representatives
Members shall be elected annually for the year beginning 
April and ending March. The electoral areas shall be as 
follows:
Negotiating Members Consutlative Members
Skilled Machine Shop & Toolroom
Semi-skilled Assembly & Canteen
Chargehands ^elding & Maintenance
Goods Rec'd, Component Stores, 
Warehouse & Despatch
Inspection & *D'* Workshop
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5. Election of Committee Members
The Secretary shall make all arrangements necessary for the 
election of members to the Committee, posting and collecting 
nomination sheets and distributing ballot forms through Works 
Supervision. The election shall be by ballot.
6. Eligibility for Office
All employees.represented on the Committee shall be full-time 
adult (18+) and six month's service with the Company in order 
to be eligible for election.
7. Period of Office
The election shall be for a period of one year, retiring 
members shall be eligible for re-election.
8. Resignation
Elected Committee members may resign during their period of 
office. Resignation shall be submitted to the Chairman who 
will report to the Committee at the next scheduled meeting.
Upon confirmation of the resignation, the Secretary will make 
arrangements for the nomination/election of a new member who 
will serve on the Committee for the balance of the electoral 
year.
9. Substitute Members
Upon election to the Committee, members will identify and 
advise the Secretary of the name of the substitute members who 
shall be invited to attend Committee meetings and otherwise 
act as representative for the area in the elected member's 
absence.
10. Changes of Electoral Areas
Elected areas may be changed by agreement of the Committee. 
Proposals for changes shall be given in one meeting for discussion 
and decision at the next schedule meeting.
11. Time and Dates of Meeting
(a) Scheduled meetings of the Committee shall be held on the 
second Tuesdayof each month (excluding August) or at such other 
time as may be determined by the Chairman.
(b) Unscheduled meetings may be called at the discretion of the
Chairman. Elected members have the right to request such
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12, Agenda
(a) Elected members may meeting on the first Wednesday of each 
month to discuss items put forward for the Agenda. The Secretary 
will advise elected members of management items in time for this 
meeting. The Secretary will be informed of the items elected 
members wish to have placed on the Agenda in time for this
to be formally circulated to Committee members and published 
on main notice boards three working days before the date fixed 
for the meeting of the Works Committee.
(b) New items on the Agenda shall be accompanied by an explanation 
of the principle points at issue in order to ensure prompt 
attention and any necessary action.
(c) No% item shall be Introduced for discussion at the Works 
Committee which could be effectively dealt with by the Supervisor 
or first line management. Where such matters have not been 
dealt with to the satisfaction of either or both parties, the 
matter may be discussed in the Committee, where necessary 
reference will be made to the Employee Grievance Procedure to 
determine the appropriateness of discussion of an individual or 
employee group grievance at Works Committee.
13. Scope tif Committee Discussions
There are no formal restrictions placed upon matters which may 
be discussed in the Committee and dealt with in Company Industrial 
Relations procedures. However, employee members elected on a 
status group basis will deal with matters requiring the representative 
negotiator role, that is,will speak principally on those matters 
that are required to be published under the Contracts of Employment 
Act., Rates of pay including Job structure, hours of work, overtime 
and shift premiums and annual holidays, or such matters which 
affect the security of employment of individuals or groups of 
employees and may be dealt with under the provisions of the 
Employment Protection Act or Redundancy Payments Act.
- 4 -  Z. I -
other items which may be discussed in Committee are likely 
to be regarded as essentially consultative, either because they 
are conditions of employment common to all U.K. ôeâTDbetL. 
companies or because they deal with on-going matters of 
management which are of concern to employees, e.g. production, 
finance reports and physical circumstances of the work place 
involving such as Health and Safety. The consultative member 
being elected on an area basis can be most effective in this 
essentially communications role. The area consultative 
member will also be expected to give support to negotiating 
members in matters of mutual concern and,as witnesses to 
Committee negotiationsywill be well placed to assist the 
principal spokesman in reporting back to employees at the 
work place.
14. Minutes
The Secretary shall be responsible for the recording of the 
minutes of all formal meetings. The minutes will also be 
subject to approval by the Chairman. The minutes will be 
circulated to elected members 24 hours before posting on NOtice 
Boards and within five days of the holding of the meeting.
During this time elected members are required to advise the 
Secretary of their disagreement of the accuracy of the 
minutes. The minutes of the meeting will be subject to formal 
approval at the beginning of subsequent scheduled meetings.
15.Communication of matters discussed at the Meetings of the Committee 
The minutes of the meeting shall be authorised statements of 
discussion in the Works Committee. Where matters discussed are of 
a potentially contraverslal nature, the Chairman shall ensure 
agreement on a statement which shall be made to employees either 
on a special notice or within the general minutes of the meeting.
16. Changes in Rules of Procedures
There shall be no change in the rules of procedures without 
formal notice at one meeting for discussion and determination 
at the next scheduled meeting.
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Appendix D
The Shiftworker representative issue; Agenda Meeting 9.3.1979
SPEAKER Text
304
Jan Well there is a small one here - some people are approaching
me asking for a negotiating member for shiftworkers (Pause)
Bill Well the negotiating members cover all grades - don't they.
Jan Yeah but they want one special for shiftworkers because they
reckon they don't get their fair deal.
Tony In what way?
Jan I don't know.
(Confused several voices)
Jan Well they reckon there should be one up there for shiftworkers
- just to put their point of view.
Tony Well in that case they must feel they've been neglected - and
310 if they have in what way?
Jan Well first of all - we - the Batchmatics - never had a square
deal last year - didn't they - not off the committee.
Bill You didn't?
Jan No
Tony Last year? 1977 you mean.
Jan The year before that.
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Bill 1977 .... 1977 was when the three negotiating members and
the committee was first formed - in October 1977.
Jan Em 1977 - well
Bill 1977 that was when it was formed.
320
Tony No 1978 wasn’t it? (several talking at once)
Bill Last year was ’78 .....  1977 was when we first formed the
committee - it was first decided to form this committee .... 
(Jan talking in background) .... and last year the batchmatic, 
er .... the shiftworkers were as equally represented upstairs 
on the discussions as the dayworkers - more so than the day- 
workers - ’cos the shiftworkers got more than the dayworkers 
out of it over the years production - over the years run ....
330 no one fell down on regrading or re-classification - no none
fell down on the benefits anybody else got - the 12&% that 
was originally offered by the management for your shifts 
holiday premium and the word of mouth at the time was said 
that we would reinstate it - reinstate 25% the following year 
was enforced and brought up by the people who represented the 
shiftworkers last year and it was obtained - that with effect 
from January 1st this year they would get their 25% - 
Personally speaking I can’t see where the shiftworkers have 
lost out at all!
Jan Well ....
Bill In fact they’ve come off better than the day workers.
Jan But ......
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Bill Only through the people what does the negotiating - they took 
part in it - management offered it and the people on the 
negotiating team held them to the offer - and no shiftworkers 
really lost out on grading last year.
Jan I didn't say we lost out on grading .....
340
Bill Well - then what else could you lose out on
Tony We've never refused to take up a shiftworkers or anybody
elses .....
Jan Well you've said .....
Tony .... they come to us and they say I've got a problem ....
Jan   on the other hand you have said many times to me that
you're getting fed up with it.
Tony With what?
Jan Well with our problem - with our problem.
Tony Ah! You're talking about your problem.
Jan Oh yeah I talking .......
Tony No Jan, you introduced this as shiftworkers ......
Jan Oh yeah - but it is - it is introduced as shiftworkers .....
Tony But now you're saying that its your problem?
Jan No I'm just giving an example of my problem (unclear) ... If
I'd had a shiftworker representative I could have gone to 
him couldn't I?
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Tony Yeah - wait a minute no
Ivor But didn't they 
350
Tony Hang on, hang on Ivor - let me answer it, let me answer it - 
Now the last time you went up there to see Geoff Reid I came 
up there with you - we sat up there and we discussed it and 
at the end of the discussion I turned to you and Tony and I 
asked you. Are you happy? - are you satisfied? - and you both 
said yes.
Jan In what way ......
Tony (Unclear)
Jan   You said to us, well this is the last time you'd ever
do it.
Tony Do what?
Jan Coming up with us ......
Tony Oh no - no.
Jan Oh yes you did.
Tony Oh no no no no.
Jan Oh yes I can get Tony up on that.
Tony Oh no.
Jan Oh yes you did.
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Tony If you’ve got a problem I'll go up there with you - but if
its going to be the same old thing - you don't understand
your job spec - I mean, how you can say .....
(Babble of voices all at once)
This is one of the things that you said - that you, you were 
unsure about your job spec - you didn't understand it - you 
were unsure about it.
Jan I wasn't - I was sure about my job spec - I didn't call the
meetings - the company called the meetings - not me - I only 
- I was only called in twice .....
Tony I never refused to go anywhere with anyone - I've never refused
367/8 - I never to anybody I'm not interested, I'm not going to
listen to what you've got to say - I'm not going to take your 
case up.
Discussion deviates to the Role of Negotiating Member Issue.
483
Tony Well you know - this thing about shiftworkers not being you 
know - well you know - its a bloody laugh cos we worked hard 
on it.
Jan Ours is a big group - I suppose theres 30 people.
Bill It's not as big as the day workers - in the machine shop 
in the machine shop.
Jan 30 is a big group.
Bill
490
Not as big as the day workers in the machine shop.
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Discussion sidetracks to numbers of workers.
510
Tony Believe you me - we had to work bloody hard and in fact I'm 
sure that some people round this table will bear me out now 
that when I first brought this before the meeting I was
shouted down more times .......
(General talking)
- the very first time - the very first time that the shift 
premium was mentioned.
Jan I'm not on about that at all but
Tony I argued against the whole committee and I know its water
under the bridge now but as its been brought out - I'd argue 
against most of the committee - and it went on for a long 
time - we had to work hard and gradually it came around - we 
got the first half - I know that there are some shift workers, 
in fact I remember Charlie S. saying to me - 'ow that doesn't 
count, we were going to get that anyway - (quietly) we bloody
weren't .......  the management have these things and they're
prepared to give them to you - yeah if you're prepared to
fight for them   (general talking) and if you can't put
forward a convincing argument you won't get it it's as simple 
as that.
Ivor Yeah it was coming up month after month Jan - this shift
premium.
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Jan I don't doubt it but .......
(confused)
Jan They promised
Tony Oh yeah they'll promise all kinds of things - you know better
than that.
Ron They seemed to be under the impression they hadn't promised
it - that was the impression I got - they hadn't.
Bill Whether it was promised or not - there's a lot of things that
have been promised verbally that hasn't been materialised.
Ron I believe - I wasn't at that meeting myself - I wasn't on
529 the committee but I remember somebody saying .....
Drifts off the point
602
Ron Anyway this other business about the shiftworkers representa­
tives - is there strong feeling on the shop floor among
Jan I do not know ... I do not know - I haven't been round - I
didn't make it an issue - I didn't go round - I presume that 
if you went round you could find .... (unclear) .... I assume 
- I don't know.
(unclear)
I haven't been round at all - I reckon most probably there 
would have been ....
Bill That's only an assumption Jan because ......
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Jan No (unclear)
Bill   I dealt - I dealt quite a lot with the shift workers
and I deal quite a lot with the 4A's and under and there's
quite a number in that group - (pause) - and I've had no
personal complaint.
Jan Well we've never said about complaint.
Bill No - well if there's dissent then ... if there's dissent ...
if there's dissent ... wherever there's dissent there's 
complaint - you can't have dissent without complaint.
(Jan mumbles in background)
There must be causes for dissent and the reason for dissent 
is generally a complaint.
Jan Well if you put it that way I er, I er I haven't heard
anything that said that, well because so and so we want a 
shiftworker - they just said that we want a shiftworker 
because our, our views weren't being represented .....
Bill But
Jan And if that is general, I don't know ......
(Several people interject - Bill Ivor and Jan again)
Bill Numbers not names, numbers of people who have approached you
in this line
Jan .... three or four
Bill No, three or four out of how many?
Jan Thirty, thirty something - I don't know as there's a general
feeling I .....
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Bill I mean you can have one bloke having a gripe - I mean something
for ever and ever - (unclear) - (Jan interjects) - would want 
a personal representative from shiftworkers and .....
Jan   (unclear) Bill, there's no question, I mean, it all




The 1979 Wage Review
i) Minute 145, 17.10.1978 - Worker representatives enquired if 
management had any proposals for the 1979 Wage Review.
Personnel Manager replied that due to the confused position 
regarding pay policy he had not.
Representatives suggested that because of the recent requests 
from management for flexibility, they would wish to discuss an 
individual flexibility agreement.
Personnel Manager invited the worker representatives views on 
the present wage structure before the next meeting.
ii) Minute 149, 16.11.1979 - Worker representatives had put forward 
proposals, including one for the creation of a sixth grade.
Personnel Manager said that management was examining both these 
and their own proposals.
Chairman confirmed that payments will date from Monday 1.1.1979.
iii) Minute 156 1979 Wage Review (Ex Min. 149) Special Meeting 12.12.78 
The Personnel Manager apologised for the delay in replying to
the representatives’ proposals for changes in the present grade/ 
wage structure for 1979. The delay had been caused by the un­
certain state of industrial settlements nationwide, particularly 
the outcome of the Ford dispute and the possible Government 
reaction to this settlement. Also the proposals put forward by 
representatives had resulted in management carrying out a complete 
reappraisal of the job evaluation scheme and investigation of 
different suggestions from management.
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iii) The reply from management was to put forward a scheme based on
the existing job/wages structure which it was hoped would assist 
in communicating to employees the changes proposed. The Personnel 
Manager proposed that there would be an upward movement of grade 
letters and number to facilitate the introduction of a grade 6, 
but no upward change in cash values except where there was a 
need for a rounding up.
Some groups or jobs would in some circumstances not move up into 
the next grade but remain in the "a" grade to ensure that existing 
differentials were maintained. These would be more clearly 
defined when management were in a position to finalise the criteria 
to facilitate movement within the new structure. The Company 
offered employees an increase of 5.5% on basic rates, which was 
slightly above the Government guidelines and confirmed that the 
productivity scheme and attendance bonus would continue providing 
it remained self-financing. These schemes could still not be 
guaranteed and would need to be reviewed at four monthly intervals.
The Personnel Manager continued that management had considerable 
difficulties in establishing a system of flexibility which would 
be self-financing. It had been custom and practice for many years 
that employees should be flexible and this would appear in the 
new criteria and the criteria would allow for a controlled wage 
drift.
Representatives said that employees had in the past been prepared 
to be flexible in periods of power failure or machine breakdowns, 
but not due to high work load, in particular areas. The Personnel 
Manager replied that management expected that employees would be 
flexible where the well-being of the Company was at stake.
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iii) The Meeting adjourned at 4.15 p.m. for representatives to 
consider management's proposals.
iv) Minute 157 1979 Works Wage Review (Ex Min. 156)
Special Meeting 14.12.1978
Representatives said that they had met with the full Committee 
and a joint decision had been made to reject management's 
proposals concerning the new grading structure.
Representatives proposed that a grade 6 should be added to the 
existing structure with additional rates of pay, that all jobs 
in grade 5 and grade 4a Capstan Setter/Operator to be regraded 
to re-establish differentials prior to Government's intervention 
in the annual wage review. Representatives also proposed that 
the 6.9% productivity scheme be consolidated immediately onto 
the basic rate and that they would seek an increase of 10% on 
the newly consolidated rate. The representatives concluded their 
proposals by saying that it was the opinion of all Committee 
members that the 6.9% productivity scheme was a means by which 
the Company seeked to restore the Company's rates of pay to a 
more favourable position compared to local industry and they 
were not prepared to take this settlement into account when 
determining the annual review.
The Personnel Manager said that the national pay rounds were 
still in a state of flux following the Government's defeat on 
sanctions, but the rules still applied and any productivity 
scheme must continue to be self-financing and be kept under 
constant review. The 6.9% productivity scheme and the attendance 
bonus had put the Company considerably ahead of the majority
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iv) of local industry, but could not be considered as totally
separate from the 1979 wage review.
The Personnel Manager continued that management felt that grade 
6 had been created and differentials increased as fitter/ 
assemblers would remain in grade 4 and certain employees in 
welding and machine shops would be able to drift into grade 5. 
Management would wish to consider representatives proposals
which may result in a need for different criteria for jobs in
grade 5 and 6 compared to those in other grades.
The Meeting adjourned at 10.30 a.m. for management to consider 
representatives proposals.
v) Minute 158 1979 Wage Review (Ex. Min 157)
Special Meeeting 15.12.1978
The Personnel Manager said that management had considered 
representatives proposals for a new grade/wage structure, 
consolidation of the 6.9% productivity scheme, an overall increase 
of 10% on the new consolidated base rate and that differentials 
should be more clearly defined including an upward movement 
for all employees in grade 5.
The Personnel Manager explained that mangement would have to 
reject representatives’ claim for 10% increase in basic rates 
as this was considerably beyond the guidelines and the 6.9% 
productivity scheme could not be consolidated as the rules 
required the scheme to be self-financing and, therefore, continu­
ally monitored on a four month basis.
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v) Management were willing to accept representatives agreements 
for retaining the present structure and adding a grade 6 to 
the structure. Management were also willing to include the 
6.9% productivity payment when calculating the new increases, 
which would yield slightly over 5% and the movement of some 
employees from 4a to 5c with a subsequent movement of some 
employees already in grade 5. Staff manual increases were in 
order with hourly paid employees to ensure that differentials 
were maintained.
Representatives received copies of the new wage structure and 
criteria (see attached). They replied that their proposals 
had been for all employees in grade 5 and 4a other than assembly 
employees to be up-graded and would wish to seek this agreement.
The meeting adjourned at 4.10 p.m. for representatives to con­
sider managements proposals.
vi) Minute 159 1979 Wage Review (Ex Min. 158)
Special Meeting 20.12.1978
Representatives said that they had discussed managements proposals 
with the full Works Committee and were unable to recommend 
acceptance. In reply to the proposals, they wished to confirm 
that they were seeking an upgrading for all 4a employees in the 
Machine Shop not just Capstan Setter/Operators and a subsequent 
upgrading for all employees in grade 5 other than Senior 
Inspectors who would remain at grade 5c. The representatives 
continued that they rejected totally the new criteria for 
assessing individuals' ability and wished to retain the existing 
criteria. They proposed that management should examine a 5%
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vi) flexibility payment in addition to the existing productivity 
scheme which would run concurrently with the present productivity 
scheme and continue for as long as the productivity scheme was 
self-financing.
The representatives explained that whilst they also represented 
the Inspectors they felt that there was a need to re-establish 
differentials between them and machine shop personnel and they 
had to represent the majority view. The representatives also 
suggested that management should examine the possibility of a 
separate representation for the Inspection Department.
The Personnel Manager replied that a request for a 5% flexibility 
arrangement was a substantial figure which would have to be 
self-financing, and that management would require time to examine 
representatives new proposals.
The Meeting adjourned at 10.15 a.m. for management to examine 
representatives proposals.
vii) Minute 160 Wage Review (Ex Min. 159)
Special Meeting 4.1.1979
The Personnel Manager said that at the last meeting, there 
appeared to be a fair degree of agreement concerning the Manual 
structure with the addition of Grade 6. There were, however, 
four major points made by representatives, that all Machine Shop 
employees on Grade 4a should move to 5c, that the Inspectors in 
Grade 5 should not move up a step, rejection of the proposed 
criteria and a proposal for a 5% flexibility payment to all 
employees.
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vii) The company had offered increases averaging over 6% with none
under 5% and some as much as 9%. If employees were to take into 
account increases since January 1978, plus the Company's latest 
offer, pay had increased by between 20.5% (£10.50) and 26%
(£16.84) per week. This was considerably ahead of inflation, 
the rise in the Retail Prices Index and nationally reported 
agreements.
The Personnel Manager said that there was a limit to how much the 
Company could afford or justify and to offer a flexibility scheme 
would be contrary to past co-operation, also some groups of 
employees already received additional payment for flexibility.
The Personnel Manager proposed the introduction of revised 
criteria and a salary structure which had been slightly improved 
for the lower grades. Management were also prepared to agree 
that all employees on Grade 4a in the Machine Shop should move to
G.5c with all other employees in Grade 5 moving up by one step 
including Inspectors with any anomolies being the subject of 
separate talks.
Representatives replied that they could not accept that Inspectors 
should move above Grade 5c and felt that if this did happen, 
there would be considerable resistance from other employees. 
Representatives also felt that there had been problems in the 
latter part of 1978 and employees were reluctant to be as 
flexible as required during this period without some form of 
compensation.
The Personnel Manager said that he was preparing to re-examine 
the Inspector position in the light of representatives' views.
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vii) The meeting adjourned at 4.15 p.m. for representatives to consider 
management's proposals.
viii) Minute 161 Wage Review (Ex Min. 160)
Special Meeting 5.1.1979
The representatives said that they had met with the full Committee 
and were unable to accept the criteria in its present form. They 
were also concerned that the problem regarding Inspectors had also 
remained unresolved.
The Personnel Manager replied that management were prepared to 
accept representatives proposals regarding changes in the cri­
teria, but could not accept representatives proposals not to 
uplift Senior Inspectors.
It was agreed that the meeting be adjourned at 5.30 p.m. and that 
representatives would report management's proposals to employees 
at Mass Meetings on Monday, 8th January, 1979.
ix) Minute 162 1979 Wage Review (Ex Min. 161)
Special Meeting 8.1.1979
Representatives said that employees had decided to reject 
management's offer and that sanctions would be taken by employees. 
It had been decided that all employees in the Machine Shop,
Welding Shop and Inspection would strike for one day, Wednesday 
10th January, and a policy of no overtime working and non-co- 
operation would take place from Monday, 15th January in the 
Assembly Shop and Stores areas. Employees would meet again on 
Thursday, 11th January to decide what further action would be 
taken.
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ix) Representatives continued that they had been instructed by 
employees to seek an additional 5% above management's final 
offer, to restrict the number of Senior Inspectors being up­
graded from 5c to 5b, an assurance from management that any 
agreed settlement would be reviewed mid-year and that the 
Managing Director should attend all further negotiations.
The Personnel Manager replied that he was very disappointed 
that employees felt a need to take such action and had thought 
that representatives and management were in a position of 
responsible collective negotiations.
x) Minute 163 1979 Wage Review (Ex Min. 162)
Special Meeting 9.1.1979
The Personnel Manager said that he was particularly disappointed 
that representatives had rejected management's offer as nego­
tiations had been carried out in a spirit of goodwill with a 
high degree of integrity and responsibility on both sides.
The increase offered and bonus negotiated at September, 1978, had 
yielded total increases of between 20.5% (£10.50) and 26% (£16.84) 
since the last principal increase in January 1978. The average 
increase of 23% was substantially ahead of inflation and direct 
taxation had also been reduced during this period, also a number 
of individual increases had also been awarded during this period. 
The Company could not offer or justify a further 5% above its 
present offer, as claimed by representatives, and in threatening 
the Company with a one day stoppage, overtime ban, non-co-operation 
and further mass meetings, the management would need to take 
certain measures to protect the Company.
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x) The Personnel Manager stated that should sanctions take place, 
management would not negotiate under duress and would cease 
overtime with immediate effect. No payments would be made to 
any employee who took part in any stoppage, attendance bonus 
and sick pay included. If a policy of non-co-operation resulted 
in a reduction in output, the 6.9% Productivity Bonus would be 
reduced accordingly.
The integrity of the Company to its customers would need to be 
maintained and would result in orders being re-routed to 
competitors. This would affect future sales, profitability, 
and ultimately jobs, as had happened to one of the Company's 
suppliers. Management were not prepared to support employees 
having mass meeting on Thursday, 11th January, and would not be 
prepared to pay for any time lost at such meeting.
The Personnel Manager concluded by saying that confrontation 
was not in either sides interest and he asked representatives 
to reconsider any action regarding sanctions.
Representatives replied that they could not agree with managements 
figures and did not view the attendance bonus as an increase in 
wages due to the conditions imposed. They felt that employees 
could not rely on bonuses which may be withdrawn and wished to 
seek consolidation of the Productivity Bonus Scheme with an 
additional 5% on basic rates.
After further discussion concerning management and representative 
positions, the Meeting was adjourned at 11.30 a.m.
The meeting reconvened at 12.15 p.m.
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x) The Personnel Manager said that management were prepared to 
continue discussing with representatives provided employees 
were prepared to remove sanctions. It was agreed to adjourn 
the meeting at 12.25 p.m. so that representatives could consult 
with employees.
xi) Minute 164 1979 Wage Review (Ex Min. 163)
Special Meeting 9.1.1979
Representatives said that employees had decided to withdraw 
sanctions in the light of the intention to continue negotiations.
The Personnel Manager said there was nothing to be gained in 
applying sanctions for either side and he hoped that negotiations 
would continue in a constructive manner. Management generally 
felt that their offer had been fair and just about at the extent 
to which the company could afford. The increase offered by 
management had been worth 6.5% and he did not wish to mislead 
representatives into believing that the Company would be able to 
afford a package of 10%.
In reply, representatives said that they understood there was a 
need for compromise to achieve a settlement, but believed certain 
points would help to achieve the desired agreement. There was 
a consolidation of the 6.9% Productivity Bonus Scheme and a 
positive statement from management that wages would be reviewed 
in the mid-year if inflation increased substantially.
The Personnel Manager replied that to commit the Company to a 
review inside a 12 month period would be totally contrary to the 
spirit of pay policy. Management would continue to monitor the 
relationship of employees wage rate to local industry and any
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xi) adverse effect inflation may have on employees' purchasing 
power.
The Meeting adjourned at 3.45 p.m. for management to examine 
representatives suggestions.
xii) Minute 165 1979 Wage Review (Ex Min. 164)
Special Meeting 16.1.1979
The Personnel Manager said that following employees' decision 
to withdraw the threat of sanctions, meaningful discussions could 
continue. The representatives were reminded that management had 
emphasised at the previous meeting that the present offer of an 
average increase of 6&% was very close to the limit the Company 
could afford and that representatives' demands for an increase 
of 10% was in excess of any offer the Company could afford.
The Company could not consolidate any bonus scheme due to the 
requirements for all productivity schemes to be self-financing 
and reviewable on a regular basis. However, there was little 
chance that the scheme would need to be removed and if 
productivity increased significantly this could justify increases 
above 6.9%.
Management were not prepared to enter into a formal arrangement 
regarding an interim review and would wish to abide by the 12 
month rule. However, management would continue to closely examine 
general trends in wage settlements and ensure that wages kept in 
line with the policy of being in the top payers.
The Personnel Manager continued that management were prepared to 
review its offer to employees, it was emphasised that this offer
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xii) would be the full extent of the Company's mandate. The proposal 
put forward was for an average increase of 8% which ranged from 
7% for semi-skilled to just over 10% for skilled employees. This 
represented increases of between £3.60 and £4.80 per week for 
semi-skilled and £7.20 per week for skilled employees. Staff 
manual differentials would be retained and increases offered 
were £5.00 to semi-skilled supervision and £7.50 to skilled 
supervision. The new structure represented increases of between 
23% and 27% since the last principal increase (January 1978) 
which was considerably above the inflation rate and present 
national settlement.
The meeting closed at 2.30 p.m. for representatives to consider 
management's proposals.
xiii) Minute 166 1979 Wage Review (Ex Min. 165)
Special Meeting 18.1.1979
Representatives said that they had held a mass meeting of all 
manual employees at which they put forward managements proposals 
for an increase averaging 8%. The result was that a substantial 
proportion of employees had voted to accept the offer.
The Chairman replied that he considered that negotiations had 
been carried out in a constructive manner and was sure that both 
Management and Representatives were satisfied with the outcome 
of negotiations and the manner in which they were conducted.
It was confirmed that increases would be backdated to 1st January 
1979 and that all back-pay would be paid in the paypackets for 
Friday, 2nd February 1979.
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xiii) There being no other business, the Meeting closed at 3.00 p.m.
xiv) 29.1.1979 - Minute 167 (Ex Min. 166)
Management and Negotiating members report results officially 
back to full Works Committee.
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A p p e n d  i x  F
BESTOBELL MOBREY LIMITED.
EXTENDED LEAVE OF ABSENCE
!. Extended leave of absence may be granted to employees who wish to visit close
relatives outside the U.K. Normally this will only apply to personnel wishing 
to travel outside of Western Europe, e.g. Australia, U.S.A. Canada or Asia.
Agreement for such leave must be given by the employee's Departmental Executive 
after consultation with the Personnel Manager.
!, This leave will only be available to employees who have more than three years
continuous service with the Company.
I ,  The employee must give at least one months notice in writing of hi ̂ her wish
to take extended leave.
I , ,  A minimum of three weeks from the current ■ years annual holiday entitlement must
be taken during the extended leave period. In addition an employee may forgo up
to three weeks leave entitlement in the preceeding year to take in this extended 
leave period if he/she wishes. If this is done and the employee does not take 
extended leave the employee will lose whatever holiday entitlement he/she has 
held back from the previous year.
I ,  The maximum leave available (inclusive of any hoiday entitlement accrued) will
be 8 weeks.
i .  Payment will only be made prior to the extended leave for holiday entitlement
already accrued. The balance of holiday pay owing w ill be paid at the end of 
the first week following the employees return to work in the case of hourly and 
weekly paid employees or at the end of the first month following the employees 
return to work in the case of monthly paid employees.
I ,  Normal sick pay arrangements are suspended during the entire period of extended
leave, paid and unpaid. Production Bonus payment will only be paid with respect
to period of paid holiday absence and not for any additional unpaid holiday.
I .  Extended leave of absence will normally be granted not more frequently than once
in three years. Personnel wishing to exceed this limit may be required to terminate 
their employment,
I ,  An employee granted extended leave will be required to sign an agreement accepting
Conditions attached to the granting of extended leave, prior to his/her departure.
The employee will receive a copy of this letter which will include a date for return 
to work.
I .  Before an employee leaves on extended leave, he/she will be required to provide the 
Personnel Department with a U.K. address where all monies owing etc. can be forwarded 
should the employee not return on the agreed date. The employee should also provide 
an address where he/she can be contacted while on holiday.
An employee not returning to work from extended leave, on the agreed date for what­
ever reason, will have his/her employment terminated automatically and will be deemed 
to have so terminated his/her employment by frustrating an expressed term for granting 
extended leave.
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